



A propos de ce livre

Ceci est une copie numérique d'un ouvrage conservé depuis des générations dans les rayonnages d'une bibliothèque avant d'être numérisé avec précaution par Google dans le cadre d'un projet visant à permettre aux internautes de découvrir l'ensemble du patrimoine littéraire mondial en ligne.

Ce livre étant relativement ancien, il n'est plus protégé par la loi sur les droits d'auteur et appartient à présent au domaine public. L'expression "appartenir au domaine public" signifie que le livre en question n'a jamais été soumis aux droits d'auteur ou que ses droits légaux sont arrivés à expiration. Les conditions requises pour qu'un livre tombe dans le domaine public peuvent varier d'un pays à l'autre. Les livres libres de droit sont autant de liens avec le passé. Ils sont les témoins de la richesse de notre histoire, de notre patrimoine culturel et de la connaissance humaine et sont trop souvent difficilement accessibles au public.

Les notes de bas de page et autres annotations en marge du texte présentes dans le volume original sont reprises dans ce fichier, comme un souvenir du long chemin parcouru par l'ouvrage depuis la maison d'édition en passant par la bibliothèque pour finalement se retrouver entre vos mains.

Consignes d'utilisation

Google est fier de travailler en partenariat avec des bibliothèques à la numérisation des ouvrages appartenant au domaine public et de les rendre ainsi accessibles à tous. Ces livres sont en effet la propriété de tous et de toutes et nous sommes tout simplement les gardiens de ce patrimoine. Il s'agit toutefois d'un projet coûteux. Par conséquent et en vue de poursuivre la diffusion de ces ressources inépuisables, nous avons pris les dispositions nécessaires afin de prévenir les éventuels abus auxquels pourraient se livrer des sites marchands tiers, notamment en instaurant des contraintes techniques relatives aux requêtes automatisées.

Nous vous demandons également de:

- + *Ne pas utiliser les fichiers à des fins commerciales* Nous avons conçu le programme Google Recherche de Livres à l'usage des particuliers. Nous vous demandons donc d'utiliser uniquement ces fichiers à des fins personnelles. Ils ne sauraient en effet être employés dans un quelconque but commercial.
- + *Ne pas procéder à des requêtes automatisées* N'envoyez aucune requête automatisée quelle qu'elle soit au système Google. Si vous effectuez des recherches concernant les logiciels de traduction, la reconnaissance optique de caractères ou tout autre domaine nécessitant de disposer d'importantes quantités de texte, n'hésitez pas à nous contacter. Nous encourageons pour la réalisation de ce type de travaux l'utilisation des ouvrages et documents appartenant au domaine public et serions heureux de vous être utile.
- + *Ne pas supprimer l'attribution* Le filigrane Google contenu dans chaque fichier est indispensable pour informer les internautes de notre projet et leur permettre d'accéder à davantage de documents par l'intermédiaire du Programme Google Recherche de Livres. Ne le supprimez en aucun cas.
- + *Rester dans la légalité* Quelle que soit l'utilisation que vous comptez faire des fichiers, n'oubliez pas qu'il est de votre responsabilité de veiller à respecter la loi. Si un ouvrage appartient au domaine public américain, n'en déduisez pas pour autant qu'il en va de même dans les autres pays. La durée légale des droits d'auteur d'un livre varie d'un pays à l'autre. Nous ne sommes donc pas en mesure de répertorier les ouvrages dont l'utilisation est autorisée et ceux dont elle ne l'est pas. Ne croyez pas que le simple fait d'afficher un livre sur Google Recherche de Livres signifie que celui-ci peut être utilisé de quelque façon que ce soit dans le monde entier. La condamnation à laquelle vous vous exposeriez en cas de violation des droits d'auteur peut être sévère.

À propos du service Google Recherche de Livres

En favorisant la recherche et l'accès à un nombre croissant de livres disponibles dans de nombreuses langues, dont le français, Google souhaite contribuer à promouvoir la diversité culturelle grâce à Google Recherche de Livres. En effet, le Programme Google Recherche de Livres permet aux internautes de découvrir le patrimoine littéraire mondial, tout en aidant les auteurs et les éditeurs à élargir leur public. Vous pouvez effectuer des recherches en ligne dans le texte intégral de cet ouvrage à l'adresse <http://books.google.com>

This is a reproduction of a library book that was digitized by Google as part of an ongoing effort to preserve the information in books and make it universally accessible.

GoogleTM books

<https://books.google.com>





HERESIES
OR
AGNOSTIC THEISM, ETHICS,
SOCIOLOGY, AND METAPHYSICS

Ex Libris
C. K. OGDEN

HERESIES

OR

AGNOSTIC THEISM, ETHICS,
SOCIOLOGY, AND METAPHYSICS

BY

H. CROFT HILLER

VOL. III

London

GRANT RICHARDS

9 HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN, W.C.

1900

PERSONAL

HE who lends or borrows a book gratifies himself by robbing the author, through compelling him to work gratuitously. In buying a picture, or a kettle, a person presumably pays its full labour-value. In buying a book, he may pay but a fraction of the labour-value. The residue of labour-value is, ethically, the author's, not his. In lending the book, he disposes of the residue of labour-value as though he had paid for it. To this extent, he robs the author or anybody who may have bought the full labour-value, as copyright.

The author of this work requests those who wish to read it, to buy it; not to lend or borrow it. As far as he can, he will enable those who cannot afford to buy it, to read it at free libraries, which will be gratuitously supplied with the work, on application to the publisher and payment of carriage.

B
1245
4 3 H4
V.3
LIBRARY
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
SANTA BARBARA

PREFACE TO THIRD VOLUME

IN the preceding two volumes of this work, I have made compromises with conventional fallacy implying that a universe of perception exists outside the mind, as it exists within the mind. I could not well investigate and traverse ordinary scientific conceptions and practical conventionalities, unless I made such preliminary compromise. On the other hand, as far as practicable, I made the reader aware that my ultimate views altogether transcended and repudiated such naïve realism as I provisionally tolerated. In the present volume my ultimate doctrines appear, altogether severed from the spurious realism of empirical science and ordinary sensualism. I hope the present exposition will clearly indicate where the radical line of cleavage exists between, on the one hand, empirical science and practical sensualism involving the truths of ordinary experience and, on the other hand, those more profound verities involving a rationally valid metaphysic. In the present volume,

I hope to show that the root-fallacy involving modern social and individual degeneracy is the implication—fostered, primarily, by the great advance of empirical and theoretical science and its resulting materialistic philosophies—that the mind is a passive reflector of a universe existing independently of the mind, as realised by the mind; and, secondarily, fostered by introspective philosophies based on intellectual preconceptions. Though these introspective philosophies avoid and correct the flagrant error of the assumption of a passively recipient mind, I hope to show that they involve the no less grave fallacy of imputing to conceptual symbols the ontological realism attributed to sensory percepts by materialistic philosophies, science, and the crude sensualism of practical experience.

I am no partisan, and only strive for intellectual demonstration. If my positions can be intellectually upset, I shall renounce them. As this and the preceding volumes contain a crucial analysis leading to denial of the philosophical validity of the premises on which are built empirical transcendentalism, materialistic philosophies, theological orthodoxy, and conventional ethics, and, as the present volume contains a metaphysical system advanced to supersede what the analysis has discredited, I venture to suggest that exponents of the doctrines I assail shall, if they can, meet my conten-

tions against their own positions and traverse my positions. If these exponents are unable to do the one or the other, I submit that it will be conducive to the best interests of society and an indication of their own intellectual and moral integrity, if those exponents make the public aware to what extent they endorse what I propound.

The first volume of this work was liberally noticed by the press, and, as it contained frankly irreverent scrutiny of many well-established proprieties typified in the activities of prominent individuals, the book invited and received much flippant treatment, from the non-critical standpoint. The second volume was not easy to treat by this method, with the result that the press seemed to fight shy of tackling it. I hope that, later, it may receive the critical attention which I believe it demands.

There is one paper to which I particularly wish to express obligation for consistently dispassionate and thoughtful scrutiny of the earlier volumes, and for grip of their scope. Though other papers have devoted careful attention to my work, I feel particularly indebted to *The Scotsman*.

The pretensions of the present volume may be concisely stated in the following terms :—It contains a new theistic, ethical, and cosmological metaphysic ; a metaphysical scrutiny of natural science, including modern doctrines of evolution and heredity ; of

materialistic and introspective philosophies, and of the foundations of Christian theology and of conventional ethics and sociology. It is frankly opposed to contemporary collective and individual motives and activities ; to Materialism and conventional Free-thought equally as to theological Orthodoxy. While all its implications lead to Collectivism as social dispensation, it is entirely opposed to the incentives and propagandism of current Socialism. In a word, it is, in the fullest sense of the terms, revolutionary, religious, moral, spiritual.

As an impression seems prevalent that *Heresies* is the same work as was constituted by a series of articles entitled *Fundamental Heresies* which ran in a weekly journal for some three years, it may be advisable here to correct the misconception. Except in respect to parts of the first volume, of two chapters of the second, and of one chapter of the third volumes, no matter appearing in this work has previously been printed, and none of the vital substance of *Heresies*, as a system of philosophy and theism, has previously even been indicated in any shape or form. What appeared in the press were but a few fragmentary and comparatively crude disquisitions at the fringe of the essential theses, and a series of controversial attacks on prominent representatives of obtrusive phases of current thought.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

	PAGE
THE KANTIAN MIND	I

CHAPTER II

TRIANGLES	12
---------------------	----

CHAPTER III

MATHEMATICS	33
-----------------------	----

CHAPTER IV

KANTIAN SPACE AND TIME	47
----------------------------------	----

CHAPTER V

	PAGE
PSYCHOLOGICAL SPACE	54

CHAPTER VI

SENSATION AND EMOTION CONTINUA	58
--	----

CHAPTER VII

MOTOR WILL	76
----------------------	----

CHAPTER VIII

THE NECESSITY-SENSATION	94
-----------------------------------	----

CHAPTER IX

A PRIORI AND A POSTERIORI	99
-------------------------------------	----

CHAPTER X

BODY, SPACE, TIME	107
-----------------------------	-----

Contents

xiii

CHAPTER XI

	PAGE
I AND NOT-I	117

CHAPTER XII

INNER AND OUTER SENSATIONS	124
--------------------------------------	-----

CHAPTER XIII

KNOWING	130
-------------------	-----

CHAPTER XIV

INTROSPECTIVE CAUSALITY	139
-----------------------------------	-----

CHAPTER XV

INTROSPECTIVE UNITY	149
-------------------------------	-----

CHAPTER XVI

INTROSPECTIVE PHILOSOPHY	156
------------------------------------	-----

CHAPTER XVII

	PAGE
RESPONSIBILITY	174

CHAPTER XVIII

JUSTICE	182
-------------------	-----

CHAPTER XIX

IMAGINATION	192
-----------------------	-----

CHAPTER XX

FAITH	202
-----------------	-----

CHAPTER XXI

PERSONAL ARTIFICE	208
-----------------------------	-----

CHAPTER XXII

INTELLECT	216
---------------------	-----

Contents

xv

CHAPTER XXIII

	PAGE
SUB-SOUL OF THE MATTER-SOUL	228

CHAPTER XXIV

UNITS OF STIMULUS AND CONSCIOUSNESS	236
---	-----

CHAPTER XXV

THE MIND-UNIVERSE	294
-----------------------------	-----

CHAPTER XXVI

A MIRROR-MIND	314
-------------------------	-----

CHAPTER XXVII

A SELF-EXISTENT UNIVERSE	319
------------------------------------	-----

CHAPTER XXVIII

THE MATTER-SOUL	323
---------------------------	-----

CHAPTER XXIX

	PAGE
MEMORY	336

CHAPTER XXX

AUTO-SUGGESTION	346
---------------------------	-----

CHAPTER XXXI

SENSORY IMAGINATION	349
-------------------------------	-----

CHAPTER XXXII

DISEASE	365
-------------------	-----

CHAPTER XXXIII

SOUL	378
----------------	-----

CHAPTER XXXIV

SOUL-EVOLUTION	391
--------------------------	-----

Contents

xvii

CHAPTER XXXV

	PAGE
CAUSALITY	422

CHAPTER XXXVI

POST-TERRESTRIAL RECOGNITION	469
--	-----

CHAPTER XXXVII

BIOLOGICAL HEREDITY AND EVOLUTION	485
---	-----

CHAPTER XXXVIII

METAPHYSICAL HEREDITY AND EVOLUTION	521
---	-----

INDEX	547
-----------------	-----

HERESIES

CHAPTER I

THE KANTIAN MIND

KANTISM affords what is called a critical explanation of knowledge, by which, knowledge is supposed to be projected out of the realm of sensation into what is imagined as universal, necessary certainty. The philosophy starts from the assumption that sensory impressions are not inherently bound together and projected into ideas, and that ideas are not inherently bound together and projected on one another so as to involve synthesis or transformation of one conception into another, in contradistinction to analysis, or the mere restatement, in other terms, of conceptions. Instead of merely involving what may be termed automatic progression from one to another stage of cognitions, the Kantian mind is supposed to be endowed with certain elements which may be roughly catalogued as manifold of sense, forms of perception, schemata of imagination, categories of the under-

standing, and pure self-consciousness. Through the assumption of these elements, Kantism professes to show why things are universally and necessarily true. It affirms that, failing these elements, mere perception would only afford knowledge of particular series of events and coexistences on which we could legitimately base no universal and necessary affirmations. Moreover, it tells us that conception is no more efficient to afford certainty regarding the permanence, causal connection, or interaction of objects than is perception. According to Kantism, all that conception could do would be tell us about ideas, leaving us void of knowledge whether the ideas corresponded to anything real outside themselves.

Kantism shows from its own standpoint that everything known is fabricated, by the elements it invokes, from material supplied by the special senses. From my own standpoint, to be later set forth in detail, the whole of the Kantian scheme of cognition is as much sensation as is anything it professes to transcend, and the elements it invokes have no existence outside fancy. I agree with Kantism that all, as known, must be constituted by the mind, only I deny such a mind as Kant imagines. To my apprehension, distinctions between perception and conception, on Kantian lines, are mere matters of words. I believe that perception and conception are essentially the same thing, as being sensation, and that Kant's elements are no less sensation, and, as such, relative, provisional, and limited, than is anything they are supposed to authenticate. I believe that they merely involve restate-

ment of the difficulty they are advanced to obviate. Whether we authenticate judgments by ordinary feelings and sense-impressions, or the Kantian elements, it seems to me that we are doing essentially the same thing—validating by sensations, and that we never get further than the demonstration that all knowing is neither more nor less than believing.

If Kant's elements exist at all, they must exist to belief. They do not exist to my belief. If they existed to my belief, I could only accept them as nebular attenuations and imaginary amalgamations of the particular experiences to which they were applied. Of course, a mind constituted of such elements will render universally certain what it brings into suitable relation with the elements. But this universal certainty will only be in relation to the mind that imposes on itself such limitations. Such a mind will necessarily apprehend what can only exist, inasmuch as nothing can exist for it except what is testable by its self-imposed limitations. But if the limitations themselves are arbitrary and fanciful, the mere fact that cognition is validated by them is insignificant.

Though I am in full accord with Kantism as to all that is known being in the mind—or rather, as I shall later show, as constituting mind itself—I entirely dissent from the theory in regard to the constitution and activity of mind. For me, there is no such mind as that suggested by Kant. My “mind” is not an active agent, but is merely the medium of an active agent—will. There is, for me, no such thing as

knowledge, in the Kantian sense. To me, knowledge is nothing but the sensation of belief. Given this sensation, whatever involves it is, for the particular mind, universally and necessarily true, but will become untrue so soon as the sensation of belief becomes correspondingly modified. There is, for me, no such thing as truth apart from the mind that feels it, and no mind can feel truth more universal and necessary than that which, for the time, it believes. To my apprehension, Kant's system does not go to the root of things, but constitutes itself a closed circuit of ratiocination fabricated by a wrong method of inferring from ideas instead of from sensory experience. On the assumption that ideas are inherently discrete entities, I am entirely with the Kantian when he asserts that they could never afford knowledge of existences and coexistences. But the question is—Are ideas such discrete entities? This question I hope satisfactorily to answer in the negative. If I can show—as I hope to—that there is in experience a conditioning sensation or pseudo-sensation between ideas adequate to account for their determinate connection, we then need no such preconditioning elements as are imagined by Kantism to account for cognition. Then, we may reject the assumption of an active mind applying its own criteria, and accept instead a mind constituted by an automatic flow of sensation.

According to Kantism, though the mind is constituted of fixed active elements, yet it is dependent, as a purely recipient agent, on varying experiences

from without, constituting what is called a sense-manifold. Failing this external stimulus, the intelligent elements are merely logical necessities of an hypothesis. I fail to see why, on Kantian conditions, we might not as well assume that the external stimulus imposed some special character on a purely passive, recipient mind, as that elements of an active mind imposed some special character on the stimulus. I do not here mean that external stimulus should, as it were, jump bodily into the mind, but that it might impose some special character of response independently of any special elements—in the Kantian sense—in the mind. If, as Kant grants, the elements—failing the external stimulus—are merely logical necessities of his system, I fail to see why the stimulus, rather than the mind, might not be the determining factor. From my standpoint, this is the real interpretation. I believe that the mind is constituted as a possible universe—the same for each mind—but I do not believe that this universe involves elemental attenuations of ordinary conceptions and perceptions applied by a self-acting mind and determining such universal necessary certainty as is imagined by Kantism.

The mind that I apprehend can do nothing at all until the soul has hypnotised the matter-soul into specific sub-souls, constituting specific external stimuli which, in their turn, excite the medium, or body, to excite the soul to particular fiats for particular manifestations of the possible universe constituting the mind. These manifestations first occur as what I

shall later deal with as sensory bodies, or what are commonly called objects. These may be termed shadows of real things (soul-fiats), which are never within the mind's immediate experience. Again, in their turn, these sensory bodies, or "shadows" of soul-fiats, give rise, by means which I shall later investigate, to what I call psychical bodies, or what are commonly called ideas. Like the sensory bodies, these are also "shadows" of soul-fiats. Series of these psychical bodies, or what are commonly called ideas, are inherently bound together, as I shall later show, so as to involve necessary and arbitrary successions as the various cognitive manifestations embraced under the terms perception, conception, judgment, intelligence.

From my standpoint, the mind is other-conscious, rather than self-conscious, and, apart from the necessities of Kantian theory itself, I do not see that anything advanced by the theory establishes the fact of self-consciousness. Granting, as Kant shows, that nothing can be thought except in relation to a knower, the assumption does not involve that the knower is self-conscious, but merely that the knower is conscious of things in relation to something not themselves. What this something is, may be outside the immediate experience of the knower. Such a knower is what I shall later set forth as soul. While everything, not itself, is, as experience, in relation to this knower, itself is only known by the mind, as inference from the experience it generates.

The knowing agent of Kantism is called an

intelligence, constituted of the elements, by which it fabricates knowledge. So far as I can see, this intelligence is nothing but a term to express particular sensations of sensations involving that one feeling as what is called knowledge is essentially different from another feeling as what is called sensation. Why the one sensation is essentially different from the other, or that it is essentially different, so far as I know, Kantism does not offer the faintest show of evidence—at least, what I call evidence. Kantism certainly resolves concepts into other concepts, but it does not show wherein one set of concepts, as sensation, is essentially different from another set, as what is called knowledge. From my standpoint, a unification or subsuming of concepts is no less sensation than are the concepts that are subsumed, and there is, for me, no more essential universality and necessity, as knowledge, in feeling the product of subsumption than in feeling what is subsumed. For me, all that is involved in such a case is a logical series of sensations, and that they are logical or rational, in contradistinction to illogical or irrational, does not depend on a consciously active agent such as the Kantian mind, but on an unconscious agent which I demonstrate as will. None of such a series of sensations, from my standpoint, is in itself more apodictic or inevitable than another, but is only practically more or less so according to the presence or absence of the sensation of belief in connection with the particular conceptual resultant. As I have often affirmed in this work, and hope fully to

establish, there is no knowing but believing. Whoever believes knows as well as it is possible to know.

The Kantian is right in contending against the conventional distinction between external and internal, or things in and outside the mind, and he is right in contending that there must be an active agent which can assimilate experience with itself before external and internal can come to exist. What I dissent from is, that this something is mind at all, and what I contend for is, that it is what causes mind to exist, as manifestation. The mind of the Kantian is merely the resolution of certain parts of the field of sensation into other parts, with the implication that the final product of resolution is the agent conditioning the intermediate products. From my standpoint, there is nothing more actively initiative in one part of such a field than in another, and, for mind to be manifested at all, there must be an agent initiating and conditioning sensation itself. This agent is will, and it is outside consciousness. The only central knower, so far as humanity is concerned, that exists, is what this will constitutes, initiates, and conditions, as sensation. Through this will, Kantism attains the illusion that what is merely sensation is a central knower, verifying all things by universal and necessary criteria, and realising universal and necessary cognitions that are not sensations.

The great difficulty, in regard to the Kantian theory of knowledge, seems to me to be, not so much its extraction from the cornucopia of thought, as its reconciliation with the fact of an independent

universe. An active mind constituted of infallible categories, forms, and what not, determining all perception and conception, and through which all perception and conception exist, and in which they are immanent as nebulous preformations, yet which cannot constitute a perception or conception without the help of an outside agent, seems to me somewhat akin to a round peg in a square hole. In its essential nature, the Kantian theory strikes me as excluding anything but its self-conscious and infallible knower and a complex of thoughts as its offspring. That anything except concepts should exist seems to me a complication with which the Kantian theory is essentially at loggerheads, and with which it is only plausibly brought into line through a number of far-fetched makeshifts. In its essential character, as a purely conceptual system dealing with verbal symbols as the prime facts in experience, it seems naturally to exclude limitations by any factor independent of the nebulous despots controlling its realm of apodictic certainty.

Kant's influence on modern thought seems to me largely attributable to the fact that his speculations humour the current materialistic tendencies. Essentially, his theory is materialistic, merely substituting conceptual symbols for the crude sensualisms of the ordinary materialist. What applies, in this respect, to Kant, seems to me to apply in another way, and far more determinately, to Mr. Herbert Spencer's system, so far as it pretends to be an epistemological revelation. As I apprehend it, Mr. Spencer's theory

of knowledge is really based on the assumption that an external world demonstrably exists, apart from the mind, of which the world in the mind is an exact representation, and that, accordingly, the mind knows its world as merely a passive recipient, or what may be termed reflector. I grant that this naïve realism is overlaid by a multitude of reservations regarding relatives and absolutes (the latter seeming to me to be inconsistent with the former on Mr. Spencer's own conditions), but I fail to see that the pivot of Mr. Spencer's theory of knowledge is not the fancy of a ready-made universe existing independently of the mind, and known as it so exists. Of course there may be such a universe and mind, but until Mr. Spencer or somebody else has demonstrated their existence to my satisfaction, I, personally, shall deny that any sensory universe exists for the mind that is not fabricated *as* the mind. How it is fabricated, I hope to show in this volume. The mind, for me, is nothing but what it perceives and conceives, and, what it perceives is the sensory universe. On the other hand, I hope to demonstrate that the mind, as a universe of perception, does not exist by its own initiative, but through the activity of the soul manifested in relationship with a universe which is outside perception.

I believe that merely ratiocinative methods will ever be inadequate for investigating the root of things, and that the days are numbered of all philosophies attempting to unravel ultimate problems on so-called naturalistic lines. I surmise that the truths

The Kantian Mind I I

of what is called natural science will soon be found largely irrelevant to problems, to the solution of which those truths have been confidently applied by modern system-builders of the school of materialism. The school itself, I venture to forecast, though apparently full of exuberant vitality—as is the social system for which it is the warrant—is on the brink of dissolution. I venture to think that Mr. Spencer will be the last great representative of this school of thought, and that, as his central biological positions are now demolished by empirical investigations regarding the morphology and functions of the cell, so, by other methods of investigation, are his naturalistic speculations regarding the ultimate facts of cognition and his sociological theories doomed to abdication. I hope to show, in this volume, that no philosophy adequate to coming needs will be able to ignore faith as an element to be reckoned with, supplementing the work of reason and affording vital impulse to that work.

CHAPTER II

TRIANGLES

ON what grounds are we to say that, universally and necessarily, triangles have their interior angles equal to two right angles? Kantism undertakes to supply the answer. It does this by reversing the normal order of cognitive succession. According to Kantism, we get to know universally and finally about triangles, not by observing actual figures, but through a self-acting mind, compounded of "sense" and "understanding," which, in its very nature, has things called forms of space and schemata, constituting ghostly adumbrations, anticipating and conditioning concrete spatial relationships, and so constituting the conditions of the mathematician's concepts and of our ordinary spatial perceptions. Though actual geometrical figures are first realised as perceptions, the Kantian tells us that the possibility of mathematical notions, and of the percepts from which they arise, lies in an "intelligence" containing space and nebulous figures in what I may term indefinite states of indefinite patterns conditioning all definite patterns.

Thus, from the Kantian standpoint, we do not primarily perceive a triangle, as sensation derived through interaction with anything not ourselves. Such simple interaction, on the Kantian assumption, would involve no notion of any particular figure which we could identify as a triangle. Still less would the sensation enable us to pronounce universally about triangles.

It will be obvious that the validity of the Kantian pronouncement depends on the way we elect to deal with symbols. If we like to say that "sensation" is something essentially different and demarcated from "idea," we may, of course, infer various conclusions from our premise. However, from my standpoint, the first thing we have to do is to validate our premise. I show, in this work, that "sensation" is essentially the same thing as "idea," whatever arbitrary distinctions we may make between the two, and that "sensation" and "idea" are inherently bound together as constituents of a flow or current which I call the sensation-continuum, with which I shall deal specifically in later chapters. If I am right, we get to know universally and particularly about triangles, not by any fanciful "principles" in a fanciful "mind," but through what I may term the automatic progression of a series of cognitions inherently bound together and conditioned by will.

From my standpoint, the Kantian "mind," as an active, self-conditioning agent, is chimera. There is no "mind" at all, excepting the sensation-con-

tinuum. This is a product of the soul, manifesting itself as will. What "mind" realises as itself, as the sensation-continuum, is the product of the soul's hypnotism of the matter-soul, primarily into a medium for its (the soul's) fiats; secondarily, into sub-souls which, through the medium's response to the soul, are revealed as sensory bodies. Thus the soul accomplishes three distinct types of hypnotism—one, of the matter-soul into a medium; another, of this medium into a responsive agent; another, of the matter-soul as an agent interacting with the medium. The universe is thus not at all a product of mind, as actor. The really active agents are the soul and the matter-soul. The mind, as perception and conception, is simply an instrument of the soul. Considered as an actor, the mind may be compared to the hypnotic's experiences in responding to the hypnotist. The hypnotic knows feelings, but he does not control his knowing. His judgment is his mind's, but this is governed by the operator's will. Similarly the mind's judgments, as the universe, are not its own, as initiative agent, but are governed by the soul's hypnotism of the matter-soul. The mind is not a doer, in the Kantian sense. It is merely a doer as hypnotic, or instrument. The really acting universe is entirely without the mind. If the mind imagines universal principles in itself, identifying it with the universe, the principles are no less the product of the soul's hypnotism of the medium than are any of the experiences, to account for which the principles may be invoked. Accordingly, such

imaginary principles really account for nothing, and, unless experience validates them—which it does not—the implication of such imaginary products can only tend to confusion of judgment.

From the Kantian standpoint there is no reason for postulating anything real, as external existence, enabling us to judge about triangles. Indeed, there is no reason for postulating any external reality enabling us even to perceive a specific triangle. The whole business is practically done by the “nature of intelligence,” whatever that may be, which may be said to contain triangles ready-made, *in utero*, and only awaiting the activity of another of those mysterious innate faculties called perception to come into concrete existence. Of course, nobody need deny Kantian assumption and dialectics, on their own conditions, any more than he need deny the assertion of a hypnotised subject that he is a glass bottle. Given a man who believes he is a glass bottle, he can, on Kantian conditions, prove his position by affirming that, in his mind, there are forms of space and schemata involving the apodictic certainty that he is a glass bottle. If other men perceive him as a “bifurcated radish,” he need only say that the forms and schemata conditioning his own judgment are in his intelligence, and that, accordingly, what he asserts about himself is universally true. On the conditions, it does not matter that millions of men have forms and schemata different from his, involving totally divergent judgment. If his judgment of his body is governed by forms and schemata in the very nature

of intelligence, his are as infallible as anybody else's. The facts of hypnotism are empirical demonstration that the Kantian phantasmagoria of "principles" and "faculties" in the mind is dialectical futility. The fact that a person may be willed to judge not only objects other than his own body, but that body itself, in a way involving total divergence from the normal judgment of himself and others, is absolutely opposed to the assumption of such mental principles (forms, categories, schemata, *et hoc*) as are postulated by Kantism. The assumption of first principles in a mind that may be deceived regarding the prime things supposed to be infallibly decided by the principles is a contradiction in terms.

The Kantian form is not space itself, or anything else in intelligible experience, but is only something necessary to the Kantian hypothesis that knowing is essentially different from feeling, and that a thing exists, as mind, that knows external excitation by certain imaginary preformations in itself which it applies to the excitations. The "mind" of the Kantian is thus an active agent, conditioning its experiences by certain fanciful types for which there is no warrant beyond the necessities of a theory. On the hypothesis of such a mind as the Kantian excogitates there is really no need to invoke external excitation at all. That an external world exists is an inconvenient fact, really extraneous to the Kantian theory of mind, and impeding its logical development. The Kantian "mind" endowed with form of space, by which all spatial judgments are deter-

mined, is an imaginary fabrication concocted to fit a theory (not validated by any proof) that judgment is something essentially different from sensation. If judgment is essentially the same thing—which I shall show is the case—as sensation, then a mind that forms spatial judgments must do this through the only things which afford us experience of spatial conditions. These things are sensory bodies. As the necessary condition of experiencing sensory bodies is to involve spatial judgment, we have better ground for affirming that the mind is endowed with a “form” of every object we perceive, than that it is endowed with a form of space which we do not perceive, and which has no *raison d'être* except to be applied to what we do perceive. As sensory bodies are as much things in mind as is space, and as they are the only things by which “space” could come into experience, if we need invoke “forms” at all, we need to invoke them primarily for sensory bodies, not for “space.”

Of space, in the Kantian sense, we have absolutely no experience. To invoke a form of something of which we have no experience, in order to account for something (sensory body) of which we have bed-rock experience is philosophically irrational. As I hope to show, the universe really constitutes “mind.” Mind itself is an empty term, apart from the sensory and psychical bodies constituting it. The Kantian reverses this teaching of experience by implicitly positing the mind as something containing, instead of being constituted by, its universe of sensory and

psychical bodies. Though we may loosely talk—as I have done in this work—of the universe as being *in* the mind, when we come to formulating philosophical theories we must not argue from the premise—as does the Kantian—that the mind is something apart from its universe. Spatial impressions are coincident with bodily impressions, and constitute, through the coincidence, sensory bodies which are what may be termed a mind-section, as ideas of these impressions constituting psychical bodies are another mind-section. Neither section “knows” better or worse than the other, but it is experientially demonstrable that the sensory section can “know” independently of the psychical section, while the latter cannot “know” independently of the sensory section. Apart from these sections, the term mind is void of significance.

These mind-sections are not products of mind. They are mind itself. To account for the existence of these mind-sections we must invoke a factor that acts, not merely one that suffers or responds. Mind merely responds. Of its own initiative it can do nothing. It only exists through soul manifested as will. We can only identify this soul as object, not by its own contents as subject. The “thinking” by which we make universal affirmations regarding triangles is no less a product of the soul than is the “sensing” by which we apprehend a specific figure of a triangle. The “thinking” is no more an active, spontaneous agent than is the “sensing.” The only active, spontaneous agent in the connection is the

will, which is the manifestation by which we primarily know the soul. If such things exist as preconditioning forms, they must exist in the soul as constituting will. However, in such connection the term "form" would be totally inapplicable, inasmuch as its only intelligible significance is as definition of some product of will. The thing itself is not the product.

This applies to the Kantian schema, suggested as enabling us to form judgments about triangles (and other sensory bodies). We get the concept of a triangle from specific images derived from specific sensory experiences. These triangular images are of various sorts (isosceles, right-angled, scalene, equilateral). Therefore, says the Kantian, mathematical judgments about triangles cannot be based on empirical investigation of triangular images, but must originate through something in the mind adumbrating all triangular images. This something is called a schema. Only through this schema can we know, as universal knowers, about triangles, that each has its interior angles equal to two right angles. When I ask what is a schema, the Kantian replies: A sort of amalgam of a conception and an image, lumping together all triangles into a sort of *olla podrida* of triangulation. Here, I am told how I get to know about triangles by being informed about something of which I can form no conception. I could not conceive a "schema" any more than I could conceive the substance of a shadow. I do not believe that anybody has ever conceived a triangle except as some specific image of one, any more than that he has ever conceived a dog

apart from such image. Through habit, we are enabled imaginatively to divorce symbols from their sensory bases, but I deny that the object defined by a symbol can be conceived except as some specific image of the object. On this, among other grounds, I deny the Kantian schema. I maintain that it is merely a spurious reproduction, as analogy, of the sensed object it pretends to determine. There is nothing in "mind" that is not "germinally" in "sense." All so-called abstract ideas are ultimately to be traced to sensory percepts.

The geometer's "universal" affirmations regarding triangles are derived essentially by the same mental processes as enable the child to form "universal" notions regarding toffy and toys. The geometer would no more be able to form judgments, universal or particular, about triangles, unless he had seen some, than a child would be able to form judgments about lollipops unless he had tasted them. When the child imagines his lollipops as so-called abstractions, he does essentially the same thing as the geometer does when he so imagines his triangles. The mind knows nothing about lollipops or triangles until the senses have realised them. There is no such thing as an idea not derived from a sensory experience, though there are a vast number of ideas not applied as if they were so derived. Kant's "schema" is one. It is essentially but a blurred, confused "shadowgraph" of a number of specific sensory experiences.

Suppose I know that universal knowledge of

triangles is conditioned by schemata, of what account is this knowledge if I also know that I have never had an experience of a schema such as affords me knowledge of a triangle, and that no inference from what I experience as a triangle will lead me to a schema? How am I to assimilate to any practical purpose two factors (schema and sensory impression) rushing at one another from opposite ends of the sensation-continuum, of one of which I get no knowledge from the other? Of what account is it that somebody who wants to prove I *conceive* a nebulous triangle before I *perceive* an actual one, invents a fancy picture to demonstrate his contention, when experience tells me that I never *conceive* a triangle or anything else unless as derivative from something I *perceive*? When "perceive" and "conceive" themselves, divorced from sensory experience, are nothings, why shall I not snap my fingers at the psychologist and metaphysician when they excogitate difference between these intrinsic nothings? Of what account is it that somebody who drugs himself with symbols tells me that though I fancy I know the thing itself as sensory experience, I really only know it through a schema? If the schema does not alter the quality, as knowledge, of the thing I know, and does not itself exist until I have got knowledge as the sensory experience, why shall I not scout the schema as being anything more significant than an example of the proneness of dialecticians to lose themselves in quagmires of futile wrangling?

Kant bases his "mind" on the false implication

that ideas, or psychical bodies involving conception, are things antithetical to and independent of sensory bodies involving perception. Experience tells us directly the contrary—that there is no antithesis between psychical and sensory bodies, and that sensory bodies necessarily involve psychical bodies. In succeeding chapters, I hope to offer conclusive evidence for this proposition, and to formulate an account of mind consistent with the demonstration that sensory bodies are the basis of all mental activity, and that there is no such thing as mind, containing and conditioning its experiences, but that these experiences, as sensory and psychical bodies (or, in common phraseology, objects and ideas), constitute the only thing to which the term mind can be applicable.

In this Kantian proposition regarding geometrical judgments, we have a typical illustration of the futility of the introspective method implying that we can know otherwise than by feeling. On what ground are we to grant that feeling, as what is called perception is essentially different from feeling, as what is called ratiocination? Suppose we imagine there is such a difference, the imagination is still only feeling. What real advance do we make by acting on the imagination? Suppose we assume with the Kantian that bare “perception” of any number of triangles would not enable us to affirm universally that triangles have their interior angles equal to two right angles. And suppose we also grant that we can make the universal affirmation, through forms

and schemata—what then? When we have got so far, we want “universal affirmations” about forms. How are we to validate these? The Kantian can offer no better validation of his forms and schemata than the ordinary observer can offer of his triangle. The form and schema exist only because we perceive triangles, and because the Kantian says that observing them is not knowing them, but that applying something nobody has observed, and that nothing ever observed necessitates as inference, is knowing the triangles. This merely means that the Kantian likes to cut up a symbol of a feeling derived from sensory experience into a number of symbols, and that some of the resulting *nuances*, as “knowing” or conception, are necessary to authenticate other *nuances*, as “perception.” The result is a mere process of validating one imaginative product by another. The sensation “knowing” merely authenticates the sensation “perceiving.” Why is not the sensation “perceiving” to validate the sensation “knowing”?

If I find that observing triangles is practically adequate to afford me a sensation binding together all perceptions of triangles in one affirmation that their interior angles are equal to two right angles, why shall I not affirm that my actual experience of the sensational bond (as what I shall later deal with as necessity-sensation) is warrant of its universal applicability, and scout the existence of a form and schema that merely symbolise into nothingness, a definition of what I experience by observing triangles? When the bound (sensory body) and the bond

(psychical body) are equally matters of sensation, why shall I not say that the triangles (as perception, or bound) involve the form and schema (as conception or bond), rather than say, with the Kantian, that the bond involves the bound?

The Kantian grants that nobody has ever conceived a triangle until he has perceived one. Still, he urges that to enable a person to conceive and judge about a triangle, he must have in his mind a form of space and a schema adumbrating figures. But, as the observer perceives a triangle before he conceives it, why shall not the form and schema issue from the perception rather than the perception from them? If we actually perceive triangles and other like figures, and cannot conceive forms and schemata until we have perceived the figures, why are the forms and schemata essentially antecedent to the perceptions? This applies throughout what I must term the rigmarole of Kantian anatomising of symbols. The scores of fantastic terms Kant invented are, to me, nothing but a Pelion on Ossa of symbolic futility born of reversing the normal order of cognition.

The intellectual emanates from the sensory. This process of emanation neither involves that the sensory creates the intellectual, nor that the intellectual creates the sensory. The emanative process merely implies preordained progression. Neither the sensory nor the intellectual is a doer. Each is merely the product of a doer—the soul, as will. The resultant of the intellectual, as of the sensory is,

indifferently, sensation. The sensation of the intellectual is merely different from that of the sensory. The sensory tells what is a triangle in a particular way. The intellectual tells what is a triangle in another way. The intellectual's account of the triangle can only exist after the sensory's account. The void-sensation (to be dealt with later) transforms the sensory into the psychical, or intellectual. The necessity-sensation (to be dealt with later) transforms primary ideas immediately derived from sensory bodies, as objects, or sub-souls of the matter-soul, into other ideas, and these, again, into other ideas. Thus, psychical knowing is only sensing from ideas, as sensory knowing is sensing from sub-souls of the matter-soul. Accordingly, the intellectual or psychical puts nothing new, as not sensation, into any resultant. All the in and out twisting among symbols of the Kantian cannot demonstrate essential difference between the knowing of a simple percept and of a dialectical complex. The Kantian has no better knowing than a line of sensation originating from external excitation. It may be well here to remind the reader that whenever I refer to external excitation, I imply by the terms interaction of the organic soul as hypnotist with the matter-soul, as what I may term hypnotic. The product, a sub-soul of the matter-soul, becomes through the soul's fiat on its medium a sensory body, colloquially *in* the mind; really, part of the mind itself. Thus, this external excitation is only really experienced as mind itself, though it may often be

convenient to deal with the mind as containing products of the excitation instead of being constituted by those products.

I really know nothing more absolutely and universally by feeling a triangle as something having its interior angles equal to two right angles, than by feeling it as a three-sided figure of a particular shape. When I affirm universally that triangles have their interior angles equal to two right angles, or when I affirm universally that triangles are three-sided figures of a particular sort, I am dealing with ideas (or what I shall later discuss as psychical bodies) not with the essential triangles. The triangles are sensory experience (or what I shall later discuss as sensory bodies). The ideas are superposed on the sensory experience. The "superposition" is effected by what I shall later deal with as the "void-sensation." This transforms the triangles, as sensory experience, into the triangles, as idea. After transforming a triangle, as sensory experience, into a triangle, as idea, I deal with the idea as I deal with the sensory experience. To illustrate this: I always see a specific triangle as the same figure. However long I may gaze at it, or at whatever different times I may glance at it, it is always the triangle, as the same sensory experience—never, say, a square or circle. This applies to the idea of the triangle. However, I may deal with the idea, it is always the same thing, inasmuch as were it another thing, I should not be dealing with the idea.

It does not matter how many different sorts of

triangles I may see. They all necessarily involve the same fundamental idea, just as, no matter how many horses I may see—white, gray, brown, black ; big, little, heavy, light—all involve the idea—horse. The horse-idea and the triangle-idea I deal with as I dealt with their sensory preconditions. All horses and triangles must be the respective ideas, just as all horses and triangles must be the respective sensory bodies, or experiences. I can no more escape affirming that all triangles are necessarily three-sided figures having their interior angles equal to two right angles than I can escape affirming that all horses have particularly shaped heads and tails. A horse could not exist lacking the particularly shaped head and tail, because, in default of these attributes, there would be no horse-idea for me. My horse-idea would remain universal though a sensory body existed having a horse's tail and body, but a man's head, or in any other state of abnormal compromise with horse quality. Similarly my idea of a triangle would not be affected were a figure to exist as which it was impossible not to discern simultaneously a triangle and a circle. Once I get an idea about anything, the idea is necessarily universal, inasmuch as what proved to be not universal in the particular connection could not be the idea.

Supposing I discovered a three-sided figure lacking the angular measurements of a triangle, but containing three interior angles, I should have to renounce my earlier triangle-idea and adopt another idea which would necessarily be as universal as was the idea it

had superseded. Assume a person never to have seen a tree until you show him a rose-bush. You tell him it is a tree. He has a universal idea that a tree is a rose-bush. For him there is no other tree. Then, suppose you show him a poplar, and tell him it is also a tree. He gets poplar-rose-tree idea instead of rose-tree idea. Each, provisionally, is equally universal, and poplar-rose-tree idea annihilates rose-tree idea. So, the tree-universalist might proceed indefinitely modifying his universal tree-ideas. Similarly, suppose I have never seen a three-sided figure containing three angles, and that somebody shows me a right-angled triangle, telling me it is a triangle. I get a universal triangle-idea, limited to a right-angled triangle. Say, I measure its internal angles. Then I get a further universal triangle-idea, determining that all triangles are necessarily right-angled with interior angles equal to two right angles. Later, say, I am shown an isosceles triangle. My earlier universal idea has to go—triangle-idea is no longer limited to the right-angled sort. Suppose I again measure interior angles. I get another universal idea—all triangles are three-sided figures containing three interior angles equal to two right angles. If I could find such a three-sided figure whose interior angles did not equal two right angles, I should only retain as universal triangle-idea—a three-sided figure containing three angles.

There is no such thing as a triangle, apart from a specific concrete figure. When the mathematician says that *all* triangles have their interior angles equal

to two right angles, he asserts nothing more universally or absolutely true than that the same idea is not another idea. Whenever we make a universal affirmation about anything, the above is all that is really implied—that a particular concept is not a concept other than itself. So, also, in sensing the concrete figure of the triangle, we feel that seeing it at one moment affords us the same experience as does seeing it at another moment. In other words, we hypnotise the matter-soul to the same effect at one, as at another, occasion. That we hypnotise the matter-soul to the same effect, that is, to afford us two or more practically identical sensations is, of course, more than the mere hypnotism as involving sensory experience, or its ideational resultant. Besides this, there is involved the sensation of sameness. Such experience of repetition occurs through what I call the necessity-sensation, with which I shall now deal preliminarily to more ample consideration.

When I see triangles of all sorts, and investigate their common qualities, I discover, through imagination, that I have attained something more than mere experience of figures, as what are called percepts. This new sensation is the triangle-concept. It “echoes” some specific percept of a triangle, and constitutes this “echo” (through the “necessity-sensation”) typical of all “echoes” of the triangle-percept. In other words, this “necessity-sensation” says that my concept of the triangle cannot be transformed into any other concept.

To illustrate this, say I sense three lines, A, B, C,

one extremity of A converging on an extremity of B; the opposite extremity of B converging on an extremity of C; the opposite extremity of C converging on the unattached extremity of A. These lines constitute a sensory body which the void-sensation transforms into a psychical body, or idea of a specific figure. Again, I sense three other lines, D, E, F converging on one another as do A, B, C, only inclined to one another differently. The void-sensation transforms D, E, F into another psychical body. Now, I have two ideas of different figures, or sensory bodies, and the necessity-sensation operates by binding these two ideas together as identities in one respect, as three-sided, pointed figures. Figure A is one idea; figure B is another idea. Actual experience, which I call the necessity-sensation, says that these two ideas are identical. I symbolise the sensation of identity by the term triangle. The necessity-sensation tells me universally and infallibly that these two ideas are necessarily identical, as triangle. In feeling this identity, we feel the necessity-sensation just as completely as we feel the ideas themselves. There is no assumption involved in invoking this necessity-sensation. It is a thing in immediate experience, equivalent to the ideas of the sensory bodies. In feeling such identity in ideas we do what is called thinking. In the above example, we have subsumed and accomplished a synthesis by transforming two different ideas of sensory bodies constituting the two sorts of figures into one judgment which we define by the symbol, triangle. This

constitutes the essence of all thinking, and is effected by the thing in experience which I call the necessity-sensation. It may be termed a subconscious sensation. As I shall later show, all thinking is essentially a subconscious process. The conscious elements, sensory and psychical bodies, are merely what I may term material to be manipulated by the subconscious elements, with which I shall deal at large in later chapters.

The necessity-sensation, in telling me about identity in concept, manifests its early stage of development. As it binds together separate ideational experiences, as identities or repetitions, so it binds together complexes of such experiences. In it we get the "germ" of causality, or necessary succession. Given the necessity-sensation, as binding together ideational experiences, as samenesses, I only need some sensation affording me the idea of an active agent to attain the experience of causal relationship. I get the idea of an active agent from what I shall later deal with as the "inner" and "outer" sensations, affording me the experiences of "I" and "not-I." The former I feel to *do*; the latter I feel to be subject to doing. Later, as a developing knower, I feel that, of particular sensory experiences ("not-I's"), some pain or please me. To these, through imagination, I impute the doing which I feel in "myself," as the "inner" sensation. Thus, the necessity-sensation and the imaginative attribution of doing to particular "not-I's" start me with the material, as sensation of acting "not-I's"

and acted-on “not-I’s,” or of causal relationship. Once I have the sensation of my body as an active agent doing to other bodies and being done to by them, the necessity-sensation brings these bodies, as ideas, for me, into causal relationship.

CHAPTER III

MATHEMATICS

EVERY primitive man touching a hot object would discover something akin to what every man about him discovered under the same circumstances. Associated together, such men would symbolise these experiences by the same sounds, and so establish necessary connection between the sounds, as they had done between the unsymbolised experiences. From such experiential rudiments originate language and ratiocinative processes. The mistake of all introspective philosophy is that it implicitly overlooks the sensory origin of symbols, and treats them as things in themselves, equivalent to the experiences from which they emanate. Kant assumed mathematics to be universally, absolutely true, and sought to explain why it must be absolutely true. He accomplishes his purpose essentially by the same method as mathematics proves itself true, or as old divines proved the Bible true, by verifying from the contents of the thing to be authenticated. The Bible was so authenticated by its own contents ; mathematics is so

authenticated ; Kant's philosophy is so authenticated. As really universal knowledge, the same vulnerability attaches to Kant's system as attaches to mathematics. Both are merely closed circuits of truth.

The mathematical faculty is merely that of experiencing the necessity-sensation between symbols. As, in the above illustration, say, "iron," "hot," "burns" emanated from specific rudimentary experiences, through the senses and involved causal relationship, through the necessity-sensation, so do numbers, the *things* of mathematics, arise and become correlated. So soon as the primitive man learned to combine, or include in a single symbol, two sensory experiences, he originated the fancy-pictures by which a Gauss, Riemann, or Helmholtz discovers transcendental space ; a Newton discovers gravitation ; or, on the authority of which Professor Lodge tells us, that "the electric force between two atoms at any distance is ten thousand million billion billion times greater than their gravitative attraction at the same distance." Kant and the mathematician show the possibility of real knowledge about symbols.

What we call laws of mathematics, or of anything else, are the selection of likenesses from unlikenesses in conceptual complexes, and the symbolising, as homogeneous concepts, of the products of selection. This is all effected by the necessity-sensation, as will be later explained. In themselves, laws are as much sensation as is any one of the sensory experiences they reconcile. To formulate his laws the advanced knower merely applies the necessity-sensation to wider

experience than was available to the primitive inductionist. The absolute quality of the knowing does not become changed through mere multiplicity of data, or re-integration of data into "laws." As the primitive observer and symbolist might be supposed to talk of a certain experience as two stones, so we might refer to the "law" of gravitation as the hundred, thousand, or ten thousand observations and imaginings of so many mathematicians and physicists. The numbers of the mathematician are essentially the same things as the numbers of the primitive symbolist, and have no more real significance than the latter, divorced from their sensory origins. No more than I can establish the real existence of two stones (really, as earlier indicated, a stone-two) by arguing back from numbers, can I establish the real existence of atoms by arguing back to matter from concepts invented to conform with numbers treated as things. If I had never seen or touched a stone, no manipulation of symbols—whether as numbers or words—could enable me to verify the existence of a stone. So no such manipulation can enable me to verify atoms. My atoms, like my stone, under such conditions, would merely be symbols of symbols not bound to sensory experience, but merely imagined as "ghosts" of something that sensory experience might show were it something else than what it is. So of the Kantian preconditions of knowledge—they are essentially nothing but such ghosts constructed of symbols, the real existence of which no sensory experience can validate either directly, as immediate

sensation, or indirectly, as inference, and from which no experience can be really shown to arise.

Mathematical facts are matters of experience about ideas, treated as though ideas were not necessarily derived from sensory experience. In themselves, mathematical facts can afford no practical truth about anything but their own validity. Applied to sensory experience, they afford plenty of practical truth. Applied to certain phantasmal analogies of sensory experience, they afford, as I have shown in earlier chapters dealing with transcendental physics, plenty of practical deception. That mathematical facts are true, I know by believing them. I do not care a jot why they are true, but if anybody can show me they are false, he will do me a service by the exposure. If a person can only tell me why they are true by telling me something else that he believes true, by adopting premises foreign to what generates mathematical experience, he does me no service so far as regards mathematics, and his own truth, if it necessitates much trouble to apprehend, is hardly worth seeking. I do not want to be told why a thing is true that I recognise as true without the aid of an informant. If I worry myself with a theory about why things are true that I know to be true, I must spend a lot of valuable time with another man's imaginings, which only serve to raise another question, Why is his theory true? If that theory only proves itself by its own internal evidences (as indeed do mathematics and every logical system built on abstract premises), I cannot see that the theory telling

me why I know is a crying necessity. A theory merely showing me why I know what I do know, and proving itself by itself, seems to me hardly worth the trouble of investigating. If I got to believe that the theory, after all, did not show what I knew, any better than the fact was shown before I got the theory ; or if, on the other hand, the theory really did accomplish what it professed, I should be in practically the identical position I occupied before I got the theory.

Mathematics is true, judged by its own contents. This truth merely means that mathematics is self-consistent. This, again, means that nobody has yet discovered any self-inconsistencies in it. So, for all I care, may Kantian philosophy be true in this sense, though I do not believe it is. So is all reasoning self-consistent to him who has discovered no self-inconsistency in it. Were the universe the reason of a philosopher of the Kantian order, then whatever was self-consistent to the reason of such a person would be absolutely, universally true. From my standpoint, the universe is primarily and mainly, so far as humanity is concerned, not in reason at all, but in human sensory experience, and all that reason can do as a real knower is logically to elaborate what sensory experience provides as the universe. When reason excogitates a universe of its own, to account for the universe provided by sensory experience, then, from my standpoint, reason attempts as impossible a task as it would do were it to try to satisfy a hungry man by telling him how the "pure reason," "pure

intelligence," or pure something-else fabricated a beefsteak.

Knowledge of the universal order is essentially empirical. All we can really do, as knowers of the universal order, is to apply our intellect (reason) to the continuously varying products of the soul's hypnotism of the matter-soul. If we can feel a closed circuit of self-consistent truth through allowing the intellect to fabricate its own premises, such truth is only universal in the sense that intellect creates certain limitations and satisfies itself within those limitations. If intellect (reason) alone really created the universe, as the problem to be solved, then intellect would solve the universe so soon as intellect had solved its own problems. However, the real conditions are that, before intellect has any problems to solve, sense must provide them. Accordingly, for intellect to provide universal knowledge, intellect must apply itself to sensory experience, not to particular "ejects" from that experience taken to be equivalent to the experience itself. No truth that is not merely specialistic can be attained by allowing intellect to affront the prime conditions which it reveals: that all cognition emanates from sensory experience. To imply, as does introspective philosophy, that intellect (reason) originates its "pabulum," as the universe, is to stultify the prime revelation of reason itself. (Intellect, as terminology, is employed in this and other chapters in its conventional sense, as indicating reason. In this sense it is quite different from what I shall later identify as intellect.)

According to Kant, the higher branches of knowledge are wholly based on synthetical judgments. For instance, mathematical dealing with numbers does not depend on the perception of identities as its essential basis. This perception, according to Kantism, does not generate mathematical demonstrations, it merely conditions their existence. If mathematical truths depended wholly on the principle of identity, they would, according to Kantism, be embodied in purely analytical propositions. The Kantian says this is not the case, and professes to prove his case by examples from arithmetic and geometry. I have dealt with the geometrical aspect of the question in the preceding chapter. To illustrate the Kantian standpoint regarding numbers, I will quote from an expositor of the philosophy.

“In order to ascertain whether the proposition, 7 added to 5 is equal to 12, is analytical or synthetical, all we have to do is to examine whether we can have the notion of $7 + 5$ without that of 12 ; the notion of the subject without that of the other term, and of the relation of equality which unites them. Now, after having added 7 to 5, we have the idea of the union of the two numbers into one ; but what is the new number which contains the two? We know that 7 and 5 form a sum, but what is that sum? Of this we are ignorant ; and the ignorance becomes much more manifest when higher numbers are made use of. When small figures are used the habit which we have acquired of passing from the separate figures to the sum, the rapidity with which

we seize their equality, blinds us as to the true nature of the mental process. But if we wish to add together into one sum several large numbers, the difficulty which is experienced in finding the number that unites them all soon convinces us that we do not reason from the same to the same, but that a new cognition is involved in the proposition.

"How is it, then, that the propositions of arithmetic have been considered as simply analytical? Because the process of the mind in the formation of knowledge has been less considered than the knowledge itself relatively to its objects and independently of the mind. Since $7 + 5$ and 12 are in effect identical numbers, it has been thought that, in the proposition $7 + 5 = 12$, we simply pass from the same to the same. But though the idea of the second term may be implicitly in the first, it is not so explicitly and psychologically; and the question is, whether, having the notions of the two unities, 7 and 5 , we have also notions of the total unity 12 which represents them" (*The Philosophy of Kant*, by Victor Cousin: John Chapman, London, p. 33).

I ask, against the above, why is the modification of a symbol of a sensory experience—say "apple"—by the number 1 , as representing it, less "synthetical" than is the modification of $7 + 5$ by 12 ? How is the term 1 more "explicitly and psychologically" in the term apple than the term 12 is so in the terms $7 + 5$? The term apple is as much a concept as is the term 12 . Why does the concept "apple" become modified by the concept "one" by a process different

from that turning the concepts $7 + 5$ into the concept 12? I maintain there is no real difference in the processes of modification. I maintain that the 1, as modification of the term apple, is essentially the same thing as the 12, as modification of $7 + 5$. The "one," as representing the apple, is as much "synthetical" as is the 12, as representing $7 + 5$.

If, without the aid of a "pure reason," I can "synthetise" an apple into "one," why cannot I, without such aid, synthetise $7 + 5$ into 12? Why cannot I apply the symbol 12 to the symbols $7 + 5$ by the same faculty as enables me to apply the symbol 1 to the symbol apple? As I have earlier indicated, numbers are mere symbols originally representing specific sensory experiences, and, later, subsuming a multitude of individual sensory experiences under the one concept, as symbol. Thus "ones" were originally, say, apple-ones, stone-ones, tree-ones, etc. Then "one" became imaginatively isolated from its sensory basis, and so came to represent, imaginatively, a thing in itself applicable indifferently to any particular sensory experience. Still later, imagination further isolated the symbol from its sensory basis, until, as conceived by the mathematician, the symbol became more real than that from which it originated. As I show in this work, applying this imaginative reality, physicists are able to excogitate any number of fanciful realities analogous to those of the mathematician.

Well, granting for the moment that the mathematician's numbers are as real as he imagines them

to be, I maintain that just as the necessity-sensation binds together "apple" and "one," so it binds together "ones" until they become "two," "three," and so on. Again, these integrations of "ones" (two, three, ten, twenty, etc.), by the same process of imaginative "incarnation" as involved "one," themselves become starting-points for further elaboration of fanciful incarnations. Thus, our "two"-organism becomes a number of "twos," as our "one"-organism became a number of "ones." So we get an infinite permutative system all built on the fanciful incarnation of a symbol as a real thing independent of its sensory origin.

The Kantian says that all this imaginative jugglery is only possible because numbers are in the mind before sensory experience gets there. If such be the case, I am equally justified in asserting that symbols of sensory experiences are also in the mind before the experiences themselves get there. The symbol apple is not a whit less essentially definitive of a sensory experience than is the symbol one. The only difference between the two, as symbols, is that whereas through imagination we have divorced the symbol one from any particular sensory experience, we have not so divorced the symbol apple (though in picturesque diction we have somewhat accomplished even this feat, witness: "apple of my eye"). Having imaginatively isolated "one" from any specific sensory experience, I feel that my apple-one, *qua* one, is identical with my stone-one or tree-one, just as I find, under like conditions of imaginative isolation, that

my tree as, say, a beech is identical, *qua* tree, with my tree as an oak. Tree, as definition of sensory experience in relation to beech or oak, is essentially the same thing as is the symbol one in relation to the symbol apple or stone. The apple-one or stone-one is essentially equivalent to the beech-tree or oak-tree. The "one" is primarily merely a symbol of identity of sensory bodies. Later, the necessity-sensation synthetises "ones" themselves, as identities, into "twos," "threes," etc., as it synthetised ideas of sensory bodies, as identities, into "ones," or as the void-sensation synthetises a sensory into a psychical body. Now we get, say, "twos," "threes" as starting-points for syntheses of the sort. So the process proceeds indefinitely, until our definitions, as "billions," "trillions," transcend any real conception and become purely fanciful concoctions, showing that imagination can create a world of its own, projecting the world of experience into the "nebular regions," and affording a system of knowing of no more philosophical value than are fairy tales.

Let me recapitulate the above points. I have various sensory experiences to which, through the void-sensation, I am impelled to apply symbols—say, apple, stone, tree—as sensory representments of ideas corresponding to the original sensory bodies. These symbols involve essentially the same synthetic activity as transforms any scientific concept into another. The symbols are nothings apart from the underlying ideas, and each symbol represents any number of the same ideas—the sameness being

established by the necessity-sensation. "Number" has not yet come into existence. As a rudimentary knower, I have simply apple, stone, tree to represent any number of the respective objects. Let us now limit ourselves to the apple-idea. As an advancing knower, the necessity-sensation involves for me another symbol implying separation between the identities—apple-idea constituting, say, two apples. Each of these identities now becomes a "one." Now, I have apple-one and apple-one: two "ones," for which I have not yet a single term. The necessity-sensation again operates. As it transformed apple-identities into one-identities, it now transforms one-identities into a single idea represented by a single symbol: two. This involves the same process of transmutation as transformed the separated apple-identities into one-identities. Now, assume I see four apples. As an advancing knower, through the necessity-sensation, I establish separated two-identities as I established separated one-identities and separated apple-identities. So the process of subsumption proceeds, until I have a science of numbers and a complex system of intercalary symbols representing ideas of the processes by which the transformations are effected. Thus the necessity-sensation establishes that one "one" with another "one" constitutes a "two." The idea of addition then becomes represented by a symbol: $+$. So multiplication, subtraction, division come into existence and are symbolised—all occurring through essentially the same activity of the necessity-sensation. Once

identity is established the rest follows automatically. Accordingly, there is no need to invoke a central knower initiating its own mathematical cognitions by means of nebulous preformations.

The application of the symbol "one" indifferently to all ideas of single objects occurs through the imaginative isolation of the symbol from any sensory basis. As the symbol "tree" is imaginatively isolated from any particular tree, so the symbol "one" is imaginatively isolated from any particular object. This imaginative isolation does not constitute real isolation. Neither "tree" nor "one" has any real significance unless as representing some object of sense or thought. The mathematician exaggerates the imaginative procedure by which the symbol "one" is indifferently applied to a multitude of single objects of thought and sense. As the ordinary sensualist imaginatively divorces "one" from any specific idea of a sensory experience, so the mathematician imaginatively cuts the "one" adrift from all specific sensory experiences and derivative ideas, treating the symbol as a self-existent entity. He has so metamorphosed the original "one" and its numerical posterity, that each becomes devoid of any definitive quality, and moves as a sort of ghost in a world of its own, among other like ghosts. Now the same necessity-sensation which bound the "one" to the apple-idea, also binds the mathematician's ghost-one to other like ghosts. Through what alienists call auto-suggestion, on the part of the mathematician, these ghosts have become as real to him as currants,

raisins, and flour are to the cook who is making a pudding. Having thus completely divorced his symbols from their sensory substratum, all that the mathematician has to do is to allow the necessity-sensation to carry him along by the method of what is called logic. If the mathematician is also a physicist with ontological proclivities, he will project matter into ghost-land, as he has projected numerical symbols.

CHAPTER IV

KANTIAN SPACE AND TIME

KANT asks : "How can there be in the mind, before any objects whatever have been presented to us, an internal intuition, which shall determine the conception of such objects? It must be that it exists in the subject as a formal capacity of being affected by objects, and of receiving from them, by this means, an immediate representation, that is to say, an intuition, a *form* of the external sense." I answer : Supposing there is the "form," why call it space? Again, why may not objects as readily be perceived in their entirety as something called a "form" be ready in the mind, to carve them out? The "form" needs as much creating as does a full percept. If the mind has created "forms" or has them ready-made, I see no reason why it could not as readily create objects independently of "form," or have them made for it. That the Kantian, through treating words as things, hypnotises himself into the notion that certain machinery for carving out objects is a simpler, or more fundamental, thing for the mind

to possess than are the objects themselves, is no proof that mind needs the machinery. If machinery of the sort is needed for carving out objects, it is needed for carving out "forms." Like the physicist's atoms, these "forms" need accounting for as much as do the things for which they are advanced as accounting. So we may proceed *in infinitum*.

From my standpoint, every evolutionary stage of mind has done all it could do, without guidance by preformations or adumbrations of what was before it. Whatever preformation or adumbration has ever existed to determine mind's work has been in the soul. About such preformations or adumbrations, as actual experience, mind must ever be a blank. All it can do is to realise their results as sensory experience and its ideational developments. Space is sensation. There is no sensation apart from external excitation. There is no such excitation apart from body (that is, apart from the soul's hypnotism of the matter-soul, involving sensory experience). Accordingly, there is no space without body, no matter how we juggle with the ghost of space as "idea." I can add or divide spatial inter-sections (involving what I shall deal with as space-sensation) and bodily extensions, but I can no more add or divide "space" than toothache. So also I can add or divide specific intervals (dependent, as I shall show, on the space-sensation), but I cannot add or divide "time."

The Kantian will have it, by implication, that the sensory and intellectual are so related that the

intellectual can build castles of truth independently of the sensory. My position is that the intellectual (not, as I shall later show, to be confounded with intellect itself) is a void until it interacts with the sensory ; but that the sensory is no such void until it interacts with the intellectual. I suggest that the sensory did an enormous amount of cognitive work before the intellectual appeared on the scene, and that if the intellectual ignores that work, it is bound to go credally wrong. From my standpoint, when the intellectual, under the Kantian's auspices, interacts with the sensory, the intellectual attains no more universal, absolute knowing than it attains when it similarly operates under the auspices of the "man in the street." All that the intellectual can accomplish is to change the sensation of belief, and to do this effectively it must, from my standpoint, never depart from the method of building up from the bed-rock of sense. Immediately the intellectual pretends to work on its own account, from top towards bottom, it becomes, to my apprehension, a necromancer, to attend to whose feats life is too short.

The Kantian professes to show that space and time exist in mind, independently of observation of specific objective relationships. He says that simple perception of objects could not involve perception of their temporal and spatial relationships. Well, suppose we grant that there is a faculty endowed with nebular time and space, what then? On like grounds, we may say there is such a sweetness-faculty or sourness-faculty ; a sharpness-faculty

or bluntness—faculty. We may invent a special nebular faculty for every perception.

We have here three things—bodies, space, time. All are things in mind. Experience tells us that if space and time are nebularly immanent in the mind, bodies must be at least as immanent. If experience tells us this, why shall we worry ourselves to decide whether anything is or is not nebularly immanent in the mind? Why shall we not accept the things as given, using our experience and reason, instead of our imagination, to account for them? Now, experience tells us that if bodies do not exist, nothing else can exist in the mind. But experience does not tell us that if time and space do not exist, nothing else can exist in the mind. For experience tells us nothing at all about space and time until it has told us about bodies. This must be so because space and time only exist, to experience, as ideas, and it is demonstrable that ideas can only exist as preconditioned by sensory experience, or bodies. According to its own experience, the mind manifests itself sequentially—first, as sensory bodies; next, as psychical bodies, or ideas.

According to the Kantian, space and time are independent of special perception of objects, of which they are the precondition. Again, according to Kantism, space and time are not conception, but perception, because conception deals with various objects agreeing in general but differing in particular, whereas there is only one space and one time which we conventionally differentiate into parts, and which

Kantian Space and Time 51

are also, really, infinitely addible and divisible. I must confess that experience tells me no more about one time, or one space, than about one "adjective," and experience tells me that I am no more able to add or divide, infinitely or finitely, time or space than I am able to add or divide "adjective." "Adjective," for me, is the symbol of an idea of an idea. Apart from the idea, of which it is an idea, "adjective," to me, is empty sound. Space and time (as imagined by the Kantian) are to me, likewise, symbols, each of an idea of an idea. Space is the symbol of an idea of an idea of what I shall later deal with as the space-sensation. Time is the symbol of an idea of an idea of what I shall later deal with as the time-sensation, both of which, I shall show, are preconditioned by sensory bodies.

The Kantian tells me that one main proof that I am wrong in such a proposition as the above is that I can think away body, but not space and time. But I can think away space and time as readily as body. By merely closing my eyes and exerting my will, I can annihilate, with equal facility, body, space and time. That I usually retain space and time, in thought, when I close my eyes, is a fact to be accounted for as my retention of body in memory, and my having various organic sensations affording me tactual experiences of movement. Could I obliterate body and the muscular sense of movement, there could be neither space nor time, for me. Really, I am thinking away space and time whenever my mind is absorbed in any particular process of

thought not concerned with time and space. Under such conditions, I think away time and space as completely as I think away any specific concrete object with which my thought is not dealing. To say that I cannot think away time and space is merely to say that my concrete experiences are such that I cannot banish them from mind, so long as I think of thinking away time and space. In the very act of "trying" to accomplish this feat, I am really busying myself with thinking about the concrete relationships on which time and space depend for existence. Let anybody fix his mind on thinking away any concrete object—so long as he is trying to think it away, he is really fixing it in his thought. The only way he can think away the object is by not thinking of it at all. Really, there is no meaning in talking of trying to think away anything. All we can do in the way of obliterating an object from thought is to think of something else, or to cease thinking at all.

That an introspectionist dealing with body, as *in* space, implicates extension with space, is a matter of his own arbitrary standpoint. My standpoint involves that space is distinct from body, as extension, and that when space is confounded with extension, the confusion arises through the application of what I shall later deal with as space-sensation to another sensation (body, or extension) from which the space-sensation is distinct, though to which it is essential. As often indicated in earlier chapters, and to be demonstrated in later ones, my experience of space is that it only exists as intersection of sensory bodies.

Kantian Space and Time 53

I care no more about what the Kantian calls the "idea" of space than I care about the idea of a turnip. The idea of the turnip is very different from the actual experience of the vegetable. I can no more get to know anything of real moment about space by dealing with the idea of it, to the exclusion of the real experience, than I can get to know the flavour of the turnip by analysing the idea of it. The Kantian argues from ideas to experience. I argue from experience to ideas.

When the Kantian says that time and space are only possible, as experience, through "forms," he implies, through arguing from conceptual instead of sensory premises, that time and space are entities apart from sensed happenings. He implies that notions antedate and precondition sensed experience, thus reversing all we apprehend as evolutionary order. He makes this reversal because he imagines that certain notions towards one end of the sensation-continuum reveal more reality than do others towards the other end of the continuum. He vainly pretends that his reason dealing with abstractions affords him a revelation essentially different from that of his senses, through which alone there is any demonstrable possibility of his abstractions. He may be compared to an acrobat trying to stand on a ball and hold it over his head at the same time.

CHAPTER V

PSYCHOLOGICAL SPACE

ACCORDING to psychology of the introspective school, which is essentially, under another name, the philosophy with which I have just been dealing, the determination of spatial relationship originates in an experience of what is called extensity or volume, supposed to be inherent to human consciousness. The skin and retina are said to afford this extensity-sensation in a far greater degree than do other organs or parts. That a person gets a different experience of volume from, say, thunder than from a penny whistle ; from pressure on a large than on a small skin-area ; from one pain than from another ; from the same object according as it is presented to one or another part of the retina, are, of course, matters of experiment. But they do not touch the real crux of spatial determination. They merely show that sensation has different qualities according to conditions of excitation. That tactual, auditory, gustatory, visual, olfactory sensations have a common quality of extensity may or may not be experientially true ; but

that spatial determination involves this extensity-sensation, or is dependent on it, is merely bare speculation. That a special faculty or capacity—call it what you like—exists in the mind constituting this extensity-sensation is also a matter of speculation. Until we can demonstrate the faculty and the extensity-sensation as the product of its function, we have no better reason for asserting that the extensity-sensation is the precondition of space-sensation than that the latter is the precondition of the former.

Assuming a certain quality to be common to a number of specialised sensations, the fact would not establish the quality as their precondition. That, for instance, green is common to a number of sensory impressions—as grass, leaves, stones, parrots, snakes, etc.—does not involve that green is the precondition of those objects. If we could discover a green sensation in every sensory impression, that would not involve that green existed before the sensory impressions. Still less would it involve that green had exceptional causative efficiency, as precondition, in regard to those sensory impressions. Even supposing we had proof that all sensory experiences had green before they had any other quality (of course, an impossibility, inasmuch as they would not be the sensory experiences, under such conditions), that would not constitute green the origin of the experiences, or even a predominantly efficient constituent. Green is a sensory experience. Grass is another, totally different. Green is merely a constituent of the complex : grass. There is not a jot of real reason to

suppose that space (judging it from the psychological standpoint) is less a complex than is grass. If it has "extensity," it has other qualities (tenuity, invisibility, intangibility, and other "ities"). "Extensity" no more accounts for space than "green" accounts for grass. Really, there is no "extensity" at all about space. There is only factitious extensity because we conceive bodies as *in* space, instead of as pre-conditioning space. If we resolutely think space and bodies as both being in mind (as they demonstrably must be) we shall find that we cannot think space without thinking it as the sub-condition of bodies.

Psychological analysis of symbols of bodily states is, philosophically, no better than a treatise on etymology, as real interpretation of sentient causation. The mere anatomising of symbols is empirically and philosophically futile as real demonstration of anything worth the trouble of investigation. In natural science, applying this method, as mathematics, to concrete phenomena, investigators get results of practical value. But in the introspective hair-splitting of psychologists I fail to discern results at all commensurate with the labours devoted to their achievement. Of what practical or philosophical value to humanity is it to be told that ideas are, psychologically, essentially different from sense-impressions, when everybody has ample evidence, independently of any "ology," that ideas and sense-impressions are so different that it is impossible for anybody in a normal state of consciousness to confound one with another? What is the use of being told that organic sensations are, psychologi-

cally, different from sense-impressions and ideas, when everybody has evidence that stomach-ache is different enough from ideas or sense-impressions utterly to disable him from confounding them? If all the psychologists in the world told me two feelings were identical that I experienced as totally different, I should be a bigoted unbeliever. If they exhausted the *Century Dictionary* in telling me that one sensation was the cause of another, I should remain incredulous. If they told me that one shade of feeling was concomitant with or prior to another, I should agree, if I had felt the shades conformably with their pronouncement. If I hadn't, I should care very little about the matter. When I read a certain sort of psychology, I always seem to be taking a passive part in the business of carving shadows.

That an introspectionist can build up his psychological individual by anatomising his own sensations and putting them together again is, no doubt, eloquent testimony to his own ingenuity and sensibility to shades of expression. At the same time, the resulting knowledge seems to me dear at the price of its attainment.

CHAPTER VI

SENSATION AND EMOTION CONTINUA

My concern has hitherto mainly been to clear the ground for a statement of my own doctrines, which, on the other hand, have been incidentally indicated in various parts of earlier chapters, in this and preceding volumes, in a manner, I hope, enabling the reader readily to grasp the more detailed exposition which will now begin. In executing the preliminary part of my programme, I have dealt critically with the theories of modern biology, physics, chemistry, psychology; with mathematics and the speculations of modern introspective philosophy. I am now going to interrupt the critical exposition by an hypothesis based on the premise of the continuity, and what I may term the automatism, of human experience. What constitutes this experiential progression I call the sensation and emotion continua. Later, though I shall revert, for a time, to the critical method in dealing with some ultimate conceptions of introspective philosophy, the contents of this volume will be a positive statement of my own ultimate doctrines.

Sensation and Emotion Continua 59

The hypothesis in the present chapter deals with experience somewhat in the terms of psychology. Yet its essential method is totally different from that of psychology. So far as it goes, the present hypothesis is advanced as a philosophically valid interpretation of the problems with which it deals. However, it will need elaboration in order that a completely satisfactory interpretation of such fundamental experiences as body, space, time, movement may be afforded. Such elaboration will constitute a later chapter dealing with my hypothesis of units of consciousness.

The sensation and emotion continua constitute what we call the conscious element, enabling us to identify ourselves, and things not ourselves, as individualities. These continua include all forms of sensory, emotive, and intellectual (excluding intellect itself and belief) experiences. Though, in this chapter, I somewhat adhere to the method of the introspectionist, inasmuch as I endeavour to indicate, by symbolising as entities in themselves, certain states of mind which we feel as constituting what may be termed a genealogical line of sensation, extending from what I call "unsymbolisable sensation" (anticipating sensory experience) on the one hand, to what I call faith (transcending experience) on the other hand, the reader must not suppose that I apply my nomenclature as defining real, active entities co-operating to constitute a thinking and feeling subject. My terms merely represent processes which I can identify in my own experience, as occurring in my own

perceptual and conceptual activities. The only real *things* I can identify are outside these pictorial definitions of subjective states. The real things are only God, soul, and the matter-soul. These I can scientifically identify as existing outside my subjectivity. If all my sensory, emotional, intellectual experiences ceased, God, the essential "I," as soul, and the essential "self" of matter, as soul, would persist. These are real things. The states I try, in this chapter, to indicate as characterising the "I" are not, in this sense, things. They are merely what may be termed transient accidents affecting the real things. Premising these points, let us now consider this field of sensation constituting the activity of the "ego."

All we experience, sensorially, emotionally, intellectually, is product of will, or soul-*fiat*, perceived through the organism which, itself, as I have earlier indicated, is a special product of the soul's hypnotism of the matter-soul, involving a medium, and what biologists call hereditary determinism through pre-determined multiplication of cells. The first product of this hypnotism experienced by the human organism, as soul-*fiat*, are what I have termed the "inner" and "outer" sensations, involving the experiences "I" and "not-I." The next experience of this soul-*fiat* is the "blur," or rudiment of sensory experience. Later, this rudiment becomes differentiated, as specific products of hypnotism, or what we call bodies (which I also term the primary "positives" or "resistances"). This stage also involves what I

Sensation and Emotion Continua 61

call the space-sensation, which I also term the primary "negative" or "non-resistance."

What I have termed the "outer" sensation, or simple sense of "not-I," is equivalent to what I have termed unsymbolisable sensation before it has become differentiated into sensory, emotional, and intellectual experiences. Thus, this unsymbolisable sensation is equivalent to the sensation-continuum, although we only experience it, in its primitive state, as the bare sense of externality, as it were anticipating actual sensory cognitions. In this state, it is what may be termed the germ of the inner and outer sensations, and may be considered the most rudimentary (say, amoeboid) stage of organic sensibility. In the human organism this unsymbolisable sensation is obscured, in its essential character as soul-fiat, by what are termed conscious experiences, involving a highly-developed sense of "I" and "not-I." Still, as soul-fiat, this unsymbolisable sensation is ever at work as the precondition of each conscious experience. It is not a faculty of the mind, in the Kantian sense. It is really out of mind (a thing of the "not-I," or body), and is only in "I," or soul. In a word, it is will, of which, as often indicated in this work, we are unconscious, except as its after-effect, some specific action, feeling, or thought.

Now, just as this will, as rudimentary unsymbolisable sensation, involved the transformation of itself as this latter into sensory experience and space-sensation, so it involved the transformation of sensory experience, as bodies, and space-sensation

into ideas or psychical bodies, and what I have termed void-sensation, binding ideas to sense-experience.

What we call language is to sensory experience as this latter is to the "outer" sensation, or rudimentary unsymbolisable sensation. We symbolise by seeing and touching (that is, we transform into signs sub-souls of the matter-soul, as sensory bodies) as fully as we symbolise by speaking. As language is the active manifestation of one mode of sensation which we call intellectual, involving the symbolism of ideas, so seeing or touching is the active manifestation of another such mode, involving the symbolism of unsymbolisable sensation. That we call the results of the former mode thinking, and those of the latter mode sensing, and that we draw fanciful conclusions regarding the "universality," "necessity," and what-not of the decisions of the thinking sensation, as compared with the non-thinking sensation, does not affect the essential identity of the two processes. Whether I "sense" my dog or "think" what I am now writing, I am, essentially, equally imagining, in the sense that I am equally transmuting the real unconscious into the symbolic conscious. When I stroke the dog I am equally symbolising as when I write this paragraph, and I "know" in the one case essentially as I "know" in the other.

These two forms of symbolism—sensory and intellectual—constitute what may be termed the main current of unsymbolisable sensation. They are

Sensation and Emotion Continua 63

bound together by the void-sensation. This is analogous, as "negative" or "non-resistance," to the "space" and "time" sensations. The void-sensation acts between sensory experiences or bodies and ideas, or what we usually consider not-bodies (but which I call psychical bodies), as the space-sensation acts between sensory experiences, or the time-sensation acts between ideational happenings.

We have so far tabulated three "negatives" or "non-resistances" (void, space, time sensations), and two "positives" or "resistances" (sensory experience or sensory bodies and ideas or psychical bodies). Though these "negatives" afford us the experience of ties or bridges binding together the various "positives," they afford us no experience of what we call necessary or causal relationship. We have now to deal with another "negative," involving this causal experience. But, first, let us see what is involved in the idea of causality itself. We perceive events as being related in time, as we perceive objects as being related in space. In other words, "resistances," as ideas, are connected by being differentiated through "non-resistance," as the time-sensation, as other "resistances," as sensory experiences, are connected by being differentiated through "non-resistance," as the space-sensation. But the conception of causal relationship is something more than the perception of mere sequences in time-relationship and differences in space-relationship. For instance, though we perceive, say, a cab to be followed by a tram-car, we do not conceive the one event to be

caused by the other. Or, again, to take an invariable succession, though we perceive daylight to be constantly followed by darkness (or *vice versa*), we do not attribute causality to the relationship. On the other hand, when we perceive the discharge of a gun to be followed by a falling bird, we attribute causality to the relationship.

Mere experiences of successions in time (that is, of events bound together by the "non-resistance," time-sensation) would not account for this experience of causal relationship. From my standpoint, what accounts for this experience is a fourth "negative," or "non-resistance," which I call the necessity-sensation. This, I maintain, is as real a sensation as is any sensory or ideational experience, or as is any one of the other "negatives." Thus, as constituting the sensation-continuum, we have now—(a) unsymbolisable sensation anticipating the "inner" and "outer" sensations; (b) the inner and outer sensations, involving "I" and "not-I," or externality and internality; (c) sensory experience, involving objects and, corollarily, the bond, as the "non-resistance," space-sensation; (d) the "non-resistance," void-sensation, as distorting imagination, transforming sensory experience into idea; (e) intellectual experience, involving ideas and, corollarily, the bond, as the "non-resistance," time-sensation; (f) the "non-resistance," necessity-sensation, binding together, in causal and other non-temporal relationship, ideas.

Complementary to and dependent on this sensation-continuum, as another mode of soul-fiat, is what

Sensation and Emotion Continua 65

I will term the emotion-continuum, involving what we call likes and dislikes, ranging from mere brute appetite to what we consider the highest development of æsthetic preference. The continua are automatic endowments common to brutes and humanity. So far as its automatism is concerned, the emotion-continuum is identical with the sensation-continuum. We no more really select in feeling emotion or reasoning, than in seeing or touching. In other words, in the cases of feeling sensory experience, ideas, and emotion, there is never, within our consciousness, so far as the particular feeling is concerned, any alternative possibility : the particular sensory or ideational experience, or emotion, is always, as it were, judging as a biassed agent, by its own contents and hence constituting its own sole justification. All these resistances, or what I shall later deal with as bodies, are conditioned by the non-resistances—void, space, time, necessity-sensations.

To constitute a genuinely discriminative element in mental activity, there must be a faculty void of contents, as feeling. Any faculty affording, in itself, an experience realised to consciousness, is what may be termed a prejudice-endowment. It is in the position of a litigant motivated by some blind impulse—say, revenge or obstinacy. It sees everything through its own idiosyncratic spectacles. To constitute a truly discriminative element there must be a faculty outside any special state of feeling. Such a factor is intellect, which says—this, of a series of contents of the continuum, as resistances and non-

resistances, shall involve a special product out of the continuum. This special product of intellect is belief. It constitutes the only truly discriminative factor in the mind, and radically differentiates the human from the brute. No brute can believe. But all brutes can sense and feel emotion, and some can reason. Man, alone, can believe. The term inspiration has no real significance except as implying belief. He who believes is inspired, and is human. To the extent that he does not believe, he is brute. So far as concerns mental activity, belief is transcendental emergence from the sensation-continuum, as unsymbolisable sensation, anticipating sensory experience, is entry into that continuum. Beyond belief, is faith. With both belief and faith I shall deal more particularly in special chapters.

So far, we have identified the human "ego" as what may be termed a tripartite entity composed of intellect and a duplex continuum constituted of two sub-types—the sensation-continuum and the emotion-continuum. Of these latter, the sensation-continuum is composed of the inner and outer sensations and of the resistances and non-resistances indicated above, while the emotion-continuum is composed of the various specific emotive affections, ranging from the lowest animal appetite to the highest æsthetic preference and the non-resistance, necessity-sensation.

There is now another constituent of the "ego" to be incidentally noticed. This is volition. It is, of course, no part of the continua, but is their condition. I shall deal with it, in various aspects, in later

Sensation and Emotion Continua 67

chapters, and have already devoted considerable attention to it. Here, I may indicate that it is the conditioning factor determining the sensation and emotion continua. There is what I may term a will-continuum corresponding to the sensation and emotion continua which may be termed echoes of this will-continuum. As the sensation and emotion continua are manifested, so they are willed. The various factors I deal with as constituting the sensation and emotion continua are merely terms picturing the underlying active agency—the will-continuum, outside consciousness and determining it. With whatever factitiously active agents I may deal, in this or any other chapter, I always imply the will-continuum as behind and conditioning such agents.

Essential to all thought processes is what we call memory. It may be conscious or unconscious. The latter sort we call instinct. Conscious memory is a product of the “non-resistance,” necessity-sensation. It is this in so far as all acts of conscious memory are based on the perception of sameness, and this perception depends on the necessity-sensation. Conscious memory must be divided into two classes—one, the automatic, involving the mere perception of sameness (repetition); the other, the volitional, involving recall with the sensation of effort and the locating of events in “time” and “space.” In this latter form, the act of memory itself, excited by “unsymbolisable emotion” (effort), is always dependent on a motor-volitional fiat, which, like all other fiats, is out of consciousness, that is, disjunct from

the sensation and emotion continua. Mere recall, not involving what I shall deal with as a motor fiat, is within the sensation-continuum, being a product of the necessity-sensation and specific conceptual experiences. On the other hand, the volitional form of memory is equivalent, in the conceptual arena, to a motor manifestation of will, and, like all volitional acts of the sort, is outside consciousness. When, in a later chapter, I come to discuss conscious memory in connection with hypnotic phenomena, I shall show that whenever an act of this sort of memory occurs, with the sense of effort, the act itself is never consciously, but always unconsciously accomplished. As in the case of the motor manifestation, so also in the case of volitional memory, we have always accomplished the act of willing before we are conscious of it.

There is another form of memory, lacking the sense of effort and perception of likeness. This is the unconscious form we call instinct, and I have termed type-memory. The subject has no "premonition," in the shape of effort, of this type-memory. He acts it purely as an automaton. The great majority of brute activities, and largely those of humanity, depend on this form of memory. I shall deal more fully with memory in a later chapter.

What is called intelligence is, essentially, sensory experience transformed by the void-sensation into ideational experience. To take an illustration—sensory experience affords us a certain product of hypnotism of the matter-soul, as an object of sense.

Sensation and Emotion Continua 69

This "percept" then becomes assimilated by the intelligence as a "concept" to which, through imagination, we apply a symbol, say knife. This "knife" is not the sensory experience, but is an elaboration, from that experience, by the void-sensation. The sensory experience I feel immediately, by intuition, as an ultimate fact which I cannot get behind. On the top, as I may say, of that, I feel something else, as what I call intelligent apprehension of the sense reaction. Between this intelligent apprehension and the sense reaction is the void-sensation. It constitutes inherent momentum projecting sensory experience beyond itself into conception, just as the unsymbolisable sensation, anticipating sensory experience, involves like momentum projecting the precondition of sense-impression into the impression itself. The synthesis from sensory experience to conception is in the void-sensation, just as the synthesis from the anticipatory unsymbolisable sensation to sense reaction is in the unsymbolisable sensation. The feeling that we want something more than is given in immediate experience, or the so-called striving for perfection, so much dwelt on by the Kantian, as warrant for his ready-furnished knower, is really inherent in each preceding grade of cognitive activity. The continua go on, as it were, in defiance of the Kantian "mind," or "knower."

As the unconscious will realises itself, as hypnotism of the matter-soul, as unsymbolisable sensation and sensory experience, so it further realises itself as void-sensation and intelligence. The momentum involving

"synthesis" is there—inherent in each preceding sensational state. The mind does not attack the sensational contingency as an outside agent, furnished with a number of ready-made tools (categories, forms, etc.). The mind is itself merely the manifestation of the sensation-continuum and emotion-continuum.

Let us now give a little more consideration to the necessity-sensation or "non-resistance," binding together ideas and projecting, as what we call synthesis, one idea on another, much as the void-sensation projects ideas on sensory experience. I have earlier indicated that this necessity-sensation involved the sense of simple succession through constituting memory of the non-volitional sort, and that it constituted the sense of causal relationship through the "inner" sensation, involving the "I" as a doer, and through imagination attributing doing to the "not-I" or "outer" sensation, as well as to the "I" or "inner" sensation.

As contrasted with the void-sensation the necessity-sensation acts only between ideas, or what I shall later deal with as non-affective psychical bodies, and between emotions and æsthetic feelings, or what I shall later deal with as affective psychical bodies, while the void-sensation acts only between sensory experiences and ideas. As contrasted with the space-sensation the necessity-sensation projects one idea of sensory experience on another (as revealing ordinary succession), or ties one idea of sensory experience to another (as revealing causal relationship), while the

Sensation and Emotion Continua 71

space-sensation merely defines relationships of sensory bodies. As contrasted with the time-sensation, the necessity-sensation projects one abstract idea or set of ideas on another (as revealing ordinary succession), or ties one abstract idea or set of ideas to another (as revealing causal relationship), while the time-sensation merely defines ideational relationships, as the space-sensation defines sensory relationships.

It will be seen that the *organism* of cognition, as distinct from "fragments" of that organism, constitutes a continuum starting as unsymbolisable sensation, proceeding through sensory experience to ideational experience, and involving sensory bodies and ideas as the "positives" or "resistances," and the void, necessity, time, space sensations as the "negatives" or "non-resistances." This succession constitutes the sensation-continuum. Involved with this continuum are what we call imagination and intelligence. Beyond this continuum are the emotion-continuum, intellect, unsymbolisable emotion (effort), and the motor fiat constituting what we commonly consider a volitional act. All these factors will be dealt with in various fresh aspects in later chapters, and have already been discussed in this and preceding chapters. They are all products in actual experience, or to be logically derived from sensory experience. What we call consciousness is merely some part of the sensation and emotion continua conditioned by the necessity- and void-sensations. All here is a matter of *sensation*. The Kantian's, equally with the ordinary person's, differentiation between

knowing and feeling is essentially without rational warrant.

By intellect, I may remind the reader, I do not mean what is commonly called reason, involving logical exercise. This is simply a manifestation of the sensation-continuum having experiential contents in itself. Intellect, as already indicated, and to be more fully elucidated in later chapters, has no such contents. It merely judges of contents. Strictly, what we commonly call intellectual experiences are not products of intellect at all, but of the necessity-sensation and specific sensory and ideational experiences. These are all in what I may term the automatic run of the sensation-continuum. Intellect merely decides about them, and leaves its decision to be executed or not, as the case may be, by effort, or what I call unsymbolisable emotion and the volitional fiat, which I shall later deal with as motor.

What is called the evidence of our senses is something within ourselves, just as is the evidence of our reason or emotion. There is no such thing as the passive receptivity to external excitation imagined by empiricists. We really as much fabricate what we know, say of a stone as a mere sensed object, as we fabricate in formulating theories regarding its origin. Any cognitive progression starting from the ideational part of the sensation-continuum (as does pure mathematics) can only be an abstract from the organism of cognition. Again, any cognitive progression pretending to work backwards to sensory experience from excogitated data of inference (as

Sensation and Emotion Continua 73

does philosophy of the Kantian order) reverses the normal order of progression. All truth, to be practically compulsive, must emanate in a clear line from sensory experience. In other words, it must follow the order of the sensation-continuum.

An idea of an object of sense, as produced by the void-sensation, or of an idea of such an idea as produced by the necessity-sensation, as inference, is quite distinct from the idea of that idea as produced by the necessity-sensation, as imagination. In the one case there is normal progression and synthesis from sense to idea and from idea to idea. In the other there is merely substitution of idea for idea. When I say, this is a lump of iron measuring a foot in diameter, the ideas are normally and synthetically derived from sensory experience. When I say, this is a molecule measuring one ten-millionth of a centimetre in diameter, the ideas are not normally or synthetically derived from sensory experience, but are merely substitution of one idea for another. On the other hand, when I say, this body is units of stimulus and consciousness, or soul, the idea is as normally derived from sensory experience as in the case of my saying the body is iron. There is equal synthesis in the one as in the other case. The sensory experience is as much transformed through my projecting it into the idea soul as in my projecting it into the idea iron. But there is no such synthetic transformation in projecting body into molecules. Here there is only infinitesimal repetition by substitution.

When I reduce matter to soul, I do not postulate

soul as an infinitesimal repetition of the idea of sensory body. I recognise that body as matter only exists as sensory experience, and that when I reduce matter to soul it is no longer matter, because it is outside the conditions through which only matter exists. In reducing matter to soul I am transforming sensory experience into something other than itself. I recognise that if I applied sensory definitions to what I had projected out of sensory conditions, I should stultify my projection just as I should stultify my procedure—to take a concrete illustration—if I first weighed some ice on the scales, and then, after melting it in a pan, poured it on the scales to weigh it again. The physicist's dealing with molecules is quite analogous to this supposititious dealing with ice. It is as philosophically puerile to apply spatial definition to a molecule as it would be practically foolish to try to weigh water by pouring it on a scale-plate. If molecules exist, they can no more be matter than are my "units." If they are not matter, they cannot be defined in terms of space. In so far as the physicist demonstrates the existence of molecules, he merely demonstrates what I propound as "units" or soul.

It will be seen that I agree with the introspectionist who says that ideas are inherently discrete things which no power in themselves could bind together so as to involve intelligent apprehension. As he imagines ideas, they are undoubtedly such discrete things. However, to me there are no such things as what the introspectionist imagines as ideas. My "ideas," or psychical bodies, as positives, are always

Sensation and Emotion Continua 75

inherently bound, by the necessity-sensation, to other ideas. If we compare ideas with bricks, they are bricks with which there is always mortar (the necessity-sensation) not only binding them together, but also selecting one "brick" to be placed on another. The "mortar" is no less a matter of experience than are the "bricks." So, of sensory bodies and the space-sensation—here again the "bricks" involve the "mortar." Our real thinking and sensing are done by the non-resistances, not by the resistances. The sensualistic view, busying itself mainly with the resistances, ignores the vital factors.

CHAPTER VII

MOTOR WILL

WILL is the fundamental activity of the soul, underlying and conditioning every realisation of the sensation and emotion continua as sensory and psychical bodies ; every manifestation of intellect as belief, and every motor activity. Thus it is a complex constituted by distinctive types of fiats. The will that ensures psychical bodies is not the will that ensures sensory bodies. The will that ensures emotion is not the will that ensures ideas. The above types may be termed sub-wills. Which shall be manifested and which shall prevail over another of these sub-wills, is determined by what I term the motor will. This is the will of wills.

That I can discriminate morally is a matter of reason. This is the product of a sub-will. That I desire to execute the discrimination is a matter of emotion. This also is a product of a sub-will. That I feel I can execute the discrimination is a matter of sensibility common to me and every other living being, even to the very lowest that has no will

constituting moral discrimination, emotion, or even differentiated sensation. On the other hand, that I do execute what I feel I can execute, and that I execute one rather than another product of discrimination, is a matter of the will of wills ensuring specific motor activity. Failing this supreme will, all the others would merely be a chaos of contending fiats inconsistent with the possibility of a coherent soul. This motor will is the final test of what I shall later deal with as soul-evolution.

Before this motor will can operate, some of the other wills must be manifested as specific sensory, emotive, or intellectual experience. Like the sub-will, intellect, the motor will may be compared to a judge; only, while intellect is a judge who pronounces sentence without executing it, motor will is a judge who executes judgment without pronouncing it. The sub-wills, as sensory and psychical bodies, or the sensation and emotion continua, know nothing of the decree of this supreme judge until the decree is executed as a motor manifestation. When, as a genuinely discriminative agent, I adopt one rather than another course of action, intellect, or sub-will, as judge, presents one or another alternative. The result is a corresponding sub-will, as unsymbolisable emotion, or effort, to which motor will responds as the particular fiat constituting what we call action. When, as a pseudo-discriminative agent, I adopt one rather than another alternative, one out of two or more sub-wills, as what we call desires or likings, excites the sub-will, unsymbolisable emotion, to

which the motor will responds by a corresponding fiat. In such a case, the resulting action is that of the brute, the specially human sub-will, intellect, not being a factor in the contingency. When, as another type of pseudo-discriminative agent, intellect, as sub-will, presents one alternative, as belief; emotion, as another sub-will, presents an alternative opposing, as automatic preference, that of intellect, and I act the determination of emotion, I am what I call a brute-human, or psychical hybrid. The form of discrimination arising from the sub-will involving what is called sensory experience, is the most rudimentary manifestation of volition. When this discrimination involves manifestation of the motor will, the result is what physiologists call reflex action, and is common to the whole range of living beings.

I have earlier suggested that will is free, or omnipotent, but that it creates conditions, as body, practically rendering it limited. This proposition will now need amplifying. What the will creates, as the body above referred to, is the medium through which the soul manifests itself as sub-wills, or sensory and psychical bodies, and as motor will excited by these bodies. This medium is a product of hypnotism of the matter-soul. Obviously, the soul which, as this will-complex, produces a medium through which only that will can manifest itself, can only be free to the extent that it can manifest itself through its medium. Accordingly, the will that is unlimited or omnipotent must be some other than such a will limited by a product of its own energy.

We must contemplate the series of wills culminating in the motor will, as we have contemplated the sensory and psychical bodies produced by those wills, as what I have dealt with as the sensation and emotion continua. We might term this series of wills the will-continuum. Really this will-continuum is the underlying reality behind the sensation and emotion continua. While these latter are real, as effects, the will-continuum is real, as relative cause. That this latter is only relative, not absolute cause, is demonstrated by the fact, *ex hypothesi*, that it is a continuum which can only exist through interaction with something not itself—the matter-soul. The very fact that it is a continuum is demonstration that it cannot be, causally, a prime efficient. That it is a continuum is self-evident, unless the arguments I advance are unsound. Again, that this continuum can only manifest itself in relation to something not itself, is also self-evident, unless the arguments I have advanced for a matter-soul are logically upset. The will that is absolutely free cannot differentiate itself into a continuum, because this involves relativity, and relativity involves limitation. For like reason, the will that necessarily interacts with something not itself cannot be absolutely free.

On the other hand, a will that was absolutely free could not create anything which should continue to exist without interacting with its Creator. For, were the created to exist without interaction with the Creator, the created would need to constitute itself creator by annihilating the conditions which con-

stituted it created. In other words, the created would then need to become self-existent. Then if, as above posited, a will that necessarily interacts with something not itself cannot be absolutely free, and if the Creator does necessarily interact with the created that it may exist, the Creator is the created, as source and support, while the created is not the Creator. It is impossible to imagine the possibility of self-creation by the created, just as it is impossible to imagine the possibility of self-creation by the Creator. So far as the mind can conceive possibility or impossibility in regard to any contingency, the mind must trust itself. The only contingency in respect to which the mind can conceive possibility or impossibility is the mind's own universe. To what is not its universe the mind cannot apply what it conceives as possibility or impossibility. As regards its own universe, the mind knows that this universe cannot be self-existent, and must depend on what is self-existent. About what is possible or impossible to the creative self-existence, the mind is necessarily a blank. If the mind logically establishes mystery, then mystery is as cogent a demonstration for the mind as is anything it realises as actual experience. After it has realised mystery as its ultimate fact, the mind must transcend belief, by faith.

I show that the mind can establish, as fact, a continuum of wills culminating in the motor will. I further show that, to render conceivably possible the existence of such a continuum, the mind must attribute that continuum, as created product, to a

will which is outside anything the mind can apprehend as limitation. Such a will we may characterise as omnipotent. The mere dialectician may urge that I constitute the omnipotent will limited by positing that an omnipotent will cannot create anything which shall continue to exist without interacting with its creative origin. I would answer such dialectics by other dialectics, to the effect that the omnipotence of the will that created our will endowed it, as a mind, with the capacity to conceive omnipotence which was not the omnipotence of the creative will. As indicated, we may apply our psychical bodies, as symbols, to our own universe. We cannot apply those symbols to what is outside our universe, as we apply them to what is within that universe. So far as we are concerned, it is sufficient to know that our universe did not create itself, and that it exists solely through interacting with a self-existent will which has no limitations within our possible apprehension. Regarding ourselves, we must believe what intellect tells us regarding possibilities and impossibilities. Regarding God, we must believe our intellect when it tells us that our possibilities and impossibilities exist only as products of what is outside our possibilities and impossibilities.

An omnipotent will could not create wills not interacting with the creative will, because such lack of interaction in created wills would involve limitation on the part of the creative will, and so annihilate its creative character through involving volition not determined by itself and, by implication, constituting

creative act on the part of the created. To attribute the power to create unconditioned wills is to stultify significance in the term omnipotence, but has no bearing on the character of creative will itself. Our terminology only applies within our limited universe. In this universe we know that nothing can be created that is not absolutely determined by the Creator, inasmuch as anything that was not so determined could not be part of that universe.

It is obvious that the suggestion commonly advanced as affording a semblance of warrant for free-will, that the Creator has endowed the creature with a limited power of choice of alternatives, is altogether destructive of any rational conception of a Creator, inasmuch as every free choice so exercised would imply a fresh product of creation by the creature, and would really involve unlimited choice. Either the result of any "choice" exercised by the creature must be absolutely determined by the Creator of the alternatives among which that choice is exercised, or the creature, to the extent of his free choice, must become a rival creator to the Creator through which he exists. Every free choice exercised by such a sub-creator would involve an element discordant in respect to the universe determined by the Creator, and so would constitute creative rivalry between the creature and the Creator. The new determinism of the creature by himself would involve creation equivalent to that of the Creator in creating the creature. The world would then become a chaos of contending free entities each exercising his

special form of self-determinism, and so introducing elements other than those determined by the Creator. I need not pursue this point further, and should not have deemed the suggestion of a limited liberty, as between creature and Creator, worth a line of scrutiny, were not the suggestion widely tolerated as being within rational credibility.

I may here indicate, for those who take the Bible as authority on this subject, that its whole teaching is essentially a denial of any shape or form of liberty, as between creature and Creator, and an affirmation of absolute determinism by the Creator. Anybody who takes the trouble to seek Biblical utterances affirming absolute determinism will find multitudes throughout the Old and New Testaments.

In what follows in this and other chapters, whenever I deal with the sensation and emotion continua, the reader will please remember that the above remarks regarding the will-continuum as underlying and conditioning reality are always implied. Thus, when I happen to mention sensory bodies, psychical bodies (ideas), affective bodies (emotion), the non-resistances (space-sensation, necessity-sensation, void-sensation, time-sensation), I imply corresponding sub-wills and the will-continuum.

The foregoing discussion involves philosophical demonstration of God, as the condition, or soul behind all other souls. These not being will that is free can only be instruments, not causes. Self-caused instruments are experientially impossible. Accordingly, there is no reality in cosmical existence

—“material” or “form”—or there is cause behind causation itself. If it be asked: Why need there be any specific will, or soul, for specific body, why may not there be nothing but body, as what the Monist calls “form,” without soul, or what he calls “material”—I reply: Anything is possible to those who believe the possibility. However, as I know nothing about “form” or “material” except through knowing “form” (emanating from “unsymbolisable sensation” as the “outer” sensation) and through knowing that this “form” is “not-I” (through the “inner” sensation), I am driven to believe that neither “I” nor “not-I” exists if specific “material” underlying specific “form” does not exist. If such specific “material” does exist, it is necessarily in relationship and needs accounting for as the product of an agent that is not in relationship. Personally, if I believed I was merely “form,” I venture to think I should live as a brute, and when I found no pleasure in living, should at once end it. The mere fact that I think this way is almost enough for me to prove that I have a soul, and that this soul is something quite different from my body. For I find so many other bodies that do not think as mine does—so many people who keep living on without getting any pleasure out of it! When I see a starving, shivering wretch, whose whole world is centred in his belly, and think of the trouble he takes to live, I feel sure I have a soul that, notwithstanding its relationship to other souls, testifies to its own existence, as “material,” in a very conclusive fashion.

As already indicated, will is a complex of heterogeneous facts. What we conventionally consider an act of willing is merely one, though the ultimate manifestation of this complex, the result of which, as another manifestation of the complex, involves perception of a motor activity. So also, as I have earlier shown in dealing with biological questions in the preceding volume, what biologists call continuity of the germ-plasm, involving heredity and procreation, is another manifestation of the volitional complex. So, again, is every specific sensory, emotive, intellectual manifestation. So, again, is the response of the matter-soul to our hypnotism, constituting the ground or basis of the sensation-continuum. All is will, as the universe. Behind this universe, as I may say integrating the volitional complex of the cosmos (although no terminology can adequately express the mystery), is the Supreme Will, or God.

Thus, we have three main types of will—the God-will, the organic will, the inorganic will. Of the God-will we can say nothing except that it is the cause and condition of the others. Of the organic and inorganic wills, we can say that they are an infinite complex manifested as phenomena of response and counter-response. The organic will, to our apprehension, manifests itself as of two main types—the brute and human. All action not governed by intellectual discrimination is the product of the brute type of volition. Under this head come all purely emotive, rational, and sensory manifestations. All action, to the extent that it is governed by intellectual

discrimination, or belief, is the product of the human type of volition.

I have earlier indicated that the motor fiat cannot directly issue through intellect. Nor can this fiat directly issue through sensory experience, or through what we commonly consider emotion, as a so-called affective state or feeling. The motor fiat is always directly excited by a specific form of emotional stimulus, which I call "unsymbolisable emotion." This involves the bare sense of effort, quite apart from any specific end or object. Everybody experiences it, as what I may term emotive momentum, anticipating every act of volition with which it is usually confounded by psychologists. It always follows any specific emotion, intellectual or sensory experience, involving the volitional fiat as sensible action. It is entirely distinct from emotive states to which we apply such terms as desire, determination, preference, resolution. It is comparable with the "void," "necessity," and "space" sensations to which I have earlier adverted. But instead of connecting, by differentiation, two states within consciousness, as do these latter sensations, "unsymbolisable emotion," or sense of effort, connects, by differentiation, some specific sensory, emotional, or intellectual state with something—the volitional fiat, out of consciousness.

Anybody who believes his will is free in the absolute sense must, if he is to prove the fitness of his belief, demonstrate, by logical inference from sensory experience, how the individual will can override the

creative will of God ; or, if such a believer in free-will does not grant God as creative power, he must demonstrate, by the above-indicated method, how any part of a self-existent cosmos can act independently of all other parts. Failing demonstration on these points, anybody who says he believes in the unconditioned nature of human will is of no more rational account than another person who says he believes in witchcraft. No will is really free that is not free in the above-indicated absolute sense. What is attributed, as freedom, to the will, by the British ethicists of the introspective school, is merely one or another state conceived as various forms of "choosing" from conflicting motives, impulses, desires. These ethicists fail to recognise that what they imagine as unconditioned will (as some sort of "choosing") is essentially the same thing so far as regards conditioned quality, as are the motives, impulses, desires, or what not, among which the so-called choice is exercised.

These introspectionists simply imagine another form of impulse, desire, motive (as what they call choice), as selecting among what are, in regard to freedom, essentially identical with the supposed chooser or will. If I "choose" between the impulses to steal and not to steal, I simply experience another impulse ("unsymbolisable emotion") which invariably involves the true act of willing or volitional fiat. This "unsymbolisable emotion" or sensation of effort no more really discriminates, as an absolutely unconditioned agent, between the impulses from which

selection is made than do any of the impulses themselves. The "unsymbolisable emotion" or *constant* impulse is as much a matter of sensation, and hence as much conditioned, as are any of the *inconstant* impulses, emotions, etc., one of which happens to excite it to excite the true volitional fiat. Thus, the true willing-act is no more identical with the constant antecedent—"unsymbolisable emotion" or sensation of effort—than with any of the inconstant elements from which "choice" is made. All introspective ethics is rendered rationally abortive through confusion of the sensation of effort with the true volitional fiat.

Though, in the majority of cases, this sensation of effort or "unsymbolisable emotion" is followed by the fiat, it is not always so. It may be arrested, or "aborted," by the ordinary impulses before it excites the fiat. I myself can speak from experience of such arrest. I have deliberately chosen a particular line of action, and during the sensation of effort—as we say, "in the very act"—have been stopped by a sudden ordinary impulse neutralising the "unsymbolisable emotion." I daresay many people have experienced such arrest. It is quite different from what is called hesitation, or the balance between impulses, motives, desires, preventing prepotency of one or another. Such experience is empirical evidence that the sensation of effort, or "unsymbolisable emotion," almost universally confounded with the true volitional (motor) fiat, is merely a matter of sensibility or sub-will, as much determined as is any other sub-will.

Quite different from the motor form of volitional fiat, involving what we commonly call willing, is the fiat through which we hypnotise the matter-soul so as to afford us sensory experiences. In the case of this volitional manifestation, we feel no "interregnum" as "unsymbolisable emotion" or effort. We simply emerge from what I may term the current of "unsymbolisable sensation," pre-conditioning "personal artifice," or actual experience, into a part of the current involving "personal artifice" as sensed objects. Senses, emotivity, intellect afford no stimuli for this form of fiat, which is the pre-condition of the manifestation of these faculties. We may say that we exercise this fiat, transforming the matter-soul into specific objects of sense, as "inspiration" direct from God. He who discovers a new element in the atmosphere, who invents a contrivance, or simply fashions one, gets the experience *of* his achievement—as distinct from experience of effort *in* his achievement—as sensing the element, or the contrivance, as the above-indicated "inspiration" or volition.

The cabinetmaker sees the table he is constructing. Here he manifests the "inspiration" (as sub-will), willing the matter-soul to afford him certain sensory experience. He also manifests "unsymbolisable emotion," as effort, in fashioning what he realises through the "inspiration." In manifesting the "unsymbolisable emotion," or effort, he consciously wills his own body to afford him certain experience as the effort. In manifesting "personal artifice," as realisation of the result of that effort, and of his own body as a

sensed object, he unconsciously wills the matter-soul to afford him certain experiences as the various objects of sense. This applies to the discoverer and inventor.

In the case of ordinary hypnotic suggestion, involving what is called telepathy or thought-transference, and a number of automatic activities familiar to everybody who has dabbled in what was once known as mesmerism, there is simply a direct transfer of fiat from the operator to the hypnotised subject. The motor will of the operator then becomes the will of the subject. More or less, according to the particular hypnotic state, "unsymbolisable emotion," or effort, is here eliminated as a factor, so far as the hypnotised subject is concerned, and his condition may be compared to that involving the "inspiration" of sensory experience. He performs his volitions, in executing the commands of the hypnotist, in a manner akin to that of the senser who realises his objects in consciousness. Of the fact of telepathy, I have had such conclusive empirical evidence within my personal experience that I no more doubt such thought-transference than I doubt that I am writing these lines.

That one person, by suggestion, conscious or otherwise, can dominate another's motor will is no more mysterious than that one person can overcome another's physical strength. The two cases are, philosophically, on the same plane. Will constitutes the muscular strength as it constitutes the hypnotic dominance. The test (belief) of the rightness or

wrongness of the exercise of muscular strength should be the test of the rightness or wrongness of the exercise of hypnotic will-power. The motor will of the hypnotist conditions the sub-wills as the ideas he "suggests," as it conditions the motor will of the hypnotic who executes the commands of the hypnotist. If one person, endowed with superior will-power of the hypnotic order, uses it against the dictates of intellect, he is as much a common rascal as is the muscular footpad who manifests his motor will at the expense of an unwary pedestrian. Multitudes of cases occur in which people in confidential relationship with others (as doctors, lawyers, ecclesiastics) exercise hypnotic will-power against the dictates of intellect and should be punished as common rogues. Did I determine the law of the land, I would rigidly exclude all such professional people from personal benefit through what is conventionally called the regard, attachment, gratitude, or what not, of those over whom they have peculiar facilities for exercising dishonest hypnotic suggestion. I am convinced that, in the majority of cases involving eccentric bequests to such people, at the expense of kindred and others in the natural order of regard, there has been just as much immoral exercise of will-power on the part of the beneficiaries, as occurs in the case of the common pickpocket or burglar. Anybody who exercises his motor will against his intellect is a moral criminal.

To constitute moral exercise of motor will, intellect must determine effort, or unsymbolisable

emotion. The mere exercise of intellect, without corresponding unsymbolisable emotion, constitutes a very degenerate type—the mere theorist. He may believe, but his belief is morally abortive. This type of abortive believer is a rare product. The vast majority of empty theorists are mere reasoners who have no belief at all. They are on the brute plane, whatever be the conventional culture attributed to them.

I earlier indicated that will was omnipotent and that its apparent limitations only existed through our bodily inability to excite it. I also indicated that the only really free will was God's will which operates, as the cosmos, through the limited power of the created to manifest it. Thus, my will and that of my neighbour are "fragments" of God's will manifesting themselves as my and his souls conditioned by their own products—our respective bodies or the matter-soul hypnotised into sub-souls, or the respective mediums as our bodies, by my and his souls. The matter-soul, too, as will responding to my will, is a "fragment" of God's will. My intellect, emotivity, sensibility—the limitative conditions under which God's will, as my will, manifests itself, constitute the evolutionary stage my soul has reached as a terrestrial entity. This stage, I believe, will condition its post-terrestrial stage, as another manifestation or a continuance of God's will in "fragments." Thus, the universe, for me, is God's will projecting itself into what I may term relationships, as "souls."

God's will is not God, any more than my motor will is my soul. God's will is a manifestation of God, as my motor will is of my soul ; but, whereas my soul is not a product of my will, it is a product of God's will. The agent enabling me to apprehend my soul and will, and God and His will, is my intellect. Accordingly, for me, my intellect demands that, as it tells me this, it shall decide how my will shall be exercised. Though it tells me my will necessarily manifests itself as God's will, it also tells me that God's will is that my will shall be limited by my intellect—itself. My will, for me, though (as procreative fiat) “creating” my intellect (as “knowing” body-faculty) is not a knower. I only know through what it “creates” as intellect. As intellect tells me I must act as I know, it tells me I must act according to its decisions. As the will of God involves my soul, and this involves my knowing-faculty or intellect, I conclude that God's will involves knowing as I cannot know. Again, as the will of God involves my soul and this involves my feeling or emotivity, I conclude that God's will involves feeling as I cannot feel. So, of all my possible sensibility—it is in God's will, only not as in me.

CHAPTER VIII

THE NECESSITY-SENSATION

THIS non-resistance is in experience, operating between ideas and involving coexistence; causal and non-causal successions; identity. Each of these is a different experience, so, it may be urged, they should not be considered as a single sensation. I reply: I have discarded the conventional view of things, implying mind as an active agent essentially different from sense. The ideas of coexistence, causal and non-causal successions, identity are, for me, sensations, just as are all ordinary sensory or psychical bodies. The necessity-sensation is a sort of body which I call non-resistance, in contradistinction to other bodies, sensory and psychical, which I call resistances. I may perceive a hundred different sensory bodies, or conceive a hundred different psychical bodies, yet each one of the respective types is equally a sensory or psychical body. So, I may experience coexistence, causal and non-causal successions, identity—four different non-resistances—yet each is what I call the necessity-sensation. It really

The Necessity-Sensation 95

does not matter, from my present standpoint, what I call them, so long as they are in experience operating between ideas. I call another non-resistance operating between ideas, the time-sensation. This I do because it is convenient to distinguish the time-sensation from the necessity-sensation, not because there is any real, essential difference, as underlying principle, between feeling time and feeling identity or cause.

As I have earlier indicated, all thinking is really done unconsciously. What is thought or felt, as conscious experience, is only the product of the unconscious "thinker"—the soul, as will. The mind, as conscious thinker, is merely the creation of the real "thinker" or will. I have thus really abolished all psychological distinctions as being merely verbal superficialities, though, for convenience of exposition, I may employ them. For a like reason that I distinguish between the time-sensation and necessity-sensation, I distinguish between these and the space-sensation and void-sensation. Still, as being manifestations of the unconscious "thinker," these are all essentially identical. I have no "faculties" for doing this, that, and the other. I have only will, doing everything that is done.

That I call the necessity-sensation, indifferently, the feelings of causality, identity, ordinary succession, coexistence is only significant on the assumption that I am a psychologist, or a metaphysician who deals with symbols as real things, and thinks of a mind that does its own knowing. At present I am

neither the one nor the other. I am only investigating real root-things.

When I do not experience causality, the necessity-sensation, so far as it is causality, is willed away. When I do not experience coexistence (never really the case), I will away the necessity-sensation, so far as it is coexistence. In such cases I may also will, instead, the necessity-sensation as ordinary succession or as identity. Similarly, when I substitute the idea of a table for that of a chair, I will away a psychical complex, as chair, and substitute a psychical complex, as table. The necessity-sensation is as much causality and ordinary succession as the psychical body is chair and table.

The only question for me is : Does the necessity-sensation exist in experience as I propound it? That it does so exist is as demonstrable as that any sensory body exists. As a table exists as sensory body, so causality exists as necessity-sensation, or space exists as space-sensation ; or, again, compulsion from sensory experience to symbol of idea exists as void-sensation. The necessity-sensation, as I propound it, is just as fully in experience as is something I have now before me, and call paper.

Whenever I refer to the necessity-sensation as being willed away, or into manifestation, or as operating, I always imply the special type of it with which I may be dealing. Thus, if in dealing with causality, I say that the necessity-sensation is willed away, I imply it as causality.

The necessity-sensation not only operates between

ideas ; it transforms these into emotions and feelings, and operates between these latter as it does between ideas. When I smile, the necessity-sensation transforms the idea into the particular feeling which excites the movement. Some psychologists contend that the coarser emotions, instead of resulting from ideas, are excited by feelings of particular bodily movements. According to this view, we smile, not because we feel merry, but we feel merry because we smile, and so on. Roughly, I think this view is correct, but that it is correct only because habit has so amalgamated the idea represented by the particular movement, with the movement itself, as practically to extinguish the idea. However, this issue need not detain us. Whatever be the psychological facts, from my present standpoint, emotions, feelings, and ideas are all psychical bodies—the two former, affective ; the latter, non-affective. Between both these types of psychical bodies the necessity-sensation operates as the real factor in their manifestation.

What we call reason is a product of the necessity-sensation as operating between ideas and constituting necessary sequences, or what we call logical progressions. Ideas themselves do not involve reason. The life of the thing is in the necessity-sensation, the unconscious factor. Ideas are inert stuff in default of the necessity-sensation. This vital factor tells the ordinary observer that the sun warms a stone, just as it tells the philosopher that a triangle is known universally and necessarily through categories, forms, and schemata, or that evolution is “a change from

an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity, to a definite, coherent heterogeneity, accompanying the dissipation of motion and integration of matter." As I have already, in earlier chapters, given considerable incidental attention to the necessity-sensation, and shall give much more in later chapters, I hope, pending further applications, that the present exposition will suffice to present my views on a firm footing and afford a clear insight regarding one fundamental fact, from my standpoint, of cognition. This fact is the unconscious or meta-conscious nature of all thought-processes.

CHAPTER IX

A PRIORI AND A POSTERIORI

KANT writes : " There can be no doubt that all our knowledge commences with experience ; for what could act upon the knowing faculty, and urge it to movement, but the various objects of sense, which, on the one hand, produce in us representations of themselves, and, on the other hand, put in motion our intellectual activity, exciting it to a comparison, separation, and reunion of these objects, working up the raw material of sensible impressions, and so forming that knowledge of things which we term experience? No knowledge precedes experience : all commences with it." Judgments derived directly from experience are called by Kant empirical, or *a posteriori*. Judgments depending on experience, but containing an element not given in the experience, are called *a priori*. While both are equally in the mind, yet the one contains elements which the mind, as it were, creates independently of its interaction with externality. Give the mind its experience from interacting with externality, then, according to

Kant, its own special principles supply a knowledge which could not emanate from the mere interaction with externality. The faculty accomplishing this transformation of experience (or "matter") into knowledge (or "forms") is called by Kant the "pure reason," if the resultant is "pure *a priori*"; the "practical reason," if the resultant is "empirical" or impure "*a priori*."

Of course, the ground for postulating a "pure reason" depends on the ground for postulating a "pure *a priori*." Unless the latter can be shown to exist, the former has no *raison d'être*. Before investigating this point, let me illustrate what Kant means by *a posteriori* and *a priori*. The affirmation: this house is built on clay, involves an *a posteriori* judgment, because all the elements are in experience. But the affirmation: if the foundation were removed, the house would fall, while involving an *a posteriori* element (because it depends on experience that what is not supported falls), yet also contains an *a priori* element (because it affirms more than is actually in the experience of the house). This determines the judgment as what may be called impure *a priori*. The notion of causality is such an impure *a priori*, because it contains an empirical element. When we say: every event must have a cause, though we get the notion of change, on which depends the conception of cause, from experience, the certainty, or universal applicability of the affirmation is not supposed, by Kantism, to be given in the experience. The impure *a priori* decides the character of things

A priori and *A posteriori* 101

as actually observed, while the pure *a priori* decides the character as it can *only* be—in its universal, necessary nature.

Beyond this division of judgments into *a priori* and *a posteriori*, Kantism invents a further difference by distinguishing judgments as synthetical and analytical. In the latter nothing is affirmed but the principle of identity. Thus, when we say : all bodies are extended, we make an analytical judgment, because we cannot think body without thinking extension. That is, we cannot “anatomise” the symbol body into anything that shall not include extension. Accordingly, in asserting that all bodies are extended, we simply extract an essential quality of body called extension, and affirm that it cannot be non-extension. But the case is different when we say : all bodies are heavy. Anatomising the symbol, body, does not reveal “weight” as it reveals “extension.” Such a judgment, according to Kantism, is synthetical, inasmuch as it imports an element or attribute not given in the subject about which we affirm.

All that is really implied in this Kantian differentiation between judgments is that we think body as being equivalent to extension, but that we do not think body as being equivalent to weight. Granting this, extension *is* body, and to assert that all bodies are extended, whether we call it a judgment or anything else, is essentially nothing but perception of identity : that one idea, as a symbol, body, is the same as another idea, as a symbol, extension. Now, let us turn to the judgment, all bodies are heavy.

If the idea of body is not equivalent to the idea of weight, in this judgment, we change the original idea, and there is what Kant calls synthetic judgment, involving a new element in the cognition.

The Kantian maintains that the perception of equivalence in ideas is not essentially the same thing as the perception of equivalence in sensory bodies. I see two bodies of particular shape, colour, etc., and perceive them to be mutually equivalent as, say, apples—sensory bodies. I have two symbols, body and extension, and perceive them to be mutually equivalent as representing ideas. But “apples” represent ideas as fully as do “body” and “extension.” If experience of sensory bodies, as ideas, involves equivalence, why is the process by which the equivalence is established different from that establishing equivalence between abstract ideas which can only exist as derivatives from ideas directly emanating from sensory experience? The Kantian contends that the latter differentiation is non-empirical, but depends on a special judging principle in the mind. He has yet to prove his contention.

Again, the Kantian contends that only analytical judgments can be allowed to depend on the principle of identity, but that synthetic judgments depend on the *a priori* judging principle. The special “synthetic judgment” of the Kantian seems to me a mere figment of his imagination. There is as much synthesis involved in transforming a sensory body into a psychical body (sensory experience into idea) as in transforming one abstract proposition into another.

A priori and *A posteriori* 103

Take the propositions : this is an apple ; all bodies have weight. The idea represented by "apple" is no more in the particular sensory experience than the idea represented by "weight" is in the idea represented by "bodies." The void-sensation accomplishes the one synthesis ; the necessity-sensation the other. If we want a judging principle for the one, we want it for the other synthesis. There is no essential difference between transforming sensory bodies into ideas, and transforming ideas into other ideas. All is equally sensation.

Why shall we worry ourselves in the wilderness of Kantian will-o'-the-wisps, when we have real experiences, as the void-sensation and necessity-sensation, affording us as much belief as we require about the quality of our knowing ? I contend that the Kantian phantasmagoria is nothing better than a tangle of futile ingenuity, until it can demonstrate that human knowing is anything better than sensation. Pending that demonstration, *a priori*, *a posteriori*, pure reasons, forms, categories, and what not are nothing essentially better than the definitions in Lempriere. There is as much *a priori* and synthesis in turning some flour, water, and raisins into a plum-pudding, as in transforming the proposition : this window was broken by that stone, into the proposition : every effect must have a cause. And there is as much *a priori* and analysis in the transformation of the plum-pudding into so many raisins and so much paste, as in the transformation of the symbol body into the symbol extension. Whether

we anatomise plum-puddings, or concepts, sensation is all we get from the feat. Wherever we arrive—whether as Kantians or bumpkins—we get no further than feeling sensory experiences, and feeling sensations about sensations originated by those sensory experiences. When Kant wrote: “No knowledge precedes experience ; all commences with it,” he wrote a universal truth on which he wofully failed to act, by trying to project himself out of experience and work backwards into it. There is only one way of emerging beyond experience. That way is by faith. When experience has done all it can, faith must consummate the work. Kant simply turned experience the wrong way about, and imagined he had got outside it.

I maintain that all differentiation of cognition into *a priori* and *a posteriori* is essentially without philosophical justification. There is no essential difference between what is called a definition and a judgment, except that the definition does not involve a decision of intellect (but is decided by contents within itself, as part of the sensation continuum), while some judgments (not of the merely logical order) involving a particular sensation (belief) apart from contents arising from the sensation-continuum (as mere logical exercise) do involve decision of intellect. In the case of a judgment the *material* is all supplied by sense, idea, and the “non-resistances.” These are all *sensation* within the continuum, constituted of experiential contents. Intellect, as deciding about this sensation, has no contents, though its decision, as belief, involves

A priori and *A posteriori* 105

a sensation foreign to the continuum. This sensation of belief is the only element to which the term *a priori* is really applicable. In this sense it is a special form of soul-fiat analogous to the volitional fiat involving motor activity, and—less often than it ought to do—exciting the latter fiat.

In deciding regarding the products of sense, idea, and the “non-resistances,” intellect merely gives a verdict regarding what I may term subsidiary judgments pronounced by elements acting within the sensation-continuum. To assert—as implied by Kantism—that judgments are constituted by “forms,” “categories,” and like fanciful attributes in the mind, is merely to place the judging faculty on a level with the sensational faculty, by endowing the intellect with contents, and so constituting it within the sensation-continuum and rendering it essentially equivalent to sense itself. A judging faculty that decides by “nebular” attenuations of what constitute the problems to be decided, merely “echoes” the sensations by which the problems are presented, and has no more claim to universal infallibility than have any of the inferior “judges.” The “*a priori*” of the “Lord Chancellor” is then essentially the same thing as the “*a posteriori*” of the “stipendiary.”

It is no doubt plausible and agreeable to establish the infallibility of human judgment by fancifully endowing the mind with machinery which shall authenticate its own sensations. Those who have pondered the effects of the application of this method to demonstrating the infallibility of the Bible and

theological pretensions will scout sympathy with the method. So far as judgments are effected by the imaginary entities evolved by Kantian metaphysic, those judgments are as much sensations as are any of the things they judge about. If there are *a priori* principles in the "pure reason" or "pure" anything else, there are such principles in the most rudimentary sensory response. Once we have the necessity-sensation operating between ideas, whether that non-resistance urges us to the judgment that a house cannot stand if its foundation be knocked away, or to the judgment that the interior angles of a triangle are necessarily and universally equal to two right angles, the respective judgments are, essentially, indifferently *a posteriori* or *a priori*, whichever we like to call them. Personally I would discard both the Latin inducements to self-bemuddlement and call the judgments beliefs, representing universal certainty to him who holds them, but to nobody else.

CHAPTER X

BODY, SPACE, TIME

I AM now going to offer preliminary consideration of time and space (and, corollarily, body) from my own standpoint, involving a special hypothesis of units of consciousness, which will be set forth at large in a later chapter. From my standpoint there is no such thing in real experience as the space or time of the introspectionist. Such space and time as his, are, to me, no more real than is a flying pig. Space and time are really two pseudo-bodies or "negatives" (in contradistinction to sensory bodies and ideas, which are "positives"), which I call respectively the space-sensation and time-sensation. Space-sensation is a primary differentiation, constituting, as such, body-sensation, or what we commonly call sensory experience. The first "positive" we experience is body; the first "negative," space-sensation. Both must be experienced together to constitute perception.

On this "positive" and "negative" are based all our possible positives and negatives or differentiations.

Resistance, or body, constitutes what I term "effective units of consciousness." Non-resistance, in the sensory arena, or space, constitutes what I term "pseudo-effective units of consciousness" of the sensory order. They are primary resultants of our hypnotism of the matter-soul into sensory experience. When this space-sensation is variable, bodies are in what we call movement. When it is invariable, bodies are what we call stationary or at rest. Our hypnotism of the matter-soul constitutes the "rest" equally with the "movement." Neither exists outside our own minds. Whether we attribute movement to ourselves or to bodies, it only exists as sensation within ourselves. The "material" soul, or *ens*, of bodies, as what I term sub-soul of the matter-soul, does not "move." Only the "form," or what we sensorially constitute bodies through hypnotism of the matter-soul, "moves." This movement of sensory bodies involves that they afford us varying effective units of consciousness, with the complementary resultant that we get varying pseudo-effective units of consciousness as what we call space.

Whether we see a body as moving, or feel ourselves as a body moving, and see the other as a body at rest, the essential conditions are the same. Our feeling of effort (muscular sensations) in the case of our moving, or lack of feeling of effort (mere passivity, as observers) in the case of the body's moving, do not affect the demonstration that the only "moving" is in our own minds, as varying effective

and ineffective units of consciousness. Whether we walk away from a body until it is "out of sight," or whether the body moves out of sight from us, the only real activity is in our soul as hypnotising the matter-soul. There is no space as an entity to be moved through by us or the body. The movement, space, body, and what we call ourselves as body, are only in our mind, as what I shall later deal with as a possible universe. The body's reality is the matter-soul responding to our soul so as to constitute a sub-soul. The body, as we know it as a definable object, is what we experience as this response of the matter-soul to our soul. What we usually call the body's attributes (shape, bulk, density, etc.), is really everything that constitutes the body itself, so far as we know it in sense. The reality of the body, as sub-soul, we only know as inference. Thus, what we call a taste, smell, touch, sound, sight, are really the only bodies we know by experience, and what we commonly call a body is a complex of taste, smell, touch, sound, sight, as the case may be.

The muscular sensations we feel, if we are an active agent or mover, are our body's experience of its own response to its soul's fiat. When I (as the "inner sensation") move a chair I feel the effects of soul-fiat, as what I call muscular effort. I perceive varying location in "space" of the chair, through deriving varying effective units of consciousness from it, and non-varying effective units from other bodies, my own among them. So I apprehend varying positions of the chair with regard to other bodies

and myself, and, incidentally, involve varying pseudo-effective units of consciousness, as space-sensation. A passive spectator of my moving the chair perceives the same effective and ineffective units, as chair-sensation, as I do. He does this because he hypnotises the matter-soul as I do. He thus becomes "infected" with the space-sensation through my hypnotism of the matter-soul into varying units of consciousness. Any hypnotism of the matter-soul by one person, involving sensory experience (body in spatial relationship), involves the same hypnotism by everybody else normally endowed and in percipient contact (what this really is I shall later investigate) with the body under conditions of the original hypnosis. If I put the chair on the table, and another person removes it from the table to the floor, he substitutes another hypnosis of the matter-soul for mine. The concrete world of objects is constituted for us in this way. We make the world as we perceive it. This is so because the sensory perceptivity of humanity, in the main, is constituted by such hypnotism of the matter-soul as involves practical identity. (Incidentally I may observe that so-called spiritualistic phenomena of levitation are readily accounted for by the above hypothesis.)

On the other hand, there is no such identical product of hypnosis as that above indicated in the intellectual and emotional realms. Here the individual human soul manifests idiosyncrasy, with the consequence that everybody has, normally, intellectual and emotive continua peculiar to himself,

though, of course, broadly modifiable by circumstances to patterns common to a multitude.

In a manner analogous to that by which space-sensation arises in the realm of the sensory, time-sensation arises in the psychical arena. Time-sensation may be termed idealised space-sensation. It is the experience of non-resistance between ideas, based on motive contingency in the sensory arena. As space-sensation involves at least two bodies, so time-sensation involves at least two sets of ideas. Any sensation that can be experienced correlating ideas with motive experience is time-sensation. As the movement-sensation depends on varying effective units of consciousness derived from a memorised sensory experience, and one in immediate realisation, so the time-sensation depends on varying units derived from a memorised idea, or a multitude of ideas, and one or more in process of realisation. The memorised idea, in the case of past time, is comparable with an object moving away from, or from which I am moving away, affording me fewer "effectives" and corresponding "space," or pseudo-effectives. The idea in process of realisation as present time is comparable with myself as the stationary body. "Between" the memorised idea and the one being realised is the time-sensation as lapse, or interval. "Between" the moving object and the stationary ones is the space-sensation. The space-sensation is ineffective units of consciousness in relation to bodies. In itself it is pseudo-effective units of the sensory order. The time-sensation is such "ineffectives" in

relation to ideas, while, in itself, it is pseudo-effective units of the psychical order. Both time-sensation and space-sensation are the negative—non-resistance ; while bodies and ideas are the positive—resistance.

The space-sensation (and necessarily body-sensation) and the time-sensation originate, respectively, in two primary experiences, which I call the "outer-sensation" and "inner-sensation," and with which I shall deal more particularly in the next chapters. Body, as proceeding from the outer-sensation, is at first what may be termed a chaos, or mere ground of blotches and streaks. Later, as the sensory machinery of the medium (the body) responds more alertly to soul-*fiat*, these blotches and streaks resolve themselves into what we call objects in spatial relationship. Then there is the space-sensation. This is no sensation of "space" as an abstract entity as conceived by the metaphysician. It is simply another sensation analogous to the "void" and "necessity" sensations, the former binding together sensory experience and thought as developments of the "inner" and "outer" sensations ; the latter binding together certain developments of the "inner" sensation, involving, as earlier indicated, thought-processes and emotions.

To apply a biological simile, there is no germ-nucleus of space in the mind. The mind creates nothing. It merely so responds to the soul, as hypnotising the matter-soul, as to experience sensations. It thinks space as the result of feeling space-sensation, as it thinks cause and effect as the result

of feeling the necessity-sensation and inner and outer sensations, or as it connects "inner" and "outer" sensations as sensory experiences and thought, as the result of feeling the void-sensation. But the space it thinks is no more the space it feels than the necessity-sensation I think, as definition, is the actual thing I feel when I experience a causal relationship, or than the void-sensation I think, as definition, is the actual thing I feel when I connect a sensory experience with the idea of it. The imagination of a sensory experience, as idea, or definition, is not at all the sensory experience. It is that experience connected, by an intermediate sensation, with a totally different experience.

Differences in the space-sensation involve what we call movement by bodies. The bodies cause these differences in space-sensation by interacting according to the laws of our hypnotism of the matter-soul. Thus, one of these laws involves that an object becomes smaller under conditions of what we call movement away from us. The space-sensation varies according to this movement of the object. The movement itself, as I shall later show in detail, involves, so far as regards diminution in size of the object, that certain units of consciousness become ineffective that were once effective. So far as regards relative positions between the moving and stationary objects, the movement involves that while, in the moving body, effective units of consciousness become fewer and fewer, in the stationary bodies the units do not vary. Thus, units of consciousness, constituting

what we apprehend as bodies, involve pseudo-effective units, or space-sensation, and movement-sensation.

Though all is within our mind, still the foundation of all are the units of stimulus, or souls constituting bodies through exciting in our minds units of consciousness as the products of our own wills. These units, as sensed objects, are the only real things of which we have primary, intelligible experience. The space-sensation and movement-sensation are what may be termed emanations from the sensory units of consciousness, or bodies-sensation. Still later, we get another "emanation." As the space-sensation and movement-sensation arise from the bodies-sensation, so the time-sensation arises from the movement-sensation. The time-sensation is to ideas as the space-sensation is to sensory bodies.

The time-sensation and space-sensation are thus emanations from the bodies-sensation, which latter emanates from what I shall later deal with as the generative "outer" sensation with its complementary "inner" sensation. In dealing with transcendental physics in the preceding volume, I denied the philosophical applicability of spatial and temporal measurements outside sensorially apprehended bodies, and, corollarily, I denied the philosophical validity of transcendental physics dealing with atoms, ethers, etc. Looking at this question from our present standpoint, body or attributes emanate from the "outer" sensation, becoming a thing of sense. This thing of sense cannot exist out of sense, for anything existing out of sense would not be a thing of sense.

In other words, by sense we can know nothing out of sense. Space and time emanate from this thing of sense, and cannot exist except in relation to that from which they emanate. Accordingly, if space and time are abstracted from their "innate" relationship to body, they become mere terms, devoid of significance. By applying them to what is insensible we destroy the conditions through which only they experientially exist. So it is with body. To talk of an insensible body is to talk of a sensory experience that is not sensory. In this connection we must, of course, divest our minds of all ideas of quality (solidity, etc.) constituting specific bodies, and simply think body as made by mind as fully as is idea. Then, any experience not sensory is not body. If we treat it as body we stultify terminology. Of course we may imagine it as body, and the extra-sensory experience may be quite real in itself; still, it is no more body than an apple is a horse-radish.

The above propositions imply processes of change seemingly analogous to the ordinary conception of evolution. However, there is no real analogy between my "evolution" and that of conventional empiricism. My "evolution" is one of souls, and, corollarily, minds, and will be set forth at large in later chapters. In earlier chapters dealing with will the subject has been incidentally touched upon. For me the fact that idea and time-sensation "evolve" from body and space-sensation, involves that, whenever the "evolution" first occurred, a new will and, corollarily, a new soul were created. Even in regard

to the concrete world the implications of conventional evolutionism, from its own standpoint, are, philosophically, unsound, to the extent that they pretend to exclude external interference in the processes of organic change, attributing causative efficiency to what are assumed to be earlier types. In dealing with conventional evolutionism, in a later chapter, I hope to show, from its own standpoint, that no type can be transformed into another—the “new” arising from the “old”—independently of direct creative interference.

CHAPTER XI

I AND NOT-I

THE ground-hypothesis of physiological psychology is that mental action of every sort is solely the product of brain action. I deny that brain is any more the prime efficient in thinking and feeling than is a tin kettle. I contend that the implications of physiological psychology, regarding the efficiency of brain as a thinking and feeling agent, are philosophically ridiculous, just as I contend that like implications of biology, attributing procreative efficiency to germ-nuclei, as physical agents, are philosophically ridiculous. Brain is no more the efficient agent conditioning thought than is skull. Both are products of hypnotism of the matter-soul by the essential "I," or soul. The brain, *qua* "cerebral matter," is merely sensory experience, just as is any other object. Only as conditioned by soul does brain afford sensation (as philosophical truth), involving belief that it is a medium for the soul's expression, as fiat, of its terrestrially active efficiency.

When, as a physiologist, I "localise" special

areas of the brain as being so-called centres corresponding to this or that mental activity, I hypnotise the matter-soul to afford me certain sensations, but, philosophically, I no more demonstrate that the brain does anything, as thinker, than I demonstrate that a mirror sees when I see an object reflected by it. In the preceding volume (p. 404) I indicated how a mirror (or any other product of constructive ingenuity) was the manifestation of God's mind through our mind. So, the brain itself, so far as we recognise it as what I may term an appliance analogous to the mirror, as being adapted to perceived ends, is a product of God's mind through our mind. In "discovering" the so-called correspondence between certain parts of the brain and certain mental functioning, we accomplish essentially the same sort of hypnotism of the matter-soul as we effect in constructing, say, a mirror. Whether we construct, or whether we perceive adaptation, the processes are essentially identical, in so far as they are equally manifestations of the working of God's mind through our soul. We "construct," in identifying the morphological and physiological characters of the brain, as we construct in fashioning what I may term the functional character of the mirror. The brain we "construct," as morphologists and physiologists, is, from the philosophical standpoint, not essentially different, as a product of hypnotism of the matter-soul, from the mirror we construct, as artificers.

I know nothing of *thinking*, except in myself.

The thinking of others I only know through their motor manifestations. These, so far as I am concerned, are merely sensory experiences. Suppose I destroy a certain cerebral area assumed to control memory-function—then, I hypnotise the matter-soul to afford me visual experience as the mutilated brain, and, say, auditory experience that the subject of the experiment has suffered loss of, say, memory. Here the brain itself, so far as I am concerned, is merely my sensory experience—a thing inside “me.” Accordingly, when I assert that it was the efficient instrument in the thought-process accomplished before the brain was mutilated, I really constitute my sensation (as sensory experience constituting the brain) the efficient cause in the thinking of something not myself. Let us now look at this question from a more familiar standpoint. Say, I cut through an artery. Here, I also hypnotise the matter-soul to afford me sensory experiences involving what I call mutilation and modification of normal function. But, in this case, I do not attribute the spurting blood to the severed artery, as efficient cause. I realise that, behind the artery, as really active agent, is the heart. Though I perturb the function of circulation as, in the other case, I perturbed the function of thinking, I do not credit the severed artery with being the efficient agent in the function of circulation. I recognise that the artery is merely a medium through which the active agent manifests its efficiency. So it is of the brain in regard to mental action. So it is of the whole body in regard

to function of every sort. Behind all, as relatively prime efficient, is the soul.

As the physicist looks for active agents to his atoms and energies; as the biologist looks to his germ-plasm, so the physiological psychologist looks to his cerebral matter. All appeal vainly to their respective "dummies." Now, let us turn to the introspective philosopher working from preconceptions, and see what he can tell us about an active agent. Let us take the Kantian as typical of such an investigator.

The active agent of the Kantian is something called a universal knower, constituting the universe from the contents of its own cognitive cornucopia. As it knows the universe which it constitutes, this knower is what is called self-conscious, that is, it resolves all its knowing into a unity subsuming the heterogeneities of experience under a few first principles inherent to itself and which it can identify. The Aristotelian law of contradiction asserts that a thing cannot at once be and not be. A stick cannot be not a stick. Introspective philosophy of the Kantian order professes to show that this Aristotelian law has shortcomings, inasmuch as it overlooks that the very fact of distinction involves relationship. Assuming an entity able to verify a stick, that entity can accomplish the task only by bringing the stick into relationship with other things verified. To do this, the entity must contain or create other things besides the stick, and must itself be something apart from what it creates. So, to say a stick cannot be not a stick is only to say that the creating entity

differentiates among its creations, which are all bound together in itself, as unity, or the thing that "knows" and embraces the differentiations.

Post-Kantian logic is devoted to demonstrating the above indicated essential relationship between objects in mind, and between mind and these objects. The method of proof is to deal with words as things in themselves. What I demonstrate from the basis of sensory experience, as soul, the Kantian, working from abstractions derived from this sensory experience, demonstrates as what he calls the unity of self-consciousness, which is all consciousness become self-conscious—in theory, to satisfy the requirements of a philosophy which, in opposition to the scientific demonstration that all knowing must be believing, and all believing sensation, seeks to establish that believing may be something so different from sensation as to constitute that absolute knowing which we attribute to God, and which I have disproved from the standpoint of experience. Of course, if the Kantian believes his "unity of self-consciousness," as all consciousness become self-conscious, to exist, it does exist—for him. But, I believe he holds unfit truth reversing the normal order of cognitive processes.

I hold that there is no such thing as consciousness, apart from some specific sensation or sensations involving states ultimately not definable by words. So soon as we deal with the *word* consciousness, we are in another state as compared with that involving what we feel to be represented by the word. When

we talk about "*self*-consciousness," we are dealing with a supposititious state which is divorced from all states involving real consciousness. We are only conscious of "*self*-consciousness" as an analogy transcending real consciousness, just as the physicist is only conscious of atoms, as analogy transcending material particles. There is a continuous line of "unsymbolisable sensation" between the word consciousness and the particular state underlying it; so we can logically connect the one with the other. But, there is no such line of connection between "*self*-consciousness" and any genuine state of consciousness. The term is merely empty sound excogitated as a dummy presentment of something we try to imagine as more than consciousness.

We only try to imagine something more than consciousness, because, as introspective philosophers, we want to reveal a "perfect" inconceivability which shall connect us, as knowers, with omniscience. This method of the introspectionist is on all fours with that of the transcendental physicist when he imagines his energies, perfect gases, etc. Because he can imagine this perfect knower, the introspective philosopher argues back from it as though it were the bed-rock of experience. The futility of this procedure is evident when we reflect that the words by which, as introspectionists, we establish our transcendental thinker, are essentially as much objects of sensation as are sensorised objects themselves, and that, if philosophy, to be of real service to humanity, must be practical—as I contend it must—there is no

virtue in a system reversing the normal order of cognitive succession, by taking as its basal premise a particular problematical sensation at the end, instead of the beginning of the sensation-continuum. For ages, the knowledge of the world was based on conceptual ghosts. Now, the world demands that its knowledge shall be based on the bed-rock of sense.

The essential "I" is the soul, and it only knows itself as the sensations it creates through hypnotising the matter-soul, involving, as mind, experiences as the sensation and emotion continua constituted by its own fiats. Thus, the soul knows itself by willing the matter-soul into a medium (brain), which can respond to the matter-soul as itself responding (as bodies) to the soul's hypnotism. Will is the creator of cognition, and cognition can only know will as something not itself, that is, as outside what cognition realises as consciousness. So, instead of the "knower" knowing, it wills what shall be known, and that what shall be known is that it, the "knower," wills.

CHAPTER XII

INNER AND OUTER SENSATIONS

THE "self" of which I am empirically cognisant is constituted by two sensations which may be called inner and outer. As these sensations constitute two essentially different experiences and are the foundation on which is erected the whole experiential sensibility of humanity, they may be further termed generative sensations. The "inner" sensation affords experience that "I" do or feel; the "outer" sensation affords experience that "not-I" does or is felt. The two sensations are complementary the one to the other, and must be experienced conjointly to constitute what we call consciousness. They involve the ultimate experiential, as distinct from inferential, affirmations possible to humanity. The only real proof I have that there is a "not-I," or external world, is this "outer" sensation. That this sensation is really externally imposed, that is, that there is something real beyond my empirical "self," I have no experiential evidence to prove, except this "outer" sensation itself. If I deny the evidence of this "outer" sensa-

Inner and Outer Sensations 125

tion as proof of externality, I have no warrant for accepting the evidence of the "inner" sensation as proof of internality, that "I" exists as an individualised entity.

This outer sensation must not be confounded with specific sensory experiences of any sort ; nor must the inner sensation be confounded with specific, intellectual, or emotional experiences. Each of these generative sensations (inner and outer) is a type *sui generis*. Specific sensory experiences I may transmute through the void-sensation (constituting what I have called distorting imagination) into specific ideational sensations, without affecting the inner and outer sensations affording me experience of "I" and "not-I." On the other hand, I cannot reverse the process by transmuting specific ideational experiences into specific sensory experiences. I have shown that the attempts of the mathematical physicist to accomplish this transmutation are in vain. So, also, I show, are like attempts of the Kantian introspectionist. The only possible direction of transmutation is from the sensory to the ideational. The generative sensations, "inner" and "outer," constitute the first differentiation of the common or fused sensibility with which I emerge from the womb, and they never change during my conscious life. Throughout that life, they say two things, and two things only : "I" and "not-I." Throughout my normal changing states, intellectual, emotional, sensory, these two generative sensations are immutable.

What the "outer" sensation apprehends is not any specific object, but "unsymbolisable sensation"

before it becomes realised by the senses, involving what may be termed my soul's basical hypnotism of the matter-soul. Through this hypnotism I first enter the current of "unsymbolisable sensation." As indicated, the generative sensations constitute all the immediate evidence I have of my "self" as an individualised entity. When I apply my reason to these primary intuitions and their resultants realised by the senses, I am able to infer to the real "self," or soul, behind the empirical "self," or these "inner" and "outer" sensations. While I realise these generative sensations constituting my empirical "self," subjectively, I can only deal with my real "self," or soul, as an object. As shown in this work, though I know or believe a good deal *about* this spiritual object, I am quite unable to know or believe that it knows, does, or feels anything as does my empirical "self." I simply know my spiritual "self," or soul, as willing all that my empirical "self" does, feels, and knows.

As I believe the "inner" and "outer" sensations when they tell me about "I" and "not-I," so, I believe sensory experience and reason when they tell me that sensations are caused, not self-existent, and that soul, or my real "self," is their cause. Further, on like warrant, I believe that there are other souls like mine, and that these souls are no more self-existent than are my sensations, or than is the "not-I" or matter-soul. Thus, I infer to a Cause that *is* self-existent. This Cause I call God. Once I believe the "inner" and "outer" sensations, I have the impetus propelling me to the Uncaused and to intermediate

Inner and Outer Sensations 127

relationships. I do not need to ask myself how I know that I know, or how I know that I know that I know, and so on *ad infinitum*, in the manner of the Kantian. If I can believe, I get all the knowing I require.

If I cannot believe the inner and outer sensations, I can believe nothing. If I can believe nothing, what I shall later deal with, as intellect, is, in my case, inefficient. The Kantian implies that I am not to believe the inner and outer sensations, but that I am to imagine a certain self-conscious unity, or intelligence which must know itself, or it could not know there were things not itself. I grant that knowing something is not myself involves that I know myself, as something different from another thing; but, I do not grant that this knowledge of my "self" involves a universal knower constituted of imagined projections of things in itself, as reason, intelligence, sense into nebulosities whose sole office is to represent, as through a veil, the very things they are pretended to authenticate. My self-knower can only authenticate itself by sensations telling that there is a self constituting *myself* that does not know *itself*, so as to afford *myself* knowledge of *it*, as *it* affords *myself* knowledge of something not myself, and, accordingly, of myself and a self as another thing than myself.

My non-knowing self tells me which, of sensations, are my empirical self; that is, which sensations are appropriated. It also tells me which, of sensations, are foreign to my empirical self; that is, which sensations are expropriated, or projected. On the other

hand, my non-knowing self does not tell my knowing self how to combine and synthetise the two classes of sensations so as to reveal my real, or non-knowing self as experience analogous to that involving the two classes of sensations. The empirical self, as sensations, knows the not-self, as sensations. The empirical self also knows the real self, as existing. This, it knows through the two classes of sensations. But, it does not know the real self as either of the two classes of sensations. It only knows the real self as something essentially different from both the classes of sensations.

The empirical self opposes "subjective" and "objective" sensations and thus enables me to know there is something not the real "self." But the empirical "self" opposes no sensation to those others, telling me more about the real "self" than sensations. When I argue to my "self" from sensory experience, as I do in this work, with the result of recognising my "self" as soul, I also recognise that this soul is discrete from the sensations it creates. On the conditions, I would call myself other-conscious, rather than self-conscious. The sensations, I know. That they are not my "self," I know. That I do not know my "self" as I know the sensations, I know. Instead of a self-conscious intelligence, I maintain that what I may term a meta-conscious intelligence is the real synthetiser of my conscious experiences. I maintain that my conscious intelligence is merely the slave of this meta-conscious intelligence, and that I need not trouble myself about knowing universally so long

Inner and Outer Sensations 129

as I act the sensations imposed by my meta-conscious, on my conscious, intelligence.

If, as a Kantian, this real "self," through its empirical self, could subsume all possible sensations under one or two other sensations, it would certainly attain practical unification of sensations. Assuming the ideal unification to be attained, the identification of the Kantian empirical self, as a universal knower, would be complete. Still, it would only know as one feeling, or sensation—the "focus point" of any number of thousands of other feelings, or sensations. Why should this one feeling be self-conscious any more than was any one of the thousands of feelings it subsumed? If one feeling may be self-conscious, why may not a thousand? Why shall the self-conscious entity be unity, rather than heterogeneity?

CHAPTER XIII

KNOWING

OUR mere liking for unity, as something supposed to transcend in perfection heterogeneity, is no better warrant for real perfection in the former rather than in the latter, than our preference for apples in comparison with pears is such warrant. Kantian speculation implies that unity is intrinsically more perfect than heterogeneity. So, the object of Kantian transcendentalism is to resolve all knowing into this imaginary perfection, and to impress on people that when this transcendentalism has approximated to its self-imposed object, it has projected knowledge out of sensation into absolute, final, universal certainty. As the reader is now aware, I am totally opposed to such pretensions. I maintain that it is essentially quackery pure and simple for any man to pretend to demonstrate knowledge as anything else than the sensation of believing. If I accepted the multitude of "ghosts" depicted by the Kantian as constituting the mind an absolute knower, the acceptance would not touch my contention that, as all knowledge is necessarily sensa-

tion of belief, there is no essential difference, so far as regards universality and finality, between the knowing of a Kant and the knowing of a rustic. Each only knows as he believes, and the believing of neither is more or less demonstrably the knowing to which the Kantian makes pretension. As I have many times asserted and proved : the great concern is not knowing, but acting as we know. Knowledge, as the sensation of belief, is adequate to our needs. In worrying ourselves about knowledge that is something else than the sensation of belief, we are apt to lose the substance in a vain attempt to grasp the shadow. Then, we emulate the ancient in his quest for the philosopher's stone. All knowledge, as belief, is equally absolute, final for the believer. It is our business to get the fittest belief ; that is, belief manifesting the latest revelation of the sensation-continuum. When we have attained such belief, our business is to act it and not paralyse ourselves by worry as to whether it is universal and final, or particular and transitory. Crying for the moon is an unprofitable vocation, whether we are philosophers or babies ! When we have done all we can in the way of knowing, faith must consummate the achievement.

We know nothing of unity or multiplicity except as concrete experiences in mind. What we cannot so cognise as unity or multiplicity is no more unity or multiplicity than what physicists call an atom is anything identical with what he apprehends as body. God is one. That is, there is no other God than all we know as God. This "one," in relation to God,

is not at all the "one" in relation to an apple. The God-one is not a numerical unit, or any fanciful attenuation or integration of our concrete notions of unity and diversity. The God-one is merely our denial that there is any other God-knowledge for us than our God-knowledge. We know God as the ultimate resultant of all else we know. As all we know converges to God, all knowledge exists through God. If we know that to which converges all else we know, we know all else through that knowledge. To illustrate this: if we know that all radii converge to a point, we cannot know a radius unless we know a point.

That the Kantian can excogitate a mind that "knows," as distinct from a mind that experiences sensations, merely shows that he can hypnotise himself, by words, into a dream that the "mind" he excogitates is outside the mind that experiences sensation. To the person who cannot hypnotise himself into such a dream, it is obvious that whatever mind can do—whether as compounding a plum-pudding, or as excogitating a "reason" that "knows"—must be equally a fabrication of that mind, concocted within itself, and that, if we "know," as gods, in excogitating our dialectics and logics, we equally "know" as gods in compounding our pudding. Whatever we do, we only get sensation of believing, and we need this sensation solely for the purpose of affecting our action.

If the "mind" of the introspectionist can jump out of itself to prove it is a real "knower," it can

only do so by enabling the introspectionist to feel belief that the mind has taken the jump. Well—suppose *he* gets this belief, what is it good for? How is it going to affect the belief and action of the man who can, credally, hardly see beyond his nose? Suppose he is informed he “knows” by categories and forms, instead of only believing by the agencies affording him his common experiences—what is the good of it all, unless the ordinary man can hypnotise himself into a Kantian word-debauchee? Is there the remotest chance of such hypnotism, when the whole of science and practical experience proclaims that there is only one way of knowing : by believing, and that there is only one way of believing : by inferring from sensory experience?

All introspective philosophy of the *a priori* sort is part and parcel of the illusion that symbols of concrete experiences are equivalent to the experiences themselves. Hegelism, the ultimate philosophical resultant of this visionary method is, essentially, the rankest materialism. Its materialistic ghosts are merely words instead of sensed bodies. The same is the case with mathematics. It is merely a method of dealing with symbols as the sensual materialist deals with what he touches and sees. Any thought-system arbitrarily isolating from its sensory basis a particular part of the sensation-continuum necessarily becomes materialistic. We must start effective philosophies from the source of human experience in the senses.

Reason tells us that God is one, but it tells us nothing about the quality of this “one,” in the sense

that it tells us about the quality of our "one" when we say we have eaten an apple. In the latter case, we know the kind of "one" with which we are dealing. In the former case, we simply know our "one" as contradicting that we can know some God that we do not know. For us, if we suppose all things to be summed up in a Supreme unity, that unity must be mystery, to which we give a name involving quantitative idea, but to which we can attach no quantitative significance. It is really our ultimate experience of "unsymbolisable sensation." We know there is no other than our God behind the universe, but we no more know what constitutes the unity of God than we know how God created the "many" of our individual experience. All such talk as that of the Kantian who pretends to afford knowledge of the God-unity by disquisition about concepts abstracted, as analogies, from sensory experience, is really of no more account in determining the quality, or even existence of unity outside human concrete percipience of inclusion and separation, than would be a disquisition about dressmaking.

There is no conceptually possible "many" except as souls and the experiences, as "personal artifice," which their minds appropriate as their own, from the current of unsymbolisable sensation. This current it is that constitutes any conceivably possible unity, but, as minds only know it as their sensations, they do not know it as unity, but only as their own particular heterogeneities. Of course they may picture—as my mind has done—this "current"

as a continuous flow from God to God ; but that this picture of the current, as unity, affords any real knowledge of what that unity would involve were it apprehended, in a sense analogous to our percipience of anything within our consciousness, as unity, it would be absurd to maintain. When we begin speculating about mind-unity and God-unity, as comparable with any unity in our experience, we are in the nebular regions.

Ideas are not discrete things. They are endowed, through the necessity-sensation, with what may be termed a momentum binding them together and projecting them into difference involving what is called synthesis. The "blur" or sensory primordium, anticipating sensory experience, is similarly projected into difference as what are called seen and touched objects, by the space-sensation. Here we have the beginning of "synthesis." Again, as ideas are bound together by the necessity-sensation, so are sensed objects bound together by the space-sensation ; and, as ideas are synthetically projected on one another by the necessity-sensation, so are sensory experiences synthetically projected into ideas by the void-sensation. The necessity-sensation binds together and synthetically projects into abstract notions in permutative series, ideas of sensed objects. The void-sensation projects objects into ideas. The space-sensation binds together the objects, through differentiation.

A fanciful difficulty raised by some psychologists and metaphysicians is to account for what they call

the synthesis of ideas. I dealt with an illustration touching this point in a preceding chapter, in discussing the addition of numbers. I showed that the synthesis from one set of terms to another was involved in the ideas themselves modified by the "non-resistance," necessity-sensation, which latter is an ultimate fact of experience just as fully as are any ideas between which it acts. That we can conceive two or more ideas separately, or in combination as something else than themselves, merely involves that we can will or not will away the necessity-sensation, as identity, just as we can will or not will away the ideas themselves. When I think 5 and 1 as separated numbers, I will away the necessity-sensation as identity and will it as arbitrary succession, just as I will away either of the numbers when I do not think about it. The "positives" or "resistances," as ideas, are no more or less sensation than is the "negative" or "non-resistance" as necessity-sensation. Again, when I think the 5 and 1 as 6, I have not willed away the necessity-sensation as identity and the synthesis is accordingly in the ideas, just as the synthesis (through the void-sensation) is in the sensory experience of an apple when I transform it into the idea of one. Thus, so far as combination of ideas is concerned, we have no need to invoke a central knower, or self-conscious entity unifying the heterogeneities of experience, as posited by the Kantian. The conditions involve the synthetic momentum for combination as fully as they involve what is to be combined, as ideational experience.

Again, our recognition of our own identity does not necessitate such a central knower. If I can recognise, through memory (a product of the necessity-sensation) an apple, on different occasions of seeing it, as being the same, I can, by the same automatism, recognise myself as being the same to-day as I was yesterday. Of course, though I recognise myself as the same to-day as I was yesterday, I may also recognise that, in some respects, I am by no means the same. There is something very different in what I recognise as myself, if on one day I feel in good health, but on the next am stricken with paralysis. Really, we are ever changing, so far as conscious personality is concerned. Again, in certain pathological states, with which I shall deal in later chapters, a person may have two or three completely distinct identities, as himself, each persisting for months, or years, and each forgotten while the other exists. In such a case, so far as sense of personal identity was concerned, there would—on the Kantian conditions—be a number of central knowers, none of which knew another.

That we can imagine something transcending belief, as knowledge, does not involve that we have a real mental picture of what this knowledge is, any more than that we can imagine something transcending experience, as mystery, involves any genuine notion of what it is. The term mystery is merely a symbol of faith, expressing that we do not know, but that knowledge may exist. Again, knowledge, as imagined by the introspectionist, is merely a symbol

expressing that more than what we can believe, as sensation of knowing, may exist transcending that sensation. My view is that humanity has no need to trouble itself about this sort of knowledge, but has very vital need to trouble itself about the sensation of knowing—not, primarily, on account of the sensation itself, but on account of the action it involves. I maintain that the introspectionist's quest of a sensation of knowing ensures his attaining a sensation of not-knowing, in the sense of not believing, and, to that extent, tends to divert from pursuit of the only sensation of knowing of real importance to humanity. This sensation must be one turning men from sensualists and sentimentalists into actors of right morality. I contend that the necessary result of projecting ourselves into a Kantian ether of symbols is to turn us into vacillating sceptics and marrowless cynics, morally incapacitated for decision about practical concerns. Kant himself lost real conviction through his antics in the empyrean of symbolic transcendentalism. His final consummation was to prove he did not know in the sense he pretended to prove he did know.

CHAPTER XIV

INTROSPECTIVE CAUSALITY

WE perceive two sorts of succession — causal and arbitrary. For instance, that night follows day, or *vice versa*, is an arbitrary succession ; that putting the poker in the fire renders the poker hot, involves causal succession. The Kantian says we get the notion of causality from an inherent power of judgment, or rule of understanding, while, in the case of the arbitrary succession, there is no exercise of such power. He asserts that, failing this judging power, or combining self-consciousness, the mere analytical judgment involving perception of arbitrary successions, such as day and night, would not enable us to differentiate between events in causal relationship and events out of it. Of course, assuming such faculties as Kant excogitates to exist, nobody need deny that the perception of difference between necessary and arbitrary successions would involve a faculty differing from one that could only afford experience of arbitrary succession. The point is that there is no proof of the existence of any faculties at all, in the implied

sense. The only real proof is that arbitrary and causal successions are equally realised by an automatically changing continuum, conditioned by will.

That we get the notion of cause and effect in one, but not in another case, merely involves that a special sensation is absent in the one case and present in the other. As such sensation, cause no more needs a "synthetic judgment" than does the bare perception of succession in the case of day and night. That we feel the notion of causality as different from the notion of mere succession, does not involve that the one, as "change," is dependent on a judging principle, while the other, as mere alternation or succession, depends on no judging faculty. The ant and the beaver perceive necessary succession as truly as we do. That we give a different name to their perception from that we apply to our own does not involve that, so far as regards the perception of causality, their minds (which we have practically as good ground for postulating as existent, as we have for postulating any mind but our own) are essentially different from our own. If we need a synthetic judgment to perceive causal relationship, so do they. That they do not conceive cause and effect, but we do, does not affect the essence of the perception, as sensation.

If any such thing as a judging faculty, or universal knower, exists, it exists as much in the case of discriminating between simple percepts or in perceiving mere successions, as in perceiving causal relationships. It is only assumption on behalf of a preconceived

hypothesis to propound that one sensation involving rational discrimination depends on a judging faculty, while another sensation, involving sensory discrimination, necessitates no such faculty. Whether we call the discrimination sensory or rational, it is still sensation—something felt as the product of excitation.

Every act of perception carries with it the “germ” or momentum for its connection with other acts of perception. Every idea is inherently bound to some other idea. The bond inherent in every idea is what I call the necessity-sensation. It is a matter of experience to everybody who thinks, as the space-sensation is a matter of experience to everybody who sees or touches. As the Indian’s lasso cast at the wild horse has the impulse connecting him with the horse, so has the “lasso” constituted by the necessity-sensation the impulse binding together one with another thought, projecting each thought or sensation, as it were, beyond itself, and so involving all that constitutes necessity, or causation. As we get the outer sensation as something anticipating realised sensory experience, so we get the necessity-sensation with one idea, as something anticipating another idea. So soon as the first idea existed, the essence of causality existed. An idea can no more exist without the necessity-sensation than a sensory body can exist without the space-sensation. The negatives or non-resistances are just as essential to and prime facts of our thinking and sensing as are the positives or resistances. The one could not exist without the

other. Thinking is neither more nor less a matter of doing than is sensing.

We do not really need to account for the necessity-sensation, any more than for any concrete experiences between which it operates. The abstract notion of causality is merely the imaginative generalisation of the necessity-sensation existing between concrete happenings. That I perceive cause involves that the necessity-sensation, as causality, operates. When I do not perceive cause, the necessity-sensation does not operate as causality. Why does it not operate? Because the will prevents it, just as the will prevents the space-sensation from operating when I bring two bodies into contact.

But, it may be urged, I propound the space-sensation as inherent in every sensory experience, and the necessity-sensation as inherent in every idea—how then, it may be asked, can the space-sensation and necessity-sensation cease to exist by the mere facts of my bringing two bodies into contact, and failing to perceive causal relationship? I reply, that they cease to exist in specific contingencies does not involve that they are annihilated. If my will excludes the one or the other in a specific contingency, the exclusion is not for all contingencies. In relation to other contingencies the sensations continue to exist. That I will away space-sensation in bringing together two bodies, still implies that the bodies cannot exist except through space-sensation. They must still be differentiated from other bodies, and their individual parts (sub-bodies of a complex body) must be differ-

entiated, one from another, by the space-sensation, though, so far as I had brought them into contact, to that extent I should have willed away the space-sensation.

So it is in regard to the necessity-sensation, when I perceive no causal relationship. The particular ideas are the analogues of the sensory bodies. So far as the particular ideas involve no causal relationship, to that extent, between these particular ideas, the necessity-sensation is willed away, though of course it will exist in some other of its forms; inasmuch as that the ideas exist at all, the necessity-sensation must continue to bind them to other ideas. As already explained, and to be further elucidated, thinking is essentially an unconscious process, and will is its condition. What is in consciousness is product of willing. We are conscious of a thought when it is willed; of a body, of the necessity-sensation, space-sensation, when they are willed—but only then. When they are not willed they are what I shall deal with as ineffective units of consciousness.

As already shown, this necessity-sensation obviates the dialectical difficulty raised by the Kantian, how to account for the notion of causality, without invoking a permanent consciousness, or knower judging by nebulous preformations really excluding an external universe, while nevertheless invoking one. The Kantian tells us that sense-impressions and ideas, in themselves, are simply alternations, but to constitute knowledge they must be transformed, by a central or permanent consciousness, into what he calls change,

as distinct from mere alternation. But experience gives us "change" as fully as it gives us "alternation." The fact that the idea of causal succession is different from the idea of non-causal succession does not involve that the one is more or less in experience than is the other, any more than the fact that the idea of rest is different from that of movement involves that the one is more or less in experience than is the other. As the idea of rest emanates from one type of sensory experience, and the idea of movement from another type, so does the idea of non-causal succession emanate from one, and the idea of causal succession from another type of necessity-sensation. The necessity-sensation binds the idea of the one type of sensory experience to another idea, that of causal succession; while it does not so bind the idea of the other type of sensory experience and the idea of causal succession. The idea that involves the causal succession is so constituted, from my standpoint, through being bound by the necessity-sensation to the generative inner sensation (with which I have dealt in an earlier chapter), involving the experience of doing, or active agency. The idea that does not involve causal succession is so constituted through not being bound by the necessity-sensation to the inner sensation. Whether this interpretation be accepted or not, there is no ground for denying that causal succession is as fully a matter of primary experience as is non-causal succession. Accordingly, it is philosophically futile to wrangle about terminology to show that, in Kant's words, "the mutable under-

goes no change, but only alternation." Experience tells us that the mutable undergoes both "change" and "alternation."

There is no ground for assuming, as does the Kantian, that, inasmuch as we have a universal notion, as causality, and a particular notion, as mere succession, the one is more or less fundamental, as experience, than is the other. The notions themselves afford us no real knowledge of their genesis or conditions of manifestation. We certainly need a particular something, as constituting mind, to render possible the notion of causality, just as we need another something, as constituting mind, to render possible the notion of arbitrary succession; but it does not follow that these essential conditions are other notions. The Kantian pretends to explain the genesis of knowledge merely by refining notions; but he does not show that notions are the *conditions* of knowledge. He merely works on the truism that knowledge *is* notions. A thing cannot be explained by its own contents. To explain notions we must transcend them. Necessarily, we shall have to express the product *as* notions; but this does not involve that, essentially, the product *is* notions. Kant's preconditions of knowledge are, essentially, nothing but notions. Through starting his process of investigation from mere intellectual preconceptions, he never transcends his intellectual plateau, but merely succeeds in introducing a new form of specialism, not essentially different from conventional science or mathematics.

From my standpoint notions condition nothing at all. They are "dummies," apart from something that *does*, and by which only they exist. What I set forth as the conditions of knowledge are not notions. Certainly they have to be expressed in the terms of notions, but, essentially, they transcend notions. Now, Kant's preconditions are, essentially, nothing but notions. He owns that his categories, etc., are nothing in themselves apart from concrete notions, and all they do, so far as I can see, is to shadow concrete notions. Notions can no more account for notions than sense-impressions can account for sense-impressions.

As already indicated, the main part of our thinking is not constituted of ideas, or what I call positives or resistances, but of the necessity-sensation, which I call a negative or non-resistance. In a word, our thinking is done sub-consciously, or meta-consciously. Ideas are really only the material that is manipulated by the necessity-sensation. Analogously, the main part of sensing is not constituted of sensory bodies, or positives, but of the space-sensation, or negative. The essential part of our sensing, like the essential part of our thinking, is sub-conscious. The sensation-continuum, in respect to the sensory and psychical bodies constituting it, may be compared to a number of peaks above the surface of an ocean. The ocean is unsymbolisable sensation, or the will-continuum, the beginning of which comes into experience as the "peak" which I call the outer sensation anticipating sensory experience, and the end of which we experience as faith.

The psychologist's dealing with causation is on a par with the Kantian's. Both concern themselves with verbal will-o'-the-wisps, through arbitrary assumption that the sensation of necessity is something essentially different from the sensations between which it operates. We have no more real reason to ask why we experience "cause" between certain constant happenings, but not between others, than we have reason to ask why we perceive sweetness in sugar, but not in salt. The necessity-sensation is just as much inherent to the particular sensations between which it operates as the sweetness is to the sugar-sensation. These remarks apply throughout the whole of introspective hair-splitting, whether philosophical or psychological. All assumes an undemonstrable possibility of knowing essentially differently through reason as compared with sense, and ignores the sensory basis of all knowing. Through this false method the introspectionist is perpetually groping in a wilderness of symbolic futilities. In a modified degree, as I have earlier shown, the transcendental physicist exemplifies this false method in dealing with what he calls light, heat, electricity, etc.

The physicist's application of this method to practical problems, of course, affords much serviceable truth which, on the other hand, as I show in this work, is totally misleading when employed to validating problems outside the practical arena. This practical recommendation, in the case of the physicist's application, is absent in the case of the philosopher's.

Through employing this merely specialistic method, the philosopher misleads in the extra-practical arena, without materially extending the scientist's truth in the practical arena. From my standpoint, any philosophy that does not frankly base itself on the affirmation that knowing is only believing, will ever involve mere revolution on a pivot of specialism. Whether I see my hand, or feel the notion that every effect involves a cause, the notion is no less sensation than is the seeing, and the knowing is equally, in each case, neither more nor less than believing. The whole process of knowing, so far as regards consciousness, is what may be termed an automatic flow. The only spontaneous, initiative agency is in the will. This spontaneity is never in consciousness as actual experience. It is only in consciousness as inference to something transcending actual experience. When we conceive this transcendent factor as a Kantian "preformation" of mere notions, we debase it to the plane of automatism, and confine ourselves, as investigators, within the ring-fence of specialism.

The outcome of the specialistic method, as philosophy, is merely a tabulating and systematising of abstract notions, as in the case of Kantism ; or this, combined with a tabulating and systematising of the facts of empiricism, as in the case of Spencerism. Each of these systems of philosophy really leaves us where we started so far as regards ultimate problems. Such philosophies seem to me mere stop-gaps, whatever be their monumental character as human achievement.

CHAPTER XV

INTROSPECTIVE UNITY

KANTIAN philosophy excogitates a principle which it calls self-consciousness. This is authenticated by the assumed fact that reason is always sensible of, and grasping after, a perfect thing which reason is ever unable to realise on account of its limitations by the conditions of actual experience. This perfect principle is called unity, involving the many in one. Why unity should be more perfect than heterogeneity, or why reason should be postulated as grasping at unity, rather than at heterogeneity, Kantism, so far as I know, does not tell us. As, according to Kantism, the mind does everything by universally certain principles in itself, I fail to see, if Kantism is right, why my mind does not grasp at unity. I can avow it does not grasp at anything except belief, and that this belief is utterly indifferent, so far as regards unity or heterogeneity. I avow that, whatever my mind may grasp at, it grasps by compulsion of what it has already grasped, not through any bait it sees in the distance, as unity.

As unity can only exist through heterogeneity, I fail to see why each unit of the heterogeneous should not be as perfect as the unity that subsumes the heterogeneous. If laws, as unities, exist, they are dependent for existence on heterogeneities, and are as sensational as are the latter. Again, the laws relating one set of heterogeneities to another are merely one set of heterogeneities supplementing another. In what essential respect can they be more perfect than are what they supplement, and without which they cannot exist? Why should a perfect mind be one that holds one set of heterogeneities rather than another?

Objects, or sensory bodies, remain discrete things in immediate experience, however we may subsume them by laws. These latter are nothing without the objects. The Kantian, with no warrant beyond his power to excogitate hypotheses after empiricism has supplied him with the material for laws, implies that the laws are the preconditions of the objects. If his imagined preconditions could save empiricism any trouble in finding laws, perhaps his *ipse dixit* would have weight. As matters stand, I think we had better trust experience, telling us that the apprehension of objects is the precondition of laws, and that, as both are equally in the mind, we had better trust inference from the bed-rock of sensation, telling us that neither laws nor objects can be the real precondition of anything, but that such precondition must be something that makes laws and objects.

Once empiricism has given laws of any sort, it

is, of course, possible to imagine a logical projection of specific laws into more and more comprehensive series of subsumptions, eventuating in an all-embracing unitary subsumption to be called universal intelligence, or anything else we like ; but even this final subsumption would be no less sensation than was any particular object subsumed by a particular law. Assuming the Creator to have but a limited stock of things to be turned into laws, perhaps the Kantian universal intelligence will, some day, be a *fait accompli*. In the meantime, I class the Kantian unity with the Greek Kalends and the prognostications of the prophetic almanac. It is easier for me to think—but not to prove—my mind a one than a many, and I am gratified when I get my one law from my many phenomena, but this has nothing to do with the ultimate nature of my mind as unity or heterogeneity, or as striving for either. The mind is impelled to seek a sensation of likeness among a number of other sensations, involving difference. The likeness-sensation it calls a law. It is merely a different sensation from any of the others. This does not constitute it the precondition of the others. Rather, the others are its preconditions. At any rate, experience tells us that ideas originate through sensory experience. Then, as laws are ideas, they must be preconditioned by what preconditions ideas. Such precondition is obviously heterogeneity, and, so far as the evidence of experience goes, mind in its ultimate nature is heterogeneous.

That the mind has unity among its sensations is no

better reason for assuming that unity is the essence of mind, than that the mind has heterogeneity among its sensations is reason for assuming heterogeneity to be such essence. "Unity" is merely a symbol of an idea of something antithetical to heterogeneity. "Heterogeneity" must be the preconditioning idea, because there can be no unity in default of heterogeneity, while, on the other hand, there can be heterogeneity in default of unity. It must be borne in mind, in this connection, that the idea of unity, as implied by the Kantian, is not the idea of oneness or singleness (which is probably more fundamental than the idea of heterogeneity), but it is the idea of resolution of a multiplicity of singlenesses into what may be termed a single multiplex constituting what is called law. This multiplex is nothing in itself. It only becomes a real thing in connection with the heterogeneities to which it applies, and which it represents under an aspect common to all. This representation is merely a sensation equivalent, *qua* sensation, to any one of the heterogeneities to which it applies. Thus it essentially constitutes merely an addition to existing heterogeneities.

The Kantian god is what I may term an inspissation of the false idea of unity as being a real entity more absolutely perfect and fundamental than is heterogeneity. Such a god is nothing essentially better than an imaginary law, subsuming all ideas in the human mind, and, as such, is but an intellectual will-o'-the-wisp, comparable to a mathematical point. Again, the universe of the Kantian is really the same

thing as his god. It is only an intellectual phantom conjured into apparent reality by a spurious appeal to sensory experience, from which it is essentially divorced. Kant's universe and god are essentially the same things as the mathematician's point, line, four-dimensional space.

The Kantian's dealing with unity constitutes ontological judgment about an idea by its own contents. We cannot form proper ontological judgment about anything by its own contents. Among the contents of the idea of unity, to the Kantian, is the idea of perfection. The unity-idea becomes, for him, really a unity-perfection idea, through imagination. To this unity-perfection "amalgam" of psychical bodies, the Kantian's imagination adds another constituent—the idea of precondition. Having thus obtained his unity-perfection - precondition "amalgam" of psychical bodies, the Kantian forms the ontological judgment that unity, as law, is the ultimate reality of mind, ignoring that unity, as law, can only exist so soon as there are heterogeneities to be reconciled, and that mind must, accordingly, be constituted of the heterogeneities before it can be constituted of the unity. Through his wrong ontological method, the Kantian treats one of a series of constituents of a thing to be determined as being the active cause of all the rest, including itself. Unity, as law, according to Kantism, has to cause not only all other things constituting mind, but has to be its own active cause, or a self-creator. Really this is what constitutes not only the Kantian's individual mind, but also the universal

mind, or god. The Kantian's god is merely the unity-perfection-precondition "amalgam" of sensations.

Could the mind realise the unity-goal imagined by the Kantian, the realisation would no more involve self-consciousness than does any imperfect realisation of the goal as an ordinary empirical law. The full realisation of the goal would only involve the attainment of an object. Whether this object was self or not-self would be no more decided by its complete, than by its incomplete attainment. For real self-consciousness to exist, the agent must know itself at once as object and subject. In knowing absolute unity, it would but know an object, just as it does in knowing any ordinary law. A being whose universe was a square, would attain his perfect unity so soon as he had attained a law governing squares, but knowing squares would not be knowing himself, unless he was nothing but the square. If he was nothing but the square, he could not know it by law as unity, because such knowing would involve knowing objectively, and the objective knower can only know his own products, not himself. On the conditions that the knower was the square itself, the latter would not be a product, but would be the knower. Hence it could not know itself by law or unity, but would need to know itself by some superhuman, inconceivable means. There is really no such thing, within human apprehension, as self-consciousness. The only consciousness possible to human apprehension is what may be termed other-consciousness.

No human soul, through its mind, is directly

conscious of anything but some specific sensory or psychical body; in other words, of some specific sensory or ideational experience. Of its truly causative, active, real self, as will, the soul, as mind, is only conscious indirectly, through inference from what is in consciousness, and at which it can gaze, as it were, from the outside, objectively. Common experience will at once confirm this proposition. Let anybody try to think of himself. He can think of nothing but some particular set of bodily sensations or movements, which is nothing but a product of his real self, or soul, manifesting itself as will interacting with the matter-soul.

What is called omniscience, and attributed to the Creator, is purely a fancy-picture outside philosophical toleration. Omniscience (as we can only conceive the term as symbolising knowing everything) might be the attribute of a limited entity, knowing all within its limitations. But, in reference to a Being outside limitations, the term has no real significance. For such a Being to be omniscient, in the human sense, it would need to stultify the unlimited attribute constituting its essence. In other words, an omniscient being could not be omnipotent, inasmuch as to know all implies that there is an "all" to know. But there is no "all" in connection with an unlimited being. So soon as that being had limited itself by an "all," it would no longer be unlimited, and, if it were not unlimited, it could not resolve the limited, as Cause. Our apprehension of causal necessity would compel us to transcend such a being, and to invoke an unlimited causative ultimate.

CHAPTER XVI

INTROSPECTIVE PHILOSOPHY

To argue back from sensation, as intellectual pre-conception, to sensation as immediate sensory experience is, as I show in this work, to reverse the natural order of cognitive evolution, which must proceed, by logical sequence, from the bed-rock of primary intuition, as sensory experience, to transcendental ultimates. In other words, sensation as logic, or the experience of reason, must be applied to sensation as primary intuition, or the experience of sense. The rationality of this contention will be obvious when we reflect that the experience of reason cannot exist independently of the experience of sense, while the experience of sense can exist independently of that of reason. From this standpoint, it is no more possible to transcend sense, working backwards from the preconceptions of reason, than it is possible to transcend gravity by standing on a ladder and trying to pull it up after us. We are as much within sensation when we employ intellectual abstraction as we are within gravity when we are on the ladder.

Introspective philosophy has, no doubt, seized a fit truth in controverting the assumed antagonism or opposition between *a priori* and *a posteriori*, and in emphasising the essential "innerness" of all apprehension of externality. Where the introspective method fails is, first, in propounding mental preconditions on the ground of imagination, instead of on the ground of inference from sense; secondly, in assuming that as these imagined preconditions can be applied to interpreting the manifold of heterogeneous experience, they are therefore essentially different, as constituting universal or absolute knowledge, from the experiences they are supposed to elucidate. This is the false assumption on which the mathematical physicist grounds the validity of his speculations to ethers and atoms, and, as I have shown, which leads to a spurious ontology, merely re-stating the fundamental crux of sensory experience. Though his imagined preconditions enable the physicist to argue back to the facts of sense, they do not really enable him to transcend those facts, but merely to re-state them by applying, out of sensed conditions, as concepts, perceived spatial and temporal relationships which are only, to our knowledge, existent within sensory conditions. So of the introspective philosopher—while his categories enable him to argue back to the facts of sense, they are, at the bottom, nothing but those facts attenuated into nebulous replicas re-stating the essential problem of sense as a problem of logic essentially identical with the problem as re-stated by mathematics. This logic, mathematical or

philosophical, is essentially as much sensation, pure and simple, as is the concrete experience it pretends to transcend.

Introspective philosophy, in its modern aspect, demonstrates the obvious truth that *a posteriori*, as something opposed to *a priori* knowledge, does not exist—in other words, that all knowledge must be an internal phenomenon, involving that there is no such thing as the mental passivity by which scientists flatter themselves they become purely receptive to outside influences, or “facts.” The mind makes facts, just as it makes fancies, and its great duty is to discriminate between the facts and fancies. The former represent fit, the latter unfit, beliefs. As earlier indicated in this work, and to be later elucidated in detail, the scientist’s laws are in his mind before they are in his consciousness, as what is called discovery. He hypnotises the outside world, or matter-soul, to afford him certain experiences which he tabulates, and, through soul-fiats, involving what is called reason, formulates as his laws. All that here occurs, so far as he is concerned, is internal. His mind is not *tabula rasa*, in the sense of a clean slate to be written on by externality. What externality he knows, he makes through hypnotism of the matter-soul, involving that he actualises more or less of a possible universe inside his mind. This primary hypnotism, involving his facts, he transmutes through the necessity-sensation into his laws. The laws are really of himself, not of the externality he imagines.

The standpoint attained by the philosophy of

Introspective Philosophy 159

introspection constitutes the things in themselves, not things existing independently of conception, but imperfect ideals or "problematical conceptions," which may correspond to nothing outside the speculator's imagination as "pure reason." The noumenal self of this speculator now becomes what he imagines as an idea of unity transcending all he can put into language regarding what he calls knowledge; but whether there is such a self outside its own imagination of itself this philosophy cannot tell. Finally, it shows that God corresponds to an idea; but whether God is anything more than an idea this philosophy cannot determine.

All such introspective speculation perplexes itself to project knowledge out of the realm of sensation, and, from Aristotle to Kant, and from him onwards, I maintain that this speculation fails in the effort. Kant himself never tires of emphasising that we cannot transcend experience, and yet the main implication of his philosophy is that experience is invalid. I assert that all his transcendentalism is, essentially, as truly sensation as is the crudest experience of the "practical" man. Whether we know as the philosopher who, like Hume, worries himself by the reflection, "There are two principles which I cannot render consistent, nor is it in my power to renounce either of them, viz. that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connection among distinct existences," or, like Kant, who tries to solve the difficulty, the essence of all the wranglings of these

philosophers is—sensation. The knowing of Kant and his followers is as much sensation as was the knowing of Locke, Leibnitz, Descartes, of Aristotle or Plato.

All that these introspectionists accomplish is to deal with conceptualised projections from sense-experience, arbitrarily divorced from that experience, as equivalent or superior as fit truth in comparison with conceptualised projections logically bound to that experience. My maxim is, the last things we know must evolve from the first things we know. The first things we know are sensed objects. We must transcend this knowledge by logical inference *from* it, not by logical inference *to* it. Our knowledge must be evolutionally graduated, as, to our apprehension, the phenomena of sense are so graduated. We cannot build downwards from apex to foundation. The abstract products of our mind must emanate from its concrete rudiments, as, to our mind's apprehension, our bodies emanated from the rudimentary. We cannot reverse what our mind tells us is the order of the universe. Granted that all we know is in our mind, our mind does not exist until sensory experience has initiated the manifestation of its potentiality. We have no rational ground for propounding universal conditions of knowledge ex-cogitated by imagination and divorced from sensory experience, when that imagination itself has no existence but as the product of sensory experience. If our mind is, for us, the universe, the internal universe it creates must be graduated as is the empirically

Introspective Philosophy 161

external universe it perceives. Because our mind has learnt to transform the immediate intuitions of sense into concepts does not warrant it in cutting itself adrift from those intuitions and treating the concepts as the equivalents or superiors of the sense-intuitions, as foundation for knowledge.

The upshot of Kantian philosophy is scepticism. Its dialectical fixities are proved by its own ultimate analysis to be mere suppositions. Between its practical and theoretical reasons it is in a continuous see-saw. First, its truths are proved, then disproved or discredited. We can have a fixed intellectual system built on fixed arbitrary presuppositions, as in mathematics. We cannot have such a system built on heterogeneous presuppositions imaginatively affiliated with the facts of experience. All philosophy not logically bound to and emanating from sense-experience must eventuate in scepticism and atheism. The Kantian God is a mere idea necessary to other ideas which themselves are nothing but intellectual ghosts without credal body or parts. The only rational end of philosophy is belief. A philosophy that ends in doubt is an abortion. Our intellectual seeing must be an evolutionary growth from our sensory seeing, or it will be the seeing of the visionary.

When I talk about preconditions of knowledge as categories, forms, and all the other products in Kantian terminology, I am only really dealing with definitions of bare intellectual sensations which, as a Kantian, I imagine as having some existence outside

imagination, but which I have no means except my own imagination of showing are necessary resultants of anything I can apprehend as real experience. Here, by auto-suggestion, I hypnotise myself by a number of symbolic phantoms, just as, in any ordinary case of auto-suggestion or hypnotism by an outside agent, I come to have an abnormal mental picture of pseudo-reality. For me, personally, on such supposititious conditions, the belief in my phantoms constitutes their reality; but such belief is a purely personal phenomenon, eccentric from the normal truth-organism, as is the belief of the lunatic. When this sort of intellectual castle-building is avowed by its originator to afford him nothing at root but a sort of academic tolerance as far from genuine belief as an oyster is from an elephant, what real conviction can it afford to people who approach it from the standpoint of their pet prejudices and preconceptions? What can be the moral effect of a philosophy which inspires even its originator with no real conviction? It is no doubt magnificent as an intellectual *tour de force*, but we want philosophy to inspire actors, not merely to impress spectators. We want a philosophy to compel to action, not merely to exemplify pedagogism.

Assuming we can know as the Kantian pretends we can, we can only know we know by believing we know. But the ultimate implication of Kant himself is that he believes he does *not* know. What, then, is the profit of his monumental effort to prove we *can* know? Belief that we do not know certainly con-

Introspective Philosophy 163

stitutes knowledge of a sort; but not of a sort that is of service to humanity. Humanity needs knowledge for action. Negative belief involves the negation of what I may term affirmative action, which is equivalent to the negation of action of any sort. A philosophy eventuating in negative belief is as serviceable as a steam-engine lacking a piston.

Introspective philosophy creates legions of chimerical problems by arbitrarily limiting the facts of elemental experiences through the assumption that what can be analytically resolved into differentiated constituents is therefore not simple and basical as experience. Through this process of anatomising symbols, introspective philosophy and psychology emulate the spurious ontology of transcendental physics and biology, attributing to fanciful units (atoms, biophors) the quality of primary elements of experience. The result of this false method is a perpetual series of imaginary refinements with no more relevancy to real inference from ultimate facts of experience than have the definitions of heathen mythology. As the physicist imagines that as he can cut up his sensory experiences, as bodies, into infinitesimal fragments or preformations of what he sensorises, therefore those infinitesimals are equivalent, as reality, to the sensory experiences themselves, so the introspective psychologist and metaphysician imagine that, as they can cut up the sensation and emotion continua into differentiated constituents (sense, imagination, intelligence, etc.), therefore these products of imaginative anatomy are equiva-

lent to real elemental constituents of the structure of cognition.

It is assumed by these symbol-anatomists that, as they can imaginatively draw a line of demarcation between an idea which they call, say, sensation and another idea which they call intelligence, therefore "intelligence" is something essentially different from "sensation," just as, say, a cow is different, experientially, from a starfish. The implication of this method of introspection is equivalent to the implication that, as we can cut up the cow, say, into legs, tail, shoulders, head, horns, hide, therefore one or another of these isolated products is more or less essential to our experience of the cow. Applying his process, the Kantian discovers a unified "knower" as the reality behind the heterogeneities of experience. Because he can chop up his own individual knowing so as to discover a "pure reason," or "pure intelligence" endowed with "categories" or "forms," he wants us to believe that his discovery of his "knower" is something essentially different from the ordinary man's discovery that a cow has usually four legs. In a word, he wants us to believe that ideas about ideas are something essentially different, as not being sensation, from ideas as impressions of sensed objects. I contend that ideas of ideas are as much sensation as are sensory impressions. On the other hand, I contend that, as sensory impressions (or what, in my doctrine of units, are sensory bodies) are the bed-rock of human experience, any profitable philosophy must accept them as its given basis of inference, and

Introspective Philosophy 165

must reject inferential processes not sequentially emanating from the sensory data.

Introspective philosophy worries itself to decide how we get the abstract notions of time and space, coexistence and succession, causality, by quite gratuitously assuming that ideas and sense-impressions are essentially different as ultimate sensational facts, from experiences of temporal and spatial intersection and causal relationship. I reject such assumption that primary human experience does not embrace, as intuition, necessary and causal succession and temporal and spatial contingency, as fully as it embraces sensory impressions. I affirm that it is no more philosophically necessary to "explain" the origin of causal experiences of relationship and abstract space and time, than it is necessary to explain the origin of the experience of physical pain or pleasure. I maintain that the intuition of cause is "germinally" present in the sense of volitional movement, and that necessity-sensation realising the idea of causal relationship is as much a matter of sensational experience as are any ideas between which it operates.

I maintain that we may just as profitably perplex ourselves to account introspectively for the sensation of pain as for the idea of causal relationship. The mere fact that we can fancifully anatomise our idea of the latter, but not of the former, is no better ground for assuming the one, but not the other, as primary experience, than the fact that we can anatomise a cow is ground for assuming that the separate anatomical products ranged on a table are the cow

itself. Similarly, the products of anatomising the idea of causality are not at all equivalent to the "living" idea itself. Succession is not necessary succession; still, the latter is as much a prime fact of experience as is the former. Again, co-existence is not succession; still, both are equally ultimate intuitions. We have not a jot more real reason to assume that the notion of cause is dependent on the notion of succession, than that the latter is dependent on the former.

In feeling something more recondite in what we call a process of reasoning than in what we call a sense-impression, and in arguing on the ground of our feeling, that something we call reason projects cognition out of the realm of sensation into the grade of absolute, universal knowing, we are merely concocting for ourselves another problem—to authenticate, by an authority outside itself, the superior validity as knower, of reason, as compared with sense. We can no more authenticate this supposed authority by the contents of reason itself than, *ex hypothesi*, we can authenticate the authority of sense, by its own contents. If the latter has to be validated by reason (as something outside the realm of sensation) then, reason needs validating by something outside the realm of reason. If sensation cannot authenticate its own conclusion, as being real knowledge, neither can reason. It is purely arbitrary to allow reason to justify itself by itself, but refuse the like concession to sense.

If sense-impressions do not involve space-sensa-

Introspective Philosophy 167

tion (as I have shown they do), and, if "form" of space is nothing without space as sensory impression (as propounded by the Kantian), then, we may as well cease talking about sense-impressions and forms, inasmuch as sense-impression without space-sensation is nothing, and space-sensation (according to Kantian hypothesis) exists neither in form nor in sense-impression, but only in both. Really, by postulating form as the condition of space, and postulating the space of form as, experientially, nothing until applied to sense-impression which, itself, has no spatial contents until affected by form, the Kantian projects space, form, sense-impression, and everything else out of existence. While he imagines he is demonstrating the universality and necessity of mathematical concepts by showing that space is constituted by a principle in the mind, the Kantian is preventing space from coming into the mind at all. Of the two things (form and sense-impression) through which he supposes space to emanate, one of them (sense-impression) is, from his standpoint, inherently devoid of space, and the other thing (form) has only space in the shape of a "nebula" that Kant himself owns is no more space than it is a turnip. I maintain that we may just as reasonably believe space to issue through a demonstrative pronoun and a note of interrogation as through Kant's form and sense-impression. I maintain that we may as well talk about the form of an abracadabra as about Kant's form of space, and that his *Critique*, so far as it pretends to identify special preconditions in the mind adum-

brating and universalising spatial, temporal, and causal cognitions, is nothing better than a maze of verbal futility.

If we like to say that causal succession is conceived through reason, while casual succession is perceived through intelligence, I contend that so far as such definitions of agency are concerned, it does not matter how the successions, causal and non-causal, are determined, or whether they are *conceived* or *perceived*. I maintain that the "reason" that conceives cause is nowise really different from the "intelligence" that perceives arbitrary succession, or from the "sensation" that realises a turnip. For me, the turnip, cause, arbitrary succession are all prime facts of sensation, and that the introspective anatomist of symbols feels that one emanates from sense ; another from reason ; another from intelligence, are other facts of sensation very far from prime. If experience gives us the turnip and the successions, causal and non-causal, through sense, idea, and the "non-resistances," I submit that we shall exercise a wise parsimony if we spare ourselves the Kantian sensations.

That we can cut up concepts of concepts does not touch the question of the primary existence of concept, as experience. That our notion of cause seems a complex of notion of succession and something else, does not affect the independent reality of cause as a prime fact of experience, any more than that a cow is a complex which may be cut up into heterogeneities involves that the cow is not a prime fact of experience. I do not need to argue to the cow from

Introspective Philosophy 169

various heaps of skin, bone, horn, flesh ; neither do I need to argue to the notion of cause from notions of succession and a "permanent, unchanging substance," or anything else in Kantian terminology. So long as I have a "feeler," I want no "knower" of the Kantian sort, that can only prove it "knows" by dissecting what it feels into other "feels" and imagining that one "feel" is compounded of, or conditioned by other "feels."

When I have cut up my cow, I have done with it *qua* cow. Similarly, when I have cut up cause into succession and something else, I have done with cause, which, though, in deference to the conventionalities of terminology, I call the agency behind it intelligence, or reason, is as much a self-existent fact of sensation as is the cow. I do not need to account for the cause-sensation any more than for the cow-sensation. In my own "natural history," in a preceding chapter, of the sensation-continuum, I indicate that cause-idea emanates through the necessity-sensation, as I indicate that the idea of a sensory experience emanates through the void-sensation. Here, I affirm simple facts of experience. I feel the necessity-sensation when I think cause, as I feel the void-sensation when I think, say, the cow as distinct from seeing and touching it. But, I do not imply that I "know" essentially differently in feeling the cause-sensation than in feeling the cow-sensation. Though I may call the cow-sensation perception, and the cause-sensation conception, the only real difference between them is that the former is sensation emanating from

my soul's hypnotism of the matter-soul (involving the "outer" sensation), while the latter is sensation emanating from my soul's hypnotism of the matter-soul (involving the "inner" sensation). In other words, "cow" is sensory experience transformed into idea by the void-sensation, while "cause" is idea of muscular volition transformed into idea of active agency of any sort by the necessity-sensation. The only central "knower" concerned in creating "cause" and "cow" are the "inner" and "outer" sensations, the sensation-continuum, and intellect. These constitute the "knower." Behind these is the soul. This wills, but does not "know."

Abstract terms are ideas of ideas, not ideas of the primary experience from which all abstract terminology originates. Take the term generosity—this originates from specific sensed motor manifestations involving the surrender of objects desired by the mass of people. At first, the term would only indicate the surrender of specific objects. Then, it would be merely definitive. Later, it would become divorced from any particular objects, as an abstract generalisation of temperamental idiosyncrasy. So it is with the term, cause. This arises from the physical sense of moving bodies. Later, this personal activity is imaginatively transferred to moving bodies affecting other bodies. Still later, it is transferred to particular sequences of concrete happenings, independently of perceived movement. Finally, it is projected out of the realm of concrete happenings, as definition of relationship between ideas of ideas or abstract terms.

Introspective Philosophy 171

The introspectionist says that mind does all its work as a self-existent, self-determining entity. I maintain that mind does nothing of the sort, but that it simply responds to God's hypnotism of soul, and its hypnotism of the matter-soul. I say that my mind can no more help thinking as it does, than my body can help feeling as it does when I apply a red-hot poker to it. I maintain that it is sheer futility to attempt to prove self-determinism for my mind by its own images involving logic backwards from the "far-end" of the sensation-continuum. Personally, I am quite content to know by believing, and I believe that humanity will be all the better so soon as it frankly acts the truth, that we can know in no other way than by believing. I venture to assert that most of the modern evils of society arise from the implied falsity that we can know in some other way than by believing. I venture to hope that, in this work, I have demonstrated that no justice, individual or collective, is possible until this prime truth is recognised and acted. We do not want the "knowledge" of the introspectionist. We only want action according to right belief. In practice, imagining we can know in some other way than by believing is only an excuse for consulting our own selfish ends before acting *as* we believe. Then, we are sceptics or knowers as occasion demands, with the result that our society is morally rotten and our knowledge rendered practically futile. There can be no self-consciousness, because all possible consciousness arises through body, or, the medium constituting

mind, affected by soul. Soul is "myself." If I know soul, I only know it through body—indirectly. To be self-conscious, I should need to know soul indirectly—as object, and directly—as subject. That I know soul objectively is a matter of demonstration, as shown in this work. That I do not know it subjectively is also a matter of demonstration—to me personally, and on this question I will allow nobody but myself to be judge. If anybody else knows his soul subjectively, he knows as I do not know. Supposing him to have this sort of knowledge, I decline to accept any system of philosophy (as being necessarily merely a matter of personal idiosyncratic experience) he may build on it. If he lacks such knowledge, he need not trouble himself to excogitate philosophy of the sort. Judging by myself, I do not believe that anybody is, or ever has been self-conscious. Everybody is normally conscious. Nobody is self-conscious. The only consciousness I possess is other-consciousness, in the shape of specific sensations, intellectual, sensory, and emotional. Of these sensations I have knowledge—none of "myself" apart from the sensations. These sensations are really objects of experience. Nevertheless, through these sensations I am well assured of my own identity as a spiritual being. I know my soul, or self, not through the self-consciousness of the introspective philosopher, but through inference from the facts of experience, involving the normal projection of ideas, or psychical bodies, on sensory bodies, so as to involve belief. For me, the sensation-continuum con-

Introspective Philosophy 173

stitutes demonstration of my soul as the active agent conditioning its manifestation. Of this soul I am only conscious as of an object. It is my very self, and yet I can only own it, indirectly, through its products.

CHAPTER XVII

RESPONSIBILITY

IN discussing motor will in an earlier chapter, I showed that it was determined by the Creator. Indeed, this conclusion is so self-evident to anybody who for a moment considers what is necessarily implied by his acceptance of a First Cause from which all other causes emanate, that the question would hardly need discussion had not theological systems, the sensation of free choice, and the common expediencies of social life encouraged false notions regarding the conditions of human activity.

Act as you know ! If you knew that your destiny was fixed as a villain, then it would be right for you to act as a villain. But no man can know his destiny. Accordingly, as he has the sensation of free volition, he is *practically* a free agent. His ignorance of his destiny renders his personal volition practically unconditioned. Did he know his destiny he would know the destiny of his volition, and knowing this he would be limited by his revealed determinism to act in one or another way. As the facts are, what he

does know is that, practically, his volition is undetermined. The very fact that he does not know how his volition is determined practically involves that he knows it is not determined. Obviously his responsibility is not affected by his knowledge that his will is ultimately determined by the Creator, but is vitally affected by his sense of freedom arising through his lack of knowledge of the specific determinism decreed for him. That these conditions involve penalties on earth is obvious. That they will continue to involve penalties post-terrestrially is equally obvious to anybody who believes that processes of change involving higher and higher developments revealed to our apprehension as occurring on earth will persist post-terrestrially.

If higher terrestrial development involves the transformation of the brute into the human, and if post-terrestrial conditions tend more than do terrestrial conditions—in conformity with the revelation of evolution—to favour the human, then we must believe that, according to the soul's terrestrial manifestation of its human potentialities will be its adaptation to post-terrestrial conditions, and that the penalties for non-adaptation post-terrestrially will be analogous to those existing under like circumstances terrestrially. I shall deal more particularly with this aspect of the question in a later chapter discussing soul-evolution. Here I merely wish to show that personal responsibility is not affected by the demonstration of creative determinism.

The essential fact, so far as regards responsibility,

is our ignorance of what determinism regarding ourselves involves as exercise of volition. In this connection we are free, because we are ignorant. So far as regards responsibility, it matters nothing that we know we are determined, so long as we do not know what is to be the issue of the determinism. If we feel we can do or not do a certain thing, so long as we neither know we are determined to do it nor not to do it, the fact of our being determined has no bearing on responsibility. We no more know we are determined to do than not to do. Accordingly, so far as regards our social relations, there is nothing except our own wills to decide whether we shall do or not do.

Again, we have guidance as to inherent right or wrong of specific action. Through belief we know as well as it is possible to know that one thing is right, another wrong, and we feel that we have power to realise or not to realise the particular right or wrong. Whether we do the one thing or the other we shall be equally determined; but this does not affect the fact that, if we do the wrong instead of the right, we know that we have the power to do the right, or, in the particular contingency, to abstain from doing the one or the other—which, in the majority of cases, is equivalent to substituting one wrong for another, inasmuch as we necessarily do wrong when we abstain from doing what we believe right. So far as experience goes, we have three alternatives in regard to a specific contingency involving right and wrong. We may select the right

or wrong, or we may remain neutral regarding the right and wrong by acting neither the one nor the other. In this case our neutrality regarding the original alternatives involves that we do another wrong through abstaining from doing the original right. Suppose we know that whatever alternative we may adopt will not affect the fact of supreme determinism, what has that to do with our adopting one rather than another alternative? The demonstration of supreme determinism has really no direct bearing on individual action or responsibility. What it does directly bear on, and that vitally, is the nature of justice. This it ejects from the arena of nebulous guess-work and projects into the arena of scientific definition. Thus, so far as it affects human action, the demonstration of determinism does so indirectly by revealing supreme right as justice more compulsively than was possible in the absence of the demonstration. To that extent the demonstration of determinism increases human responsibility instead of reducing it as superficialists assume.

The demonstration of determinism only touches action through the revelation it affords of justice. Directly in itself it involves no action at all. Could we govern ourselves solely by the demonstration of determinism, we should need to be absolutely quiescent—to do nothing at all. That involves fatalism, and has been the ideal of certain visionaries in all ages. Obviously, an ideal such as this based on the truth of determinism, to the exclusion of all other truth, is the negation of responsibility and contradicts

the whole of human experience, which tells us that things exist only through *not* being quiescent—through doing and being done to. The Christian doctrine of non-resistance constitutes a form of the irrational fatalism above referred to. The essence of action is resistance, and the essence of morality is action. Real Christianity is essentially foreign to morality, and the fact has been practically demonstrated by every truly Christian community that has existed. A grave responsibility now attaches to those aware of the facts, but who try to evade this supreme demonstration of determinism and its ethical resultants, and it will be a monstrous evil for society if the currency of superficialism and insincerity, confounding the demonstration with a doctrine of fatalism and irresponsibility, is allowed to circulate until violence instead of reason attempts the solution of the problem which evolution now reveals to civilisation. Let those in authority disprove what I set forth in this work, or, if they believe what I set forth, let them *act* it! The price of ignoring it is social upheaval. There is no religion or morality but justice. There is no justice but my justice. There is social perdition without that justice.

I may here incidentally notice a question apt to occur in connection with the subject of this chapter. Through determinism all possible action, good or bad, of the individual is decreed by the Creator; yet the individual is held responsible for his action—how, it may be asked, is this reconcilable with the conception of a just Creator? I reply: If the Creator be

judged by the standards of justice and injustice applied by men to men, the Creator who so foredooms creatures is not just. On the other hand, the Creator causes the "justice" of men to exist, as He causes anything else in the universe to exist. Justice is as much a product of the Creator's will as is the sun or moon. We may as well ask whether the Creator is the sun or moon as ask whether He is just or unjust according to our standards of justice and injustice. The Creator has revealed to us our duty, but He has not revealed to us His duty. It is childishly presumptuous to apply to the Creator the canons of conduct which we can apprehend only through the Creator's will. He is no more limited by our conditions of justice and injustice than by our conditions of passion, pain, pleasure. The private soldier does not cross-question his commanding officer before obeying him. Shall we cross-question the Creator of the universe before obeying Him? If we know that the Creator exists, and that He has given us apprehension of right and wrong, ignorance whether we are decreed for right or wrong, feeling that we can select right or wrong, shall we presume to demand the Creator's justice before executing our own justice? Such is the fool's quest. The reasonable man does not apply his tapes to the Creator, but knows when faith is decreed to transcend reason, through the same endowment enabling him to know that right is the thing to do, wrong the thing to shun. There is wisdom in knowing that we do not know, and virtue in disciplining ourselves according

to that knowledge of ignorance. Our business is to act as we know, and to be patient when we know we do not know.

Such specious and irrationally futile application as that above dealt with of relative standards to an entity outside limited relationship arises from lack of assimilation of what is logically implied by the terms creator of the universe. The universe is conditions as well as conditioned. Conditions that are not part of the universe would stultify meaning in the term universe. A creator of a thing (universe) which necessarily comprises conditions as well as conditioned excludes the notion of any sort of freedom of the creature, as against the Creator. As indicated in an earlier chapter, a limited freedom, as against such a Creator, would be equivalent to an absolute freedom. *Pari passu* with its degree of free quality, it would imply opposition to the Creator. A limited freedom, in the sense implied by those who suggest it, involves sub-creative interference with creative determinism as fully as would any product of a power, not the Creator, which should subvert the laws we apprehend as governing physical phenomena. Were such a supposititiously rival creator to annihilate our sun, there would be essentially no more interference with the universe determined by our Creator than there would be such interference had any creature the slightest freedom to determine his own action, as against his Creator.

If we apply our standards of justice to a Creator, we imply that the Creator is in conditioned relation-

ship, inasmuch as our justice can only exist among elements in conditioned relationship. This is obvious when we reflect that justice can only exist where there is law, and law can only exist where there is a law-giver. If a creator is within conditions permitting the existence of justice, as we apprehend it, that creator must be limited by some law. This would imply a law-giver determining the conditions of a creator. Obviously, such a law-giver would need to be a creator of a superior order as compared with the creator under the law, and to assume such a contingency would be to stultify conception in regard to the term creator. As I shall later show, there is unconditioned as well as conditioned relationship. That only is in unconditioned relationship which originates conditions. Such a source is creator. Law—and corollarily justice—emanate from this source. To assume the source to be conditioned by justice is merely to assume the source to be self-conditioned. Obviously the transcendental analogue of justice within conditioned relationship cannot be conceived by creatures within such relationship.

CHAPTER XVIII

JUSTICE

No introspective philosophy can formulate a definition of justice that is not, at root, a mere matter of likes and dislikes, nor can it formulate an ethics that does not leave the individual without practical guidance in the great majority of specific contingencies. Indeed, as I show in this work, no genuine ethics is applicable to the individual until it is applied to society. Individual justice is impossible without social justice. No genuine morality is demonstrable by introspective philosophy, because its demonstration is not attained by the application of reason in a direct line from sensory experience, but by the dialectical manipulation of a number of vague concepts (happiness, virtue, duty, well-being, pleasure, pain, etc.) involving nothing but futile wrangling about terminology without a scintilla of scientific conclusiveness. I maintain that the British ethicists, from Hobbes to Mill, the German from Kant to Hegel, and Comte to represent France, present no system of ethics that has practical applicability to the

needs of our time. All introspective ethical systems necessarily lack compulsion on the individual mind now demanding, as compulsion, the definiteness of scientific objectivity. While professing to treat morality as a subject of scientific scrutiny, conventional theory, even in its most modern aspect, adopts as ethical criteria mere sentiments and prepossessions in favour of one or another scheme of conduct.

No valid system of ethics is possible that does not apply what I may term scientific philosophy to defining justice. The result of this application, as I show in this work, is to constitute the individual servant of the community, and to abolish private property not derived as wage for service. The individual, or society is only incidentally the concern of ethics. Its real concern is justice. Individual justice is only possible subject to collective justice. Society must be just before the individual can be just. The validity of the above definition of the social requirement of justice is demonstrated by the bearing of scientific philosophy, as I show in this work, on free-will. There is no absolute freedom; therefore all faculty-product belongs, by ethical right, to the community. Again, as I show in this work, right morality, so far as regards the individual, is summed up in the apothegm—action according to belief. This axiom I have validated from the standpoint of universal practical experience, and from the standpoint of natural science and its philosophical elaboration. Finally, I offer emotional incentive for the practice of this morality in demonstration of God as its authority.

Ethical right only exists through belief as the product of intellect. Intellect says that if God, not man, created his faculties, they belong to God, not to man, socially or individually. Society is merely the trustee for their administration, and if it administers them by any standard except that of intellectual apprehension of right, society is a fraudulent administrator of God's property. As an honest trustee society must apportion faculty-product as the common property. This does not, at our present stage of evolution, preclude society on its own behalf, from rewarding more liberally some than other services, but it does preclude society from permitting the individual to own, or decide what he owns of, his faculty-product. Individual reward must be decided by society according to intellectual demonstration of ethical right. So long as nations are isolated, self-contained communities, individual faculty-product belongs to the particular nation as trustee for God. So long as the individual man is an isolated entity—that is, so long as he is not part of a community—he is trustee for God of his faculty-product, and being the sole person interested in the trust, he may administer it on his own behalf. No individual, within civilisation, is such an isolated entity; so no such individual has the right of administration on his own behalf of the trust.

Again, a nation is comparable with such an isolated individual to the extent that it may administer its faculty-product on its own behalf. On the other hand, its ethical compulsions differ from those of the

isolated individual, to the extent that as the nation is a complex of individuals it must administer its faculty-product in conformity with the intellectual demonstration of justice. If the nation fails to do this it is ethically permissible, indeed ethically compulsory, that any other nation or nations constituted according to justice take active measures to enforce justice on the recalcitrant nation. Of course the actual manifestation, as offensive action, by the just nation of its ethical compulsion, will necessarily be conditioned by expediency. If there is a preponderance of power to enforce justice over power to oppose it, then the enforcement will be practicable. If the power to enforce be lacking, then justice will necessarily be affronted by omission on the part of the just nation or nations, and commission on the part of the unjust nation. In practice, until in the comity of nations there is a power able to overcome any national attempt to affront justice, individual nations will have to establish justice by their own initiative—that is, by a preponderant power within themselves. This power must arise through the permeation of the individual with determination to establish justice. Before he can experience this determination he must become intellectually assured of what constitutes justice. In this work I try to afford him the assurance. Before he himself can practise justice his determination to enforce it must ensure a society constituted according to its dictates. As society is now constituted, it is no more possible for the individual to practise justice than for society to practise it.

At present all societies are constituted on a basis of injustice. Though interference between one unjust nation and another to enforce justice does not involve aggression on justice so far as regards the specific object of interference, still it involves aggression on justice in regard to the status of the judging nation. There is not genuine ethical right of interference between nations one with another, even to remedy injustice, unless the interfering nation is itself constituted according to justice. If one rogue forcibly suppresses the wrong of another, the one who judges has no ethical status. He merely exercises the right of might to practise one or more forms of ethical wrong and to suppress others. This is the present position of societies in respect to the individual wrongdoer. These societies exercise the right of might, not of ethics. Until societies are constituted according to justice, injustice, necessarily, can only be opposed by right of might. Before any society can be constituted just, a power, not necessarily itself just, must arise within the society, able successfully to exercise the right of might to extirpate injustice. When this is accomplished, the society will have ethical status as judge in applying force to the individual wrongdoer or to another society affronting justice.

Whether it is possible to commit injustice to yourself I do not intend to discuss here. But, assuming the possibility, the only way such injustice could be committed would be by exercising will-power against intellect's determination of right. Then, a man, in regard to himself, would be in the

position of the brute who so exercised his will-power over another as to affront intellect's determination of right, or who, analogously, exercised his muscular power. Intellect-power, to human apprehension, is the faculty nearest approximating man to divinity. All other faculties, as already indicated, confine him to the brute-level. If man has any post-terrestrial possibilities essentially transcending those of the brutes, I believe those possibilities will depend on his terrestrial exercise of intellect-power so that it involves corresponding action.

The lack of intellectual, in comparison with sensual developments, characterising this nation, is an influence strongly making for dissolution. The nation without either emotional or intellectual ideals is on the way to perdition. This nation has lost emotional ideals—as have all nations under the influence of science—but has attained no intellectual ones. Its only ideals are material—the lowest form of sensual. The press, literature, art of the country, stamp it as animal—atavistic. Those who believe the disease has not progressed beyond the power of remedy, and who work for its eradication are the only real patriots and men this country can show.

No philosophy based on introspective abstractions is adapted to effect the reformation, or is any emotivity pretending to revivify the dry bones of theological tradition such a factor. The only possible regenerative agency for this age is scientific religion, emanating, as belief, from sensory experience and involving justice as its ideal.

There are now no just men in this country, because the social conditions do not permit their existence. There are perhaps a few moral, or honest men—that is, men who act according to their convictions; but there are no just men. As shown in this work, justice is a specific thing emanating from the scientific and philosophical demonstrations of determinism, and is impossible, as exercise, to the individual, until social conditions afford scope for its manifestation. What is possible to each individual, as a relatively free agent, is to co-operate with his fellows to overthrow the existing social conditions and substitute others consistent with the exercise of justice by the individual. Anybody aware of the demonstration of justice, and who yet connives at the present system, is ethically on the plane of the common rogue. For the present agent the possibility of acting justly is virtually limited to striving to upset the existing social system and establish another based on justice. Justice is impossible as a rule of conduct for the individual, until he is dispossessed, on behalf of society, of all monopoly of faculty-product. The so-called virtues and vices depending for their repute, as good or bad, on emotional predisposition (benevolence, malevolence, prudence, recklessness, frugality, profligacy, and so on through the whole range of automatic, animal propensities) are outside the realm of morality, except to the extent of their bearing on justice. This is the criterion by which, as ethical manifestation, all emotional predisposition must be tested, and this criterion can only be applied through

men's manifestation of right morality—action according to belief.

In the end the fate of society depends on the individual. I hear many people say, what can I do? Why should I strive for justice or anything else, so long as everybody is striving the other way, and so long as my striving would be to my personal disadvantage? Such questions, from the brute standpoint, no doubt are pithy as well as plausible, and, so long as men are governed by their brute, instead of by their human, such reflections will, no doubt, prevent multitudes from stirring a hand for justice. One of my main objects in writing this work is to turn brutes into men. If brutes cannot be turned into men, then I believe that society, as now constituted, is doomed to perish under an avalanche of violence, carnage, and hatred. Obviously, justice will never be attained by people who put to themselves such questions as those above indicated, and act their expediential implications. No measures for social amelioration have ever been the work of such people. On the other hand, nothing is more probable than that, if a million men were to-day inspired with the single determination to substitute a just, for the present social dispensation, the substitution would be accomplished within a year. What is wanted is the human will. A phalanx of a million men fighting for justice would conquer the world, let alone the opulence, privilege, and brutism of a single nation.

The heterogeneous mob of emotionalists and expedientialists calling themselves socialists will never

achieve such a change. Although they clamour for justice, they do not even know what it means. They take it to be a matter of bellies, hours, nationalisations, municipalisations, outputs, competitions *et hoc*. They have not a glimmering that these things are only of the brute ; that justice is of the human, and, when realised, would sweep away the brute grievances they are at such pains to lop away in detail. Failing intellectual ideal, the rights and wrongs of those flesh-pot famishers are only their own emotive propensities, and the single thing they are united about is to get hold of what their opponents monopolise. How far they would exemplify their enthusiasms were they in the place of the monopolists, it is not difficult to estimate for one who has taken the measure of emotionalism. When we find leaders of such a movement of emancipation at once proclaiming themselves for equality, fraternity, liberty (the last absolutely inconsistent with the first, and the other dependent on personal likes and dislikes), and acclaiming in tones of the maddest sensualism of the gutter the argument of big battalions, big guns, and big exchequers, we may at any rate form a fairly reliable judgment regarding the remoteness of the rank and file of the supporters of those emancipators from even a rudimentary conception of the ideal of justice. If the realisation of justice depends on such flounders in the bogs of emotionalism as these, it is : God help justice ! The proletarian licking his lips like a sated wolf, or wild, in the delirium of a demented homicide, at the bidding of sanguinary press-hucksters and

poetic tub-thumpers ; the ostensible representative of cultivated intelligence and honesty denouncing the motive for slaughter in one breath, and demanding its unflinching perpetration in another ; the professional representative of a god of love emulating the vulpine proletarian ; the exponent of the doctrine of mob-infallibility-cum-brotherhood and liberty-cum-equality singing hallelujah to the bloody extermination, on behalf of a gang of sordid exploiters and parasites, of a people's right to select its own laws—these are spectacles to make any gods weep that are concerned about justice and the date when humanity is to become human.

CHAPTER XIX

IMAGINATION

ON imagination depend all introspective philosophy and conventional transcendental science. Imagination is either a replica or a distorted reproduction of sense-experience. In the former case a true sensory image is reproduced by what is called memory. In the latter case a number of sensory images are memorised in combination, so as to involve a mental picture foreign to any actual sensory experience. To take an instance of this latter process, let us suppose the imagination of a flying pig. Here we combine what we memorise as wings with what we memorise as a pig. Whether there are or are not flying pigs, we may construct a perfectly logical process of ratiocination on this imaginative combination. We may apply mathematics and physiology and mechanics to showing how that pig will soar from earth, and how it will alight—in a word, we may emulate the transcendental physicist who tells us all about ether and atoms. Still, our “nuclear premise” of a flying pig will invalidate all we accomplish as logicians and empiricists.

Another example of this distorted reproduction of sensory experience is afforded by the time, space, and motion of the transcendental physicist and the introspective philosopher. Here mental symbols of sensory experience constituting concrete relationships are treated as equivalent to the sensory experiences. When the Kantian philosopher talks of "forms" of space and time and other similar nebulosities, he really attenuates into nothings his concrete experiences of bodily relationship, involving spatial intersection and movement. He says he knows space and time only through these "forms," while nevertheless owning that his "forms" only exist because he knows spatial and, by implication, motive relationships. This is as though I were to say I only knew beefsteak through "forms" of that comestible. If I need "form" for space or time, I need it for the taste of beefsteak. As I show in this work, my space and time are as fully dependent on my sense of bodily relationship as is the flavour of steak. Logically, the flavour of my steak needs a preconditioning "form" as necessarily as does, according to the Kantian, my sense of bodily extension or differentiation. If he may deal with the symbols space and time as equivalent to sensed relationships, I may deal with the symbol flavour as equivalent to my experience from eating the steak.

The essential origin of imagination is always some sensory experience. Given such a sensory "nucleus," it is reproduced, elaborated, or distorted by the void-sensation, becoming an ideational "nucleus" to be similarly transformed by the necessity-sensation. So

long as this mutative process involves what we call logical inference—that is, thought-sequence common to normal minds—from a true sensory “nucleus,” we start our “voyage” from the source, and may proceed as far as we like towards the “ocean.” The resultant is fit truth. On the other hand, if the void-sensation involves our transforming a sensory body into an abnormal psychical body—as in the case of the analogies of transcendental physics, of various figures used in common speech, or of introspective dialectics dealing with hypostasised symbols—we start any voyage of inference on which we may embark from what may be termed a side-eddy of the current of unsymbolisable sensation, and from this side-eddy we shall never emerge into the “ocean” of truth.

As already indicated, what I have termed distorting imagination, involving the void-sensation, transforms sensory bodies into psychical bodies. Let us take an illustration. I hypnotise the matter-soul to afford me a certain sensory body which the void-sensation enables me to transform into a psychical body, to which I give a name, say, sheep. If I am a butcher, or a wool-dealer, or an anatomist, “sheep” will present very different characters, as a sensory body, from what it presents to me as a mere non-expert observer. The butcher’s “sheep” will be mainly a matter of flesh and bone; the wool-dealer’s “sheep” a matter of fleece; the anatomist’s “sheep” a complex of interrelated structures. Each specialistic hypnotist will have his sheep-psychical body as something he abstracts, as what I shall deal with as effective

units of consciousness, from the totalised "sheep" which, as sub-soul of the matter-soul realised as sensory bodies, is in every mind, but which is also only partially realised as effective units at any particular act of sensing (or what I call act of sensory apprehension). In all the above cases of observation the product would be a normal psychical body, whether it constituted the "sheep" of the ordinary observer or of the specialists, whom I may term prejudiced observers. In the above cases there is no imagination. Every psychical body is here directly derived from a sensory body through the void-sensation.

Now let us suppose that, together with the psychical body constituting the trunk and legs of a sheep, we combine the head and tail of a horse. Here we have normal psychical bodies (ideas of sheep's trunk and legs and horse's head and tail) derived from normal sensory bodies abnormally correlated as other psychical bodies. This constitutes the essence of imagination. In all its grades, from the ideas of the commonplace visionary to those of the poet, the essence of imagination is the abnormal correlation of psychical bodies, which latter are ultimately resolvable into sensory bodies. Now, let us take another case. Let us suppose a sheep the size of a mouse. How are we able to suppose this? The supposition is only possible because we have transformed a multitude of sensory bodies into a single psychical body which we call size or dimension. This abstract generalisation affords us, on the conditions, the sheep as a psychical body, equivalent in

one respect to the mouse as a psychical body. Now, the psychical body "dimension" is really nothing in itself. It only becomes real so soon as it is applied to a psychical derived from a specific sensory body. The sensory body must condition what sort of a "dimension" the psychical body is to be. Thus, when we suppose a sheep the size of a mouse, the conditions are reversed. Here "dimension" conditions the sheep. This affords another instance of the abnormal correlation of psychical with sensory bodies, constituting imagination. The last is the transcendental physicist's method of transforming sensory bodies into psychical infinitesimals. As the one imaginer transforms the sheep to the size of the mouse, through misapplication of the abstract generalisation "dimension," so does the transcendental physicist transform sensed particles into "atoms." The "minuteness" of "atoms" no more exists than does the "minuteness" of the sheep of the supposed size of a mouse.

What is called recollection, or the localisation in time of events revived by memory, is a form of imagination. What is called productive imagination involves synthetic metamorphosis of psychical bodies as arbitrarily combined memories into other psychical bodies. The physicist's hypotheses of atoms and energies are constituted by productive imagination, as is my picture of a sheep the size of a mouse, or of the nondescript constituted of the sheep's trunk and legs and the head and tail of a horse. Productive imagination depends on the necessity-sensation as

constituting arbitrary correlations of psychical bodies derived from sensory bodies. In a normal process of inference the necessity-sensation so projects one psychical body on another as to ensure causal continuity. On the other hand, in productive imagination it projects one psychical body or correlation of psychical bodies on other psychical bodies, so as to ensure causal discontinuity. Productive imagination is really a process of inference under abnormal conditions, involving the arbitrary selection of premises and cleavage of causal continuity. All inference based on analogy, such as the physical hypotheses of atoms and ethers, illustrates productive imagination, and is essentially spurious as demonstration.

The question arises: How do we recognise the difference between imagination and actual experience? Sometimes we fail to recognise the difference even in the case of a sensory body at one moment in, at another moment out of, actual experience. A good illustration of this is afforded by hearing, involving what I shall deal with as sensory body of the auditory order. A faint rhythmical sound will sometimes persist as seemingly real after the actual sound has ceased. Physiologists profess to account for this discrimination between real and imagined sensory bodies (or so-called images and sensations) on the assumption of weaker shocks or explosions, as being aroused by intra-cortical currents constituting "images," than are aroused by currents from the sense-organs constituting "sensation." However, such an interpretation begs the question of the existence outside mind

of the cortex itself, to say nothing of the sense-organs. As the reader will be aware, from our present standpoint we cannot grant that the cortex is any less a thing of mind than is the "sensation" for which the physiologist accounts by this cortex. From my standpoint, what enables us to distinguish between the real, as sensory bodies, and the unreal, as psychical bodies constituting what we call imagination, is the experience, through the will, of the void-sensation, or its absence through lack of willing. (See earlier discussion of this subject in Chap. XII.) When we suppose a psychical body to be a sensory body—in ordinary phraseology, when we confound a real object of sense with the idea of the object—we continue to will the void-sensation, which normally is only involved with hypnotism of the matter-soul into a sub-soul or sensory body. So long as we continue to will the void-sensation, it does not matter, so far as concerns apprehension of the sensory body as real, whether it be memorised or sensed; in other words, on the conditions it does not matter whether we are dealing with a direct hypnotism of the matter-soul or with a psychical body resulting from that hypnotism. So long as the void-sensation is there we get the notion of reality. In the above illustration we should suppose the sound to be real until we had ceased willing the void-sensation. What are called visual after-images are other instances of the sort. Here we memorise the sensory body and retain the void-sensation. Accordingly we see the object modified in various ways by memory, but still

real as a sensory body. Physiologists say that such an effect arises through retinal fatigue, and of course invoke the wave-theory of light. However, as in the earlier case, the great question is begged on which depends the whole issue. The retina itself, from our present standpoint, is as much a thing in the mind needing explanation as is the after-image for which physiologists account by taking the retina to be something out of the mind not needing explanation, and by assuming light to be another thing out of the mind, equivalent to a sensory body of the visual order, or what we commonly call a seen object. The void-sensation is a thing as much as the sensory body itself. The one, no less than the other, is a thing in the mind. We may as well ask why we recognise the sensory body itself as why we recognise the void-sensation. Accordingly, there is no more reason to ask why we recognise the difference between actual sense-impressions and imagination than why we recognise sense-impressions at all. Both are ultimate facts of experience.

All normal imaginative products are ultimately resolvable into memories which, again, ultimately depend on the necessity-sensation superseding the void-sensation, and so constituting the difference between psychical bodies directly and those indirectly derived from sensory bodies. We will away the void-sensation, so banishing what we call actuality, and will into existence the necessity-sensation, involving memory, just as we will away a sensory body, or will one into existence, when we, respectively, fail

or succeed in hypnotising the matter-soul into that body. All is a product of willing effective into ineffective units, or *vice versa*, whatever be the experience. In wrangling about terminologies, as in certain psychological speculation, we miss the essence of the phenomena. Why are ideas different from sense-experience? why is imagination different from actuality? how are ideas associated? and so on. All such questions, as dealt with by introspective psychology, are really only questions about symbols, not about real things underlying the symbols. We can only deal with the reality by projecting ourselves outside specialisms and investigating from the whole body of empiricism. Psychology, biology, physics in themselves can tell us nothing about efficient causes. All that these specialisms can do is to map out their respective parishes, and formulate hypotheses consistent with the maps.

The essential difference between imagination and reality is that, in the former case, the soul is not directly interacting, as hypnotist, with the matter-soul, so as to involve the void-sensation, while in the case of real experience the soul is so interacting, and the void-sensation is operating. Collateral evidence for the existence of a world external to ourselves is the fact that we cannot imagine a sensory body not compounded of elements already in our experience. Were there nothing but the soul to constitute our universe, we should (assuming our present limitations) be in a perpetual flux of pictures affording us no anchorage, as memories, to reality. However, as the

soul conditions our experiences through the medium of a soul not itself (the matter-soul), our experiences are necessarily fixed by the relationship, and we recognise when the relationship is being manifested, or when it is only being imitated or parodied. In many cases, however, we are apt to deceive ourselves, notwithstanding our clues afforded by the matter-soul. As I have shown in this work, a large part of what is called science is nothing, essentially, but such self-delusion.

CHAPTER XX

FAITH

FAITH is the ultimate consummation of emotion or of intellect, according as the brute or the human is the soul-type. Antecedent to modern intellectual evolution conditioning belief by reason, faith, emanating from emotion, performed the office in soul-evolution, as transforming the lower into the higher brute, which faith, emanating from intellect, now performs in transforming the brute into the human. When the faith of the brute emotionalist is now "grafted" on to the belief of the human intellectualist, the result is a degenerate soul-type which I term psychical hybrid. Practically, all the faith of the present day is of the brute-type. Or this brute-type of faith, in the case of an ignorant residuum, its object is a supposed man-god. On the other hand, in the case of the section of the public of higher intelligence and culture, the object of the brute-faith is material power. In the one case, we have the man-god; in the other case, we have the Golden Calf and its concomitants, as the objects of

this brute-faith. Under present conditions, the faithful to the man-god are in hopeless impotency, through numerical inferiority, as compared with the faithful to the Golden Calf, who are now masters of the world and, from my standpoint, will have to renounce their faith and adopt that of the man, or ensure a chaos of social upheaval resulting in a violent end to them and their deity.

As the brute-faith in the man-god involves a doctrine of non-resistance, it is fostered as an ally by most of the faithful to the Golden Calf, who mainly profess the cult of the man-god, reserving their own deity for tacit, but real, devotion. Indeed, the majority of the high-priests of the faith of the man-god, also called the Lamb, are really devotees of the Calf. On the other hand, there is a small band of devotees of the Golden Calf who, on the strength of mere reason—and often mainly as testimony of their faith in the Calf's ability to render things comfortable here—bitterly assail the cult of the Lamb. These partisans are called atheists, freethinkers, agnostics. They are mainly, not really, atheists, freethinkers, or agnostics, inasmuch as they have a god—the Calf; do not think freely, but according to their brute preferences, and, instead of being non-knowers, know their own deity to be of such transcendent reality that they spend their lives in making genuflections at its shrine.

Naturally, an emotive religious cult such as the Christian places great store on faith based on credulity, inasmuch as any other sort of faith would

be inconsistent, in these days, with its existence. Naturally, when the conditions of belief have displaced emotion as its substitute, those interested in maintaining the rationally annihilated cult try to obscure the vital difference between faith based on credulity and based on belief, trusting the ignorance, insouciance, and disinclination for change, characteristic of the average public, to render tolerable, on a basis of credulity and hypocrisy, what once existed on a basis of honest enthusiasm. I am one of those who believe that evolution will not long tolerate a society that is thus tolerant towards its faith. I am one of those who believe that, unless society annihilates its present tolerance, evolution will annihilate society.

Faith always implies a God corresponding to the credal stage of the agent. The faith of a savage implies his Mumbo Jumbo. The faith of an atomist philosopher involves his "unknowable" and "survival of the fittest." The faith of a sincere—and necessarily ignorant—Christian involves his Christ, Holy Ghost, and Father. The faith of an everyday materialist involves his Golden Calf. The faith of a genuine believer involves his God of Justice. All the faiths, other than the last, are of the brute credal stage. They are not really based on belief at all, but on credulity, mere ratiocination, or animal selfishness. Faith is common to humanity. But there is only one sort of faith compatible with modern social integrity and individual upraising. This fit faith is the normal consummation of belief. As unsymbolisable sensation leads into experience, so fit faith leads

out of it. Fit faith must consummate what reason and intellect have realised as belief. Fit faith is to what may be termed the end of the sensation-continuum, what unsymbolisable sensation, as anticipating sensory experience, is to the beginning of that continuum. Faith, *per se*, is, essentially, extrinsic to belief. Accordingly, faith, in itself, is extrinsic to morality. On the other hand, there can be no real morality without faith. Like the unsymbolisable sensation anticipating sensory experience, faith is a bare impulse void of definable body until resolved into some concrete eject. In the case of unsymbolisable sensation, the eject is sensory experience. In the case of faith, the eject is transcendental projection of the ultimate issues of experience into the sense of what we call mystery, which is, essentially, a sense of the inadequacy of our beliefs to afford a full revelation. Faith of any sort is now only possible as the product of reason (as the case may be, eventuating or not eventuating in belief), or of ignorance and stupidity, involving credulity. Though the mass of people in this country are not stupid, they are densely ignorant and deplorably indifferent regarding all matters that do not immediately affect their sensual cravings; and all the power of wealth, on its own behalf, being devoted to gratifying the brute by the cheap dissemination of mental narcotics, the slough of ignorance, flippancy, triviality, and sensuality is ever becoming deeper and fouller. I venture to express the opinion that average intellectual development is at a lower level in this country than in the United

States and any of the European nations, with the exceptions of Russia, Spain, Italy, and Turkey.

In material concerns we have at present a good example of the effects of the poison of emotionalism and materialism in the alternating fits of hysterical exaltation and depression according as the newspaper headings convey one or another sort of news from Africa; in the snarlings of the press, one moment against the military commanders if they fail, the next moment in its extravagant laudations and tigerish gloatings when victory happens to be ours. When I compare the press comments from Pretoria with those from London, I am inclined to doubt whether the vigorous race still hails from these islands. When a normally serious and equable man becomes all at once garrulous, flippant, obscene, querulous, pathologists presage serious mind-trouble. When a normally serious race betrays analogous revulsion, the objective observer discerns grave signs of disaster. He sees a nation with idols for God, and affirms: unless fit faith come, that nation is doomed.

Before closing this chapter, I may offer a few observations regarding faith, as constituting knowledge of God. Mr. Herbert Spencer and other philosophers have been at dialectical pains to show that conception of a First Cause, an Infinite, an Absolute is impossible, because by the very act of conceiving them they would need to be brought into relation with the caused, the finite, the relative, and to be brought into such relation would negative their characters as First Cause, Infinite, Absolute. As these philosophers deal

with God as being various ideas which are inherently inconceivable—pseudo-ideas—their God is of course “unknown.” The faith with which philosophy is concerned, consummating belief, obviates the difficulties occurring in relation to Mr. Spencer’s unknowable divinities. Mr. Spencer’s knowing is only sensation. So is the faith consummating belief. On the conditions, this faith is as good knowing-sensation as is Mr. Spencer’s. Its certainty is as good as the certainty of any other sensation of knowing. I do not at all need to know God as an idea, if I know Him as an object of the faith I now deal with. This faith is just as good demonstration of my God as is reason in regard to any common problem, inasmuch as my faith is the necessary ultimate of everything that reason can demonstrate. God is not-knowable in the terms of word-logic, but He is knowable in the terms of faith consummating belief. I know that God is outside limitations, though I cannot conceive Him in the terms of this knowledge. The ability to conceive is here quite superfluous, inasmuch as belief affirms that God must be outside limitations and involves faith in the validity of the affirmation, whether I can or cannot conceive its actualisation. All speculation based on the false conception of knowing, which I hope I have demolished in this work, is ultimately abortive as leading to not-knowing, or doubt. Regarding supreme relationship, I hope to show, in later chapters, that this does not involve limitation of the Creator.

CHAPTER XXI

PERSONAL ARTIFICE

THE "current" of unsymbolisable sensation anticipating sensory experience (as what I term the outer sensation) becomes realised to us as that experience, as what I term personal artifice. This involves the peculiar, idiosyncratic interpretation which constitutes objects or properties and discriminations regarding them, as apprehended by particular individuals of the same type, and by the individual of one as distinct from another type. Really, the individual is unable to decide the quality of product of personal artifice of any other individual; he can only decide it of himself. Though I assume that every man perceives a table, for instance, as I perceive it, I have no absolute assurance of the fact. I only know the table through my own personal artifice, and, as I cannot identify any other man's soul with my own, and as personal artifice depends on soul, I cannot really decide to what extent my internal experience as the table is identical with that experience of any other man.

Still less can we decide, on this point, in regard to types other than human. We can only make guesses by comparing what we visualise as their structure with what we visualise as our own structure. Indeed, we can only know they perceive at all by hypnotising the matter-soul, as their bodies, into affording us the experience, as motor manifestations, that they react in one or another way to excitants. How, spiritually, as conscious entities, they react to stimuli by personal artifice, we can only determine by attributing to them personal artifice akin to our own. That their souls, as spiritual entities, are akin to our own as procreating agents, I have shown in earlier chapters dealing with biology and its metaphysical elaboration. And that certain fundamental emotions are common to them and us we may reasonably infer from our experience of their motor manifestations. Still, this is very far from any real basis of comparison between our and their personal artifice.

We cannot base such comparison on mere morphological appearances. These, in ourselves as much as in other types, are the product for us of our soul's hypnotism of the matter-soul. They offer no clue as to how unsymbolisable sensation is realised, in other types, as personal artifice. They are merely products of our own personal artifice. Let me take a concrete case to illustrate this point. We find various identities between the structure of a dog and our own structure. The dog has eyes, ears, nose, mouth, viscera, cerebral and spinal systems, nerve-cells, etc., constructed broadly on the principle

of our own corresponding parts. But our structure or medium only perceives, as exercise of personal artifice, itself and the dog's structure. We only perceive as instrument of the soul. Assuming the dog has a soul, our personal artifice regarding the dog's structure may be radically different from the dog's. It may perceive its body as something totally different from what we perceive it.

Organic structures, *qua* structures, only exist through the soul, because they only exist through personal artifice, *as* structures. We can only judge of the response of our own structure through our soul. And we only cognise the dog's structure through our structure so conditioned by our soul. To measure the dog's personal artifice, we should need to know how his soul conditioned its structure. This would only be possible if we could metamorphose our soul into the dog's. And then we should not know the dog's personal artifice in terms of our own, but merely as a dog. Our physiologists and anatomists, in their experiments, are only dealing with their own personal artifice. All their morphological and functional verifications are merely the results of their souls' hypnotism of the matter-soul, affording them varied revelations of their own minds as specific sensory experiences. But their sensory experiences have no necessary correspondence with those of the dog. The similarities they perceive between their own structure and that of the dog are utterly foreign to the question of similarity between the dog's and their own personal artifice.

We really no more know how the dog experiences his world of sense than we know how the oyster experiences its world. We know, individually, how we apprehend our world of sense, and we feel assured that we know how our fellow-men apprehend theirs. But we have no like ground for assurance regarding any non-human type. Though we recognise, as our own personal artifice, through hypnotising the matter-soul, that the dog has structures akin to our own, we cannot hypnotise the dog's soul into affording us analogous knowledge regarding his internal experiences of the outside world. What we really know of anything is what we know of our own sensations.

Unsymbolisable sensation, as God's hypnotism of the soul of organic life, is a bond connecting types and individuals ; but how those types and individuals realise, as personal artifice, this unsymbolisable sensation, is a matter of soul-fiat and can only be really known to the individual. For us humans, this unsymbolisable sensation first becomes realised, as personal artifice, as the primordium or "fused" sensibility involving the potential contents of what is, later, sensory experience. Next, it becomes realised, as personal artifice, involving the differentiation of the primordium into specific sensory experiences. Next, it becomes realised, as personal artifice, as memory of sensory experiences. Later, it becomes manifested, as personal artifice, as sense of what may be termed habit of sequence, involving the "germ" of the notion of causality. Still later, it becomes realised

as vocal sounds expressing the primary personal artifice of sensory experience. Still later, it becomes manifested, as personal artifice, as sounds expressing necessary connection between other sounds expressing sensory experience. So, by continuous accretions from unsymbolisable sensation, of personal artifice, language, as an intellectual product, comes to exist.

Language is essentially a product of distorting imagination (involving the void-sensation) through which we are enabled to transmute specific realisations of unsymbolisable sensation, as sensory experience or primary personal artifice, into a secondary form of personal artifice as imitative sounds. I believe that the first manifestation of human speech would be as sounds imitating the characteristic auditory impressions involving our apprehension of vocal manifestations characteristic of organic life, and of sonorous manifestations characteristic of physical phenomena. Through habit of utterance, humanity would gradually alter the rudimentary imitative symbols until they had become associated with the particular objects, not through secondary personal artifice as mere imitation, but, through a tertiary form of personal artifice binding them to the objects through memory and inculcation, and thus initiating what psychologists call association of ideas. For us, such processes have so evolved that we are apt to lose sight altogether of the sensory basis of language, and to attribute to words the quality of things in themselves. So we naturally get our transcendental conventions in science and introspective philosophy,

involving, as I show, a multitude of philosophically false premises and futile conclusions.

Emotion is a form of personal artifice involving differentiation of unsymbolisable sensation into what I figure as currents, earlier discussed as the sensation and emotion continua. The sensory and psychical forms of personal artifice are only realised by the individual mind for itself. In regard to emotion, as personal artifice, there is no evidence to establish identity even as between two individuals of the human type, let alone as between individuals of the human and any other type. We all think we know what love and hate are for everybody, as well as for ourselves. I surmise we have absolutely no means of estimating how any other person than ourself realises even these fundamental and coarse emotions, let alone the more sophisticated and delicate types termed æsthetic. I surmise that the *nuances* constituting love and hate are practically infinite, and that no two individuals experience identical shades. Indeed, judging from my own experience, I would assert that even the individual himself cannot identify, as identical, his feeling of love, or hate, under any two conditions of excitation. Of hate, so far as it applies to persons, I have had no experience (though I have had much experience of repugnance), but I can discriminate a multitude of shades in my love for individuals. There is here no question of intensity involved—merely a difference of what I may term *timbre*. I only experience hate in regard to principle. Here, I confess, the feeling always seems to present

itself as of one unvarying *timbre*. This I attribute to the constancy of credal intensity conditioning the emotion. In the case of persons as the objects of emotion, it seems to me that the heterogeneity of excitant souls largely influences the emotive fluctuations in regard to the coarser emotions, while, in the case of intellect as excitant, there is no such excitative instability in the object. Psychologically, I am with those investigators who hold that emotion is simply the feeling of bodily change induced by any excitant. Thus on this hypothesis we feel mirthful because we laugh, miserable because we cry, instead of laughing because we are mirthful and crying because we are miserable. However, from our present standpoint, the body itself being no less a thing in mind than is the emotion, that we crudely perceive the bodily state as antecedent to the emotional state does not imply that one causes the other. Metaphysically, there is no ground for positing causative efficiency as between one and another mind product. The only causative agent recognised by metaphysic is the soul. From our present standpoint sensory and psychical bodies are real things; "bodily states" are unreal things created by arbitrarily applied personal artifice. According to my hypothesis, to be set forth in another chapter, emotions are psychical bodies of the affective order (or "affective bodies") as ideas are "psychical bodies" of the non-affective order, or sensory experiences are "sensory bodies." The latter are antecedent to the former; but they do not cause them. What causes the one or other class of bodies

is soul-fiat, or will. The manifestation of these bodies constitutes what I call personal artifice. All the mental processes dealt with by psychologists are merely manifestations of personal artifice as one or another sort of body arising through the soul's hypnotism of the matter-soul into a special medium, and the excitation transmitted by that medium to the soul and responded to by the medium, as realisations of effective units of consciousness.

Our ordinary cut-and-dried classifications of emotions, sensory experiences, and conceptions is altogether futile, from the metaphysical standpoint. Nobody really knows how another person loves or hates, sees or hears, or conceives. Affective psychical bodies are ever merging with non-affective psychical bodies and modifying them and sensory bodies. So do sensory bodies modify psychical bodies. Thus, the personal artifice of one person may be totally different from that of another person. Indeed, I venture to think that the personal artifice of the individual is never the same for two consecutive moments. At one moment, one psychical or affective body, or set of bodies, prevails in the personal artifice; at another moment, a sensory body may predominantly qualify the personal artifice, and so on *ad infinitum*.

CHAPTER XXII

INTELLECT

INTELLECT exists, in immediate experience, only as what I may term its eject—belief. This sensation is unique. It is entirely distinct from the flow of ideas, as reason, though it can only arise as the effect of reason on intellect. It is really inspiration—the transcendent culmination of the sensation-continuum “metabolised” by intellect. Wherever it exists, in art, handicraft, literature, morals, or in any other manifestation of human activity, so soon as it is affronted by action, the result is debasement of the product. In the vast majority of human activities, belief does not manifest itself at all. The consequence is practically the same as in the cases in which it does exist, but is affronted by action. Such activities, prosecuted in the absence of belief, never rise to a high level of productiveness. Most of our art and literature, where it is not prosecuted against belief, is prosecuted in its absence. I think few whose opinion is worth having will gainsay that masterpieces are hardly characteristic of our workers in the particular

fields. As the handicraftsman is now virtually nothing but a machine-tender, the test cannot well be applied to him. Nevertheless, where he does manifest his personality, I surmise he will bear out my contention.

In regard to our ordinary dealings with one another, we have no belief. We have only what are called reasons, involving expediency. There is no essential difference between our "reasons" and the tiger's automatism urging him to spring at the antelope. When the professing Christian reasons to the conclusion that, as everybody else is trying to batten at the expense of his fellow, he should do the same, the Christian only believes his conclusion if he does not believe his religion. He usually solves the difficulty by believing neither his conclusion nor his religion, but by swallowing both. Here belief neither judges his "reasons" nor his religion. The consequence is that his handiwork, society, is as debased, judged by human standards, as is the literature from which he usually derives his mental and moral pabulum.

Intellect does nothing but judge. It does not sense, feel, or reason. It merely causes one particular sensation—belief. No constituent of the continua affords this particular sensation. The sole office of intellect is to afford it. When this sensation, derived from intellect, so operates as to excite unsymbolisable emotion (effort), the result is "fit" volition, that is, volition of the evolutionally highest type possible to organism. The sensation-continuum is to intellect as

unsymbolisable emotion (effort) is to will (as the particular fiat conditioning motor activity). Intellect may be termed the will of the mind, while will itself (as the special fiat for action) is the ruler deciding whether the intellectual "will" of the mind shall or shall not be consummated by action.

Intellect is the special endowment differentiating the human from the brute. All other endowments are common to both types of organisms. To the extent that the human being is volitionally moved according to the decision of intellect, he is man. To the extent that he is volitionally moved according to the decision of emotion, reason, or sense, he is brute. At one time emotion performed an office corresponding to that of intellect for this age. The "inclination" proceeding from emotion then acted as does now the "discrimination" proceeding from intellect. In such ages of emotional dominance, humanity had only manifested the potentiality of brute-evolution. Even at present a vast majority of the human race has not transcended the brute-stage of evolution. In this country we are now experiencing a vivid illustration in what is called the wave of patriotism—essentially, merely the clan-spirit of the cave-man or of a pack of wolves—permeating all strata of the community, of the extremely thin veneer of humanity that partially hides the brute. Personally, I must avow the belief that, assuming post-terrestrial evolutionary continuity, a vast majority of this nation have no reason to anticipate a future stage of existence essentially differing from that of the brutes. My

view, to be later set forth at large, is that the future life will start its development from that attained terrestrially, and that, accordingly, the animal here will start as the animal there.

I look on the exercise of faculty here as the criterion of the future experience. If, as I contend to be the case, intellect is the only faculty really demarcating the human from the brute, and if, as I contend to be the case, intellect must excite through unsymbolisable emotion (effort) the volitional fiat in order that the human may manifest itself, then the human does not exist unless action is governed by intellect. Accordingly, to the extent that intellect does not operate as exciting action, the agent is brute.

As already indicated, reason is quite distinct from intellect. Reason is part of the sensation-continuum, and has experiential contents. As impelling to action, it merely involves expediency, not essentially different from the brute-gratification of emotion. On the other hand, intellect demands submission to principle quite external to the animal cravings. Intellect is out of the continua and has no contents. It is the highest development of the spirituality of the soul as realised in organism or individuality, and, corollarily, the soul which responds to it, so as to involve corresponding action, is the highest grade of soul. Probably every human being and many brutes have intellect-endowment potentially. But, if the potentiality is not actively realised terrestrially, it is, so far as post-terrestrial continuity is concerned, latent terrestrially, and must become patent post-terrestrially before the

evolutionary stage attained by those organisms manifesting it on earth is attained by those not so manifesting it. Evolution does not proceed by jumps on earth ; neither, I surmise, does it so proceed between terrestrial and post-terrestrial conditions. The individual must drain his cup post-terrestrially as well as terrestrially.

Intellect is a manifestation of soul-fiat, so selecting from the sensation-continuum as to decide what I may term the fate of reason, while, on the other hand, what I have termed motor will may be said to decide the fate of intellect. As indicated, intellect has no contents affording us concrete notion of itself, as have imagination, memory, emotion and sensory experience. These afford the material for intellect to work on as discriminating agent. Though, loosely, we may talk—as indeed I have done in this work—of intellect as embodied in the logical sense, this latter endowment is entirely distinct from intellect. When I say an effect involves a cause, the necessity-sensation carries me along from idea of sensory experience involving what is called induction, to another experience by which I pass from psychical bodies, directly derived from sensory bodies, to other psychical bodies involving what is called abstract proposition. But that I feel, as belief, the result of this “flow” of the sensation-continuum, depends on a particular form of soul-fiat constituting what I now particularise as intellect, realised as its eject—belief. At one time (as is the case largely at present) intellect did not intervene between emotion and unsymbolisable emotion (effort).

Then the volitional fiat emanated directly from emotion, just as it does in the brutes. Under such conditions the agent was slave to his passions, sentiments, and animal cravings, and was not, spiritually, human.

To demonstrate radical difference between types, we must demonstrate soul-difference. What morphologists deal with as constituting difference is merely a product of mind, not soul. That an animal has two legs, or four legs, from our present standpoint, is insignificant to determine radical typical difference. So far as the sensation and emotion continua are concerned, there is no real difference between man and brute. These continua involve, essentially, only the same thing—automatism. Sense, intelligence, reason, emotion are all common to brute and human mind—merely manifested in degrees by one as compared with another type. On the other hand, no brute can believe. Belief alone, of all mental endowments, differentiates man from brute. Whether the creation of man happened six thousand years ago, or sixty thousand, or six hundred thousand, I must go dead against the scientists who judge of the existence of man by morphological criteria. For me, man only exists when volition, as motor manifestation, is controlled by intellectual discrimination. At present I maintain that man is as rare a commodity as the *Dinornis*. His legs, arms, head, nose, mouth, eyes are no doubt impressive spectacles, but they no more constitute him, except by repute, man, than similarly impressive spectacles in the pig constitute it man. Or, again, do the steam-engines, telephones, telegraphs

produced by that bifurcated structure authenticate the presence of man any more than the ants' and birds' nests or the beavers' dams authenticate that presence. Or, again, do that forked entity's love and hate, his fear and audacity, his generosity and stinginess, his deceit and candour, or any other of his emotional or rational states reveal the presence of man, any more than like states of the tiger, wolf, dog, fox, monkey, elephant reveal it. Man is the intellectual animal and none other, whatever be the corporeal framework, the ingenuity, the emotivity. Man is the only animal that *can act according to belief*, and, so far, he has not manifested his presence, to any great extent, on this earth. I venture to think that he is about the rarest thing on it.

I do not believe that the creation of man has yet been accomplished. I believe that, at present, the animal called man is what may be termed a psychical hybrid between the brute and human, in which the human is yet an almost negligible quantity. I do not believe there is a pure man yet existing. I believe that man, until a comparatively recent intellectual epoch, was psychically pure brute. I believe that the vast majority of this nation are, psychically, pure brute. From my standpoint, the pure man must be a creature whose moral actions are governed by intellectual belief, to the exclusion of emotion opposing such belief. I believe there will be no extirpation of suffering on earth until the human in man completely asserts itself over the brute. I believe that all human suffering exists because man is yet, psychically, a

hybrid. There is virtually no suffering among pure brutes. According to the brute in the hybrid man is the minimal actual suffering. According to the human in the hybrid is the maximal actual suffering. The ecstatic self-torturer, or martyr of by-gone ages, suffered comparatively little. The wolf will gnaw itself away from its trapped leg as though the member were a foreign body. Certain brute types of men are almost insensible to physical punishment. *Pari passu* with the predominance of brute in the hybrid is the insensibility to pain, physical and moral. I believe that woman has far transcended man in progress to human purity. She is more ignorant than man, but she is more honest, under the requisite conditions of intellectual cultivation, in manifesting the supremacy of intellect. As the average woman is intellectually convinced, she acts. Certainly, few are so convinced at present. However, when the intellectual ferment has permeated woman to the extent it has done man, I surmise that the emergence of humanity from the hybrid stage will be vastly accelerated. We have benevolent brutes and malevolent brutes. I prefer the former. Nevertheless, I recognise that my preference is no real criterion of the intrinsic merits of the brutes. Each class obeys its automatic animal propensities, and I cannot believe that one such propensity is, ethically, scientifically, or philosophically, intrinsically higher than another. Or can I believe that soul-evolution determining post-terrestrial states—about which I shall have much to say later—is measurable in terms of brute-propensity of any sort

—benevolent, malevolent, or of a neutral tint. I believe that the only real test of soul-grade is action according to belief—honesty.

It will be seen that as intellect, to manifest itself, must involve belief, people who, as so-called philosophical sceptics, lose themselves in the mazes of dialectics do not manifest intellect at all. They are mere reasoners, no more outside the brute-category than is the emotionalist. Their achievements only illustrate what I may term the automatism, as distinct from the spontaneity, of the mind. They may be compared to a court of special pleaders, without a judge. Conventional philosophy is constituted by the work of such hybrids. To limit myself to a dead example—although there is a very tempting living one—of this hybridism, I may instance Kant. He was one of the greatest mountains of rationalistic hybridism the world has produced. He squeezed reason dry and didn't get a drop of belief. The vast majority of the so-called leaders of thought in this country are, to my belief, hybrids. Politics, journalism, literature, religion, anti-religion are carried on by people whose prominent characteristic, to my apprehension, is to be devoid of belief. Science alone, of the mental pursuits, from my standpoint, is carried on by men.

I hardly need remark that I do not make these affirmations in any deprecatory sense, but solely as the conclusion of an investigator who judges by impersonal criteria. If such an investigator discovers one salient characteristic distinguishing between psychical

types, and if such an investigator has reached my conclusions regarding soul, he is bound by his principles to affirm his conclusions, however they may affect common prepossessions. I can discover no distinguishing characteristic absolutely demarcating the human from the brute other than intellect. Accordingly, I affirm that the human is only essentially different from the brute to the extent that intellect prevails over other psychical faculties, and that any activities not involving such prevalence are, essentially, the activities of brutes. I apply my rule as much to myself as to anybody else. So far as I am not governed by intellect, I am brute ; so far as I am so governed, I am man. So far as my philosophy is not the product of intellectual dominance, it is brute activity. So far as my philosophy is such product, it is human activity.

By the above affirmations, I do not mean to imply any absolutely superior validity of intellect over reason or emotion, as determining what is conventionally called truth. This point is quite beside the present issue. It is possible that the human may hold truth less valid than that of the brute, if, as conventionally assumed, truth be anything else but what is believed (which, I have shown, it cannot be). So far as our present issue is concerned, it does not matter whether what is conventionally termed fallacy or truth excites belief. All that does matter is that belief exists. If it exists, it can only exist through intellect. Neither reason nor emotion *per se* can constitute belief. They can only constitute automatic inclination, entirely

distinct from belief. Anybody may reason to two diametrically opposite conclusions without believing either. So, again, he may feel any intensity of emotive inclination without feeling belief. In such cases nothing but the brute manifests itself. In later chapters this question will be dealt with in various other aspects, and its ultimate implications disclosed.

In regard to action, the outcome of reason is expediency. This is a matter of the personal, and its realisation by action constitutes brute-selection. Belief is a matter of the impersonal, and its realisation by action constitutes human selection. Brutes occasionally act expediency, the product of reason ; but they never act belief, the product of intellect. Expediency is always motivated by desire to attain a particular end. The realisation of belief, by action, is quite independent of such desire. The object set before us by belief has no necessary connection with desire of any sort, and, in excluding desire, the action of belief excludes the brute from the particular determination.

To illustrate the difference between reason and intellect, I may take an example from the clash of prepossessions manifested by partisans in regard to this Boer war. I have read plausible arguments by the same writer showing, on the one hand, that the war constitutes a gross moral wrong on our part, and, on the other hand, showing that now we are engaged in it, we should wage it until we had got our "pound of flesh." This obviously implies that a wrong action tends to become right the more

unflinchingly it is perpetrated. I deny that such a writer, in respect to the subject with which he deals, has any belief at all. He is a mere wrangler exercising reason to validate his own prepossessions, and deceiving those who accept him as guide. All forms of social and individual corruption are facilitated by the exercise of reason, without belief. The press is a prime source of national and individual decay, because people devoid of belief, but with alert reasons, are permitted to appeal, by specious arguments, to any passions it may be their interest to fan. Such writers are charlatans who would be treated as is the common rogue, by any society in which belief was the recognised standard of action. So long as any astute rogue has the privilege of earning his bread by writing as the helot of other rogues, and of imposing broadcast on the public the products of his mental and moral prostitution, so long will the press be a main factor in national degeneration, and, unless the evil be eradicated before it has done its work, in national dissolution.

CHAPTER XXIII

SUB-SOUL OF THE MATTER-SOUL

It may now be well to indicate, more in detail than I have hitherto done, what I mean by a sub-soul of the matter-soul. With the matter-soul itself I shall deal in later chapters. As already stated, a sub-soul of the matter-soul is the product of hypnotism of the matter-soul by the organic soul. That the matter-soul is a necessary implication to account for sensory bodies is shown by the whole body of evidence advanced in this work. To account for the origin of the matter-soul and to indicate its salient characteristics will involve a transcendental hypothesis of emanation which I shall state later. Here, I merely wish to indicate the characteristics of a sub-soul of the matter-soul. This is the precondition of any part of the sensation-continuum which we realise as a coherent, individualised body of sensations and call sensory impressions, constituting a seen, touched, tasted, heard, smelt object or objects. Thus, a sub-soul of the matter-soul constitutes what we apprehend as a flower, whether as seen, touched, or smelt

Sub-Soul of the Matter-Soul 229

qualities—all of which so-called qualities are, for me, sensory bodies, constituting the sensory complex which we call flower. So, again, my own body, or that of another person involves a sub-soul of the matter-soul. Such a sensory complex as my body has special qualities differentiating it, as medium for soul-fiats, from sensory complexes which are merely products of the soul's willing of the matter-soul into sub-souls constituting what we call inanimate objects. These points have been pretty freely elucidated, and I need not further discuss them at present. As a mere product of hypnotism of the matter-soul, the medium is equivalent to any ordinary sub-soul as a thing of the universe, or mind, constituting an inanimate object.

All that constitutes, in immediate experience, a sub-soul of the matter-soul are the sensory bodies (visual, tactual, auditory, gustatory, olfactory) arising through interaction between one sensory complex (the medium) and such sub-soul. Thus, the sub-soul itself is not in immediate experience, whether as constituting the medium, or any inanimate object. All that is in experience are the particular sensory bodies. That these sensory bodies are realised together as constituting a coherent whole, or what we call object of sense, occurs because they are realised as psychical, as well as sensory bodies, and these psychical bodies are correlated by the necessity and time sensations, while the sensory bodies are correlated by the space-sensation. Really, this distinction between psychical and sensory bodies is

arbitrary, inasmuch as the sensory bodies are essentially as much psychical, as being things of mind, as are the psychical bodies. However, there is the real distinction between them, that while the sensory bodies are directly derived from sub-souls of the matter-soul, the psychical bodies are indirectly so derived through the sensory bodies.

Thus, any single sensory body—a sound, sight, touch, flavour, scent—is representative, as what may be termed a fragment, of some specific sub-soul. Again, any sight or touch, constituting what we apprehend as part of a coherent sensory whole (or what we call complete object), is representative of some specific sub-soul. Thus, the leg of a chair is representative of the chair, as sub-soul. The finger or brain is representative of the medium, as sub-soul. So is a nerve-cell or fibre thus representative. Accordingly, a sub-soul of the matter-soul may be conceived as sub-divisible according to the sensory bodies arising from it. When we contemplate the leg of a chair, or a nerve-cell, as an isolated body, we incompletely realise a sub-soul of the matter-soul, and so constitute what may be termed arbitrary sub-division of the particular sub-soul. The mind can obviously effect such sub-division to an indefinite extent. Still, the complete realisation of a sub-soul of the matter-soul is only as a series of sensory bodies limited by the space-sensation and rendered coherent by psychical bodies. A chair leg and a nerve-cell, though in themselves coherent sensory bodies, are only what may be termed fragmentary realisations of a sub-soul,

Sub-Soul of the Matter-Soul 231

the complete realisation of which would involve a chair or some organism, as medium. Such fragmentary realisation involves what I call de-hypnotism and re-hypnotism of the matter-soul. Thus, an anatomist who picks out a muscle or nerve-fibre de-hypnotises and re-hypnotises the matter-soul, constituting a sub-division of a sub-soul of the matter-soul which, as fully realised is, say, a human body. This legitimate process of de-hypnotism and re-hypnotism is, I may say, parodied in the conceptual arena by the mathematical physicist. His atoms are not sensory bodies at all, and, accordingly, are representative of no sub-soul of the matter-soul.

Of course, what I now write regarding sub-division of a sub-soul of the matter-soul must only be taken as figurative presentment of the prime truth that what exists, as sensory bodies, is the mind itself, as universe, and that sensory bodies do not exist externally to the mind, but are externally preconditioned by the matter-soul transfigured into sub-souls by the soul's hypnotism. Here we have a transcendental truth beyond accurate presentment in the terms of sensual perceptivity. Every sensory body—a leaf, crumb, wood-shaving, particle of dust—is, in a sense, a sub-soul of the matter-soul. However, each is only completely known as a psychical-cum-sensory body. As such psychical and sensory compound, or complex, it is only what I term a fragment of a sub-soul of the matter-soul, the totality of which sub-soul is mnemonically implied in each act of perception of the fragmentary body. When I

contemplate a leaf, a particle of dust, a crumb, I always implicitly sense it as what I may term an eject from a more coherent sensory complex. Thus, the leaf implies a tree, or herb; the crumb implies bread; the dust-particle implies some specific complex of visual, tactual, etc., bodies affording notions of shape, density, flavour, scent, etc., which we mnemonically unify as a definite type-sensation or intelligible sensory existence. The dust-particle is only really in intelligible experience so soon as it is identified as, say, wood, cotton, iron, coal. So soon as it is thus known, the dust-particle represents a true sub-soul of the matter-soul. Integrated as constituent of a block of wood, a mass of iron or coal, the particle of dust would lose its identity, *quæ* dust, as a sub-soul of the matter-soul, becoming instead merged as constituent of a bodily extension representing an altogether different sub-soul. It will be seen that sub-souls of the matter-soul are in persistent metamorphosis. As sensory bodies change, so do sub-souls. That sensory bodies change depends on the change in sub-souls, and this latter change depends on the soul's hypnotism of the matter-soul. All is, ultimately, will.

Things, as we experience them, are mind, or actualised universe. But mind is nothing apart from the matter-soul and its hypnotism by the soul into sub-souls. Iron, as discriminated from wood, implies two processes of hypnotism of the matter-soul, resulting in two types of sub-souls. Iron and wood, undiscriminated, as dust, are, in the connection, mere

Sub-Soul of the Matter-Soul 233

terms signifying nothing. Merely as undiscriminated dust, neither iron nor wood exists. Undiscriminated dust implies a type of sub-soul different from that involving dust discriminated as iron or wood. To be iron or wood-sub-soul, dust must be sensed as iron or wood. Iron and wood being things of mind, only exist when mind realises them. They are not, as ordinarily is assumed, things existing apart from mind. Dust, *qua* dust, is neither iron nor wood, nor anything but "dust." To constitute a sensory body "dust," the matter-soul must be hypnotised into a sub-soul typically different from that constituting a sensory body iron or wood. So soon as the dust-particle is realised as wood, or iron, the matter-soul is hypnotised into an iron, or a wood sub-soul. This changed hypnotism must have occurred antecedently to the discrimination, as its precondition. The mind does nothing ; only the soul does.

That all sensory bodies, as known, are necessarily things created by the mind as responding to the soul, and by no possibility demonstrable as existing outside the mind as they exist within the mind, is empirically demonstrable in a multitude of ways. Modern investigation of psychiatric phenomena presents a host of illustrations of the fact. Again, the Röntgen rays and such a perturbation as colour-blindness illustrate the point, as do various normal illusions of sight and touch.

The bodies I deal with in my own doctrines are the only ones of which we have first-hand knowledge beyond question. Everybody can identify them for

himself, and nobody can show that he perceives any other sorts of bodies than those I set forth. It is no doubt subversive of our common notions to consider a lump of iron as essentially the same thing (as being mind itself), so far as regards our immediate perception of it, as is the pain we feel when it crushes our finger. On the other hand, it is as certain as anything, humanly, can be, that all we can immediately experience as the iron is as much sensation (in the wide sense of internal response to excitation, whether called thought or feeling) as is what we call the feeling of pain. That we feel the iron as a hard, heavy something outside ourselves, while we feel the pain as an impalpable ghostly something inside ourselves, does not involve that the *feeling* of the thing outside (by which, only, we know it) is essentially different from the feeling of the thing inside. *Qua* feeling, each is equally "inside."

I, personally, believe that the iron is really something outside, while the pain is something inside my "self." But I do not believe that the iron, as I perceive it, is something outside my "self." In that respect, it is as much inside as is the pain. I believe that the iron is something outside as well as inside my "self," solely by warrant of the two generative sensations (inner and outer) with which I have already dealt. But that I hold this belief does not affect my other belief that the iron, so far as I perceive it, is a sensory body, or complex of bodies, as much within my mind (really, as earlier indicated, my mind itself) and fabricated by it, as are the

Sub-Soul of the Matter-Soul 235

thoughts by which I am now expressing myself, and which I call psychical bodies.

Again, I do not believe that such bodies as the thoughts could exist, until such bodies as the iron, etc., existed ; or, do I believe that such a body as the iron could exist unless there were some potentiality (which I call the possible universe, and shall later deal with specifically) in, or as, the mind, constituting what I may term a cognitive pabulum preconditioning all possible sensations derivable from external excitation, which excitation exists as what I call sub-souls of the matter-soul. Or, again, do I believe that this cognitive pabulum could exist and operate, or that sub-souls of the matter-soul could exist as excitants, were there no active agent, which I call the organic soul, manifested as will. Or, again, do I believe that this organic soul could exist, unless there existed the self-existent God-soul.

CHAPTER XXIV

UNITS OF STIMULUS AND CONSCIOUSNESS

BEFORE starting the exposition of my doctrine of units, let me restate a few main points which have already been elucidated in various earlier parts of this work. The soul constitutes the essential "I." It manifests itself as will. This will constitutes a medium from the matter-soul. This medium we call our body. The soul also constitutes sub-souls of the matter-soul interacting with the medium.

In constituting its medium, the soul endows it with a possible or potential universe, constituting all possible response, as sensory and psychical bodies (what I have earlier dealt with as the sensation and emotion-continua) to the soul's hypnotism of the matter-soul. With this possible universe I shall also deal specifically in later chapters. Here, I may say that it constitutes what we call mind, and is composed of the units of consciousness with which I deal in this chapter. It is potentially the same as each mind. But, actually, it is the same as no two minds. This occurs because no two souls are identical in regard to

will-power, that is, in power to will mediums through which to transform ineffective into effective units of consciousness. That its universe shall be at all actualised by the mind, the soul must first will the matter-soul into sub-souls, and the medium must so interact with these sub-souls as to excite its soul to will ineffective units (as part of the possible universe constituting the particular mind) into effectives. So soon as this occurs, the mind realises itself as some part of the hitherto "latent" universe; in other words, some part of the sensation-continuum manifests itself. Thus, our external world (including the medium itself so far as it is a sensory body) is our mind, constituted and conditioned by our soul's willing of a medium from the matter-soul, which medium can so respond to the products, as sub-souls, of our soul's hypnotism of the matter-soul, as to ensure the soul's willing of ineffective into effective units. Accordingly, our mind is merely an instrument of our soul. Sensory bodies are transformed into psychical bodies (ideas) by the void-sensation (a part of the possible universe). Sensory bodies exist through the space-sensation (another part of the possible universe). Psychical bodies are conditioned by the necessity-sensation (another part of the possible universe).

The units are assumed to enable me to picture, in concrete terminology, machinery by which time, space, movement come into the realm of experience. The units must be considered speculative inventions, logically valid as inference from sensory experience, and

accordingly, from my standpoint, as valid as is sensory experience itself. They enable me to express the real facts of temporal, spatial, and motive experiences according to the demonstration afforded, in this work, of those facts as resulting through hypnotism of the matter-soul. I could not render intelligible the possibility of such hypnotism, unless I supposed some *modus operandi*, and I could not set before the reader a *modus operandi*, unless I assumed separated elements acting and reacting, with corresponding results to the experience and so constituting what is called mind.

The following preliminary scheme will be amplified later in this chapter :—

Unit of stimulus.	Complementary primary elements.
Unit of consciousness.	
Effective units of consciousness, sensory or psychical.	The conscious agent. A continuum, or summation of units, as the percipient agent, realised as sensory and psychical bodies, or what are commonly called sensations, ideas, emotions, feelings.
Effective units of stimulus, sensory.	A continuum of units, as the excitant agent, or sub-soul of the matter-soul, complementary to sensory effective units of consciousness.
Ineffective units of consciousness, sensory or psychical.	The unconscious, or sub-conscious agent. An element that may become effective, or has been effective, through varying conditions of soul-fiat involving percipency.
Ineffective units of stimulus, sensory.	Constituted by de-hypnotism, or re-hypnotism of the matter-soul, involving the extinction of sub-souls of the matter-soul, and of corresponding sensory bodies.

Pseudo-effective units of consciousness, sensory.	Space-sensation, manifested by the willing of effective sensory units into ineffectives, and by the willing of effective affective psychical units involving the feeling of non-resistance between tactual bodies.
Pseudo-effective units of consciousness, psychical, of the affective order.	The space-sensation of feelings, emotion, manifested by the willing of effective psychical units of the affective order into ineffective.
Pseudo-effective units of consciousness, psychical, of the non-affective order.	Time-sensation, manifested by the willing of effective psychical units of the non-affective order into ineffective.
Changing units of consciousness, effective into ineffective, or <i>vice versa</i> , sensory or psychical.	Constituting movement of sensory and affective psychical bodies—the latter as intensity.
Act of sensory apprehension.	A sensory realisation of units.

It will be seen that the foregoing scheme embraces the elements of sensory bodies; of ideas, or non-affective psychical bodies, and of feelings and emotions, or affective psychical bodies; in a word, of the sensation and emotion continua. Each of these types of bodies involves corresponding pseudo-effective units of consciousness. In regard to tactual and visual bodies, these pseudo-effective units constitute what is commonly called space and what I call the space-sensation. In the cases of auditory, gustatory, and olfactory bodies, the pseudo-effective units also constitute space-sensation, as differentiation analogous to that involved in regard to tactual and visual

bodies. In the case of affective psychical bodies, the pseudo-effective units constitute space-sensation as differentiation between emotions, feelings analogous to the differentiation arising through the space-sensation in regard to auditory, gustatory, and olfactory bodies in the sensory arena. In the case of non-affective psychical bodies (ideas) the pseudo-effective units constitute what is commonly called time, and what I call the time-sensation.

Units of stimulus are fanciful elements constituting sub-souls of the matter-soul and appearing in consciousness as corresponding effective units of consciousness of the sensory order. Accordingly, units of stimulus represent the hypnotisms of the matter-soul anticipating and determining sensory experience. When sensory bodies are destroyed, which really means when they are changed into some other bodies—for instance, when a piece of steel is turned into a knife-blade—units of stimulus are changed or destroyed: that is, effective become ineffective units, and ineffective become effective units of stimulus. A corresponding change occurs in regard to the particular units of consciousness. Such change of units of stimulus I call de-hypnotism and re-hypnotism of the matter-soul. When a piece of steel is turned into a knife-blade, it is still “steel”; but it is another sensory body, or complex (all sensory bodies are really complexes). It is only “steel” as idea. As sensory complex it involves change of units of stimulus, involving changed sub-soul of the matter-soul, according as it is the crude

piece, or the blade. These sensory bodies are the things to which the units of stimulus apply. Psychical bodies are not anticipated by units of stimulus, but by the necessity-sensation and the void-sensation—the latter binding them to sensory bodies, the former binding them among themselves.

Non-affective psychical bodies (ideas) arise primarily from sensory bodies, through the mediation of the void-sensation, and are bound together, projected on one another and otherwise conditioned, as what are called the stream of consciousness and logical and desultory successions, by the necessity-sensation. Affective psychical bodies (feelings, emotions) arise from, or are coincident with, non-affective psychical bodies (ideas), and, like these latter, are bound together and conditioned by the necessity-sensation. All these sensory and psychical bodies are elementally constituted of units of consciousness corresponding to the respective types of bodies.

Let us see what scientific grounds we have for postulating units of stimulus and consciousness. Physiologists tell us that in the phenomenon of muscular contraction, under certain conditions of succession of the exciting shocks, it requires a summation of units of stimulus to ensure a complete contraction. A number of consecutive units of stimulus must affect the muscle before it can, so to speak, manifest an act of apprehension by contracting. Similarly, in what is called a reflex motor act, the nerve-centre also “apprehends” a summation of units of stimulus. “A single weak stimulus, which

in itself is incapable of discharging a reflex act, may, if repeated sufficiently often, produce this act. The single impulses are conducted to the spinal cord, in which the process of summation takes place" (Landois and Stirling).

Again, experiments to determine what is called conscious reaction to stimuli demonstrate that this reaction proceeds from a summation of units of consciousness. Thus, what is called the reaction time for a visual impression of the electric spark is 0.15 second; for an auditory impression 0.16 second; for a tactual impression 0.133 to 0.201 second. This physiological "reaction time" is thus equivalent to what, in my hypothesis, are termed the "ineffective units of consciousness" (equivalent to so many "ineffective units of stimulus" if we consider the excitant) which must precede what I term an "act of sensory apprehension." To this stage of summation we may apply a term used in physics, calling it the critical point of summation. That we perceive sound in 0.16 second, and light in 0.15 second, implies that more "ineffective units of consciousness" are required for the former than for the latter act of apprehension.

I am now going to deal with the experiences we call space, movement, size, contour. Before doing so, it may be well to remind the reader that, by a sensory body, I do not mean what is conventionally imagined as such body. My sensory bodies are solely what are called visual, tactual, auditory, olfactory, and gustatory impressions. Later, I shall justify this view. At

present I need only indicate it, and remark that whenever, in the following consideration of motive and spatial contingencies, I mention a sensory body, I mean what is commonly called a visual experience. Of course tactual experiences—to say nothing of auditory, gustatory, olfactory—also involve spatial experiences, but, at first, it will be convenient to confine our attention to sensory bodies of the visual order, or what are commonly called seen objects. Again, it may be well to say a few preliminary words about space itself. As already indicated in various earlier parts of this work, space, from my standpoint, as experience, is merely differentiation between sensory bodies of the visual and tactual orders. In itself, space is what I call space-sensation, constituted of what I call pseudo-effective units of consciousness of the sensory order.

The size of an object depends on the number of effective units of consciousness it can excite during one act of sensory apprehension; that is, on the effective units that are willed. If the object be near, we may assume that practically all the units of consciousness involved in the act of apprehension are “effectives.” If the object be distant, proportional numbers of units become “ineffectives.” Thus, *qua* size, a large distant object is equivalent to a small near object. The “reaction time” (equivalent to “ineffective units of consciousness”) in the one case neutralises the difference between the total “units of consciousness” perceptually normal to the two objects. While the small object involves fewer units

of consciousness as its inherent character, it involves more "effectives" as its sensational character. So its sensational size becomes, say, equal to, or greater than, that of the inherently larger object. Now, as I have shown, "space" is unreal, but spatial intersection (space-sensation) is real, as perception. According to my hypothesis of units, every sensed object, no matter how "distant," is always, essentially, in touch with the observer. There is never anything really between him and the object. A star, hundreds of millions of "miles" away, is really "in" the observer as truly as is an object a few "inches" from his eyes. The "miles" and "inches" are really constituted by ineffective units of consciousness (or, corollarily, units of stimulus, according as we contemplate the observer or the object), involving, experientially, the pseudo-effective units, or space-sensation. Thus the distance is not constituted by space as an entity independent of sensory experience. There is really no such thing as distance in the conventional application of the term. Distance is, experientially, in ourselves, as ineffective units of consciousness, and these units are willed effective or ineffective, as the case may be.

A further consideration now confronts us. If there is no such thing, absolutely, as distance, there is no such thing, absolutely, as bodily extension, and bodies are spirits behaving as Dalton told us gases behaved—passing into each other as into vacua. What Dalton's empiricism impelled him to say about gases, my hypothesis of units says about bodies. They are essentially spiritual things created by our

souls' hypnotism of the matter-soul and only in experience as sensation.

The same object, no matter where it may be "located," involves, for an act of sensory apprehension, the same units of consciousness, and its "remoteness" or "nearness" merely involves that a greater or lesser number of units of consciousness become effectives. In the case of the "distant" object, a large part of the available units is neutralised, so far as regards the act of apprehension, by being employed in exciting it; that is, to constitute the "reaction time," or critical point of summation. Consequently, the practical effect of a large "distant" object is to start the act of visual apprehension with the same effective units as does a "near" minute object of the same apparent size as the large distant object. We may compare these differences respecting effective and ineffective units with the physicist's conception of specific heats. This implies that certain substances require more units of heat to raise them to a certain temperature than do others. Thus, in certain substances, units of heat become ineffective which, in other substances, are effective to excite what, on the physicist's assumption, may be termed the act of apprehension of the substance.

Let us now give some preliminary consideration to movement, from the standpoint of my hypothesis of units. When a body moves away from, or towards us, or when we move towards or from a body, it appears larger or smaller, more defined or less defined, as the case may be. That it appears larger

or smaller occurs, as above indicated, on my present hypothesis, because it affords more or less effective units of consciousness, involving more or less pseudo-effective units, as space-sensation. That it appears more or less complex, according as it is "nearer" or more "remote," also occurs, according to my present hypothesis, because varying units become effective or ineffective. Thus, a man under particular conditions which we call the distance of twenty feet, affords us a much more complex sensation than under the conditions of what we call, say, a mile. This arises, according to my present hypothesis, from the fact that effective units of consciousness, as the man, become ineffective, the change constituting what we call distance. We get the same units from the man at a mile as we get from him at a few feet, only, while at a few feet there are ineffective units "between," say, his legs, and between his coat and waistcoat, constituting what we call contours and space, and while there are, at that distance, effective units constituting what we call colours, patterns, etc., at a "mile" these units have all become ineffective, with the consequence that the man has become a mere elongated patch of black.

The above propositions imply that objects, as perceived, are what we make them, not what they "make" themselves. In other words, the details of contour differentiating matter, as objects, is our mind's response, as realising effective units, to what I term hypnotism of the matter-soul. We make the objective pictures constituting our sensory experiences. To take the earlier illustration, the limbs, trunk, and

head of the man are specific correlations of units of stimulus which, as affecting the observer, are correlations of units of consciousness. What we call the situation of the man, as near or remote, are the particular units that are, for us, effective. When the man is spatially remote, the units of consciousness affecting the observer have become so modified, as effective and ineffective, that the objective man, instead of being a complex figure of comparatively large dimensions, becomes of simple continuous outline reduced to comparatively minute dimensions. The varying space-sensation (pseudo-effective units), or what I have earlier termed "negative" or "non-resistance," which the observer derives as existing between him and the objective man as the latter "approaches" or "recedes," is constituted by the units which have become ineffective, and is experienced because other objects which memory preserves for the observer, or which are in immediate sensory apprehension, as specific effective units of consciousness, do not change their normal character, as proportionate effectives and ineffectives, while, on the other hand, the units derived from the approaching or receding man are so changing their character.

The respective variations in effective units of consciousness, with regard to the observer, constitute the varying spatial sensations (varying pseudo-effective units) he derives, involving what is called the approach or retreat of the observed man. Thus, there is really no such thing as movement, as we ordinarily imagine it. There are only units dis-

appearing from consciousness (as ineffectives) and units remaining in or entering consciousness (as effectives). The former constitute what the physiologist calls the reaction time necessary to excite a manifestation of responsiveness. They also constitute what I have earlier termed the "unsymbolisable sensation" anticipating sensory experience, and, again, the "outer" sensation which, with the "inner" sensation, constitute the "I" and "not-I."

Thus, from our present standpoint, the universe may be conceived as a spiritual "solid," and what we commonly call space may be conceived as the parts of this "solid" which, as pseudo-effective units, are not in experience. The different impressions we get, as what I now term sensory bodies (but which are commonly arbitrarily considered attributes *of* bodies), arise from what I may term different strata of soul-fiats, or sub-wills acting on the matter-soul and thus constituting what is for us the cosmical complex. There is no absolute "space" or void in this complex, because there is no absolute intersection between units. There are only some units which, as effectives, we realise in consciousness, and other units which, as pseudo-effectives and ineffectives, we fail to realise in consciousness. What we commonly call bodies in spatial relationship are these absolutely continuous, but, relatively to our experience, discontinuous units, as respectively effective and pseudo-effective correlations.

To illustrate the above points: assume a body moving away from another body, say, from ourself.

Pari passu with the movement is the increasing space, as in regard to the body, units previously effective become ineffective, and, in regard to space, the increase of pseudo-effective units. Or, assume the body approaching. Here we have the converse process: a decrease of pseudo-effective units and increase of units transformed from ineffective into effective. Now, the approaching or receding body, in its essential nature, as sub-soul of the matter-soul, is a correlation of ineffective units of stimulus outside spatial conditions. When this sub-soul becomes a correlation of effective units it enters into relationship with other sub-souls similarly transformed from ineffective into effective correlations. The relationship between these correlations is what we call space, and what I call the space-sensation constituted of pseudo-effective units of the sensory order. What we call the normal size of an object is its state as a sensory body presenting so many effective units as we feel to afford the most complete sensory realisation of what we call contour and detail. As this body moves away from us, it presents a continuously decreasing number of effective units (with correspondingly increasing pseudo-effective units) which have become transformed into ineffectives. When the body is what we call out of sight, it has reverted to its essential nature as a sub-soul of the matter-soul constituted of ineffective units, and the pseudo-effective units have correspondingly been willed away. Then, as regards ourselves and that body, space is annihilated. Thus, the persistent coming in, as

effective, and going out, as ineffective units (with corresponding pseudo-effective units), constitutes all we apprehend as spatial contingency, and, corollarily, movement. Again, when we get the idea, as distinct from mere sensory impression, of these units as changing, we attain a "non-resistance" in respect to psychical bodies corresponding to that we attained in respect to sensory bodies. This psychical non-resistance is commonly called time. I call it the time-sensation, and shall deal with it, specifically, later.

The question may be asked, how do I account for movement across a field of view, in which case the object does not diminish or increase in size, or vary in definition. My interpretation is that such movement is constituted by varying pseudo-effective units, as space-sensation, as between the moving and stationary bodies, without variation of effective units, as the moving body. As I have often indicated, the efficient factors concerned in thinking and sensing are not so much the resistances, or bodies, as the non-resistances. Though the most obvious change in a moving body is change in size and definition, involving varying effective units, no change in size or definition of a sensory body may occur, yet it may move. In such a case, what happens is that pseudo-effective units, as space-sensation, are variably willed, as between the moving and stationary bodies, while no variation occurs in the willing of effective units as the moving body. So we get the impression of cross-movement. Pseudo-effective units, as space-sensation,

may be variably willed without necessarily involving variable willing of effective units as a moving body. On the other hand, effective units, as sensory bodies, cannot be variably willed without involving variable willing of pseudo-effective units, as the space-sensation. Thus we may have sensory bodies with regard to which pseudo-effective units, as space-sensation, change without involving change in effective units as the bodies.

The different sensory experiences (or what, on my hypothesis, are sensory bodies) constituting what we call sight, touch, hearing, smell, taste, are, from our present standpoint, typically different correlations of units arising through typically different hypnotisms of the matter-soul. Thus a seen object is a visual sensory body ; a sound is an auditory sensory body ; a touched object is a tactual sensory body ; a flavour is a gustatory sensory body ; a scent is an olfactory sensory body. All, for me, is equally within the mind. So the one thing—say, a flavour—is as much a body as is another thing, as what we commonly call a seen object. For me there is no object or body existing except the particular sensory experience. Thus, from my standpoint, what is commonly lumped together as a body is a complex of bodies. Accordingly as it is seen, heard, tasted, touched, smelt, it is one or another body.

Underlying such a realised complex of sensory bodies is the sub-soul of the matter-soul constituted by the soul's hypnotism. This is outside immediate experience, and is only identified by an elaborate

system of inference from immediate experience. So soon as such a sub-soul is willed to interact with the universe, or mind, the condition arises of what we call sensing, and sensory bodies come into being—tactual, visual, etc., as the case may be. All souls are hypnotising the matter-soul into the same sub-souls, but only a few souls may be willing a particular interaction, involving sensing, between the mind or universe and the particular sub-soul. Again, all souls are de-hypnotising and re-hypnotising alike the matter-soul. That is, all souls are substituting alike certain sub-souls of the matter-soul for other sub-souls. By way of illustration, if I ignite some wood and turn it into smoke and ashes, my soul de-hypnotises and re-hypnotises the matter-soul into other sub-souls. Every soul does as my soul does. Did not every soul do the same thing, as hypnotism of the matter-soul, as does my soul, the universe of any particular minds conditioned by such souls could not be willed to interact so as to ensure—in the case of the illustration—my perception of the transformation of the wood into smoke and ashes (olfactory, tactual, and visual bodies). Were any people, so conditioned as I was not, present with me when I burnt up the wood, they would not perceive what I perceived as the changed sensory bodies (smoke, ashes). If all souls did not hypnotise, de-hypnotise, and re-hypnotise in the same way, the matter-soul, perception would be a chaos of idiosyncratic interpretations of sensory bodies.

An “act of sensory apprehension” is so many

effective units of consciousness as can start and (through their preservation, as succession, by memory) constitute a complete sensory realisation. Thus, the "space" which we fabricate in the gross, as bodies in spatial relationship, is anticipated in what physiologists call the subliminal arena. As bodies "approach" and "retreat," so do units of consciousness "approach" and "retreat." The appearances and disappearances which we realise in the conscious realm, as bodies in varying place-relationship, are "adumbrated" in the unconscious or sub-conscious realm as "appearances" and "disappearances" of units of consciousness. As already indicated, the essential part of sensing and thinking is done in the sub-conscious arena.

I may here repeat what I indicated in commencing this chapter. What I now propound regarding units is an imaginary scheme based on metaphysical inference from sensory experience and the facts of true empiricism regarding the conditions of mental activity, establishing the prime truth that sensory perceptivity is the product of hypnotism of the matter-soul and preconditions psychical perceptivity. This proposition I have already demonstrated by much evidence in the arenas of biology and physics, and transcending those arenas, which evidence I shall later supplement in investigating the empirical arenas of psychology and psychiatry. As already stated, my hypothesis of units is offered as a picture of conceivable conditions which would account for the facts that time, space, and bodies are creations of

the mind, and that space and time, as space-sensation and time-sensation, only exist as sub-conditions of the experience of bodies. On the other hand, that these sub-conscious "sensations" only exist as sub-conditions of the experience of bodies, does not involve that the real cognitive activity is more in the bodies than in the space and time-sensations. Rather, as earlier indicated, the real activity is in the sub-conscious processes (non-resistances), though we realise the activity primarily as the conscious processes (resistances).

In the present chapter I am mainly concerned with my units as elements involving spatial and temporal contingencies. However, as already indicated, this is not at all the limit of the conditions to which the units apply. They really constitute every experience (light, heat, electricity, sound, scent, flavour, pain, pleasure, hardness, softness, etc. etc.) we derive as interacting with the matter-soul, as hypnotists. The totality of these units constitutes what I have earlier termed the sensation and emotion continua and unsymbolisable sensation, and what I also term the possible universe in the mind.

Let us now further consider the question of space as affected by my hypothesis of units. What we call one object in a certain place is a continuum of effective units of consciousness involving what I call an act of sensory apprehension. Once such a continuum is realised as an act of sensory apprehension, it is fixed or "stereotyped" by the memorising faculty so that no other continua of effective units can affect

it. This mnemonic fixation is soul-fiat willing the reproduction or persistence (according as the object is revived in its actual absence from sense, or is sensed in conjunction with other objects) of the particular continuum of effective units. Thus when we gaze at a number of objects there is no promiscuous mixing of effective units. Each detail of each object, so far as it is perceived, is a specific continuum of effective units constituted by the soul's hypnotism of the matter-soul, just as is each complete object itself, or as is the total field of view composed of many objects. On the other hand, how much of all these continua of units can be realised as effective during any particular act of sensory apprehension is a matter of the soul's limitation of its medium.

In Chapter VIII. of the preceding volume I showed how what are called the X rays annihilated bulk. I may now devote a little consideration to this phenomenon from the standpoint of my hypothesis of units. I contended that the X rays, equally with light (and all other so-called energies), was property constituent of bodies. From the ordinary standpoint, bodies are tactual impressions of resistance and visual impressions of contour. From my present standpoint, bodies are units of stimulus realised as visual, tactual, auditory, gustatory, olfactory, effective units of consciousness. Where, as propounded by conventional theories, substances are penetrated by light or the X rays, according to my present hypothesis bodies are "penetrated" by nothing, but are the products of the matter-soul so responding to

hypnotism by our soul as to yield us varying effective units of consciousness. The "opacity" or "transparency" of a body is merely the effect of particular visual units of consciousness. That I can see through a body involves that units of consciousness constituting bodies "behind" the transparent body can afford me units, as effective, simultaneously with certain effective units constituting the transparent body. All the bodies concerned, as earlier indicated, are inherently "latent" in my soul (as are all other bodies). What I do when I see through the transparent body is to render "patent," or effective, certain units constituting the transparent and the other bodies. When an opaque body obscures other bodies, though I hypnotise the matter-soul so as to afford me both sorts of bodies, as units of consciousness, I can only render effective those constituting the opaque body.

It will be seen that, from my present standpoint, the conventional distinction between concrete and spiritual is fundamentally untenable. Really there is no concrete, in this conventional sense. Practically, of course, the fiction is a very valid one. Sensory bodies of the tactual and, largely, of the visual orders are concrete. However, they are this *only as sensation*, and sensation in itself is not concrete in the practical sense, but in that sense is spiritual. In regard to touched and seen objects, there is what may be termed concrete *sensation*. But no sensation can present as object a concrete thing-in-itself, in the crude ontological sense of ordinary sensualism. Did we assume

that a stone was essentially the solid thing outside ourselves of naïve experience, we should need to grant that, as such a solid thing, it had somehow jumped into the mind. Obviously we could not perceive it were it not in the mind, and obviously it would be absurd to suppose that a thing of the nature ordinarily attributed to a stone could drop into our mind as we see it drop into a pond. Either we must assume such an absurdity, or we must accept my philosophical affirmation that the stone, as we perceive it, is a complex of sensory bodies of the tactual and visual orders, combined with psychical bodies of the non-affective (ideas) order. The former class of bodies constitute what we call the weight, colour, hardness, coldness, shape of the stone. The latter class of bodies constitute the various scientific and commonplace notions we form regarding it, whether as geologists, chemists, physicists, or ignoramuses.

These psychical bodies are what may be termed after-products of the sensory bodies. The stone has to exist as the latter before it can exist as the former. The geologist enriches the primary, visual, and tactual acquisition as the stone-complex by adding various psychical bodies to the complex. The chemist and physicist do the same. From beginning to end the stone, as realised in immediate experience, is nothing but a complex of mind-stuff or spirit, constituting a fragmentary realisation of the sensation-continuum or universe constituting the mind, and all, as I show, conditioned by will, as a continuum.

We have now to consider another point. We can see two opaque bodies of equal size provided one of them is not in a particular position. The question arises, How do we get the experience of position, as distinct from mere spatial intersection? The latter, as earlier indicated, is readily explicable on my hypothesis of units, by assumption of simple increase or decrease in effective units, but will this also indicate why objects appear in particular positions? I maintain that my hypothesis will cover this problem. On the other hand, I may observe that to require a theory to account for the perception of position is really no more reasonable than to require a theory for any particular bodily appearance. The perception of position is really as much an ultimate fact as is the perception of extension or of physical pain. It would be no momentous matter affecting my philosophy, so long as I could account for body, space, and movement, were I unable to account for position. However, I am able to account for it.

According to my hypothesis of units, visual space—which is the only space with which I need deal in the connection—appears so soon as differentiation appears between correlations of units of the visual order, and necessarily involves position. The implication of visual bodies carries the implications of visual space and position. Again, so soon as one position exists the conditions for all position exist, inasmuch as each possible position is simply a differentiation between two correlations of effective units constituting two objects. In perceiving a

complex of objects, we project one of a couple of correlations of units on another correlation, and so on indefinitely, and by memorising the effective units normal to the various objects (constituting their normal "size"), we realise what is called position, which is thus simply memorised differentiations of correlations of effective units of consciousness of the visual order. With tactual space I shall deal later.

Suppose I view twenty men promiscuously grouped; in a moment one member of one couple of correlations has been projected on another through the series; lines of direction, involving what is called perspective, have been created, and I consciously realise the complex picture. Where there are no effective visual units there is "space." Where a button, a hat, a band are momentarily seized and memorised as affording less than their normal effective units, the elements of the perspective conditions are so adequately recorded as to determine the whole picture as by a flash. Right, left, diagonally—in every direction—one of a couple of correlations of units is being projected on another correlation, and recorded until the mind has changed, from ineffective to effective, the full complement of units constituting the picture.

Thus, when we have interpreted how objects come to exist at all, we have implicitly answered the question: Why are objects in varied positions with regard to one another? To exist at all, an object must be defined by sense. So soon as this occurs

position is defined, inasmuch as what is defined by sense must be differentiated, and, accordingly, for an object to exist there must be another object. The very fact that another object exists involves position as necessarily as it involves the objects. For like reason, there is no position within a body itself. Of course we may imaginatively cut up a body into parts, and consider one part as located in relation to another; but such imaginative procedure does not affect the fact that a body is a correlation of effective units, indifferent within itself as to position. Position only comes into question so soon as a body is a unit in the determination. So far as the body as an isolated entity is considered, it is not a unit, but a universal. As earlier indicated, bodily extension is quite distinct from spatial contingency. This only arises between bodies, as space-sensation. Corollarily, if bodies are contained in another body (say in air) there is no spatial contingency in what contains them, so far as it is contemplated as isolated. There are no spatial contingencies in a gas. Accordingly, as Dalton observes, gases permeate one another as into vacua. Gases only enter spatial contingency so soon as they are limited by bodies involving sensed difference, as space-sensation. Gases do not involve such difference.

Space-sensation is the only space that exists, as body-sensation is the only body that exists. As what I call a non-resistance, and deal with in this chapter as pseudo-effective units of the sensory order, space is the antithesis of body, as extension or resistance

(effective units). No resistance in itself can constitute a non-resistance. As sensorially percipient, the mind only exists through its inability to amalgamate resistances and non-resistances. To assume extension as equivalent to space is to deal with body and space as entities outside the mind, and with body, as it were, compounded of specific quantities of space. Body and space are things solely existing as of the mind. Things of the mind only exist as differentiations. Were space not differentiated from extension, neither the one nor the other could exist as a thing of the mind. It may be suggested that though visual extension be, as above indicated, excluded from spatial contingency, tactual extension is another thing. Tactual equally with visual extension is excluded from spatial contingency. When I spread out my fingers on a body there is space-sensation as between my fingers, but not as in the body over which they are extended. Remember, the body, equally with the space, is my mind, as universe.

Units of consciousness are of different types, as are sensory bodies. The typical diversity of units of consciousness involves what we call the sensory faculties. A tactual body is quite another thing as compared with an auditory, visual, olfactory, or gustatory body. Each is equally real as a body, and all are essentially alike as being constituted of effective units of consciousness of the sensory order. A taste is equally real as a sensory body, as is a sight or a touch. A spade is as much a thing of the mind, as is the flavour of an orange or its scent. If we

cannot touch or see olfactory, gustatory, and auditory bodies, neither can we smell, taste, nor hear tactual and visual bodies. Where, in earlier chapters, I dealt with smell, taste, sound, as being qualities of bodies, I did so because I had no need to proceed further in my demonstrations than to meet the fancies of the materialist. My present standpoint has transcended this position. Now smell, taste, sound are bodies themselves just as much as are tactual and visual experiences, inasmuch as all are correlations of effective units of consciousness.

Let us now devote a little consideration to the tactual body. This involves the non-resistance, space-sensation, as does the visual body; yet the space-sensation emanating through the tactual body is no more like the space-sensation emanating through the visual body than the bodies themselves are alike. Through habit we get to think there is some inherent correspondence between the tactual and visual bodies. Nothing could be further from fact. Visual units are no more comparable with tactual units than a chair is comparable with a sigh. "Persons with congenital cataracts relieved by surgical aid, whose world until the operation has been a world of tangibles exclusively, are ludicrously unable at first to name any of the objects which newly fall upon their eye. 'It might very well be *a horse*,' said the latest patient of this sort of whom we have an account, when a 10-litre bottle was held up a foot from his face. Neither do such patients have any accurate notion in motor terms of the relative distances of things

from their eyes. All such confusions very quickly disappear with practice, and the novel optical sensations translate themselves into the familiar language of touch" (*Psychology*, p. 349. W. James. Macmillan, 1892). That the patient is thus unable at first to determine optical distances is proof that his tactual distances were different from visual ones, and, accordingly, is evidence for my contention that space is experientially created by bodies, not bodies by space, as suggested by the Kantian school.

Visual, tactual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory sensations have been occasionally assumed in this work qualities or attributes of bodies rather than bodies themselves. However, from my present standpoint, as indicated, these sensations are constituted of specific types of units of consciousness, and are the only bodies within our experience. The matter-soul, through which, in conjunction with our soul, these units emanate as effective and constitute bodies, is a matter of inference not of direct experience, as is also our soul itself. These units, on the other hand, are simple definitions of the elements of immediate experiences. To illustrate this point, I have earlier indicated that seen movement is varying effective units of consciousness of the visual order. I might instead have said that seen movement was more or less seeing. However, as conventional notions of seeing are opposed to what I want to convey in my hypothesis, I imagine "units" of seeing as the physicist imagines "units" of heat. That I have more real justification for imagining my units of conscious-

ness of the visual order than the physicist has for imagining his units of heat, is evident from my demonstration that heat, as an abstract from body (as posited by the physicist), only exists in fancy, while seeing constitutes body itself. From my present standpoint, heat is an affective body, and as such is outside spatial relationship. Again, as the only real experience about movement we have is that we get more or less seeing from a body according as it approaches or recedes from us, it is logically necessary, assuming the fact of the visual units, to postulate that movement is constituted by more or fewer effective units of the visual order as compared with some memorised standard constituting a norm.

Obviously there is movement in the tactual arena as there is in the visual arena, but is there also movement in the auditory arena? Does sound move as do visual and tactual bodies? Well, a tactual body does not move as does a visual body; still it moves in its own way. So does an auditory body move in its own way. A varying auditory impression is as fully varying effective units constituting movement, as what is called intensity, as is a varying visual or tactual impression constituting what we usually call movement. A dying sound is essentially, so far as movement is concerned (as varying effective units), the same thing as a departing train. Again, contemplating spatial analogy, an intermittent sound is essentially the same thing as two visual bodies, one memorised, the other in actual experience, in place-relationship. The auditory space-sensation is different

from the visual space-sensation, but so is the latter different from the tactual space-sensation. Pseudo-effective units, as space-sensation, differ as do the various effective units constituting the various types of sensory bodies. There is no more essential difference between the visual space and movement and the auditory space and movement than there is between any of these and the tactual space and movement. All, as experience, equally exist only as varying effective units of consciousness of the particular orders. Tactual and visual bodies, as mind-stuff, are not essentially different from auditory and olfactory bodies. A sound and an aroma are essentially the same things as bodily extension and resistance in the visual and tactual arenas. The quality of the sensation does not affect the fact that it is sensation. We usually fancy that there is a sort of substratum or underlying reality about a tactual or visual impression that is lacking, say, in an olfactory impression. We call something *a* rose when we have certain visual and tactual impressions, while we call something the scent *of* the rose when we get a particular olfactory impression. Nobody can offer a scintilla of real evidence that the distinction is valid ; while the whole consensus of experience, philosophically investigated, utterly discredits the distinction.

There is nothing less sensational and more real in handling and seeing than in smelling. Without the faintest philosophical or experiential justification we assume that touching and seeing afford us knowledge of a "thing in itself," while, say, smelling affords no

such knowledge. Where is the "thing in itself" when you have eliminated sensory impressions? Wherein is the essential difference between one sense-impression and another? That I can walk through one sensation, as a perfume, but cannot walk through another sensation, as a brick wall, is no demonstration of anything but that one sensation is not another; that one sort of mind-stuff is not another sort. Resistance-sensation is no less mind-stuff than is perfume-sensation. If resistance-sensation authenticates an *ens*, so does perfume-sensation. The "real thing" is no more the former than the latter.

Let us now return to the consideration of movement. In this connection we must divest ourselves of our common method of regarding the body itself as *doing* anything. The body does nothing. The things that *do* (as manifestations of will), from our present standpoint, are units of consciousness. Thus we must exclude notions of muscular exertion (as in walking); of mechanical energy (as in the locomotive). Again, we must exclude our common notion of space as being a thing through which bodies move. The bodies with which I am now dealing do not need to move "through" anything. Movement is not now *in* space, but space is now an incident of movement. Space only exists as space-sensation, which, so far as we actually experience it, is merely the differentiation through which tactual and visual bodies manifest their interrelationship. Space-sensation necessarily changes as such bodies move in relation to other like bodies, moving or at rest (bodies

affording unvarying effective units). From the conventional standpoint, space is a thing that never changes. From my present standpoint it is, experientially, an appearance produced by visual bodies as changing, and it changes with every change of such bodies.

When I am travelling in a railway carriage I see varied successions of objects. These are in my soul, before I see them, as part of a "latent" universe of sensory and psychical bodies, which I term the sensation-continuum. As I move, they become "patent" as effective units, and revert to their "latent" state as ineffectives. The space I feel I am passing through is, philosophically, changing pseudo-effective units of the sensory order. Experientially, it is the transformation of ineffective visual-units into effective units, and these latter back again into ineffectives. The locomotive, as a complex of sensory bodies, is a product of the soul's hypnotism of the matter-soul to which we attribute causative efficiency as extending the actualised universe possible to individual minds. Our limbs and muscles are products of the soul's hypnotism of the matter-soul into a medium through which we experience specific affective psychical bodies which we call exertion. To this medium we attribute similar causative efficiency, as extending our actualised universe, as we attribute to the locomotive. Really the causative efficiency is in our soul as willing specific effective and ineffective units. There is no more real causative efficiency in the locomotive, limbs and muscles, as entities in themselves, than in the

knife with which I cut an apple. The affective psychical bodies as sensations of exertion in regard to our limbs, and the non-affective psychical bodies as ideas of energy in regard to the locomotive, no more *do* anything than do our sensations when we cut our finger, or imagine ourselves in Timbuctoo when we are in the Strand. The real doing is our soul's willing of our universe into effective or ineffective units. Our railway journey, or our pedestrian tour, is this willing of our soul. Thus the real conditions of our movements are that we will the respective affective and non-affective psychical bodies, and the sensory bodies constituting our limbs, sensations of exertion, the locomotive and the physical "energies," of which it is the application. All these are things of our mind, and our mind is a thing of our soul.

Now, let us turn to movement of the tactual body. This is different from that of the visual body, to the extent that the units are typically different. On the other hand, it is like the movement of the visual body, to the extent that it involves differences in space-sensation. The movement of the auditory, gustatory, and olfactory bodies is quite of another order as compared with the movements of visual and tactual bodies. In the cases of auditory, gustatory, and olfactory bodies, the movement involves no space-sensation. It merely exists as what we call intensity. The same may be said of the movement of affective bodies (emotion); of what I term the quasi-affective body (belief); of unsymbolisable emotion or effort. The movement of non-affective

psychical bodies (ideas) involves that each comes and goes as part of a continuum, constituted by the necessity-sensation. Here a whole correlation of units, constituting a specific body, momentarily becomes effective and ineffective, so that the body itself is not individualised, but merges with other like bodies to constitute a correlation of bodies, one or more of which, as it were, obtrudes itself into prominent individuality, and so gives a special character or *timbre* to the correlation called the stream of consciousness or flow of ideas.

Now, let us turn to bodily extension. This can only vary in the case of a body able to manifest changing units of the visual order, as effective becoming ineffective, or *vice versa*. Corollarily, bodily extension can only vary in the case of a body involving visual space-sensation, which, again, implies visual movement for the body. All other bodies than visual have either invariable extension or none at all, and their space-sensation does not affect extension. There is no extension in the non-affective psychical realm (ideas). The idea of duration constitutes the nearest approach to extension in the non-affective psychical realm. But there is no real extension in the idea. The idea of duration of an hour is no more extended than the idea of duration as interval of a second. There is invariable extension in the cases of tactual, auditory, gustatory, and olfactory bodies ; of affective psychical bodies (emotion, bodily sensations) ; of unsymbolisable emotion (effort). Now let us glance at the space-sensation. This varies coin-

cidently with varying extension only in the case of visual bodies. Tactual space-sensation varies without affecting tactual extension. Auditory, olfactory, gustatory space-sensation does not vary. Space-sensation of any sort only exists in regard to bodies manifesting extension. The type of space-sensation depends on the type of body. Corollarily, pseudo-effective units, constituting space-sensation, vary as do effective units of consciousness, constituting sensory and psychical bodies, with which space-sensation may be involved.

From the conventional standpoint, it may be urged that a touched body has variable extension. Thus, if I touch a book lightly with the tip of my finger, and then press my hand and fingers on the book, it may be urged the extension in the one is very different from that in the other case. Undoubtedly this is the case, and the objection will serve as an illustration of what I mean by sensory bodies, in opposition to ordinary views regarding such bodies. In the case of the book, the tactual body is only "book," in conjunction with the visual body. In itself, the tactual body is not book or anything else defined in terms of sight. The tactual body is simply an impression of touch. When I lightly place my finger on the "book," I merely feel a vague impression of resistance. When I place my hand and fingers more heavily on the "book," I feel various distinct impressions of texture, outline, indentations, and so forth. There is greater extension in this latter than in the former impression. At the same time the latter, from my standpoint, is no more the same tactual body as

the former than a pen is the same visual body as the book. Now, let us contrast with this what occurs in the case of a visual body. When I look at the book a foot or two away, I see it of very different extension as compared with that when the book is twenty yards away. Here the difference of extension really applies to the same body. The visual body is obviously "book," no matter what be the impression of extension. On the other hand, by varying the extension of the tactual body, I change the body itself. The finger-tip "book" is an entirely different tactual body as compared with the full-pressure "book."

So it is in regard to auditory, olfactory, and gustatory bodies, for each of which there is only one extension. Thunder is a very differently extended sound, as compared with the tinkling of a bell. Here we have no such difficulty in discriminating between auditory bodies as we had in the case of the tactual body. Nobody thinks of confounding thunder, as an auditory body, with the tinkling of a bell, as such body. Here conventionalism and my philosophy are in accord. That they are in opposition, in regard to tactual extension, occurs through the false implication that there is some inherent connection between tactual and visual impressions that does not exist as between these latter and auditory impressions. The wrong implication arises through the common materialism, implying that objects are things outside and independent of the mind, and realised by the mind as they are outside the mind. So we habituate ourselves to attributing independent existence, as "real things,"

to visual and tactual bodies, while we do not attribute such reality to auditory, gustatory, olfactory bodies. Dominated by such spurious realism, we imagine our visual body, say, as a gong, a thing in itself which would exist as "gong," were there not a mind left to perceive it; while, on the other hand, our auditory body is imagined as merely a transitory product of such a "real thing" as the gong. This spuriously realistic habit compels us to overlook that, if the gong, as a thing in itself, has to be under particular conditions before we can hear its sound, so "it" has to be under particular conditions before we can see or touch "it." We have no better ground for assuming the seeing and touching to be "it," than for assuming the hearing to be "it." We know nothing, experientially, about "it," but the touching, seeing, hearing. If there be an "it" beyond these sensory impressions, to discover that "it," we must investigate by methods transcending those of the spurious realist. The real "it" is not the seeing, touching, hearing, or any combination of such impressions. The real "it" is sub-soul of the matter-soul, created and conditioned—of course, subject to Supreme Will—by the will-continuum of the organic soul.

The conventional assumption is that tactual and visual bodies, as what is called concrete substance, or matter, precondition auditory, gustatory, and olfactory bodies. From my standpoint, this "matter" of the sensualist does not exist, and auditory, gustatory, and olfactory bodies are no more preconditioned by tactual and visual bodies than these latter are preconditioned

by auditory, gustatory, and olfactory bodies. The spurious realism, involving the false implication that tactual as well as visual bodies are variable in regard to extension, also involves that tactual and visual bodies precondition auditory, gustatory, olfactory bodies. Did "matter," as the solid stuff of naïve sensualism and empirical science, really exist outside the mind, as is implied by those methods of investigation, it might be strictly permissible to say that tactual and visual bodies preconditioned auditory, gustatory, and olfactory bodies. However, as the supposititious "matter" does not really exist as is implied by empiricism, the preconditioning character attributed by sensualism to tactual and visual bodies is, from the philosophical standpoint, fanciful.

Precondition, in the strictly philosophical application of the term, only exists where there is active causative agency. There is no such agency in the case of sensory bodies of any sort. The five orders of sensory bodies are preconditioned, in the strict sense, by nothing but sub-souls of the matter-soul, and these sub-souls do not constitute any sensory body the precondition of another sensory body. Sub-souls only constitute sensory bodies the precondition of psychical bodies. Hearing, tasting, smelling, no less precondition seeing and touching than the latter precondition the former. There is really no such thing as precondition at all in the conventionally realistic sense. As ordinary sensualists, we are assured that conventionally concrete matter exists when we smell, hear, or taste anything. And we are assured

that this "concrete matter" is something see-able and touch-able. But we cannot show that this see-able, touch-able "matter" is anything essentially different from hear-able, smell-able, and taste-able "matter." Accordingly, we have no philosophical ground, as naïve sensualists or scientific empiricists, for assuming that the see-able and touch-able precondition the hear-able, smell-able, taste-able.

That the sound follows the firing of the gun does not involve that the gun-firing preconditions the sound, as active agent or cause. Of course, we commonly assume that an antecedent preconditions what invariably follows it, and it is permissible and convenient, when we are not particularly concerned about exact notions, to state that such an antecedent causes what follows it. However, at present, we cannot tolerate such easy-going affirmation. From our present standpoint, the gun is a visual complex, and such complexes condition nothing. The sound is an auditory body, and, as such, conditions nothing. The gun is there, and the sound is there, but neither causes or conditions the other. All that causes, in the contingency, is what constitutes cause itself as a psychical body or complex of such bodies. This factor is soul, as will, manifested as the sensation and emotion continua.

Of course, we could not have the sound unless we had the gun under the condition of being fired. But neither could we have the gun, under the special condition, unless we had the sound. Granted that the gun has to be fired before we get the sound, this

merely involves that we get the time-sensation between psychical bodies, as ideas of the firing and of the sound. Between the gun-firing and sound, as merely sensory bodies, there is no time-sensation at all. That between the ideas of the firing and of the sound there is time-sensation does not involve that the gun-firing is the cause of the sound. Then, as precondition really involves cause, the gun-firing does not really precondition the sound. To identify true preconditions, we must probe far beneath the strata of investigation dealt with by crude sensualism and empirical science.

Precondition only exists, in experience, through the non-resistances necessity-sensation and time-sensation. This "precondition" of experience is not philosophical "precondition." The necessity-sensation and time-sensation are themselves no more self-existent causative agents than are the tactual, visual, auditory bodies. Before we can grant precondition, in the philosophical sense, we must identify a truly causative agent. In this work I identify such an agent, as soul, subject to God.

I may here offer a few remarks regarding light and electricity, with which I have earlier dealt from other than my present standpoint. From this standpoint, light is a psychical body of the affective order. As light, it is a feeling, as distinct from a sensory body. Such feeling is what I call an affective body. The only sensory bodies are bodies that we apprehend directly as products of sub-souls of the matter-soul. Light is the resultant of a product of such

product of a sub-soul, just as are ideas and emotions. The different so-called oscillations imagined by physicists as accounting for varied luminar colours, are psychical bodies of the non-affective order (ideas), illegitimately (except as practical theory) based on the assumption that light is an entity outside the mind, propagated *through* space, another entity outside the mind. Thus the physicist's light moves as do sensory bodies, imagined as things outside the mind and apprehended by the mind as they are outside it. My light does move, only it does not move as a sensory body, but as an affective body. The movement of affective bodies only occurs as what we call intensity, involving varying effective units of consciousness of the affective order, but no varying pseudo-effective units of consciousness of the affective order, as space-sensation. Thus the movement, as intensity, which I attribute to light is a matter of real experience which anybody may test for himself by his feelings. But who can test the physicist's movement of light by his senses? On the physicist's conditions, the movement of light must be testable by the senses, inasmuch as, on such conditions, light must be a sensory body conceived as something independent of the mind, and known by the mind as it exists out of the mind.

The above comments apply to electricity. The *idea* of electricity is a psychical complex of the non-affective type, philosophically invalid for the same reasons that the idea of light, as oscillations, is invalid. On the other hand, the *experience* of electricity is feeling, or a psychical complex of the affective type

to which the remarks offered in respect to light-experience apply.

Now let us turn to gravity. The *idea* of gravity, as force, is a psychical complex of the non-affective type, illegitimately derived (as are all ideas of force and as are the ideas of electricity and light) through the false implication of a universe outside the mind and perceived as it exists outside. From my standpoint, gravity is constant soul-fiat binding together the inner and outer sensations constituting the experiences of subject and object, and so tending to bring sensory bodies to what may be termed a focus-point. That a stone thrown up in the air eventually drops to earth implies that a thing in the mind, as a sensory body, or complex, manifests two sorts of movement eventuating in what we call rest. The particular "spot" where the stone comes to rest is the "focus-point" determined by the constant fiat binding the inner and outer sensations. What is called the centre of gravity may be imagined as a fixed neutral point between the inner sensation (psychical bodies) and the outer sensation (sensory bodies).

The physicist's idea of force is spuriously ontological. According to genuine ontology there is no such thing as force, in the physicist's sense, inasmuch as there is no such thing as the physicist's inert matter, through which force is assumed to manifest itself. When I throw up the stone, I will a sensory body to manifest changing effective units of consciousness with concomitant pseudo-effective units (space-sensation). I do not project the body, as a

thing outside mind, into space as another such thing. The body, in relation to other bodies, makes the only space that exists. I do not, in the physicist's sense, endow inert matter, as a thing in itself, with force, as another thing in itself, any more than I endow with force the idea of the projected stone, when I recall it through memory. The stone, as a moving body, is just as much a thing of mind as is the idea of it. We only know the stone as a moving sensory body. In its essential nature, as sub-soul of the matter-soul, we do not know it as moving at all. The mechanical idea of force, involving the law of equivalence between actions and reactions, is different from the ontological idea of physicists. The mechanical idea of force is merely an embodiment of empirical experiences regarding change of momentum. The physicist's "force" involves spurious ontology. The "force" of mechanics implies no ontological assumption.

Let us now see how my present standpoint affects the time question. Time is segregated ideas involving the arbitrary fixing and memorising of points in continuously or intermittently moving visual or tactual bodies. Just as there could be no "space" in default of space-sensation as "intermittence" constituting visual and tactual bodies, so there could be no "time" in default of moving tactual or visual bodies. Time is intermittence between psychical bodies, as it were nailed to other psychical bodies directly derived from moving visual or tactual bodies. In conceiving time, we fix in memory a "moment of rest" or isolated point in the continuous or intermittent movement of

a visual or tactual body, and apply the memory of the fixed moment of rest to another such point in immediate experience. The difference, or non-resistance, between the segregated ideas is what we commonly call time, and I call the time-sensation. When I feel time I, as it were, nail down an idea directly derived from a visual or tactual body. The body continues moving. This movement I merely sense, without idealising, until another point is reached. To this latter I apply the memory of the first "point." Proportionately with the sensed intervening movement, the memorised "point" has become ineffective units. Thus, between the two "points," I get the time-sensation, as what is called interval, just as, between two moving bodies, I get the space-sensation, as intersection. The one "point," as compared with the other, becomes proportionately ineffective units, as a visual body moving away from me becomes proportionately ineffective units.

What we commonly call duration is quite different from the time-sensation. Duration is equivalent, in the psychical arena, to bodily extension in the sensory. Duration is a manifold of ideas constituted by memory. There is no more real time-sensation in duration than there is space-sensation in bodily extension. We only get real time-sensation as what is called interval. Of course, we may call an interval of a few seconds—the limit of what we can identify as interval—a duration. However, what I here mean by duration is an hour, day, week, year, years. In all such experiences there is really no time-sensation.

There is merely a heterogeneous complex of ideas welded into one vaguely extended psychical body of the affective order, to which we can attach no real temporal significance, but which we may compare with a more or less blurred landscape. From my standpoint, we can only derive the time-sensation from visual and tactual bodies. When we hear two sounds, we seem to get the time-sensation, as interval, from them. Really we get it from various internal tactual bodies (heart-beats, etc.) and external visual and tactual bodies. By external I here, of course, mean bodies derived through hypnotism of the matter-soul, as distinct from the medium itself. Sounds, in themselves, would afford us sensation of difference (their analogue to the space-sensation of tactual and visual bodies), but would not afford the time-sensation.

As already stated, ideas are correlations of effective units of consciousness of the non-affective psychical order. Emotions, feelings, are correlations of units of consciousness of the affective psychical order. What psychologists call the stream of consciousness are ideas as resistances, bound together by the non-resistance, necessity-sensation. What I will term the stream of sense-experience are sensory bodies, as resistances, bound together by the space-sensation in its various characters, as tactual, visual, olfactory, gustatory, auditory, according to the particular bodies involved. What are commonly called space and time are, for me, the non-resistances, space-sensation and time-sensation, the one applying to the sensory, the other to

the psychical. Correlations of effective units of the non-affective psychical order (ideas) not involving time-sensation, but, as the stream of consciousness, involving promiscuous or logical succession, are not derived from sensed movement ; nevertheless, just as psychical correlations involving sense of temporal succession can only exist through a non-resistance (time-sensation), so also can non-temporal correlations, involving desultory or logical succession, only exist through a non-resistance (necessity-sensation). Thus, while the various types of sensory correlations of units (visual, tactual, auditory, etc.) each involve only one non-resistance (space-sensation in its various characters), psychical correlations of units may involve two non-resistances : time-sensation and necessity-sensation, the former derived from motive contingency in the sensory, the latter independent of motive contingency.

Let us now recapitulate the foregoing exposition. First, we have sensory bodies, divided into three main classes : those having variable space-sensation and extension ; those having variable space-sensation and invariable extension ; those having invariable space-sensation and invariable extension. The first class comprises visual bodies ; the second, tactual bodies ; the third, auditory, gustatory, and olfactory bodies. Then we have psychical bodies, divided into two main classes : those having invariable space-sensation and extension, and those having neither space-sensation nor extension. The former class comprises affective bodies (emotion, feeling) ; the latter, non-affective

bodies (ideas). The above bodies constitute the sensation and emotion continua, as what I term resistances. They are conditioned by certain sub-sensations which I call non-resistances. These are : (*a*) the void-sensation, conditioning the transformation of sensory into psychical bodies ; (*b*) the necessity-sensation, conditioning the inter-relationship of psychical bodies ; (*c*) the space-sensation of visual and tactual bodies, conditioning their inter-relationship ; (*d*) the space-sensation of gustatory, auditory, and olfactory bodies, conditioning their inter-relationship ; (*e*) the time-sensation, differentiating psychical bodies, as ideas separated by a moving sensory body or bodies of the visual or tactual order.

Outside the sensation and emotion continua are : (*a*) the "inner" and "outer" sensations, pre-conditioning the manifestation of the continua ; (*b*) intellect, conditioning, as belief, the result of the manifestation of the continua ; (*c*) unsymbolisable emotion, or effort, exciting the motor will ; (*d*) will : the condition underlying the realisation of the sensation and emotion continua and consummating that realisation.

I hope the reader will now be able to entertain an intelligible conception how, in accordance with the demonstrations of philosophy, a universe can exist in ourselves, from which motion, space and time, as ordinarily conceived, are banished as realities. I hope the reader will see that the universe, so far as philosophy is concerned, may as well be an ever-present, unchanging "point" as the thing of stupendous ex-

tensions, durations, distances, complexities, metamorphoses existing to our common perceptivities. These are all products of our "personal artifice" constituted by specific willings of effective and ineffective units of consciousness. Alter this "personal artifice" (as, I contend, it is altered by what we call death), there may well be, for us, another universe as diverse from that we now experience as the latter is from the universe revealed by philosophical elaboration of the facts of common experience, and this post-terrestrial universe may yet manifest as true evolutionary continuity with our present one as this manifests within its own contents. Just as we have this present universe "latent" in us, as part of the will-continuum, so have we our post-terrestrial universe "latent" as another part of the will-continuum. What our future universe shall be for us is determined by what we make our present one, as fully as the conditions of our maturity are determined in this life by the conditions of our youth. In other words, the post-terrestrial manifestation of the will-continuum is conditioned by its terrestrial manifestation. Determinism started us as universe-makers. So it will end us, if we are to be ended. The "fittest" on earth will be "fittest" after earth. The man here will be man there. The brute here will be brute there. If man is higher here than the brute, so will he be higher there. Brutes standing on two legs and wearing coats, trousers, and diamond rings are mistaken for men here. Evolution, terrestrial and post-terrestrial, makes no mistakes.

Let me now set before the reader a tabulation schematising the field of human experience, according to my hypothesis of units.

SENSORY BODIES.

Visual.	<p>No time-sensation. Variable space-sensation (affecting extension). Variable extension. Movement (involving time-sensation for psychical bodies).</p>
Tactual.	<p>No time-sensation. Variable space-sensation (not affecting extension). Invariable extension. Movement (involving time-sensation for psychical bodies).</p>
Auditory. } Olfactory. } Gustatory. }	<p>No time-sensation. Invariable space-sensation (analogous to, but typically different from, visual and tactual space-sensation). Invariable extension. Movement, as intensity.</p>

PSYCHICAL BODIES (Non-affective).

Ideas.	<p>No extension. No space-sensation. No movement, except as parts of a changing continuum called the stream of consciousness. Necessity-sensation. Time-sensation (arising through movement of visual and tactual bodies).</p>
--------	--

PSYCHICAL BODIES (Affective).

Emotion.	}	Movement, as intensity.
Bodily sensations.		Invariable extension.
		Invariable space-sensation (analogous to, but typically different from, visual and tactual space-sensation, and excluding spatial relationship).
		Necessity-sensation (in the case of emotion only).
		No time-sensation.

INTELLECT.

No space-sensation.
No time-sensation.
No extension.
No necessity-sensation.
Only exists in experience as an eject—belief.
Movement, as intensity, in eject.

QUASI-AFFECTIVE BODY.

Belief.	No space-sensation.
	No time-sensation.
	No necessity-sensation.
	No extension.
	Movement, as intensity.
	Eject from intellect.

BODILY EXTENSION (SENSORY).

A correlation of effective sensory units constituting an act of sensory apprehension, or realisation of a sensory body.

SPACE-SENSATION.

Differentiation or intersection between bodies of the sensory order, constituted of pseudo-effective units of consciousness of the sensory order, and of the affective psychical order.

BODILY EXTENSION (PSYCHICAL).

A correlation of effective psychical units constituting realisation in experience of an affective body.

TIME-SENSATION.

Differentiation between bodies of the non-affective psychical order. Dependent on movement of sensory bodies. Constituted of pseudo-effective units of consciousness of the non-affective psychical order.

DURATION.

Any part of the stream of consciousness experienced as a psychical complex embodying memorised successions of sensory movement.

No relationship to the time-sensation, but analogous to bodily extension in the sensory arena.

NECESSITY-SENSATION.

Bond between psychical non-affective and between affective bodies, or between one and the other sorts of bodies. Preconditioning memory and idea of causality, and the various æsthetic sensations. Constituting reason, and the essential activity of all reflective processes.

MEMORY.

Reproduction of psychical bodies. Essentially soul-fiat. Out of consciousness.

IMAGINATION.

Memorised bodies projected on other memorised bodies or on bodies in actual experience. Can only occur in the absence of the void-sensation.

SENSATION AND EMOTION CONTINUA.

The organism of experience, sensory and psychical.

UNSYMBOLISABLE SENSATION.

The substratum constituting the sensation-continuum, only experienced as the "outer sensation."

OUTER SENSATION.

The primary intuition of externality, anticipating sensory bodies and constituting, with the "inner sensation," the empirical ego.

INNER SENSATION.

The primary intuition of self as an active agent.

PERSONAL ARTIFICE.

The idiosyncratic interpretation of their experiences by individuals and types.

DISTORTING IMAGINATION.

The faculty transforming sensory into psychical bodies.

The basis of language. Manifested in experience as the void-sensation.

VOID-SENSATION.

The bond between sensory and psychical bodies.

Analogous to the necessity-sensation acting between psychical bodies.

Differentiates imaginary from real experience.

FAITH.

The complement, at the end of the sensation-continuum, to unsymbolisable sensation, at the commencement of that continuum.

Faith consummates the sensation-continuum, as unsymbolisable sensation anticipates that continuum.

SOUL, OR ORGANIC SOUL.

The essential self. Manifested as will.

MATTER-SOUL.

The essential not-self. Hypnotised by the organic soul into sub-souls, experienced as sensory bodies.

UNITS OF STIMULUS AND CONSCIOUSNESS.

Elements of sensory and psychical bodies.

EFFORT.

Unsymbolisable emotion.

No space-sensation.

No time-sensation.

No necessity-sensation.

Invariable extension.

Movement, as intensity.

WILL.

Manifestation of soul. Not in experience except as its eject, a motor activity.
 The precondition of all bodies, as a continuum. .

It will be seen that, from my present standpoint, a sensed body is not at all what is conventionally assumed as the body. When we ordinarily talk about an object we imply that it is a thing, and that what we sense about is, as shape, bulk, density, colour, are merely what we call attributes, quite distinct from the *thing itself*. This naïve assumption has hitherto appeared adequate to our so-called practical needs. I maintain that it is no longer adequate, because the greatest practical need of our society is to regain belief in God which it has transiently lost through the extinction of the emotive simulacrum which had previously occupied the position now occupied by intellectual discrimination, as compulsion to belief; and because I feel assured that belief in God can only be regained through a more profound and accurate realisation, so far as our present apprehension is concerned, of what constitutes our experience of the world, than has hitherto been accessible to the multitude.

What we commonly call a body is really a complex of bodies, each as different from the other as any ordinarily imagined body is from another. The conventional body's bulk, density, colour, shape really represent three bodies of the visual order and

one body of the tactual order. The last is as different from the others as an elephant, from the conventional point of view, is different from a thistle-down, and each one of the visual bodies is as different from another of the triad, as a zebra is different, from the common standpoint, from a horse. That what I above advance is correct, and that what is commonly assumed is incorrect, is evidenced by the fact that the only conclusion possible through rational investigation of human experience is that the world, as we know it, must be as pictured, and thus contained by the mind, and that if there is a world exclusive of that pictured by the mind, and thus contained by it, such world can only exist beyond the range of definition in terms applied by the mind to its primary pictures of the world.

If I see something I see it as shape, colour, texture. So far as I have any first-hand knowledge of the thing before me it is nothing but a sensation, as the case may be, of round, square, oblong, angular, pointed, jagged, etc.; or of red, blue, green, orange, white, gray, black, etc.; or of soft, smooth, rough, etc.; or of bright, dull, clear, etc. So, proceeding through the various sense-apprehensions, I obtain all the real, first-hand knowledge of the thing I am investigating. Now, if the various sensations I thus obtain are not themselves bodies, where do bodies exist? If I conceive all these sensory bodies lumped together as another body which I imagine as distinct from, and yet comprising the sensory bodies, the further realisation is really

further away from first-hand knowledge than is any one of the sensory bodies. But, assuming the comprehensive body to be the real thing, and the others merely constituents of the real thing, we have still before us the fact that all we have determined is something in our mind. The assumed totality of the sensations, as the conventional "thing itself," is no less in the mind than any one of the sensations.

Now, taking these first-hand things as the basis of all we know of our world, unless we succeed in limiting our apprehension to these basical things (an impossibility to the person of average intelligence), we must accept the logical ultimates of these basical mind-images. Besides being constituted of the faculty that creates shape, colour, etc., the mind is also constituted of the faculty that creates what we call logical succession. If what the mind supplies, as logic, enables us to feel, as real, other things than shape-bodies and colour-bodies and such bodies lumped together into more complex bodies, then, what the mind supplies, as unsensed preconditions of such bodies, are still real, as fully as are colour and shape and like sensory bodies of which the others are preconditioning elements. All we are here dealing with is, equally, mind-stuff; so, if we take care to exercise our mind normally from the prime facts of experience, we cannot go wrong in forming conclusions.

If colour, bulk, contour, density, transparency, opacity; sound, flavour, scent, are bodies, so are psychical sensations afforded by the sensation-con-

tinuum, constituting what we call ideas, also bodies. So, again, are psychical sensations afforded by the emotion-continuum, constituting what we call feelings or emotions, bodies. The psychical are just as much created, as experience, as are the sensory bodies. Of course the former are created, as experience, through the sensory bodies as primary experience. These sensory bodies thus afford the ground or basis on which the experience-creator must construct his continuum. He necessarily builds up his experiential structure from its foundation, as the sensory bodies.

As will be clear to the reader who has followed this hypothesis of units and my investigation of scientific concepts, the condition of space only experientially exists as what may be termed an eject from sensory bodies, as ineffective units of consciousness of the sensory order, and the condition of time as an eject from psychical bodies derived through motive contingency in the sensory arena. Sensory bodies, or what we call objects, make space. Psychical bodies, or what we call ideas, make time, subject to moving sensory bodies, inasmuch as ideas only exist through objects. Accordingly, were there no objects there could be neither time nor space. Corollarily, if post-terrestrial states do not involve objects, there will be no experience of time or space after what we call life is extinct. Of course we are utterly unable to conceive a state lacking such experience, and we are equally unable to conceive post-terrestrial continuity with terrestrial conditions in which objects

will cease to exist. I believe in such continuity, and, accordingly, believe we shall have objects, space, and time in the next stage of our existence. In later chapters I shall devote detailed consideration to the question of post-terrestrial existence.

CHAPTER XXV

THE MIND-UNIVERSE

THERE is a great difference in perception of details, according as we gaze at one object or at a number of objects. In the latter case some are in what is called the fringe of consciousness, while others are at its focus. Accordingly some units which are effective at one moment are ineffective at another. This involves the conclusion that whenever an object and an observer, in the conventional sense, come together, all the possible units constituting the object are "in" the observer. On the other hand, it involves that only so many of the units constituting the object will become effective as the soul is able to will into the percipient, or medium, as mind. In an earlier chapter, in discussing will, I showed that we could desire more or less than we could will (see vol. ii. p. 393). So in the case of realising units as effective, the medium, as mind, cannot so realise all that the soul constitutes as units, or the total contents of the object. So far as the soul is concerned all possible units are always effective, inasmuch as all possible

units only exist through the soul's hypnotism of the matter-soul. On the other hand, the soul's machinery (our body) can only realise a part of these units as effective.

In regard to the above conditions the object may be pictured, in respect to our soul, as our desire to accomplish is to our ability to will what we desire. The object, as it were, "wants" the will to reveal it, as effective units to the percipient, but can no more excite the necessary fiat than can the percipient himself in regard to a multitude of his desires. Carrying further this argument we may infer that, as a single object is endowed by the soul with all units possible as constituting that object, so the world or the universe is likewise endowed by the soul with all its possible units. In other words, if in gazing at an object I "create" that object by endowing it with all possible units, whether effective or ineffective, so I "create" the universe, as units. Thus we arrive at the position which I have often indicated in earlier chapters—that all we know of the universe, as externality, is what we know of our own minds, that is, of the machinery responding to our souls. From my present standpoint we are really as much in the presence of the universe, or rather, it is as much in us, as is any object of immediate perception. The units are in us, of the universe as much as of the object. The difference is in what we can realise as effective.

In an earlier chapter (Chap. IX. vol. ii.) I indicated how we got "infected" with what I called type-

sensations. The above considerations may serve further to elucidate this point. Assuming that all the units for all possible objects are in every soul, as its hypnotism of the matter-soul, it is clear that the possibility, so far as concerns soul, of universal apprehension is in every person, and that the only question is how far this possibility can be rendered actuality, by body or medium. The units are all there. The difficulty is to render them effective. Now in every case of discovery of a fresh type-sensation (for instance, argon or helium) this difficulty is overcome by the one organism we call the discoverer. Once he has overcome the difficulty, all that is necessary to ensure the "infection" by the new type-sensation is to stimulate into patency what has been latent in everybody. All have the discovery *in utero*. The units are in everybody. They merely need changing from ineffective to effective. This change is effected by the will-continuum, underlying the sensation-continuum, the effective stimulation of which constitutes the "infection."

So it is, indeed, in regard to all possible cognition. It is latent, as potentiality, in everybody. The difficulty is to render it patent. The soul can will all, but it does not will bodies that can excite it to exercise its omnipotence. Everything we do in changing the appearance of bodies involves changing effective into ineffective units, or *vice versa*. When a carpenter planes a board, when a soldier shoots off another's head, when a sculptor chips stone, when a chemist turns solid into gas or liquid, or *vice versa*,

they simply change units of consciousness as effective or ineffective. In the case of the homicide, this involves the severance of a soul from its medium. A number of folk are butchering one another in Africa while I am writing this in England and have never been in Africa. If my soul involves all possible units, it creates those butchers and butchered in Africa, *in posse*, though they are strangers to my body or medium. I get certain effective units regarding these people by reading the papers; still the people themselves, as bodies, are out of my sphere of consciousness, as I am out of theirs. They are units I cannot realise as effective, just as I cannot realise my desire to exterminate certain other people concerned in starting the butchery. The real difference between souls is in the bodies or mediums they create as their own. Some souls create bodies that realise effective units only as places, say, in Europe; other souls create bodies that can only realise effective units as places in Africa, Asia, America. Still Europe, Africa, Asia, America are, indifferently, in the souls of all these people, as effective or ineffective units as the case may be. That the people, say, in Europe, fail to realise, as effective, their Africa, Asia, America units, does not affect the speculation I am now advancing.

It may be asked: Do I mean to imply that I have the body of every combatant in this Boer war in my mind as units of consciousness? I reply that I mean this—that if I have the same possible universe in my mind, or, as my mind, as has each of these com-

batants, I must have each of their bodies (as parts of that universe) in my mind, as ineffective units, as fully as each combatant has his own body, as units, so in mind, effective, when he is sensing his body; ineffective when he is not sensing it. If each combatant had not his own body in his mind, or as his mind, as part of his universe, he could not know his own body by sensing it. If I had not each combatant's body in my mind, as part of my universe, I could not perceive any such combatant's body were I shoulder to shoulder with it on the battlefield. Nothing can affect the mind except what can excite what already exists in the mind, or as the mind. The conditions of this excitation involve what we call sensing. This sensing merely involves that the soul so hypnotises the matter-soul that a sub-soul results which, as excitant, enables the mind, through its soul, to transform certain ineffective units of its universe into effective units. Every soul is hypnotising the matter-soul into the same sub-souls, though some souls are not realising, as effective units, the sub-souls so realised by other souls.

When I am in England and a certain combatant unknown to me is in Africa, I cannot sense him, that is, my soul does not so hypnotise the matter-soul that the resulting sub-soul enables me to realise, as effective units, the particular sensory body constituting the combatant, which, nevertheless, must be "latent," as ineffective units of my mind's possible universe, as fully as must a table in the next room, which I know to be there, but which is now, for me, ineffective

units of consciousness of the sensory order. I could no more sense the table, were I in the next room, than I could sense the soldier, were I with him in Africa, unless each, as a sensory body, was "latent" in my mind, as ineffective units, or "patent," as effective units. And neither could be "patent" as effective units, unless it pre-existed, as "latent," or ineffective units. Could either be patent without being latent, something would have to come into the mind which was inherently outside its possible universe. This would involve, so far as regarded the foreign intruder, that it created a new mind and constituted itself percipient as well as object. The logical application of such a principle would involve the naïve realism that the mind was a sort of mirror, and that objects were the same things out of the mind as in it. Did we accept such an hypothesis of mind, we should accept crude sensualism and implicitly repudiate all science demonstrating that objects are perceived, not as they exist outside a mere passive reflector, but as images fabricated by an active agent constituting the quality of its own percipience.

Then, it may be suggested, if I have the combatant's body in my mind, as ineffective units, I must have his particular feelings and emotions, at each moment, as he goes through the war. I reply, the two conditions are distinct. The feelings and emotions are psychical bodies. Sensory bodies are what we derive as immediate products of hypnotism of the matter-soul. Every soul hypnotises the same possible (though not the same actualised) sensory

universe from the matter-soul. But no two souls fabricate the same psychical bodies from their sensory universe. There is no absolute, constant, external standard conditioning the fabrication of psychical bodies such as conditions the fabrication of sensory bodies. The hypnotism of the matter-soul exists as the absolute standard of fabrication of sensory bodies ; so, given the condition of sensing, the actualised sensory universe is the same for each soul. On the other hand, the realisation of psychical bodies depends on the necessity-sensation which manifests itself as connection between non-affective psychical bodies (ideas), as well as between affective psychical bodies (æsthetic feelings, emotions), and between non-affective and affective psychical bodies themselves. Though this necessity-sensation is part of the possible universe of each soul, it is extremely variable in actual realisation as projecting one psychical body on another — non-affective on non-affective (idea on idea) ; affective on affective (emotion on emotion ; æsthetic feeling on emotion) ; non-affective on affective, or *vice versa* (emotion on idea), and so on. Thus, though each normal mind has the same possible psychical universe, as it has the same possible sensory universe, each mind has not the same possibility of identically realising psychical bodies as it has of so realising sensory bodies. If an artist and a non-expert look at the same picture, each presumably senses it as the same sensory body ; but the psychical bodies excited by the sensory bodies (primarily, through the void-sensation, then through the

necessity-sensation) of the two observers are probably totally different. Each senses as does the other ; but neither feels the sensory resultant as does the other. The sensing is governed by the fixed standard—the soul's hypnotism of the matter-soul into sub-souls. The feeling is not governed by the same necessity-sensation transforming non-affective into affective bodies (ideas into emotions and æsthetic feelings). As already indicated, the essence of thinking is in the non-resistances, not in the resistances. The necessity-sensation decides the idea or emotion constituting what may be termed the affirmative thinking or feeling. Really, the essence of the activity lies in what may be termed the negative thinking or feeling constituted by the necessity-sensation itself. Of course, underlying and conditioning the manifestation of the necessity-sensation is the soul's fiat. As the soul wills the necessity-sensation, so is the feeling, or emotion, or idea.

As I have each sensory body—reverting to our illustration—as a combatant in Africa, in my mind, as ineffective units, it may be suggested that I must have all sensory bodies that exist, so, in my mind, as effective or ineffective units. This is the case and implies the proposition that the same universe is in every mind, or that every mind is the same universe. Whatever exists as a sensory body is in my mind as effective or ineffective units of consciousness. Again, whatever is to exist as a sensory body, so long as my mind exists, is in that mind as ineffective units.

The above may appear very extravagant to the matter-of-fact person. However, philosophy cannot consent to be bound by the limitations of that no doubt sagacious product. Philosophy has to brave his ridicule rather than shirk its own conclusion. Until the matter-of-fact oracle can reveal to philosophy how a universe can exist to a percipient mind, unless that mind, in some way, has that universe in itself, the matter-of-fact sceptic may well consider his own certainties *sub judice* equally with those of philosophy. As often indicated in this work, the mind is not comparable with what we conventionally (and inaccurately) attribute, as passive response, to a mirror. The mirror, itself, is a sub-soul of the matter-soul which we only know as tactual and visual bodies (smoothness, brightness, etc.). That it is a sub-soul, we do not know by immediate experience, but by projecting sensory bodies into psychical bodies—in other words, by what we call inference. As sensory bodies, the mirror does not exist out of our mind. Only as sub-soul of the matter-soul does it so exist. Our mind, through the soul's fiats (but only through them, not through its own initiative), is a doer that conjures its own experiences by interacting with other doers—the sub-souls of the matter-soul constituted by the organic soul's hypnotism. Europe, Asia, Africa, and America, so far as anything in them can be in the mind, must be in the mind—really, as earlier indicated, the mind itself—before actual experience of any single thing in Europe, Asia, Africa, America

can exist. Nothing can come into the mind, except as excitation to what already exists, as what may be termed mind in the germinal state. There is really no such thing as mind except the possible universe, some part of which, through the soul, realises itself as an actual universe. All that external excitation, as sub-souls, can do is to excite the mind to realise itself through its soul as effective units of consciousness.

The assumption that the mind can know anything, as a mere reflector or passive agent, is negatived by the whole of advanced science, let alone philosophical scrutiny. Could the assumption be tolerated, all modern science would need to be repudiated, and we might revert to the verifying method of the crude sensualist, for whom seeing is the highest possibility of believing. Atomistic philosophies are inherently vitiated by the empiricism (as chemistry and physics), on which their advocates profess to base them. If atomic science is right, then atomic philosophy is wrong, inasmuch as atomic science implies that the mind is a doer, not a mere passive agent; while, on the other hand, atomic philosophy implies that the mind is merely a passive agent getting its realities, as perception, not only from, but *as* something external to itself. The philosophy of atomism bases itself on what is egregiously unphilosophic—the assumption that what is in the mind must needs be out of the mind as it is in the mind. While, according to science, the mind transforms its world of crude sense into atoms, ethers *et hoc*; according to the

implications of atomistic philosophy, the mind knows these atoms, ethers, etc., only as the crude sensualist knows his objects of sense. Here, philosophy which, to be worthy the name, should transcend science really debases itself below the level of science. Science says nothing about the ultimate nature of mind, but implies a great deal; while this atomistic philosophy says a great deal about the ultimate nature of mind, but implies nothing, essentially, but the crudities which science has tacitly repudiated.

It may be urged that it does not matter how the universe exists—whether in the mind, or out of it. I reply that it matters a good deal to show humanity that its concerns transcend its animal appetites and immediate interests, and that one means of revealing this fact is by showing humanity that it is of some account in the scheme of the universe. One of the results of philosophical probing is to reveal this fact. Obviously, if humanity is enabled to believe that it constitutes its universe, humanity will be predisposed to believe that, as it constitutes one universe, it may constitute others, and that, accordingly, its responsibilities and possibilities are not limited to the universe it at present constitutes. In a word, if the universe is potentially present in the soul of every person, and is only limited by the inability of the body to express the soul's potentiality, as effective units, then we may reasonably suppose that what the body now fails to realise will be realised as the destiny of the soul.

The above contentions regarding the soul, as con-

taining the universe, may seem to lend colour to the monistic idea, with which I have dealt in the preceding volumes, traversing the assumption of soul-individuality, by resolving existence into a single soul, and projecting bodies out of existence as what are called forms, in contradistinction to material. However, as I show in this work, the prime facts of experience, the "inner" and "outer" sensations, or "I" and "not-I," show that the soul does not create the universe in the absolute sense, but merely creates it as what can possibly be realised as effective units, which units, again, are only realisable through the soul's interaction with some soul not itself (which I call the matter-soul).

The universe, as potentially present in the soul, we are forced by experience to define as being all possible units of consciousness, none of which, however, can be realised as effective unless by the organic soul's interaction with a soul other than itself, the latter affording units of stimulus complementary to the units of consciousness inhering in the organic soul. Thus this organic soul is not a self-existent entity. Failing interaction with the matter-soul, it cannot exist as percipient, or can the matter-soul exist as object, failing interaction with the organic soul. Accordingly, neither of these souls is creative in the absolute sense, inasmuch as they are interdependent. Behind these souls as real Creator is, of course, God. What are interdependent are not self-existent, and, to account for interdependence, we need self-existence. Now we have the true trinity: the God-soul and its issues, the organic soul and

matter-soul. In a later chapter I shall show how God's relationship to the universe does not involve interdependence as regards God. If it still be urged that I am making extravagant demands on belief in propounding the mind-universe, let me tell the reader what a sober physiologist affirms regarding the cerebral cortex. He writes: "I believe it may be said that each of the syllables of each of the words of each of the languages that we speak has its localisation in a cell of the grey cortex of the brain" (*Medicine and the Mind*, de Fleury, English translation, Downey and Co.). I ask the reader to try to estimate how many different syllables, in different languages, he has uttered during his lifetime, and then, adhering to the materialistic conception of matter, to try to think how each of these syllables could be conceived as having one particular spot set apart for itself in his brain. Again, I ask him to try to think how any materialistic interpretation of matter could render conceivable the possibility of its differentiating itself into those spots in cortical cells, which, according to this physiologist, constitute the origin and record of "each of the syllables of each of the words of each of the languages we speak."

Again, I ask the reader to reflect and try if he can imagine the possibility of his knowing anything which is not constituted all he knows about it by his mind. For instance, can he imagine how he can know that a chair exists, unless his mind has fabricated the chair as a mental image? Again, can he know more about the chair than he knows about the mental

image? I myself am pretty well endowed with imaginative capacity, but it is utterly beyond my power to imagine any contingency of knowing that shall not depend solely on the mind's capacity to elaborate the thing known. Of course, the excitation to knowing, and the knowing itself, may be two essentially different things. As I hope I have sufficiently proved in this work, we can know that something exists, as excitation, not in the mind. However, this knowing is only possible by inferring from what is in the mind. That the excitation exists, as something not in the mind, we may be well assured. Thus as an idea we know the external thing, as a bare generalisation as in the mind; but, what the thing is beyond bare generalisation, to which this idea applies, we can only know by applying to one idea other ideas; in other words, by a process of inference. By such a process we determine the validity of an idea in the mind of a thing out of the mind, and transform a bare generalisation into a concrete notion. Accordingly, even in this philosophical case, all we know is in the mind. If we believe, we know as well as it is possible to know. If the inferential method tells us that a thing exists out of the mind that we can only know as in the mind, the proof of the validity of the conclusion is that we cannot upset it by the mind; in other words, that we believe it. I have no means enabling me to believe the idea of a thing out of the mind, as conditioning what is in the mind, other than the means of inference from the basical things I do believe. These basical things are

sensory bodies. Inferring from these basal things in the mind, I am able to believe about things out of the mind, as what I call the matter-soul, the organic soul, the ante-cosmic soul, etc. etc.

All things known being in the mind, the universe must be there. This universe is a complex of sensory and psychical bodies, as actualised, primarily, of the former. Obviously, the sensory and psychical bodies must always have been in the mind, because they exist nowhere else. If the mind, as what is called conscious, does not realise them, the mind, as what is called unconscious, or sub-conscious, must realise them. This sub-conscious realisation constitutes what I call ineffective units of consciousness. If there are no ineffective units, there can be no effective units. In common phraseology, if there is no unconsciousness, or sub-consciousness, there is no consciousness. Corollarily, if all realised sensory bodies are effective units, then all sensory bodies that can exist, or have existed, must either be effective or ineffective units. This applies to psychical bodies derived from the sensory bodies. Here there is no past or future. All is present, consciously or unconsciously. Thus, the universe is in each mind, and the same universe is in each mind.

Were not the same universe in each mind, any collective advance of knowledge would be impossible, inasmuch as it would be impossible for one mind to know the universe of another mind, and nothing could be put into a mind, as effective units, that was not there as ineffective units. Take a few illus-

trations : Had the experimental physicist no part of his universe, as mathematics, involving numerical imagination, he could not understand an equation. Had not the ordinary person an anatomical part in his possible universe, involving sensory bodies, as bones, muscles, etc., he could gain no intelligible notion of a human body, no matter what explanations might be offered him. He might hear the words of his instructor, but they would have no more significance to him than to a parrot. Those engaged in the work of instruction have vivid illustration of the facility with which certain subjects are imparted to particular pupils, as compared with others. The philosophical interpretation of such differences is that certain minds can more readily realise certain parts of their universe than other minds can realise the same parts. Or, stated in the terms of my metaphysic, the interpretation may be put : certain souls, by hypnotising the matter-soul, will media that can excite fiats for certain sensory and psychical bodies (constituting mind) more readily than for other sensory and psychical bodies. The application of these remarks to various pathological phenomena of mind (aphasias, amnesias, etc.) involving the loss of particular faculties is obvious. In such cases, the medium loses its power to excite fiats for the particular parts of the universe represented by the lost faculties ; and, corollarily, the soul's power to will a medium is correspondingly modified.

Let us take another illustration. A soldier in battle is hit by a bullet. The weapon and bullet are type-sensations, or sensory bodies which everybody

realises out of his universe on certain conditions which we call sensing. The man who fires realises the rifle and bullet as sensory bodies of the visual and tactual orders. The man who is shot fails to realise, say, the rifle, but realises the bullet as an affective body involving pain, or shock. Later, perhaps, when the bullet is extracted from his body, he realises it as sensory bodies of the visual and tactual orders. Then, say, he has fever and nervous prostration. Now, he realises various affective bodies, attributing them through the necessity-sensation, to what he realises as sensory bodies of the visual and tactual orders constituting his mutilated member. Say, he dies. His soul no longer hypnotises the matter-soul, but those about him continue the hypnotism. Then he is buried. Now commence what I call 'processes of de-hypnotism and re-hypnotism of the matter-soul by other souls. These processes involve the corpse. Later, they involve various sensory bodies which we call products of putrefaction, attributed to the agency of micro-organisms, with which interesting entities I shall deal in later chapters. We may prevent this process of putrefaction by de-hypnotising in another way—say, by what is called cremation. Everything occurring in the above illustrative case is in the human mind as product of will.

Before dealing with further illustrations of the sort, let me reconsider an interesting question to which I have earlier adverted. Why does one person and not another sense a particular object? The answer seems obvious enough, does it not? No

doubt, one senses what the other does not, because the one applies his sensory organs to it, while the other does not. We must get a better answer than that. Let me put the question in another way. As everybody has the same universe in his mind, why does not everybody get the same sensory bodies of the visual and tactual orders? Say, I hypnotise the matter-soul into a pencil in my hand—why does not the reader do the same? Because, perhaps, he is a hundred miles away. But, from my present standpoint, he is really where I am. We are both in our minds, and mind makes “a hundred miles.” If mind makes the “miles” for both of us, why cannot it make the pencil for both? Really, neither the pencil nor the miles have anything to do with the point we want to decide. The deciding factor is will. My soul wills one part of our universe as effective; the reader’s soul wills another. Each of us is willing the same matter-soul into different sub-souls as interacting with our common universe. The “miles” between us represent the difference in our willings. Suppose we met at a railway-station and I held the pencil while the reader looked at it—then we should both will the same part of our universe as effective (through willing the same sub-soul into interaction), as before we had willed different parts (through willing different sub-souls into interaction). We have both travelled to enable us to will together that pencil. He has traversed one part of the country, I another. So, before we could will that pencil together, we had to will a multitude of

other sensory bodies from our universe. Let us now consider some other illustrations.

When a vivisector destroys particular cerebral areas, he so hypnotises his own medium and that of the mutilated animal that his medium cannot excite the soul to will the sensory body constituted by the destroyed part of the brain, and the sensory bodies constituting the motor activities which, for him, represented the lost activities of the subject of his experiment. Again, the animal's soul (assuming non-human souls) is so affected by the hypnotism that it cannot will a medium that can excite it (the soul) to will the sensory and psychical bodies constituting that part of its universe rendered ineffective, as the lost activities. Again, to take other illustrations, genius, talent, special capacity of any sort, all depend on the particular soul's willing of its medium. The boor has the universe of the genius, only he cannot render it effective. Again, the brute-human hybrid has the universe of the man, which he cannot realise as effective. Each of us has the same universe, but what we do with it is the measure of our soul-evolution. As the soul is willed by God, so it wills. As the soul wills, so is the medium. As is the medium, so are the sensory and psychical bodies constituting the particular realised universe. What we call culture is forcing sensory bodies (as words) and, through them, psychical bodies (as ideas) on the medium, and so stimulating it to excite its soul to will particular parts of its universe, as ineffective units, into effective units; in other words, culture means rendering

conscious, as far as practicable, the mind's unconscious or sub-conscious universe.

Again, that brutes appear to us partially to understand us, and we them, and that we assume that we are largely unable to understand them, and they us, occurs—assuming brutes have souls—because they and we have universes different in some respects, alike in others; or—assuming brutes have no souls—because our souls cannot will certain psychical bodies affording us what we call understanding of the sensory bodies willed by our souls as the bodies of the brutes and their motor activities. On this assumption of no brute-soul, the brutes would be equivalent to sub-souls of the matter-soul, or what we commonly call dead matter. Such an assumption, I need hardly remark, would be totally opposed to inference from experience which is conclusive that brutes have souls equally with ourselves.

CHAPTER XXVI

A MIRROR-MIND

My bodies are *the* real things of experience. The bodies of ordinary empiricism are really out of experience, as what I may term imaginary ontological projections, just as are the physicist's atoms and energies. When a person tells me this is a book, I do not deny the fact, though I deny that what he calls a book is the simple thing he imagines through accepting the apparent but not real verdict of his understanding. It is obvious, on a little reflection, that such unquestioning acceptance ignores the one all-important point that what experiences must make what it experiences, and that what it primarily makes is not "book," but a complex of sensory bodies.

Let us now discuss more in detail than we have done the question, Why may not what is experienced as sensory bodies also exist independently of experience, as it is in that experience? Why may not the mind be compared to a mirror merely reflecting, instead of constructing, its outside world?

As already indicated in earlier discussions of this point, a reply to such questions is afforded by empiricism, showing that matter is not at all as it is experienced by sense. The whole of empirical science goes to establish this fact. If bodies are, essentially, as we sense them, empirical science, instead of being knowledge, is delusion. I myself, as the reader will be aware, have not an exaggerated regard for empirical science ; still, as it corroborates philosophical science, showing that mind creates its sensory bodies, I am justified in appealing to that empiricism. Were bodies, essentially, outside mind as they are inside mind, they must either be as revealed by sense, or, as revealed by empirical science, they cannot be both as revealed by the one and the other.

Assuming for the moment that bodies are outside as they are inside mind, it would be impossible, to rational apprehension, for mind to annihilate, say, bulk, as is done by the X-rays, inasmuch as the mind that merely reflected or reproduced something external to itself, as, say, the flesh of a hand, could not also reflect the hand as devoid of flesh. If the flesh exists as something essential, real, and mind merely reflects it, mind cannot turn it into not-flesh, any more than a mirror can refuse to reflect the object before it. On the assumption that sensory experience was merely reflection or reproduction of what was outside mind, such obviation of body, as that by the X-rays, would be impossible.

Still, it may be suggested, the X-rays alter the body as a thing to be reflected. As the conditions

change, so the product of reflection changes. I ask against this, what are the "conditions"? We know nothing about the X-rays or about light itself, except as product—on the present assumption—of our reflection of bodies. How then can we say that the X-rays or light is a condition altering bodies, when we do not know the X-rays or light, except through knowing bodies? What are conditions that only exist through what they are supposed to condition? If the conditions, as the X-rays and light, exist only to the "reflectors," through bodies, where is the rational warrant for assuming that these "conditions," only existing through bodies reflected by a perceiving "mirror," can alter the nature of bodies as products of the reflection?

As it is impossible to demonstrate the existence of light or the X-rays, except as preconditioned by sensory bodies, it is gratuitous assumption to attribute any effect, as conditioning agent, to light or the X-rays. So far as the "mirror" is concerned, the only possible conditioning agent is what is reflected—body. On the assumption that bodies appear and disappear to the mind, as a mere reflector, we must attribute to bodies the volition that we usually attribute to mind, and must divest mind of such volition. Either we must have an active percipient conditioning its impressions, or we must have an active object conditioning the percipient as mere reflector. If we maintain the latter condition, we constitute ourselves bodies, or automata, and to what we commonly consider automata we attribute the

spontaneity we otherwise attribute to our own minds. Of course, if we do this, we may as well drop all pretension to know anything, and may sit down simply recording what bodies elect to offer us as reflectors. In fact, we may then cease thinking altogether and emulate the jelly-fish and mushroom.

The opposite error to that of the naïve realist is the assumption of the pure idealist that what is made as experience necessarily excludes a factor independent of the experiencing agent. However, the primary fact of experience (as what I term the "outer sensation") is that there is more concerned in the existence of experience than the agent creating its own experience. If it be urged that this primary fact itself emanates from the experiencing agent, I answer that this does not affect the point that, if the primary experience says there is an objective world, there is one. If the agent is to deny his experience that there is an outer world, merely on the ground that he creates that experience, then he may as well deny on like ground that a horse has four legs. The "outer sensation" telling him there is a not-self is equally valid, as compulsion to belief, as is the ordinary sensory experience that a horse has four legs. Of course, his crude sensation of an outer world, or not-self, needs analysing, just as does his crude sensation involving the horse. On the other hand, the analysis no more involves denial of the outside world than denial of the horse. Both remain equally valid, as realities. All that the analysis does is to reveal more about the respective realities than was revealed by

crude experience. The *things* are as we can believe them to be. If analysis shows that the horse is something different from what the crude sensualist imagines it to be, or that the universe is something different from what I am emboldened to term the crude scientist imagines it to be, then it rests with both creators of experience to amend their creative work.

CHAPTER XXVII

A SELF-EXISTENT UNIVERSE

As earlier indicated, the hypothesis of units I have expounded is a conceptual system, formulated to render intelligible the demonstration, from the whole arena of human experience, that what we perceive, equally with what we conceive, is in our mind ; that there is a real existence outside our mind ; that the external existence is susceptible of influence by our souls, and that the result of the interaction between our souls and this external existence (the matter-soul) is sensory experience and its issue, psychical experience. Applying the logical faculty to the above demonstration, we are constrained to believe that all we can apprehend as an external world and ourselves has emanated from some source to which our conception of causality cannot apply. So, to our apprehension, this Source is uncaused, or self-existent and self-determining. To the determinations of reason and intellect establishing the existence of this Source, or what we call God, is added the experience we call faith, affording us intuition of a special order

corroborative of what reason and intellect afford as what we call rational demonstration. Thus, the consensus of our knowledge, rational and extra-rational, is to demonstrate a universe emanating from a Creator.

As this universe emanates from a Creator, it must necessarily be determined by that Creator ; for, were it not so determined, it would need to be creator itself, inasmuch as it would need to add conditions to those imposed by the source from which it emanated. If everything emanates from one source, to assume that what emanates is not determined is to assume that the product of creation is also creator. This involves that a creator created itself. Well, a creator creating itself involves two creators, one the creator creating, the other the creator created, which is a contradiction in terms, inasmuch as what is created necessarily has its nature determined by what creates it, and, being determined, whatever it "creates," as a secondary efficient cause, must be created, as condition of the secondary "creation," by the prime efficient. However, if we accept the rationally absurd proposition of a created creator, we merely twist words out of their natural implication to express what I contend for, from the standpoint of reason—a universe conditioned by one Creator. We have only to call the created "creator" the universe and we arrive at the conclusion, by an eccentric route, of reason and intellect. The creating God must still condition the created "god" as I propound the universe to be conditioned by my God.

A Self-Existent Universe 321

But, it may be urged, all this is mere dialectic ; we may as well assume the universe as assume a creator self-existent. I reply that it is rationally impossible to assume the former, inasmuch as any self-existent entity cannot be the universe which we only know at all through knowing that it is not self-existent. There is, for us, nothing possible but what we can imagine as existing. We could only imagine a self-existent universe through attributing to things we apprehend as the universe qualities which the very possibility of our knowing those things precludes us from attributing to them. These things only exist for us through our knowledge of causality. We cannot imagine anything about a universe without first knowing a universe, and we cannot know one without first knowing causality.

Assuming anything to be possible we did not know about the universe, the possibility would not represent the universe. When the possibility came into actual cognition, it would be the universe. A universe we do not know is equivalent to a flavour that has never been tasted. It may be urged, why trouble ourselves about causation of the universe—why not take it as it stands without worrying ourselves whether it is caused or uncaused? I answer, such a course is now practically impossible to the normally intelligent person, but, assuming its adoption, we should emulate the brutes. From my standpoint, if we emulate them here, we shall emulate them when we have done with this stage of existence, and shall consequently have to accomplish much

evolutionary work elsewhere which we should otherwise have accomplished here. Eat, drink and be merry, for to-morrow ye die, is a comforting sort of doctrine for swine, but it seems to me to have disadvantages, inasmuch as dying, to my apprehension, is not a thoroughly efficient extinguisher. If I thought that what we called death meant annihilation, I daresay I might be able and, possibly, willing to accept the universe as I found it, without worrying myself about things that did not worry the pig. *Chacun à son goût !* The fates have not determined me on hog-lines.

CHAPTER XXVIII

THE MATTER-SOUL

THE sensation and emotion continua and the non-resistances, involving space, time, idea, emotivity, constitute a series of internal activities excited, unconsciously to the percipient agent, by the soul's hypnotism, primarily of the matter-soul, secondarily of its own medium, or what we commonly call our body. What is commonly called volition is the excitation of a special soul-fiat involving movement of a sensory body, such soul-fiat being excitable through the intellect's excitation of unsymbolisable emotion (effort), or through the excitation of the latter independently of intellect, by ordinary emotions, appetites, feelings. Volition excited by the latter stimuli is what I will term automatically discriminative. Volition excited by the intellectual stimulus is what I will term spontaneously discriminative. The excitants of the automatic form of volition are, mainly of two classes, involving respectively what are called physical pain and pleasure and æsthetic preferences. The excitant of the spon-

taneous form of volition involves but one thing—belief. The only organic type in which the spontaneous form of volition can be completely identified is the human. The automatic form of volition is common to all organic types.

The proposition that the spontaneous form of volition is peculiar to humanity involves the assumption that there are other souls constituted as is our soul. On the other hand, as we can only judge of the volition of these souls by hypnotising the matter-soul, to afford us sensory bodies through which we judge as to the volition, we really, so far as we judge of that volition by the motor activities of the bodies, constitute that volition by our own soul's hypnotism of the matter-soul, attributing to the sensory bodies we have so fabricated souls such as we attribute to the body we fabricate as being ourself. If there is no reality outside our own soul, in the sensory bodies it creates as our own and other bodies, then our soul is the only soul. On the other hand, if there is such reality, then our soul is merely a unit among souls, and the volition we attribute, through fabricating sensory bodies, is volition of other souls than ours.

As I believe that there are other souls than my own, and as I believe that the sensory bodies I fabricate as percipients represent media through which these souls manifest themselves as does my soul through its medium, I further believe that the spontaneous volition I attribute to my soul is common to some of these other souls, and that the automatic form of volition is common to them all.

Now let us turn to the inorganic. We fabricate it as our own body and other like bodies which, through the fabrication, we call organic. Through the evidence of our own intuitions (involving knowledge of biological determinism) we discover that the sensory bodies we fabricate as our own and other like bodies are different in one essential respect from the sensory bodies we fabricate as what we call the inorganic. While, in regard to the organic sensory, we can fabricate what may be termed a continuum of likes or typical identities (procreation), in regard to the inorganic sensory we can fabricate no such continuum. Here we have two classes of sensory bodies, both fabricated within ourselves, to one of which we attribute souls such as our own; to the other of which we have no ground for attributing such souls. The one class of bodies, *qua* bodies, exists through the same evidence as validates the other class of bodies. Both are equally within the sensation-continuum as units of consciousness. In the one case we have a soul for each body validated by our own soul. In the other case we have no soul which we can validate by our soul. Still I maintain we have good inferential ground, apart from direct inference, from our own soul. This I will now indicate.

We only know our own body, as medium through itself, conditioned by its specific soul, and we only know that body's soul through that body conditioned by that soul. We know other bodies, as mediums on like conditions, and we know (believe) they have souls such as our own soul. Thus, while we know

no mediums to which we can deny souls, we know a multitude of such bodies to which we are forced to attribute souls, and we know that these bodies are essentially the same, *qua* bodies, as the bodies as to whose souls we have no direct evidence. Accordingly, if bodies, as mediums, exist without souls, we know nothing about them, inasmuch as we can show no such body to exist that is not conditioned by a soul.

Now all these mediums which we know to have souls are, as I show in this work, the product of the interaction between their souls and something not those souls, which I call the matter-soul. Is this really soul? I contend that it is, inasmuch as the fact of interaction involves volition of a sort in the responding agent as fully as in that exciting the response. A thing devoid of active energy could not interact at all. An absolutely inert thing would be outside relationship of any sort, and so impossible as an object of perception. An actively interacting agent as excitant, such as the organic soul, necessarily involves a counter-agent equally active, *sui generis*, as responsive. Such an agent is the matter-soul, or inorganic soul.

The individuality of the inorganic soul is not conditioned as is that of the organic. While the latter is not conditioned by the inorganic soul, this is conditioned by the organic soul, and through such determinism becomes the essential substratum which, in ourselves, is a sensory body, of which our own body, so far as concerns its inorganic status, is no less a type than is, say, the body we call a stone. Our

soul wills the matter-soul into individualised sub-souls as our body, just as it wills the matter-soul into individualised sub-souls as the stone. Beyond this, our soul wills the individualised sub-souls of the matter-soul constituting our body into a special medium which shall know itself (soul), and which shall know the individualised matter-soul as not itself (the individualised organic soul).

Empirical evidence for the independent existence of a matter-soul is afforded by the fact that we can only will to afford sensory bodies within rigid limitation. Thus, if a thousand people see an object, say a chair, every one only wills it as that particular sensory body. No effort can transform the chair into, say, a coal-box. Against this fact must be set the fact that hypnotic suggestion could effect such a transformation. A hypnotised subject could be influenced to imagine the chair a coal-box. However, this transformation would be realised as a psychical, not sensory, body. As a sensory body the chair would still be a chair to the hypnotic, notwithstanding that, as a psychical body (idea), it might become a coal-box. In all hypnotic perturbations of sensory experience the effect occurs through abnormal modification of the void-sensation involving abnormal transitions between sensory and psychical bodies. The sensory bodies, under such conditions, are normally intact, only they are projected into abnormal psychical bodies through the hypnotist's will. Such abnormal distortion of sensory bodies will be treated more specifically from the empirical standpoint in

later chapters devoted to a consideration of soul from the empirical standpoint. At present I am only concerned with the normal facts of internal fabrication of sensory bodies as evidence for a matter-soul independent of the organic soul.

When a number of people see, say, the chair, each person is to be considered an individual soul fabricating a particular sensory body. The question before us is, Does each soul create its particular sensory body independently of any external standard, as matter-soul, or subject to such standard? Adhering to the illustration, each soul calls its body a chair, and each soul ascribes to its particular "chair" the attributes ascribed by each other soul. Again, presumably the "personal artifice" of each soul involves that these chair-attributes, besides being merely defined by psychical bodies (ideas) as being the same things to each soul, are really so identical. Now, it is reasonable to assume that did each soul, without specific limitation outside itself, create its sensory body (chair), differences would be revealed as psychical bodies (ideas) defining the quality of one soul's product of creation as compared with another's, just as when psychical bodies alone involve (as what is called difference of opinion) divergent interpretations according to the idiosyncrasy of each interpreting soul through its particular body.

Here then, I maintain, we have good empirical evidence supporting my contention from other standpoints that, though our souls create our world as what we call sensory experiences, or what I call sen-

sory bodies, there is a world outside our world deciding what experience we shall attain through our internal fabrications. Again, as our internal fabrication is a manifestation of will operating through the medium of what we experience as product of such fabrication (matter), I contend that we must grant that, just as there is a will fabricating our own sensory experiences, so there is a will interacting with our will to render possible the fabrication. In other words, as often indicated in this work, the external world is will, just as is the internal world. As we know nothing of sensory bodies except as the product of will in ourselves, so, if we can only know those bodies through something not in ourselves, that something must also be will.

Thus our cosmos is resolved into two wills—that of the matter-soul and that of the organic soul, constituting sensory bodies. Another point now confronts us. Assuming, on grounds which I have earlier stated, and shall later discuss in detail, the heterogeneity of the organic soul as a complex of wills, emanating from the ante-cosmic undifferentiated organic soul, the question arises, Is the matter-soul a similar complex of individual souls? I hope I have already offered reasonable evidence that this question must be answered affirmatively; that, if individual sensory bodies exist as products of our soul's hypnotism of the matter-soul, there must be a corresponding individualisation of the matter-soul. Looking at this question from our present standpoint of units, the case may be thus stated. Every medium composed

of units of consciousness, as the percipient, involves a corresponding individualisation of the matter-soul composed of units of stimulus, as the object. This individualisation of the matter-soul into sub-souls, by the human soul, involves that each human soul creates, by will, a complex of sensory bodies (the percipient), through what I term hypnosis of the matter-soul into a complex of sub-souls (the object). Thus, sensory bodies are products of the matter-soul's response to the human soul, as hypnotist, with the result that what, as the matter-soul, was simple or homogenous, becomes complex or heterogeneous. This constitutes the flux of the cosmos we call evolution, made by our souls and the matter-soul.

Now, we have to go further. If the matter-soul becomes complex through our soul's will, so must the ante-cosmic organic soul be rendered complex by some other will. In the second chapter of the preceding volume, I indicated that cosmical evolution was anticipated ante-cosmically. I can now render clearer what I then indicated. Ante-cosmically, God creates two souls—the matter-soul and the organic soul, or what are conventionally termed the living and non-living. Then God wills the organic soul into differentiations as individualised souls. Now begins what is called evolution, constituted by these individualised souls so willed by God that they will the matter-soul into differentiation as the cosmos or sensory bodies, and, corollarily, into sub-souls willed to emanate from the matter-soul as they (the organic souls) emanate from the ante-cosmic organic soul.

Thus, before there could be what we call the cosmos, there had to be sub-souls of the ante-cosmic organic soul, as what we commonly call living beings, or what I call organic souls, able to hypnotise the ante-cosmic matter-soul into complexity, first as the sub-soul constituting the medium, or what we commonly call body, of such organic souls ; next into the sub-souls underlying the results of hypnotism by such organic souls. In a word, there had to be percipients before there could be objects. Accordingly, on my hypothesis, the cosmos was not created, as commonly assumed, as something complete in itself, ready for occupation by living beings. On the contrary, living beings had to exist to constitute the cosmos, inasmuch as the only cosmos that exists for living beings consists of sensory bodies, arising through hypnotism of the ante-cosmic matter-soul into sub-souls. The sun, moon, stars, etc., are where they are because they are put there by organic minds conditioned by organic souls. We may call them hundreds of thousands or of millions miles away ; all the same, their exact location is inside our own minds !

In various parts of this work I have indicated that what we call discovery, invention, construction, are really processes within our own minds, involving hypnotism of the matter-soul. The bearing on this point of the above remarks regarding cosmical evolution will be obvious to the reader. If we can fabricate suns we can fabricate telephones, argons, heliums, atomic and vortex theories, and a number of other things, by investigating our sensation-continuum.

Also, if we take care not to deceive ourselves by taking psychical as equivalent to sensory bodies—in other words, by confounding analogy-mongering with inference from sensory experience—we can attain some serviceable belief regarding things more profoundly real than are even atomic theories and new gases and appliances.

Let us now consider how the foregoing determinations regarding the nature of experience bear on conventional materialistic interpretations, constituting what we call science and ordinary experience. Metaphysically, we have reached the conclusion that all possible experience is in the mind, and cannot, in any shape or form, exist out of the mind as it exists in the mind. Thus, a chair and the sun, as what I call sensory bodies in the mind, must, according to the inferential investigation I have afforded, be things totally different, as true objectives, or real things in themselves, from what they appear in the mind. As such real things, they are what I have termed sub-souls of the matter-soul. On the other hand, it will be obvious that the whole of our common beliefs only exist through our imaginative externalisation of these things in our mind, to the effect that we can investigate them as things in themselves, acting and reacting independently of our minds. Hence, our common empiricism is really a process of self-delusion by which only we can fabricate a world of what may be termed practical reality as distinguished from philosophical reality.

The justification of this imaginative degradation

of philosophically true objectivity into the practical objectivity of common experience is, of course, obvious to everybody, in the multiplicity of products, enabling us to gratify our sensual needs. On the other hand, the evils of the degradation are equally manifest in the moral degeneracy to which I have called attention in this work. I believe that these evils are not inherent to the process of degradation, but are transitory incidents occurring as what I may term lopsided evolution, consequent to the brutishness of humanity under present conditions, and the facilities for animal gratification afforded by the truths emanating through the degradative process of verification. So impressed is the public by the facts of what is exclusively called science, and so intoxicated has the public become through the material triumphs of that science, that the highest human science, that affecting the real man, is provisionally obscured by the lower science affecting only the brute.

However, influences are at work, arising from that very brute itself, in humanity, which influences, I surmise, must soon radically alter the public purview. Fanned by zealots, the rapacious instincts of the masses are urging them to appropriate a full measure of those animal gratifications which have hitherto been the monopoly of a small minority. Once the masses know their power, and how to use it, there is nothing, apparently, to prevent the bouleversement giving them the good things for which they hunger. How long the redistribution, did it occur on present moral conditions, would ensure the equality pictured

by the zealots of the movement, is a matter with which I have dealt in other parts of this work, but with which I am not now concerned. My present question in this connection is, Will the redistribution occur through the science of the brute, or the science of the man? I venture to hope that it will occur through the latter, inasmuch as I believe that, if the revolution occurs through the science of the brute, evolutionary retrogression will be the result, and that, in the present case, evolution is decreed to be progressive, or towards a humanly apprehensible higher stage of development, through the evolution of a higher stage of religious belief involving justice as its ideal.

Throughout this work I have indicated that all reliable investigation must proceed by logical sequence from sensory experience. From my standpoint of units, this means that the sensation-continuum, involving sensory and psychical bodies, shall so manifest itself as verification that it constitutes a normal sequence of psychical bodies following sensory bodies, not an abnormal sequence of sensory following psychical bodies. As I hope I have demonstrated that sensory bodies are inherently the preconditions of psychical bodies, it is obviously philosophically futile to pretend, as does much so-called science, to render psychical the preconditions of sensory bodies. As we can identify a sensation-continuum emanating from unsymbolisable sensation, progressing from sensory bodies through the void-sensation to psychical bodies, from these latter through the necessity-sensation to

belief and faith, it is obviously reasonable to adapt our truth to this natural succession, in so far as that truth determines our social activities. By conforming to this natural order, we obtain belief in God and in justice as our ideal. By reversing the order, we get "atomic mechanics," atheism, introspective doubt, the rule of might, and individual and collective degeneracy.

CHAPTER XXIX

MEMORY

THE hypnotism of the matter-soul involving sensory bodies and the transformation of these sensory bodies, through the void-sensation, into ideas, involves, in the latter bodies, essentially what is called productive imagination. The ideas are, essentially, imaginative products normally superposed on the sensory bodies, which latter themselves constitute a form of personal artifice to which the term imagination is not inapplicable. When the time-sensation and the necessity-sensation (so far as it is identity) occur in conjunction with any specific willings of sensory and psychical bodies, the product is a mnemonic fiat, or what we commonly call an act of memory. This act, like all other fiats, is always accomplished before it is in consciousness. As already sufficiently indicated, all so-called conscious manifestations, as sensory and psychical bodies, are what I term sub-conscious or meta-conscious, as precondition of their being conscious. Our mind-universe is sub-conscious (as ineffective units of consciousness) before it is con-

scious (as effective units). An act of memory simply involves that a specific correlation of units is willed as effective, constituting specific psychical bodies not bound to sensory bodies by the void-sensation, but bound to psychical bodies so conditioned by the void-sensation, by the time and necessity sensations—the latter sensation involving the perception of likeness or identity, and the former sensation involving the temporal lapse which, together, constitute what we call a memory. In other words, ideas which once were bound to sensory experiences are, in the act of memory, willed into actuality, lacking the sensory bond, but through being willed in conjunction with the necessity-sensation, convey what I may term the quasi-illusion that they are really bound to the specific sensory experiences from which they originally arose, inasmuch as they appear identical with the ideas which were so bound to sensory experience.

Memory is, essentially, a specific form of soul-fiat and, as such, is always outside consciousness. Conscious memory, like the conscious “willing” or “choosing” of naïve sensualism, is a philosophically baseless assumption. There is really no such thing as conscious *doing* of any sort. The soul is the only doer, and what it does we only know after it is done. In Chapter VI. of this volume, in incidentally dealing with memory, I divided it into two classes—automatic and volitional. Such division is convenient for purposes of exposition, but like all psychological distinctions, is essentially arbitrary and inaccurate as ignoring and implicitly denying that will is the active

agent underlying and conditioning all mental processes, and that what is consciously realised as its activity is really only equivalent to the shadow as compared with the object that casts it. As every sensory body is distinct from the specific sub-soul of the matter-soul through which that sensory body comes to exist, so is every mnemonic product distinct from the fiat which is its precondition.

Memory of all sorts—from the simplest reflex repetition of movement to the most complex ideational reproduction—is essentially outside the sensation and emotion continua. Whether with or without effort, it is equally nothing but a pure act of willing psychical bodies. Whether I will the sensation that I did something last week, or will the immediate experience of doing something, the essential thing is the will, not the particular sensory and psychical bodies. That I get the time-sensation as part of the one experience, but not of the other, merely involves the willing or not willing of that non-resistance from the ineffective to the effective stage. I get no time with the immediate experience, because the void-sensation is willed, but the time-sensation is not willed. I get time with the memorised experience, because the time-sensation is willed, but the void-sensation is not willed. We do not remember through the idea of time, but we necessarily get time with the mnemonic fiat. When I recall an act as being done “an hour ago,” there is no adding of specific intervals backwards to the act. There is simply willing of the idea of an hour, coincidentally

with willing of the idea of the act. That it is a specific time-sensation—as “hour”—is no more significant than that it is a specific space-sensation when I imagine two objects to be a hundred yards apart. Of course, in the latter case, I have the sensory bodies in immediate experience, while, in the former case, one set of the psychical bodies is not in immediate experience. Well, it is the nature of psychical bodies only to be in immediate experience, individually. I cannot have two ideas simultaneously in immediate experience. I can only connect idea with idea through the necessity-sensation. When such connection involves memory, there are the non-resistance, time-sensation, as effective units, and the non-resistance, necessity-sensation, as identity.

In every so-called conscious act of thinking, whether involving causal or merely causal succession between psychical bodies, the time-sensation is really present, though it is only consciously in experience when time, as a psychical body, is itself in experience—that is, when a symbol of the time-sensation (“time”) is itself thought as a psychical body in connection with other psychical bodies between which it operates. Thus, what is called the stream of consciousness really involves the time-sensation (though out of conscious experience) between every idea constituting it; and every act of bringing one idea into relation with another, as what we call thinking, is really an act of memory. So in regard to affective and sensory bodies involving movement and

constituting the reflex activities dealt with by physiologists—they are all manifestations of memory.

There is no such thing as a single or pure idea in consciousness. Every seemingly simple psychical body, like every seemingly simple sensory body, is really a complex. This implication is always assumed in every case when I refer to a psychical or sensory body. When I see a spoon on a plate, I seem to cognise them simultaneously as the idea of a single sensory impression. Really, the spoon and plate are multiplexes of sensory bodies and consequent psychical bodies, constituting what we call shape, colour, brightness, dulness, smoothness, roughness, between each of which constituents of the particular multiplex there are the necessity and time sensations. The totalised resultant of such continua of resistances and non-resistances is what I call a type-sensation, constituting the particular sensualised object and involving what I have termed personal artifice. So it is in the case of what are called abstract ideas. These are always complexes of some part of a continuum of resistances and non-resistances. There is no such thing in experience as a single abstract notion, as there is no such thing as a single sensory body. Each is really a complex and involves an act of memory.

In the case of ideas of sensory bodies, a particular continuum is demarcated by being brought into relation with another continuum through the space-sensation. When I look at the spoon on the plate, I differentiate by the space-sensation, and I perceive

simultaneously because I cannot differentiate by the time-sensation, which is willed away, as ineffective units. What any particular time-sensation is to be—long, short, minute, hour, day—is determined by will, just as is what any particular space-sensation is to be—inch, foot, yard—or what any particular sensory body is to be—large, small, rough, smooth, bright, dull, blue, red. All is in the will-continuum as realisation, and in the universe as potentiality. Outside this universe and will-continuum, time and space do not exist.

The validity of the above contentions is empirically demonstrated by the facts of hypnotic suggestion. The bowel-emptying experiment referred to on page 423 of Volume II. may be instanced in the connection. Here the hypnotist wills peristaltic action to occur at specific times. He says to the subject: At such and such hours to-morrow your bowels will act. The effect occurs quite independently of conscious co-operation by the hypnotic. His bowels do not act according to his time-measurement, but according to the will of the operator. The command itself he has entirely forgotten. In the words of Moll: "It is not the command itself but the idea of its execution which is remembered" (*Hypnotism*, Albert Moll, p. 252. Walter Scott, 1891). Really the term "remembered" is not here appropriate. The "idea of execution" is no more here a thing in the mind than is "the command itself." The "idea" simply asserts itself as effective units of consciousness—as one may say, forces itself

into the mind—through the will of wills (motor will).

Automatic activities involving special expertness (piano-playing, skating, dancing, etc.) illustrate the unconsciousness of memory. Sleep offers other illustrations. Thus, a person says he will wake at a particular time in the morning, and does so. Just as in the case of hypnotic bowel-opening, time is annihilated. The motor will ensures the awaking, just as it ensures the peristaltic action. In the former case, it arouses the inner and outer sensations, substituting consciousness for subconsciousness, or awaking for sleep. Only then does time come into existence. It may be asked, Why does the awaking occur at the particular time? It may as well be asked, Why does a desultory thought come into my head? The "time," like the desire or determination to awake, or the desultory thought, is, as sub-will, a product of the soul. The *acts* of thinking and desiring to awake, involving realisation of the particular sub-wills, are determined by the motor will. That the motor will decides the actualisation of the inner and outer sensations (as awaking) coincidently with a particular time-sensation is as accountable as that it decides the actualisation of the desultory thought or the desire to awake. When I register a determination to move a chair, I do not normally move a coal-box. When I register a determination to awake at eight in the morning, I do not often awake at nine or ten. Of course, some motor wills are more efficient than others to execute such a determination as the awak-

ing. This does not affect the principle of the causation, as being outside the sensation and emotion continua, as mind, and within the will-continuum, as meta-consciousness.

The multitude of cases of post-hypnotic suggestion involving deferred soul-fiat recorded in psychiatric treatises all go to prove that the efficient agency in every sort of mnemonic activity is meta- or sub-conscious, as will. Remembering, in the conventional sense, is a phantom conjured into existence through confusion of the feelings of effort and accomplishment (in the case of "conscious" or "volitional" memory) with the act of memory itself. These feelings of effort and accomplishment so overlap, in this form of memory, that superficially considered, they appear to be the only factors involved. A similar confusion occurs, as already indicated, in regard to all common acts of volition. Say, I feel my nose to itch. I have the desire to scratch it. Then comes unsymbolisable emotion, or effort, and finally the sense of accomplishment. These are all in consciousness. But they are merely sensory and psychical bodies (sub-wills) utterly devoid of active efficiency. The motor will must operate before the sub-wills involving the itching and effort can result in the sub-will involving accomplishment.

The more effort there is in memory, the less efficient is the memory. This is well illustrated by the common experience of trying to remember a name. The more we try, the less we remember. Then we give up the effort, and the name spon-

taneously appears. Expert activities of all sorts illustrate the point. Instinct offers a good example of the unconscious nature of memory. All forms of type-memory or instinct are deferred mnemonic fiats, essentially on a plane with post-hypnotic manifestations. In the case of instinct, auto-suggestion takes the place of suggestion by the hypnotic operator. Conscious time-experience is banished in the case of instinct as in the other cases with which I have dealt. The bird builds its nest at a particular time, not because it "remembers" anything, but because its will-continuum involves a particular impulse and its consummation by the motor will. Instinct is really typical of all memory, with or without effort. There is no more conscious remembering (so far as regards the essential act) in deciding where we dined yesterday than in the bird's selection of spring for nest-building. We are only really conscious of sensory and psychical bodies in immediate experience. Of everything else, we are meta-conscious, or sub-conscious. As indicated in earlier chapters, that of which we are conscious, as sensory and psychical bodies, is only a product of the active efficient. Our thinking and sensing are really done meta-consciously, or sub-consciously.

As already explained in earlier chapters, our universe is a will-continuum interacting as hypnotist with the matter-soul. Our conscious experiences as sensory and psychical bodies are parts of this will-continuum. What is outside this conscious experience—as what I have termed the non-resistances—is another

part of this will-continuum. The motor will is the culmination of this continuum. A sensory or psychical body of any sort is a sub-will willed by the motor will to become manifest to the medium. A psychical body, or complex of bodies in past experience, as memory is such body or complex, as sub-will willed by the motor will to manifest itself to the medium, from the will-continuum, in conjunction with the non-resistance, time-sensation.

CHAPTER XXX

AUTO-SUGGESTION

It may now be well to explain what I mean by auto-suggestion, a term often used in this work. Sensory bodies are realised by interaction of the soul, as hypnotist, with the matter-soul, as hypnotic. Normal psychical bodies are realised through hypnotism of the medium : (*a*) so as to involve the transformation of sensory bodies, through the void-sensation into psychical bodies ; (*b*) so as to involve the transformation of psychical bodies into other psychical bodies through the necessity-sensation. Auto-suggestion is a specific affective body or emotion willed independently of the void and necessity sensations and involving what I may term non-rational or extra-rational realisation of some part of the sensation and emotion continua. Prophetic visions and revelations, scientific discoveries, creative art-work, a number of abnormal nervous manifestations involving what is called hallucination, the normal regularity of sleep and awakening and other instinctive manifestations, sudden impulses, are examples of auto-suggestion.

Once the product of auto-suggestion exists, as intuition or inspiration, its further elaboration may be rational, involving normal, sensory, and psychical sequences. Thus the bird's instinct to build its nest, *qua* instinct, is a product of auto-suggestion, eccentric from the sensation and emotion continua constituting its experiences prior to the advent of the impulse to build. Once it starts building, the process is rational. So, again, the idea of falling asleep at a particular time is such a product, as is the cognate idea of waking. Waste and recovery of tissue, offered by empiricism, as accounting for normal sleep and waking, labours, as interpretation, under the disqualification of all empirical determinations. We fall asleep and awake at regular times, for the same reason that the bird builds its nest (that is, fabricates particular sensory bodies) at regular times: because we and the bird will into effective or ineffective units, as the case may be, some part of our mind-universe. The particular volitional act in the connection involves auto-suggestion. So, again, the "inspiration" of a Pasteur telling him that minute organisms cause fermentation is at first auto-suggestion. For others, it later becomes a product of suggestion. Again, various hysterical mimicries of organic lesions are auto-suggestions. Indeed, by auto-suggestion actual organic lesions (nose-bleeding, blisters, etc.) have been induced. To the philosopher this is not at all surprising, inasmuch as he clearly recognises that the bleeding nose and blisters are nothing but sensory bodies—mind-stuff. Again, all genuinely creative art and thought

work is auto-suggestive. Every real innovator is an auto-suggestivist. The vast majority of people are mere subjects of suggestion, dragged along by the auto-suggestivist. All the momentous work of the world is done by the auto-suggestivist. Again, in his mean form, as common impulsivist, he renders the world indebted to him for most of its calamities. When I come to deal with empirical hypnotism, auto-suggestion will be further considered.

CHAPTER XXXI

SENSORY IMAGINATION

It may be urged that microscopic enlargement resolves all bodies into multiple extensions or differentiated parts which, to the unaided vision, appear homogeneous, and that this fact is against my doctrine of sensory bodies as being merely mid-stuff. This contention will involve a discussion of what I call sensory imagination, which is a form of illusion by the senses, analogous to what we commonly call imagination, in the psychical arena. It must be clearly grasped in this connection that a sensory body is what arises, *directly*, through hypnotism of the matter-soul. This is a normal sensory body, and through the multitude of such bodies perceived as coexistences we form normal sensory judgments in which one body acts as sensory standard of another body. Now, so soon as we constitute sensory bodies through the microscope we apply sensory bodies (as the microscope) to other (normal) sensory bodies, with the result that we get abnormal sensory bodies in place of the normal ones. These abnormal sensory bodies are, as it were, out of

perspective with the rest of our sensory universe. This distortion constitutes what I call sensory imagination. The abnormal bodies are perfectly real in themselves, only their reality is of the type of the reality of an illusion or hallucination. They are what may be termed discordant with normal sensory judgment. Instead of going against the philosophical demonstration that sensory bodies are mind-stuff, microscopic enlargement is good evidence for philosophy.

It may be urged that the abnormal bodies enable us to know more about normal bodies than we should otherwise know. Such a contention is practically valid. However, it is philosophically peccable, inasmuch as it involves the common fallacious assumption that bodies are things apart from the mind that perceives them. We really get to know nothing more about normal sensory bodies through abnormal ones than we get to know about normal ideas through distortion by what is commonly called imagination. I get to know no more about my skin by discovering sweat glands in it through the microscope than I get to know about a pig by imagining it with wings. The skin I see through the microscope is no more the skin I see without the instrument than the flying pig is a real pig. As *idea*, the flying pig is as real as the idea of a normal pig. Similarly, the glandular skin, as a product of sensory imagination, is as real as is the skin I normally create as a sensory body. On the other hand, the reality of the idea of the flying pig is abnormal, while the reality of the pig, as commonly conceived, is normal. Similarly, the reality of the glandular skin is abnormal,

while the reality of the skin, as ordinarily sensed, is normal.

Obviously, in applying the microscope to the skin we will sub-wills, as the microscope, into relation with other sub-wills, as the skin, with the result that while the microscope and the normal skin are sensory complexes directly derived through hypnotism of the matter-soul, the magnified skin is not at all such a complex, but is the derivative of two normally derived sensory complexes. We cannot grant that a derivative of two normal sensory complexes is of the same order of reality as are the normal sensory complexes. Turning for a moment to psychical bodies—these when normally derived from sensory bodies afford, from my standpoint, normal reality. But abnormal sensory bodies derived from normal sensory bodies afford abnormal reality, between which and normal reality philosophy must carefully discriminate. Philosophically considered, the reality of sensory imagination is, essentially, equivalent to the reality of psychical imagination. Let us now consider some more concrete illustrations.

A book is a body, so is any letter on its page. The book-body contains the letter-body. It “contains” the latter through the necessity-sensation which binds book-psychical body (idea) with letter-psychical body so as to involve another psychical body which we term inclusion. As merely a sensory body the letter is no more contained by the book than the book is by the letter. The inclusion only exists as between psychical bodies. Now the psychical bodies book and letter are derived from normal sensory

bodies, that is, from bodies which are in normal relationship with other bodies. On the other hand, microscopic bodies are not in such normal relationship. They are elaborated from normal bodies by what I contend to be equivalent to imagination in the psychical realm. We might picture such a process of elaboration to be continued until we had cut up sensory bodies into "atoms." Then we might picture a perpetuum of magnifications and re-magnifications of "atoms." But we should never effect any genuine synthesis of "matter" into "spirit." We should simply sensorially deceive ourselves, *in infinitum*, by microscopically "imagining" bodies outside normal relationship. Of course, this sensorial "deception" by the microscope is practically invaluable. On the other hand, philosophy has to test credentials outside the practical arena.

In discussing astronomical distances in the preceding volume (p. 263), I indicated that telescopic enlargement of celestial bodies did not bring those bodies into spatial contingency, but merely created illusion of sense. The bulk of a telescopic body is really something added to a sensory body, as the microscopic body is something extracted from a sensory body. When a poet elaborates a prosaic idea into picturesque imagery, he does essentially the same thing as the telescope and microscope do in the sensory arena. Mind disports, as the microscope and telescope, in the sensory arena as it disports, as the poet's fancy, in the psychical arena. The telescope and microscope are as much things of mind as is the poet's fancy. We usually consider the telescope and microscope to fortify sense.

Really they perturb it by compelling it to transcend its normal conditions. We similarly compel reason to transcend its normal conditions when, as physicists, we coerce it to accept fanciful analogy-manipulation as equivalent to normal inference from sensory experience. In all these cases I am ready to admit the practical advantages of the perturbations, which are none the less philosophically significant as tending to mislead judgment, however practically beneficial they may be.

The absolute standard of sensory bodies is the immediate product, as a normal sensory body, of the soul's hypnotism of the matter-soul. Microscopic enlargement is a modification of that immediate product involving an abnormal sensory body. By the factitious multiplication of bodies through the microscope, we are not really affecting the ultimate philosophical problem of body and space, but are merely restating it, just as the physicist restates the ultimate problem of empiricism by postulating his atoms and energies. If I fabricate bodies by transforming a smooth sheet of paper into a coarse-grained multiplex of bodies, or if I magnify a flea to the apparent size of a frog, I am merely superposing one sense-determination on another—that is, fresh mind-stuff on existing mind-stuff of the same order. Such superposition involves no synthetic change. It merely involves restatement. The bodies created in the paper are no more real than is the monster flea, unless we like to deny that non-magnifying conditions represent the real standard. If we accept this standard

—as every reasonable person does—then the product of microscopic enlargement is equivalent to the product of fancy in the psychic realm. That mind can deceive itself, as sense, by an optical appliance, or, on the other hand, by what is commonly called an illusion or hallucination, is an illustration of the truth which I have often impressed in this work : that there is no philosophically valid means of determining truth other than by inference from sensory experience.

It may be asked, do figures drawn on paper represent bodies? I reply, they do, inasmuch as they represent correlations of effective units, involving acts of sensory apprehension. Whether we draw the figures or construct them as solid blocks, placing them on the paper, they are equally, from my present standpoint, bodies of the visual order. Then, it may be asked, why are not figures constructed in space, by which astronomers measure distances, bodies? I reply, for the simple reason that they lack the condition by which only bodies exist. This condition is sensory experience. Lines in space cannot exist, because space does not exist, until “lines,” as sensory bodies, exist. When I imagine a flying pig, a mathematical point, a stellar parallax, an atom, I am doing essentially the same thing as when I magnify a flea to the size of a frog. In the imaginative constructions I am applying mind to distort sense by imagination, just as in the case of the magnification I am applying mind to distort sense through the microscope. As indicated in earlier chapters, this is the method of verification of the savage, and is superseded through altered conditions

involving belief. Just as, by the microscope, we can resolve an apparently simple body into a complex, so by imagination we can indefinitely superpose ideational infinitesimals on a sensory experience. Thus we can say that bodies are constituted of atoms, molecules, vortices, energies, just as we can magnify a plane surface till it is a corrugated mass of spatial differentiations.

Against this it may be urged that microscopic enlargement of bodies reveals a vast detail of structure imperceptible to unaided sense, but which our intelligence apprehends as constituting a real complex of means to end transcending our normal identification. Why is this complex not as real as is the body presented in its less differentiated state as unmagnified? I reply, these details under the conditions of unaided vision are "latent" in the mind as ineffective units of consciousness, of the sensation-continuum realised through the soul's hypnotism of the matter-soul. The microscope, like the object, is a sensory body inside ourselves, by willing which into relationship with the object (that is, applying one body to another) we render "patent" or effective what were ineffective units. Now when we imagine anything we do, essentially, what we do when we magnify an object by the microscope. We render effective what were ineffective units of consciousness. On the other hand, while in the case of ordinary imagination we usually identify the units we have rendered abnormally effective as constituting unreality, in the case of the microscopic "imagination" we do not so identify them, but treat

them as constituting reality equivalent to that revealed in the case of unaided observation.

This arbitrary determination of one transformation of ineffective into effective units as constituting (in the case of imagination) unreality, and of another such transformation (in the case of microscopic enlargement) as constituting reality, is, of course, practically, perfectly valid. Nevertheless, philosophically, what is not present to sense does not exist to sense. Taking the magnified flea as illustration—so long as this is present to sense the normal flea does not exist to sense. Which is to be our standard of reality—the magnified or unmagnified flea? We may take either—only if we take the magnified flea as our standard, we must have everything else magnified in the same proportion, otherwise, in reasoning about the flea as part of our world of sense, we shall form entirely wrong conclusions, just as we shall do if we argue about pigs, taking an imagined pig with wings as our standard of reality. Of course, the wonders of the microscope are something to dilate about, but so are the wonders of imagination, and both are equally within ourself.

The sensation-continuum is inherently what may be termed rational, to the extent that it affords us the notion of adaptation of means to end. If, as an ordinary observer, we notice that a giraffe has a neck and general conformation adapted to enable it to feed high; or, as a physiologist, we discover through microscopic illusion some minute structure adapted to a particular end, we are only automatically

realising a rational sensation-continuum. The fact that we discover adaptation in microscopic structures does not affect the truth that philosophical demonstration can only exist as a systematic process based on certain standards of perceptivity involving normal sensory bodies. The universe is a rational organism because it is a rational sensation-continuum, not because it exists as a rational something outside the mind. We discover design in nothing external to our minds. We only know design as our own minds. We feel a rational sensation-continuum through responding to a universe (the soul's hypnotism of the matter-soul into sub-souls) which is outside our mind, as immediate experience. Whether this external universe is rational or irrational—as we apprehend the qualities—we have no means of determining, except by inference. I believe that our notions of design have no applicability to this external universe.

A set of illusions may be perfectly rational in themselves. Given particular premises, we can always fabricate some plausible ratiocination thereon. Thus, if we accept microscopic bodies as being on the same plane of reality as are normal sensory bodies, we can plausibly argue to a multitude of unphilosophical conclusions regarding sensory bodies. However, we cannot, as philosophers, accept microscopic bodies as sensory standards on which to base transcendental inferences. When we are formulating a philosophical system of truth, we have carefully to discriminate about the premises on which we build a logical edifice. That this shall be a solid structure,

we must start from sensory bodies in a world within our normal limitations; or, if we select as our standards sensory bodies as magnified objects, or psychical bodies, as imaginary contingencies, then we must correspondingly modify the rest of our world of sense or idea, which would be impossible for us. Where we are likely to go logically wrong in such a case as that with which I am now dealing, is in overlooking the equal "innerness" of our sensory and psychical bodies, and thus attributing a spuriously ontological significance to our sensory bodies which we avoid doing in the case of our psychical bodies. Thus, while we call our pig with wings imaginary, we call our magnified flea real. Both are, essentially, equally imaginary.

But it may be urged, surely when the bacteriologist discovers micro-organisms, they are not imaginary. I reply: In themselves they are real, just as are hallucinations, though, in relation to our normal world of sensory and psychical bodies, both are equally unreal, being, as I may say, out of perspective. Of course, we may verify a great deal about the bacteria and hallucinations, connecting them with our normal, sensory, and psychical bodies; still, in relation to those bodies, the others are unreal. But it may again be urged, we know that micro-organisms cause fermentation and various diseases—surely this demonstrates the reality of the microbes! Assuming, for the moment, the reality of this empirical causation, we may say on like ground that if a hallucination, or an illusion of sense causes a

person to collapse, it is real. Nevertheless, it is unreal in relation to normal experience. So are the micro-organisms in this sense unreal. As philosophical investigators, we cannot dispense with a standard of reference, as reality. This standard is normal sensory experience.

When the bacteriologist discovers, say, the comma bacillus and connects it with cholera, he does, essentially, the same thing as another discoverer who discovers, say, a flea, and connects it with cutaneous irritation. These discoverers manifest specific soul-fiats involving sensory and psychical bodies. However, in the case of the flea-discovery, the issues are within normal sense-experience. Here the product of discovery is a normal sensory body. The flea "causes" irritation because we can see and feel it at its business—that is, we normally fabricate it as a sensory body, and connect it, by the void-sensation, with a psychical body (idea of flea). Then we also fabricate other sensory and psychical bodies in connection with the flea. These secondary bodies are a local swelling and feeling of itching. This latter, again, we transform into a psychical body (idea of irritation). Then we bring these psychical bodies into causal relationship through the necessity-sensation. As will be later shown, this empirical causation is altogether unreal. However, its reality or unreality does not affect the present point under consideration.

When we turn to the comma bacillus, the case is different. Here we fabricate an abnormal sensory

body. The discoverer is on the lookout to find what causes cholera, that is, he is trying to hypnotise himself by auto-suggestion for the purpose of fabricating an abnormal sensory body which he can connect causally with cholera. He succeeds, by the aid of the microscope, in fabricating the bacillus. Once he has done this, he will hypnotise, by unconscious suggestion, others on a like quest to his own. These other hypnotics will become "infected" with the "bacillus epidemic." The auto-suggestion once peculiar to the original discoverer has now become common to a number of people, so that each fabricates the bacillary sensory body on such conditions that each, like the original discoverer, connects it with cholera. Again, these bacteriologists begin injecting their bacillus into the bodies of, say, rabbits, hypnotising the rabbit's soul, by unconscious suggestion, as the original discoverer had hypnotised himself by auto-suggestion, and as these followers had been hypnotised by him through unconscious suggestion. So, again, when Lister discovered his antiseptic treatment for wounds, he hypnotised himself by auto-suggestion involving abnormal sensory bodies as toxic germs, which he connected with putrefaction, as Pasteur, Koch, and others connected their respective "germs" with the respective effects, and as Weismann, Hertwig, and other biologists apply their biophors, determinants, etc., to the interpretation of biological problems; or, finally, as the physicist applies his atoms, molecules, etc., through his special process of auto-suggestion.

All these processes of auto-suggestion are perfectly valid as practical application. However, philosophy cannot afford to accept premises based on abnormal sensory bodies, any more than she can afford to take premises based on abnormal psychical bodies. Philosophy must lay her foundations in the bed-rock of primary normal experience which is constituted by normal sensory bodies, and must apply normal psychical bodies, as what is called inference, to these normal sensory bodies. Let me again impress on the reader the importance, from our present standpoint, of remembering that *all* experiences constituting a sensed world are in ourselves—in other words, that our objects of sense, *as* we sense them, are not things we have extorted from a “nature” extrinsic to ourselves. This “nature,” so far as it exists as not ourselves, we do not know at all by sensory bodies, but solely by psychical bodies applied to the latter. As scientific empiricists, we are revealing things in ourselves, not outside ourselves. Accordingly, it does not matter to science, as empiricism, what things she accepts as premises, so long as these things enable her to increase her empirical acquisitions, or, in other words, knowledge of things in ourselves. Thus, science, as conventionally named, merely requires analysis involving restatements of things in experience. On the other hand, philosophy requires synthesis as verification of things not in experience. So, while science tolerates secondary, tertiary, or any grade of things in ourselves, as premises, philosophy can only tolerate primary things in ourselves, as premises.

Bacteria, biophors, atoms, molecules, as suggested by materialistic doctrines, involve no synthetic knowledge. They merely constitute choppings-up of certain sensory bodies into other sensory bodies. On the other hand, units of consciousness, as I propound them, do constitute synthetic knowledge, inasmuch as they involve the logical projection of primary sensory bodies into true objectives transcending sensory experience. Looking at bacteria from the philosophical standpoint, to say they cause disease is merely to say that one thing in the mind causes another thing in the mind. So far as these bacteria exist as abnormal sensory bodies, they exist only in the mind. If they exist out of mind, they exist as souls. Then if, as external agents, they cause anything in us, as disease, they must cause it as souls, by hypnotising our souls so as to involve fiats for the disease. Looking at disease itself—this only exists as a thing of our body, which latter is a thing of our mind, just as are the bacteria as sensory bodies. Then disease, so far as it is caused by bacteria, and assuming these to be souls, is a thing in our mind caused by things (the souls of bacteria) out of our mind. If we consider the bacteria as not being organic souls, then they are merely sub-souls of the matter-soul. If, under the latter conditions, we say they cause disease, then sub-souls of the matter-soul are supposed to cause morbid function on the part of the organic soul, involving that this latter, by hypnotising the matter-soul, causes our body to experience the particular effects we call disease.

The bacillus, as entering the body, or medium, is equivalent to a knife-blade as entering such medium. In the connection, the medium, the bacillus, and the knife-blade are complexes of sensory bodies, and, as such, can do nothing. There is no causative efficiency in the bacillus any more than in the knife-blade. So far as cause exists at all in connection with the bacillus and blade, it exists in connection with psychical bodies arising from sensory bodies through the void-sensation, and in connection with psychical bodies bound together by the necessity-sensation. As already explained, there is no real causal activity in any such contingencies affecting mere bodies so far as regards the bodies themselves. The only causal activity exists in regard to the souls, the interaction between which constitutes the particular bodies involved in the causal contingency.

Again, as between the germ-cell which procreates and that which does not procreate, there is no difference, as sensory bodies. The procreating germ-cell no more acts than does the non-procreating germ-cell. Both are equally merely sensory bodies. The thing that acts is the soul which, as will, constituted by the procreative fiat (involving what we call life), renders persistent the soul-continuum decreed to emanate from the type-soul (to be dealt with specifically later) originating the line of souls culminating in the particular product of procreative fiat of two sexual souls. Through his microscope, the biologist fabricates sensorially imaginative bodies which he calls germs and sperms. He wills these sensorially

imaginative bodies into relationship, just as the ordinary empiricist wills, say, a razor and his hairy chin into relationship. As the ordinary empiricist attributes causative efficiency to his razor, as cutting away the hairs, so the biologist attributes causative efficiency to his sensorially imaginative "germs" and "sperms" which, he says, cause procreation through mutual action. Empirically, this statement is perfectly valid. Philosophically, it is utterly untenable, being based on the prime philosophical fallacy that sensory bodies are things independent of the mind and yet perceived as they independently exist. The above points will be dealt with more particularly in a later chapter dealing with causality.

I am no assailant, within the arena of empiricism, of the biologist, with his spurious causality and his sensorially imaginative germs and sperms. Within his limitations he affords much valuable truth and, unconsciously, indicates still more valuable truth. I believe that one eminent biologist, August Weismann, has, inadvertently, done enough, in shattering materialistic plausibilities, to render his name memorable in the annals of philosophical and religious evolution, when that evolution shall be contemplated by the historian unperplexed by temporal proximity to the dying struggles and apparently exuberant vitality of materialism.

CHAPTER XXXII

DISEASE

LET me try to make plain that what we call disease is only known to us as certain affective bodies (feelings) and as certain sensory bodies (structural abnormalities) which are things in our own minds. Just as one organic soul, as what we call a discoverer, can "infect" a number of people with a new gas, so can an organic soul infect other souls with what is called morbid function, or disease. The effective units manifested as, say, argon, are essentially the same things as the effective units manifested, say, as phthisis. The medium that realises, through chemical and physical empiricism, the hypnotism of the matter-soul as the gas, argon, is the same as the medium that, through various feelings, realises phthisis; or as the medium that realises the disease through what is called medical diagnosis. Again, the soul that hypnotises the matter-soul into the organism that feels the disease, or observes it, is the same as the soul that hypnotises the matter-soul into the gas. Again, the organism that excites the soul to fiat for the gas

is the same as the organism that excites the soul to fiat for the disease. If, through hypnotism of the matter-soul, various souls can be "infected" with the gas, so can they be infected with the disease.

Every disease is as much part of the possible universe of every mind as is every gas. Each soul has every possible disease, as ineffective units, as it has every other possible sensory or psychical body. Each pathological state is particular sensory and psychical bodies, just as a chair is a sensory body. What we call a disease is some complex of ideas, emotions, feelings, sensory bodies which may or may not annihilate the mind's realisation, through the soul, of its own medium, as a sensory complex. The annihilation of this realisation, by the soul, of its own medium, we call death. Morbid function, or disease, is a form of willing (which we recognise as abnormal), by the soul, of ineffective into effective units. We could no more suffer from disease did it not exist as part of our possible universe of effective and ineffective units, than we could see our hand, were it not in our mind as such effective units preconditioned by ineffective units. If my soul can hypnotise the matter-soul so as to ensure the realisation of effective units in my universe, constituting a chair, my soul can likewise will the matter-soul, as my body, so as to ensure the realisation of effective units in my universe, constituting smallpox, cancer, diphtheria. Moreover, if a discoverer can hypnotise the matter-soul so as to ensure "infection" by the type-sensation, argon, another person can similarly ensure infection by the

type-sensation, smallpox. "Infection" with argon is surer than infection with smallpox ; still, the processes, at root, are identical, involving the realisation of a particular part of a universe common, as effective or ineffective units, to all souls. Smallpox no more jumps into mind, as a foreign interloper, than does argon. Sensory and psychical bodies, as disease, are as fully the stuff of mind itself, as is a new gas, or a new craze in bonnets.

Let us now see how empiricism bears on this philosophical statement. First, it is well known that some people are more liable than others to "catch" disease. This involves that they are more prone than others to hypnotise the sub-soul of the matter-soul (as their own body) to that effect. Next, it is known that those who fear catching a disease are likely to catch it. While the former type get disease through direct hypnotism of the matter-soul, as sub-soul, or their own body, the latter get the disease through first exciting their soul by their body, involving auto-suggestion, or self-hypnosis, in which case the soul responds by hypnotising the matter-soul, as sub-soul, so that the disease is the resultant. Certain forms of hysteria involving so-called imaginary ailments not evidenced by the physiological or morphological changes normally coincident with the ailments are other instances of such auto-suggestion. It is known that savage races, coming under the influence of civilised races, are decimated and ultimately extirpated by the diseases of the latter, previously unknown to the victims. Here, the savage

soul is hypnotically dominated by that of the civilised matter-soul. The result is direct hypnotic conveyance of the disease. Next, it is known that savage races out of intimate contact with civilisation, and wild animals, hardly suffer at all from disease, but die through starvation, or as victims of predatory violence. The reason is : neither have hypnotised the matter-soul so as to realise disease. For a like reason, the rustic is free from the new gas that has "infected" a number of scientists. He cannot hypnotise the matter-soul so as to realise the gas, and there is nobody to hypnotise him by suggestion. Finally, it is known that the more complex and interdependent a human community becomes, and the more domesticated a brute type becomes, the more complex are the respective morbid diatheses. Where our ancestors had one or two diseases, we have a dozen. We have discovered more of our mind-universe, as involving disease, than had they. So of domesticated animals ; they suffer from many diseases corresponding to those in the human type, but from which wild animals are largely exempt. They are hypnotised by the human soul, as the savage is hypnotised by his civilised conqueror.

In the above connection, it may be well to remind the reader that the body, *per se*, does nothing beyond responding to the soul, either directly without the intermediation of its (the body's) excitation on the soul, or after having excited the soul to any particular fiat. The disease, as actual experience, is a thing made within, not without. What are called external

predisposing causes can only exist as the soul's hypnotism of the matter-soul. Apart from this hypnotism, the matter-soul, so far as the organic soul is concerned, is inert. Thus, what is called an epidemic is a prevalence of particular hypnotisms—one organic soul affecting another so that all hypnotise the matter-soul to the same effect. The more the public know of the prevalence of a disease, the more widely it is likely to be spread. What is called the advance of medical science constitutes, from our present standpoint, what may be called an advance in the manufacture of disease. The more we popularise medical discoveries of new diseases, the more we popularise the diseases themselves, just as, the more we popularise, say, the discovery of argon, the more completely the public get "infected" with the gas. What is called preventive medicine operates beneficially by hypnotising the public into confidence, which is another way of saying that it prevents the public from hypnotising the matter-soul so as to propagate the disease. Drugs, so far as they act beneficially, illustrate the same fact. Will is what cures; not drugs. Not only does will cure; it also provides what has to be cured—disease.

The materialist may suggest: When a person is, as I say, "infected" with "bacteria," he will realise the animals through verbal symbols, while, on the other hand, if he gets infected with disease, he may get it without even knowing what it is called. This seemingly obvious difference is really only a distinction not involving real difference. What is language?

It is auditory or visual signs representing sensory and psychical bodies. Thus, it is essentially a multitude of sensory bodies (symbols) taken to represent psychical bodies. As sound or written symbols alone it is in the connection no more significant than any other sensory experience before it has become a concept. Language is nothing to the listener until he has been hypnotised by the ideas represented by the symbols. Psychiatrists tell us of people who have been hypnotised with symbols, but not with the ideas they represent. Then these people speak a language of which they do not understand a word. Now an idea or psychical body is a correlation of units willed by the soul as effective from the store of ineffective units constituting the possible universe of each mind. Accordingly when, by language, we get "infected" with "bacteria" (or any other notion) our soul must have become hypnotised by the first soul whose fiat transformed, as bacteria-notion, certain ineffective into effective units; or, on the other hand, our soul must have become hypnotised by other souls which had so transformed their units through excitation of soul-fiat by psychical bodies (as language) independently of the original discoverer of "bacteria-notion."

That we at this day attain such "infection" through symbols presupposes a mnemonic persistence of a practically infinite series of hypnotisms involving what we call a vocabulary, with every word of which we had to be hypnotised before our soul could will the corresponding units, from ineffective to effective, so as to constitute a psychical body involving intelli-

gent apprehension of the word. Failing this hypnotism by souls which had already been similarly hypnotised, the word would have no more intelligible significance to us than to an infant, whose soul is normally incapable of willing a medium able to respond to hypnotism about words so as to involve apprehension. Thus, to get infected with a disease through hypnotism without symbols is essentially the same thing as getting "infected" with bacteria-notion through hypnotism by symbols. The person who discovers a new word destined to become part of a language, hypnotises his fellows essentially as does the investigator who discovers a new bacteria-notion.

For many generations human souls have been hypnotising one another with symbols, of which there is a vast accumulation. Accordingly, most human souls are now able to escape much preliminary hypnotic "drudgery," accomplishing by suggestion what to a primitive epoch had to be accomplished by auto-suggestion. Take a word—"good," for instance. Assume this to be a primitive symbol. The soul that discovered "good," through auto-suggestion, would have to hypnotise a number of other souls with the psychical body underlying his symbol good. Gradually a number of other primitive symbols would be evolved by auto-suggestion and disseminated by direct hypnotism from soul to soul. So ages after ages have accumulated and transmitted their hypnotisms, until now we get "infected" with bacterio-notion without even having ever looked through a microscope, merely through suggestion by symbols. All our logic and

imagination is constituted by such suggestion by symbols, enabling us to realise more and more of the sensation and emotion continua constituting our universe.

Now, assuming, as I contend, that a bacteriologist, by auto-suggestion and the microscope, discovers a special germ which he causally connects with a special disease, he "infects" others, and they others again, with his germ. He does this essentially as another discoverer who, by auto-suggestion, invents a word and "infects" others with it. This applies to the propagation of disease, which is as much a thing in the mind as is the germ or the word. The more diseases are discovered, the more minds will be infected with them—in familiar language, the more they will spread. I venture to surmise that the epidemic of influenza which has prevailed for several years would not have existed with anything like the virulence it has displayed had there been no doctors and no popular press to "disseminate" scientific hypnotism, and no gossip to disseminate "symptoms." The disease with which I am now dealing appears to have been recognised from early times. So, from my standpoint, a general process of hypnotism to that effect must have existed from early times. I surmise that the present stir about phthisis will affect as many with the disease as will be cured by the sanatoria. Again, I surmise that if medical men can only hypnotise the public with an infallible "preventive" of phthisis, that disease will become comparatively rare. I would not give as much for the "preventive" when it comes, in the doctor's sense as an antidote, as I

would give for the hypnotism, in my sense as an antidote. I venture to think that medical science will come to recognise that, as a curative and preventive agency, the whole pharmacopœia is worthless compared with hypnotism.

Let me present the above propositions and illustrations in another aspect. When we cut our finger with a knife, we say the knife causes the cut. From our present standpoint the contingencies involved are (*a*) hypnotism of the matter-soul involving two sensory complexes of the visual and tactual orders which we commonly lump together as knife; (*b*) hypnotism of the matter-soul into four bodies of the tactual and visual orders which we commonly call finger and blood; (*c*) hypnotism of the medium so as to involve a body of the affective order which we call pain. The knife, finger, blood, as sensory bodies, exist as effective units of the sensory order. The pain exists as effective units of the affective order. Further, we get (*d*) changing moments of rest, or changing units, as what we call movement of the knife to and across the finger. If the knife-body were not in the mind as effective units, there would be no blood-body or pain-body, as effective units. The soul wills the knife-body in the mind; it wills the changing units involving movement, and the blood and pain-bodies.

Now, we may assert, on the ground of actual hypnotic experiments demonstrating the possibility of producing structural lesions, by suggestion, that it would be possible to suggest a knife and ensure the

wound, blood, and pain as occurring in the supposed example. This would involve that the soul of the wounded medium did not hypnotise the matter-soul into the knife-body, but that another organic soul had so hypnotised the soul of the wounded medium that the latter's fiat on its medium involved the same bodies (pain and blood) as would have been produced had that soul hypnotised the matter-soul into the actual knife and its movements. We may further venture to assert, on the ground of actual experiment, that auto-suggestion, in the absence of direct hypnosis by another soul, could ensure all the above effects independently of hypnotism of the matter-soul into the knife. Let us apply the above remarks to the assumed causation of disease by bacteria, and on the assumption that bacteria are mere sensory bodies, not souls (identical, in this respect, with the knife in the above example). It is evident that bacteria, on such conditions, can no more be true causes of disease than the knife is a true cause of the wound and blood. The disease is just as much sensory and affective bodies as are the blood and pain. The bacteria, like the knife, are merely changes concomitant to other changes in the medium, responding, as mind, to the soul's fiats. Finally, on the ground of structural lesions through suggestion and auto-suggestion, we may assert that whether or not bacteria are mere sensory bodies in the mind, or souls external to the human soul, suggestion alone is quite capable of producing the effects attributed to bacteria. Now, it is obvious that the more diseases there are dis-

covered (that is, produced by auto-suggestion) the more diseases there will be to talk about, and the more there are to talk about the greater will be the probability of suggestion and auto-suggestion ensuring such diseases and creating others.

At present medical science, in its preventive aspect, is practically unanimous in asserting that enteric fever is almost solely attributable to pollution of water and milk and atmosphere by putrescent sewage (whether containing specific germs or not). If such be the efficient causes of the disease, it seems to me difficult to account, from the standpoint of medicine, and in view of the almost universal operation of the assumed causes, for the fact that whole populations in ancient and modern times, to which the scientific precautions would be unknown, should have managed or should now manage to escape extermination by the disease. On the other hand, if people are hypnotised into believing that good drainage is a sure preventive of the disease, I can easily account, from my standpoint, for the fact that good drainage may prevent the disease. From my standpoint, suggestion or auto-suggestion is as able to prevent as to ensure a disease. So my reason to account for the fact that whole populations living under insanitary conditions escape particular diseases which medical science causally connects with such conditions, is that the people know practically no more about the diseases, through suggestion, than they know about the modern preventions against them. "Where ignorance is bliss, 'tis folly to be wise." As I have emphasised throughout this

work, knowledge that is not acted is a bane. Whether that knowledge involve the downfall of a religious cult or the discovery of the typhoid germ and the necessity of efficient drainage, so soon as the knowledge comes there must come corresponding action, or—the penalty! I believe that so-called pathogenic germs can only carry disease in the sense that the soul of the organism supposed to be affected by them can hypnotise the medium so as to yield the “germs” as bodies, in conjunction with other bodies, called the disease; or, on the other hand, if these “germs” are themselves organic souls and not mere products, as sub-souls, of the human soul’s hypnotism of the matter-soul, then such germs will, on the assumption that they cause disease, do so by hypnotising the soul of the suffering organism, so that the disease is produced in that organism, as is any other response of that organism to its soul’s fiat: say, as ordinary ideas and sensory experiences are produced.

It may be urged that, to whatever we attribute disease, as cause, the only cause with which we can practically deal is the empirical cause. This contention is right—at present. But it is right only because we have not yet learnt to deal with philosophical causes, as we have learnt to deal with empirical causes. I believe that the time is not very distant when we shall deal more effectively with disease, through availing ourselves of the philosophical facts of causality, than we now deal with it through availing ourselves of the empirical facts of causality. I believe that a not very distant revolution will occur

in our therapeutics that, in familiar language, will turn it inside out, so that its present professors, were they then to rise from their graves, would be as non-plussed as would the neolithic savage were he dumped down in one of our great hospitals.

CHAPTER XXXIII

SOUL

THE individual organic soul is essentially four types of will: (*a*) the will constituting what I call the mind-universe, or sensation and emotion continua. This will, as a complex of sub-wills, is constant and the same for each normal soul of the same type. It manifests itself as sensory and psychical units of consciousness (effective or ineffective, as the case may be) and, corollarily, as sensory and psychical bodies, involving what we commonly call sense-perceptivity, reason, emotion; (*b*) the will constituting intellect, manifested as belief; (*c*) the motor will deciding what particular sub-will shall prevail so as to excite unsymbolisable emotion (effort), and the manifestation of itself (motor will); (*d*) the will, as a complex of sub-wills, hypnotising the matter-soul into sub-souls interacting with the mind-universe, and into the medium. The above is what I have termed the will-continuum, and it constitutes the soul.

The motor will is the test of the evolutionary grade of the soul. With soul-evolution I shall deal

specifically in the next chapter. The motor will may be pictured as related to the other wills, as intellect is related to the sensation and emotion continua. All wills but the motor will have what may be termed fixed, specific contents, as all the constituents of the continua have analogous contents. As these sub-wills are represented in consciousness by the continua, the analogy between the sub-wills and the continua will be obvious, as will the analogy between the motor will and intellect, which latter is outside the continua, as already explained. As intellect consummates the continua, so the motor will consummates the will-continuum, as deciding the direction of effort, or what we commonly call action.

Thus, what I term the mind-universe and intellect are this will-continuum manifested through the medium, itself a product of interaction between a sub-will and the matter-soul, involving what I term hypnotism of the matter-soul. This mind-universe, as already indicated, is potentially the same for each medium, inasmuch as the will-continuum constituting that universe is the same. But what part of this universe is realised, as actual, by any particular mind depends, as already explained, on what part is willed as effective units of consciousness. Whether any particular sub-will manifests itself as effective units, or does not manifest itself, constituting ineffective units—with the resultant of different actualised universes—depends on God's specific determinism.

In earlier chapters, in discussing biological prob-

lems, I indicated that what we recognised as the multiplication of souls (procreation) involved the specific flats of two souls. We have now to consider how souls can will other souls. This leads us to the hypothesis of emanation, to which I have referred in various parts of this work. According to this hypothesis, we have to assume as precondition of individual organic souls and sub-souls of the matter-soul, constituting what we commonly generalise as creation, an emanation from God involving the ante-cosmic organic soul and the ante-cosmic matter-soul.

The ante-cosmic matter-soul may be pictured as a spiritual primordium, homogeneous until rendered heterogeneous, as sub-souls, by hypnotism by the organic soul. Thus it has potentialities for metamorphosis to be rendered actual by the organic soul. So soon as it manifests metamorphosis, by responding to the organic soul, the ante-cosmic matter-soul becomes cosmic, and what we commonly call the universe is created. Thus there is no universe until there is the individual organic soul to hypnotise the matter-soul into heterogeneity, or metamorphosis, as sub-souls. At first this hypnotism of the ante-cosmic organic soul may be assumed as involving comparatively limited heterogeneity. For instance, the first organic souls that hypnotised the matter-soul may have realised no sensory bodies at all. They may have been devoid of sight, differentiating touch, taste, smell, hearing, and possibly many other differentiating senses unknown to us, but constituting universes for other souls than ours. However, what-

ever may have been the primordial differentiation, so soon as it began at all, creation began. Thus, from my standpoint, what we familiarly call living beings and dead matter came into existence together, the one corollary to the other.

The ante-cosmic matter-soul, as become cosmic, may thus be conceived as an inexhaustible spiritual cornucopia, ever ready to respond to the demands of organic souls by affording sub-souls ; ever ready to be de-hypnotised and re-hypnotised from one sub-soul into another. Again, it may be conceived as a perfectly submissive will, ever ready to do the bidding of the will of the organic soul, as universe-maker. Through the response of this will, as the matter-soul, each "stratum" or typical line of organic souls gets its predetermined modicum of actualised universe, and each stratum will change its universes as what I shall deal with as post-terrestrial soul-evolution.

Let us now turn to the ante-cosmic organic soul. This also is a spiritual primordium, as emanation from God. It is not cosmically differentiated by the intermediation of a product of creation, as is the matter-soul, but by direct impulse from God. This prime impulse involves what I may term an impoverishment of the ante-cosmic organic soul, inasmuch as some potential constituent, to be cosmically realised as what I call a type-soul, then leaves the ante-cosmic organic soul, never to revert to it, but to initiate a line of souls of the particular type which, having once accomplished a terrestrial stage of existence, shall prosecute an indefinite series of post-

terrestrial stages. As the individual organic soul manifests itself as the continuum of wills, and as the mind manifests itself as the sensation and emotion continua, so does the ante-cosmic organic soul manifest itself as what may be termed a soul-continuum, constituted by all the type-souls that exist, have existed, and shall exist terrestrially. If no more type-souls are destined to exist than have existed, then the ante-cosmic organic soul no longer exists, but has fulfilled its predetermined evolutionary courses of metamorphosis into type-souls, many of which, and their evolutionary posterity, have also fulfilled their terrestrial stages and are prosecuting post-terrestrial stages. When the last soul endowed with man's universe shall have quitted earth, the human type-soul and its posterity, like other terrestrially extinct lines of soul-types, will be in post-terrestrial stages of evolution. Let us now consider what is meant by type-souls. By type-souls I mean souls endowed with a specific, possible universe, as units of consciousness which may be realised as effective through hypnotism of the matter-soul. Thus at each cosmic realisation of a type-soul there is creative interference, as God's willing the ante-cosmic organic into a cosmic soul endowed with a fresh universe. To illustrate this, assuming the lobster-soul to have such a different possible universe as compared with the crab-soul, then each would be a type-soul, or would originate from a different type-soul, involving a fresh cosmic realisation (and corresponding exhaustion) of the ante-cosmic organic

soul. On the other hand, if the possible universe of the crab be the same as that of the lobster-soul, no fresh cosmic realisation of the ante-cosmic organic soul would be involved in the first terrestrial appearance of the lobster as distinct from the crab-soul; but both souls might be assumed to emanate from the same type-soul from which, corollarily, a multitude of individually different souls with the same possible universe as that of the crab and lobster would emanate. That the same type-soul thus originates the crab and lobster and a multitude of other souls, all endowed with the same possible universe (though perhaps realising, through their individual wills, quite different universes), would involve God's direct hypnotism of individual (pro-creating) souls, constituting what Darwinians call evolution.

Assuming the crab and lobster-souls to be evolutionally derived from the same type-soul, the latter, by God's will, as creative interference, differentiated itself into two souls (crab and lobster), which should realise in typically different ways (as effective units) the same possible universe, and through the procreative fiat perpetuate typically differentiated souls, as what biologists deal with as organic types. We may reasonably suppose that the possible universe for the crab is the same as that for the lobster-soul. But we cannot reasonably suppose that the possible universe for the dog is the same as that for the lobster. Accordingly, from our present standpoint, the dog-soul must have originated from another type-soul

than that originating the lobster and crab-souls. When we come to man, as the culmination of such processes of cosmic realisation of the ante-cosmic organic soul, we discover that his possible universe differs in one respect from all possible universes which reason enables us to attribute to non-human souls. Man's special universe is constituted by the culmination of the brute-universe (sensation and emotion continua) in belief. Accordingly, whatever particular soul first involved belief as culmination of its possible universe constituted a fresh type-soul, involving progression beyond the brute-soul. Whether the ante-cosmic organic soul involves any universe transcending that of which belief is culmination there is no need to speculate about. So far as we can apprehend, no cosmic soul can have a universe transcending that involving belief. It will be seen that the foregoing propositions imply that the ante-cosmic organic soul is what may be termed a universe of possible universes. When identical elements of such universes become part of the universes of souls originating from different type-souls (as, say, in the cases of the various sensory, ideational, and emotional experiences—each of which must have originated through a different type-soul—common to human and brute-souls) the new type-soul has only been constituted by the fresh element, not by the elements pre-existing in other souls devoid of the new element. Thus the brute (sense, emotion, reason) in man shows that he originated from the same type-soul as did the dog. Only the human (as intellect) shows that a new type-soul or element of

the ante-cosmic organic soul became cosmically realised with his appearance.

We have now to consider how cosmic souls came to exist at all. Assuming all I have propounded regarding the ante-cosmic organic soul, we have still to get an hypothesis for the appearance of individual souls. Assuming an element, say, what we call common sensibility characterising the most rudimentary souls, how did this come to be cosmically realised as a first type-soul? To account for this, we must assume that soul to represent the first cosmical interference on the part of the Creator, so far as regards organic life. In later chapters dealing with evolution, from the conventional, scientific, and other standpoints, I hope to show the necessity of invoking creative interferences. Here I need only assume the fact to account for the appearance of terrestrial souls. Once such a soul had come to exist, fresh souls would be generated through fiats constituting the various processes of multiplication dealt with by biologists, and which I have discussed in earlier chapters. Again, as each fresh cosmic realisation of the ante-cosmic organic soul as a type-soul was decreed to appear, some specific soul or souls would involve, in the procreative fiat manifesting the new typical character, creative interference analogous to that which had constituted the first cosmic realisation of the ante-cosmic organic soul.

In various parts of the preceding volume I indicated that purpose in nature is not manifested in adapting organisms to what is called environment, but in alter-

ing environment and eliminating what is not adapted to the change. This point may now be dealt with from our present standpoint. The organic soul necessarily makes "environment" by hypnotising the matter-soul into the phenomena constituting environment. That an organic type becomes extinct involves (on the assumption of souls other than human) that the cosmic organic soul constituting that type ceases to hypnotise the matter-soul. On the other hand, assuming none but human organic souls, the disappearance means that the human soul ceases to hypnotise the matter-soul so as to involve the sub-souls or bodies which constituted the extinct type. In the case of mere structural alteration (involving what biologists call rudimentary parts), but not the extinction of organisms themselves, the effect occurs through the transformation of effective into ineffective units by the human soul, involving changed hypnotism of the matter-soul and correspondingly changed sensory bodies. All the talk of biologists about "use and disuse," *et hoc*, in this connection has no philosophical relevancy to the question, inasmuch as whatever changes occur ("environment" among them) arise through the soul's hypnotism of the matter-soul, not through causes outside the human soul.

The "environment" dealt with by biologists is no more a cause of the change than the latter is of the environment. Both are equally products of the human soul's hypnotism of the matter-soul. What biologists call useless rudiments are correlations of units of consciousness, once effective, now almost

entirely ineffective, constituting hypnotism of the matter-soul. The "environment" to which the superseded Lamarckian school of biology attributed causative efficiency as modifying agent is as fully a product of this hypnotism as is what it was supposed to modify. Of course, crude empiricism completely proves that conditions affect persons. But philosophy must go deeper than such observation. If an organism cannot get food it dies. Philosophically, this merely means that the collective organic soul, as society, cannot will what, to modern apprehension, is a just environment, and, corollarily, that the particular soul cannot will an organism as its medium; or, on the other hand, assuming a famine, it means that the souls of the starving bodies cannot so hypnotise the matter-soul as to ensure a bounteous environment, and, corollarily, the persistence of their media. The *things* are all in the soul. The bodies that starve and the earth that lacks rain are equally constituted by soul-fiats. The soul wills famine and plenty. That the soul is now willing famine in India is no less philosophically true than it is practically true that people revelling in luxury are now allowing (philosophically willing) hundreds to die of starvation in London. When intellect rules, the soul will will that people shall not die of starvation in London. Possibly science may, some day, prevent them so dying in India. Then the matter-soul will not be hypnotised into a famine in India.

Individual soul-evolution, so far as humanity is concerned, is not a matter of universes, but of intel-

lect and motor will. The universes are the same for every human soul. How they are realised is what differentiates one from another individual soul of the human type. And how their universes are realised depends on the motor wills of those souls. As I have often affirmed in the course of this work, not what we know but what we do is the great test. If a sub-will ensures belief but the motor will does not ensure action corresponding to that belief, that will is at war with itself, giving the lie to its own verdict. From my standpoint such a will has the evolutionary fates against it and is decreed for perdition, if post-terrestrial pains and penalties constitute perdition. Evolution is not merciful terrestrially. I believe it will be no more merciful post-terrestrially. The will to will, or motor will, is the supreme will and the supreme test of soul as an evolving entity. All wills realising universes are merely wills interacting with the matter-soul. The will that realises intellect is outside that interaction, and what wills the prevalence over another of this will, is the will of wills. Only in the human soul does this will, realising intellect by moral action, exist. It constitutes, as consummating intellect by motor action, the spontaneity, as moral volition, which is the sole real differentiation between the human and the brute.

What is conventionally dealt with as evolution of bodies is evolution of souls, as wills. Every cosmic realisation of the ante-cosmic organic soul, as what biologists deal with as a new type, is really the evolutionary change of soul, as will, realising a new possible

universe from the ante-cosmic organic soul. Every soul that wills its lower wills, as universes in part (as more rudimentary realisations of the ante-cosmic organic soul) to prevail over its higher wills (as more developed realisations of the ante-cosmic organic soul) is what, from the conventional standpoint in regard to ordinary organic structures, we call a monstrosity. As indicated, such a will is at war with itself; rent by internecine strife. To take one illustration: if a soul allows emotion to prevail over intellect, the higher is rendered abortive by the lower will. From my standpoint, such a soul will have more evolutionary suffering than has one that lacks the higher will but manifests normal activity in regard to the wills with which it is endowed. There is inherently no wrong or right in any action simply as action. What constitutes wrong and right is, solely, belief. The motor will can only achieve right by realising belief.

As indicated, the matter-soul is a primordium responding to organic souls by continuous differentiation into sub-souls, and there is a soul-continuum, as there are will, sensation, and emotion continua. To each organic soul the matter-soul affords a special universe, as sub-souls. From my standpoint, what we call death is the realisation by the organic soul of a fresh series of effective units, constituting what I may term its post-terrestrial continuum, typically different from continua realised during the terrestrial stage. Corollarily, this involves a correspondingly different universe as product of hypnotism of the

matter-soul. As the ante-cosmic organic soul "died" in part by the birth of the cosmic organic type-soul, so the individual organic soul dies by the birth of a post-terrestrial soul. This birth and death do not involve that one soul is annihilated and another substituted. The implication is simply that the newborn soul realises, as post-terrestrial sensation continuum, a series of effective units which were ineffective in the "dead" soul. I have propounded that the possible universe is the same for each soul of the same type. This involves, from our present standpoint, that post-terrestrial universes are in each such soul, as is the universe of its terrestrial stage. Thus, the soul's destiny is fixed, so far as regards possible universes, terrestrial and post-terrestrial, so soon as the soul exists; and how the soul will realise, as effective units, its possible post-terrestrial universe is determined by how that soul so realises its possible terrestrial universe.

CHAPTER XXXIV

SOUL-EVOLUTION

FROM my standpoint there are only two types of organic souls with the minds of which philosophy is practically concerned. Such souls are those, the minds of which believe (that is, in which intellect manifests itself), and those, the minds of which do not believe, but merely sense, feel emotion, and exercise reason. The former are human minds ; the latter, brute minds, no matter what be the structure willed by the soul, as medium. The average human mind, as now existent, is compounded of purely brute and purely human characters. On the other hand, the brute, or non-human mind, has no purely human character constituted by intellect and belief. The brute and human minds have the same universe, as the sensation and emotion continua. What the brute mind (whether human or non-human) lacks is intellect, involving belief, and what the brute soul lacks is motor will, corresponding to belief. I believe that there are multitudes of brute souls that have willed mediums of the human type, but lacking

the essential human character. In other words, I believe that multitudes of ostensibly human beings have purely brute minds, altogether lacking intellect, and purely brute wills, corresponding to the brute minds. I believe that existing social dispensations, the predominant religion, the vast majority of individual activities, are manifestations of nothing but the brute soul. I believe that there can be no real social advance until man supplants brute, as predominant power. I believe that this predominance will only arise so soon as those souls that have willed minds capable of believing, also will the consummation by action of the beliefs. When such souls so manifest themselves, the brute will be overcome, so far as regards society, and the individual brute be crushed, instead of being, as now, exalted.

From my standpoint there is post-terrestrial soul-evolution, as there is terrestrial mind-evolution, or medium-evolution. The test of terrestrial soul-evolution is the degree to which soul has realised its will-continuum which is determined for it, terrestrially and post-terrestrially. This will-continuum, under terrestrial conditions, involves the brute and human types, and is manifested by the respective mental activities and motor volitions which I indicate as being characteristic of the brute and human types. A soul that only realises its brute-volitions will have to realise that part of its will-continuum which has been latent terrestrially, under other conditions, post-terrestrially. In a word, it will start post-terrestrial evolution from a lower plane than

that of the soul which has terrestrially realised the human part of the will-continuum. Let us now see what this involves.

As considered practically and philosophically, causes are very different things. As I shall later show, in a chapter devoted to causality, there is no philosophical cause within the universe except the will of the organic soul. This cause within the universe is only efficient as instrument of a cause outside and beyond the universe. To treat environment as an efficient cause, as does the biological empiricist, is practically justifiable. However, when this empiricist, on the strength of his determination of practical causality, presumes to question the existence of a cause beyond what he calls environment, as conditioning evolution, he seems to me as unimpressive a performer as the juvenile who makes a brave show of swimming in a foot or two depth of water.

Obviously, if bodies are merely the creations of souls—as I think I have rationally proved to be the case—bodies may reasonably be considered a comparatively trivial item in the scheme of evolution. From my standpoint, the real evolution is for souls, and only for bodies as the creations of souls. I believe that the brutes have souls. One ground for such belief is the conviction that the motive of the brute is essentially that of the vast majority of human animals. I feel as convinced as about anything that my dog is motivated by incentives essentially identical with those of people I know personally, and which motives are very largely my own, and, I infer, on a

multitude of, to me, conclusive grounds, that the vast majority of people I do not know personally are motivated by these incentives. Again, so far as I can judge, the motives of the humanity of my time are essentially the same, whether the particular section be called civilised or savage. I see nothing essentially different between the emotive impulses of my dog, of the savage, of the modern cleric, politician, trader, soldier, editor, artist, monarch. Moreover, I see that any other incentive than this emotive impulse is virtually non-existent. I see that the religious cult professed by the most advanced sections of humanity and their social and international dealings are almost entirely conditioned by this emotive impulse, which is, at the bottom, brute selfishness.

On these grounds I deny that there is any real difference between the present evolutionary stage of the human and brute souls. Of course, I grant that the development of this emotive impulse has reached a higher stage among certain human individuals than among any brutes ; but, taking the mass of humanity and the mass of certain of the higher brutes, I believe that the development in the one is no higher than in the other. Moreover, I believe that, as between multitudes of reputedly civilised humans and multitudes of brutes, the development is higher in the brutes than in the humans.

I believe that whatever has attained individuality, as soul, on earth, is destined to continue its evolutionary career, post-terrestrially, from the stage attained on earth, and that this stage will be judged,

not according to what is imagined as potentiality (or a supposititiously possible power of accomplishing what has not been accomplished on earth), but according to actual manifestation on earth. Though I believe that the human soul is potentially endowed with a higher capacity for development than is the brute soul, I also believe that, if the actual manifestation of the human soul, in any stage of its development, is no higher than is like manifestation by the brute soul, then, whatever destiny awaits the one in a post-terrestrial state, awaits the other. I believe that every moment of terrestrial activity has its corresponding moment of post-terrestrial activity. I entirely scout any special destiny reserved for the human soul and saving it from consequences which it would have ensured had it been a brute soul. From my standpoint there can be no essential difference between the post-terrestrial destiny of a human soul and that of a brute soul, unless there has been essential difference in manifestation on earth. I can see no test of essential difference in manifestation, except the test of motive, and I can see no essential difference in motive that does not involve the substitution of intellect for emotion, as governor of action. I believe that man has the potentiality for such essential difference; however, if the potentiality is not realised as manifestation, on earth, it is, so far as regards post-terrestrial evolution, a "dead asset." What is not realised here must be realised elsewhere. Potentiality, without realisation, does not count in the scheme of evolution.

In all ages there have probably been sporadic divergencies in the direction of such soul-evolution as I indicate, and philosophy has been the field in which the grasping at soul-evolution has been most manifested. Emotive religious cults have only been media through which the brute in humanity has been raised to higher developmental stages. Such cults have never ensured soul-evolution out of the brute stage. The Christian ideal of self-sacrifice is only the ideal of the ennobled brute. The devotee of the cult has ever been the slave of his animal automatism ; never the discriminating agent realising human soul-evolution. This latter, involving the real man, is only possible when intellect occupies the judgment seat and, through unsymbolisable emotion (effort), excites the fiat for motor action.

Intellect—not to be confounded with reason or intelligence—alone radically demarcates between the brute and human. But intellect alone does not raise the man, as an evolving soul, above the brute. For this to occur, intellect must constitute motive—that is, it must govern action. If intellect merely rides, while emotion drives, the result is degeneracy from the stage of the ennobled brute produced by purely emotive incentive. With intellect riding and emotion driving we get the modern cultured nondescript, neither man nor brute, whose ideal of expediency is at present urging civilisation to dissolution. As earlier indicated, intellect has no contents and is out of the sensation and emotion continua. It merely judges. If its judgments are not executed the result

is all that constitutes moral depravity and retrogressive soul-evolution. Morality perceived but not acted involves disease, to which cancer in comparison is trivial. Body, emotivity, intelligence, reason, offer no line of cleavage between the human and brute. That line only exists as intellect. Man, as psychical hybrid, manifesting intellect but not exercising it as governor, is, as soul, a lower product than man, as brute, not manifesting intellect but governed by the highest emotivity. Man, as hybrid, is lower in soul-evolution than man as brute. To the extent he manifests hybridity, man is morbidly abnormal. To the extent he manifests pure brutism, he is normal and on the evolutionary up-grade according to the stage of his brutism.

Some critics dispose of my doctrine regarding intellect by airy assertion that men have never governed themselves by logic, and never will. I grant that the world has not hitherto been prone to governing itself by logic. On the other hand, I surmise that the time is not very distant when logic will have a considerable voice in the affairs of mankind. However, as I indicated in an earlier chapter, this does not really touch the vital point of my doctrine. If a man reasons illogically and acts the belief he so attains he fulfils my conditions of intellectual governance. Intellect manifests itself solely as what I have termed the eject, belief, quite apart from what is believed. Belief is the sole peculiarly human sensation. All other sensations are common to brute and human. No brute can believe. Many brutes

can love, hate, fear, respect, rejoice, reason, and so on through the sensation and emotion continua. What I affirm and demonstrate is that to constitute true soul-evolution from brute to human the animal must act as it believes. In this connection it does not matter whether the animal believes logically or illogically. If it believes illogically, given suitable guidance it will remedy the defect by adopting logical belief. Once let my prime truth be manifested in practice, illogical belief will be a very trivial impediment to social integrity. Until quite recent times the public was unable to believe at all. It could merely follow this or that emotive impulse. Naturally, logic has yet had very little influence on its actions. The issue I raise is that the time has now arrived when society is able to believe, and, through the ability to believe, but disability to act what is believed, is becoming core-rotten.

As this present universe of ours only exists as we make it by our minds, it may be permissible to speculate how the universe might be made by mind in a post-terrestrial stage. In this world we find the human brute crushing his weaker fellow ; the strong, cunning wolf or fox battenning at the expense of the feebler, less wily lamb or chicken. We find honesty incompatible with what is called survival in the struggle for life. This assumed struggle for life is to gratify as long as possible the animal cravings of a thing that, at the best, has but a very short existence. There appears to be no struggle on behalf of a thing that does not die. To judge by

human activities, such an undying thing is not believed to exist. What is called science, having destroyed the means which once enabled people to imagine they believed there was such an undying thing, but not having supplied a substitute for what it has destroyed, people are naturally exclusively solicitous about the thing that dies, but, while it lives, affords tempting baits for the exercise of brute endowments.

I do not contend that there is anything essentially higher in struggling for a thing that lives than for a thing that dies. However, as people are struggling, it may be to their advantage to know what they are struggling for, and for what they are not struggling. Personally, this sort of struggle does not much interest me. The only sort of struggle that interests me is to enable one principle to prevail over another. Excepting about a few human beings, I care vividly about nothing but justice. And I only care about justice because I have got a habit of obeying my intellect, and it tells me that God decrees justice to prevail.

This justice for which I strive is intimately connected with the thing which does not die, inasmuch as justice is the measure of the soul's terrestrial evolution beyond the brute stage. Let us assume that, in a future state, the conditions of self-gratification that now prevail are reversed, so that the human lamb and chicken of the earthly state monopolise the privileges now enjoyed by the wolf and fox. Suppose that the intellectual knower of the earthly state who

failed to practise his knowing were to start his post-terrestrial stage on the plane at which he surrendered his terrestrial stage, and that such conditions prevailed post-terrestrially as ensured that the soul-fiats affording him gratification on earth should afford him, after earth, the experience of pressure by the upper and nether millstones as the fruit of his soul's failure to consummate terrestrial evolution to the human stage. Such speculative contingency as I have above sketched, if realised post-terrestrially, would be quite in conformity with what we know of evolution on earth. Here on earth we see the creature crushed by its environment—that is, by the world it makes for itself. Why shall it not make another world to crush it? Why shall not the wolf and the fox here take the place post-terrestrially of the lamb and the chicken, so far as these latter suffer by the former?

We have every reason to believe that processes of change will be accomplished post-terrestrially by methods analogous to those we recognise here. If the soul has to evolve post-terrestrially, we have no experience but that telling us that if the body fails to conform with its conditions it necessarily suffers. We have no rational ground for doubting that, as the soul fabricates a body on earth, it will fabricate a body after earth, and that this post-terrestrial body will be as capable of suffering as was the terrestrial body. Thus we have no rational ground for denying that the predatory here may be the prey there; that the "fit" and "unfit" here may change places there. If justice is the sporad here it may be the normal

there, and may grind what prospered by injustice here. If the mind makes an actual universe here, may it not speculatively make a universe there which shall be realised in conformity with the speculation? Suppose intellect and reason affirm such speculation as I offer above, may not the psychical bodies realised as effective units of consciousness constituting this speculation, anticipate the psychical bodies, as effective units, which shall constitute a post-terrestrial universe?

I see no ground for denying the possibility of accurate prophecy, any more than for denying the possibility of discovery of a new constituent of the atmosphere. All possible universes being in our souls, either as effective or ineffective units of consciousness, if we forecast a future universe, we simply render effective what were ineffective units, just as we do when we make any ordinary discovery or forecast any ordinary event. Of course, the forecast may be wrong, just as a supposed discovery may prove to be nothing new, or a supposed cow may prove to be a cotton sheet. In these cases, any error would merely involve an abnormal transformation of ineffective into effective units, either as sensory or psychical bodies. In ordinary phraseology, all here is a question of premises, inferences, and methods. So of the genuine prophet—he has nothing but premises, inferences, and method, as means. At one time, premises and inferences, as prophetic means, were subsidiary to method. Still, the prophet foretold a saviour for mankind, and that saviour appeared. Then emotion performed, for humanity, the rôle it

has now yielded to intellect. In these days, premises and inferences are all-important to the prophet. So we get, instead of the Jewish seer, our Adamses and Leverriers, who transform, from ineffective into effective, units constituting a new planet. Later, the planet is realised as a sensory body, and astronomy exalts itself.

In speculating about a future universe, I merely emulate the method of the eminent mathematicians who discovered Neptune before it became a sensory body. They took conditions existing as effective units of consciousness or sensory bodies, to which they applied psychical bodies. I adopt the same method in speculating about post-terrestrial conditions. As I believe that terrestrial activities are the preconditions of post-terrestrial states for organic souls, and as I believe that justice is the highest manifestation possible to humanity under terrestrial conditions, I believe that justice will be the starting-point for humanity under post-terrestrial conditions, and that those souls that fail to realise justice by action here, will have to realise it by action there. If there are units in my soul constituting a post-terrestrial universe nullifying justice, those units are ineffective; in other words, there is no such post-terrestrial universe for me. If another man believes he will affront justice here without suffering for it there, he cannot realise my effective units and I cannot realise his. If he is the true prophet, I am the false one.

Let me recapitulate a little to render clear the above contentions. The individual organic soul starts

its earthly career as what may be pictured as a fragment of a type-soul which again is a "fragment" of the ante-cosmic organic soul, which latter is proportionately actualised, and so disintegrated or neutralised, as potentiality. To adopt the figure of science, the ante-cosmic organic soul, proportionately to its actualisation as terrestrial type-souls, loses energy or evolves from the ante-cosmic stage. What goes from it as terrestrial type-souls can never return to it as ante-cosmic soul. The actualised souls emanating from the ante-cosmic organic soul are for ever fixed as entities which must individually accomplish a pre-ordained destiny. Whatever universes these actualised souls may create, those universes are potentially present, as ineffective units of consciousness, in the souls so soon as they emanate from the ante-cosmic organic soul, either as type-souls or descendants of type-souls.

Thus, what the discoverer, the inventor, the prophet, the poet, the painter, reveal to other souls are effective units of consciousness which those other souls cannot for themselves transform from the ineffective to the effective state. The units are in the soul of the ordinary, equally as they are in the soul of the extraordinary man, only while the latter can transform his units from ineffective to effective, the other person can only transform his by aid of the extraordinary person. Obviously, as there are people who can reveal effective units as stars, gases, telephones, physical, biological, physiological, chemical theories, religious cults, philosophies, so there may be people

who can reveal future events, as what we call prophecy. In every ordinary act of memory we do essentially the same things as are done by those extraordinary people. Our accomplishment, as ordinary or extraordinary folk, is merely turning ineffective into effective units of consciousness.

Some of us, even with the aid of extraordinary people, are unable to effect this transformation of units from the ineffective to the effective stage. In common phraseology, we cannot understand what is revealed, or we are forced by prejudice, selfishness, or other perturbing influences (products of our own will) to reject what is revealed. Nevertheless, if God has decreed that the revelation shall prevail, sooner or later everybody will effect the particular transformation. In the case of what are called subversive truths, the inability of people to effect conformable transformations of units is necessarily most manifest. Such subversive truths, often involving a radical transformation of effective units (as what are called established beliefs) into ineffective units (as what may be called forgotten truths), as well as a radical transformation of ineffective into effective units (as new beliefs), there are two processes of transformation, of a radical order, to be accomplished.

On the other hand, when the new truth is merely an extension of established truth—in other words, is not of the subversive order—the process of transformation is readily effected. Everybody then, as we may say, jumps at the new truth. Thus, to take illustrations : Darwin's revelation of natural selection

was of the subversive order. Nobody could accept it without rendering ineffective a whole host of hitherto effective units (beliefs). Accordingly, for many years Darwin, to the conventional world, was as a red rag to a bull. However, the inevitable must happen. Now everybody swears by Darwin. Result: we have another revelation—this time of the non-subversive order. Now our prophets are crying in the market-place the revelation of what is called imperialism. What could better be “mortised” into the established truths of the Darwinian revolution and of human brutism than a doctrine telling the big powerful bully that his God-decreed destiny was to bludgeon his way to omnipotence? Does not every psychical brute feel himself cut to the measure—in person or by deputy—of this revelation? Have we not, as plentiful as rats in a sewer, the meek-spirited Christian to whom rent-day is a terror, expanding like a pugnacious turkey at what “we” are doing in Africa, and at what “we” are going to do when “we” really begin to show our fangs and claws as the world’s Royal Bengal Cat? Has not the virtuous press, on the top of Darwinism, afforded the domesticated patriot such facilities for transforming his ineffectives that he is simply hugging his brutism as the only treasure competition, taxes, rent, and the demands of an ambitious family have left for his private consumption? Have we not Parliament itself patting on the back the paving-stone, plate-glass-smashing, howling, kicking champions of the new truth? Do not the ministers of the Gospel of Love

expound the new truth as the necessary complement of the cult of the Lamb? When, on the one hand, I read that President Kruger "sternly forbade any jubilation over the great reverse to England's army" (at Spion Kop), and, on the other hand, I witness "mafficking" as the patriotic consummation of my native land, I realise that the mills of fate grind slowly, and I shudder to think how small they may grind when a belief-bereft, rotten-great nation is ripe for doom.

I believe that souls which, on earth, have not realised the human stage of evolution will commence their post-terrestrial stage from the brute level, and that the universe they create, post-terrestrially, will be badly adjusted to the propensities of the bodies they then create. In other words, adopting the conventional terminology, the bodies will be ill-adapted to their environment, and will suffer accordingly, as bodies suffer here under like conditions. I believe that the tendency of evolution is ever to the development of higher types of beings—that is, of beings which can recognise their ideals as higher than others contending with them. Whether the recognition, by beings, of the higher excellence of their ideals, as compared with the ideals of other beings, be accurate will be tested by the prevalence of one or another type of ideal.

If man is essentially a higher type than brute, then human ideal, to our apprehension, must be higher than brute ideal. The question now arises, What is human ideal as distinct from brute ideal?

From my standpoint, the human ideal has ever been that farthest removed from the primitive propensities. What constitute these propensities? First, the gratification of the physiological demands of the organism; next, the gratification of emotive promptings. These constitute the primary animal propensities. Among themselves, these propensities manifest various grades of activity. Thus, the pure brute gorges himself to repletion, while the more humanised brute limits his eating by rational restraint. Again, the pure brute is slave to his passions and caprices, while the more humanised animal subjects them to his reason.

A secondary animal propensity is the gratification of reason. Reason is usually considered an exclusively human attribute. I altogether reject this assumption, because I reject the assumption that psychical bodies, as symbols, are not derived from sensory bodies, and because I believe that all processes of association between symbols, whether called reason or intelligence, are equally automatic function constituted by the necessity-sensation, and, as such, are brute endowment. I maintain that brutes fabricate psychical bodies (ideas) as do humans, and that reason is nothing but perceived necessary sequence between ideas, or psychical bodies bound together by the necessity-sensation. To perceive necessary sequence is to reason. Whether the sequence be between two psychical bodies, say "stick" and "fetch," or between any number of psychical bodies in correlations, constituting logical process, the essential nature of the operation is not affected. The automatism enabling

my dog to connect his psychical body representing "stick" with another psychical body representing, to him, "fetch" is nowise essentially different from the automatism enabling me to connect my psychical bodies so as to constitute this paragraph. The spontaneous or human element only appears so soon as I believe what I write. The brute can feel the automatic run. He cannot feel the spontaneous discrimination.

Looking at the question from the metaphysical standpoint, we have no ground for judging about the brute's psychical manifestations except through what we perceive as its motor manifestations. Again, so far as the brute exists for us at all, it exists as a sensory complex created by our own minds. Thus the motor manifestations by which we necessarily judge of the brute's psychical powers are really our own sensory bodies. If we arbitrarily isolate these bodies as being a thing outside our minds, that does not affect the point that we must judge about the brute's reason and intelligence by attributing to our sensory bodies certain functions which in ourselves involve psychical bodies. Now I think I have shown in this work that to adopt the psychological method of discriminating between various shades of psychical bodies is mere verbal futility, inasmuch as all psychical bodies are as much sensation as are sensory bodies. Even if we grant that brutes cannot reason, the point is not affected that reason is part of the sensation-continuum, and, as being a part, is no less automatic than is any other part. Thus, even assuming that brutes cannot reason, we have no ground for grant-

ing any essential difference between what we call reason as being, on the conditions, our own peculiar endowment, and what we call intelligence and attribute indifferently to ourselves and the brutes. Accordingly, judging from an opposed as well as my own standpoint, I deny that reason projects humanity beyond the brute stage.

We have now reached the conclusion that human, as distinct from brute ideal cannot be constituted exclusively by the exercise of emotion or reason, and that intellect is the only faculty—given the others—that can reveal the human ideal. It reveals this ideal purely as judge outside the “pleadings” of the other faculties. Reason and emotion, without intellect, will afford us logical sequences and prepossessions, but cannot afford us the peculiarly human sensation : belief, involving the human ideal. Intellect constitutes the man. All other faculties constitute the brute—certainly in various stages of ennoblement, but still the brute.

Though intellect is outside the sensation-continuum, its necessary precondition is, of course, reason. As reason eventuates in intellect, so emotion eventuates in faith. As I have earlier indicated, intellect also involves faith, but while the faith of intellect is complementary to belief, the faith of emotion excludes belief. This latter faith is common to brute and the man-brute or hybrid. The former is peculiar to man. The faith of emotion is equivalent in respect to emotion, to belief in respect to intellect. Thus as intellect transcends emotion as the man tran-

scends the brute, so does the faith complementary to belief transcend that complementary to emotion. While the faith of emotion stunts the human by driving it to brute fealty to persons or to traditional records of persons, the faith of intellect drives the human beyond itself, to the cause of all things. To the extent that he is driven by the faith of emotion, man, the hybrid, emulates the sheep that follow the bell-wether. To the extent that he is driven by the faith of intellect, he manifests soul-evolution beyond the brute stage.

We have now identified the pure man as constituted by intellect and its eject, belief (with the latter's complementary faith), and reason. We have identified the pure brute (in various stages of ennoblement) as constituted by reason and emotion and the latter's complementary faith.

Now, an all-important point in regard to post-terrestrial existence invites further consideration. This point is action. The human or brute only completely realises itself by interacting with its fellows. It can only interact by acting. From my standpoint, its acting here will decide its acting and experiencing post-terrestrially. I believe that the terrestrial brute, acting through motives of emotion and reason, will prosecute its soul-evolution post-terrestrially as brute, and that as the brute suffers little here, it will suffer little there. I believe that the human (that is, the intellectual believer) who acts here as brute (that is, who repudiates his belief by acting according to reason and emotion, instead of according to intellect) will

prosecute his soul-evolution as a duality of contending spirit, and will bodily suffer until the human prevails over the brute. Incidentally, I may here refer the reader to remarks, in an earlier chapter in this volume, on the influence, as involving suffering, of this contention between brute and human during the earthly stage. I believe that the pure man (that is, the being who acts his belief to the exclusion of his emotive promptings opposing the belief) will prosecute his soul-evolution free from suffering. On the other hand, I do not believe that the pure man has yet existed on earth.

We all know that some people have greater inducements than others to outrage moral law—that is, to repudiate belief. The question arises, May we suppose that any amelioration of future hardship will be ensured by the contingencies of environment here? As already indicated, I do not believe that such contingencies will affect the issue. What we understand as retribution or punishment is not involved in soul-evolution. Incidentally, suffering will occur post-terrestrially as it does terrestrially, but this does not involve that the Creator is motivated by human passions and is more offended by one than another creature. If a soul cannot evolve here, it will have to evolve post-terrestrially, just as if an organism cannot get food it must die. If a soul be neither pure human nor pure brute, it will have to suffer post-terrestrially, as it did terrestrially.

Granted that, from the practical standpoint, one man has more temptation than has another to do what he believes wrong, these “temptations” can only

prevail against intellect so long as the brute prevails, and the brute can only prevail so long as the soul wills affective bodies (as passions, lusts, etc.) responsive to particular stimuli (as objects of lust, passion, desire), which objects, again, are products of the soul's hypnotism of the matter-soul into sensory bodies constituting the particular objects. The so-called environment that tempts is as much a product of the soul's willing as are the lusts and passions which entail submission to the temptation. The will that enabled intellect to prevail would not enable the passions to prevail, or would it provide sensory bodies, as objects of passions and desires, adequate to render these latter conquerors of intellect. I do not believe that any man has more temptation to affront his intellect than has another, but I believe that one soul, more than another, allows brute sub-wills, as passions and lusts, to prevail over human sub-will, as intellect, and that this condition constitutes the measure of soul-unfitness and of post-terrestrial suffering. The "temptations"—mere sensory bodies—are negligible factors, if there is will to execute the dictates of intellect. Only if the soul so wills the sensory bodies into relationship with the affective bodies (lust, etc.) that intellect is nullified, are the "temptations" real factors in the contingency. The soul that wills its brute sub-wills into predominance necessarily wills its environmental "temptations."

Nothing is evil in itself. Evil only exists through belief. The gratification of passion or desire only becomes evil so soon as it affronts belief that it is evil.

What we call wrong is an affective body opposed to another affective body which we call right. Obviously, for souls whose universe did not comprise these bodies, right and wrong would not exist. The only souls in regard to which there can be profitable discussion respecting right and wrong, are human souls. If these souls are brute, their right and wrong will be extremely variable, as products of desires, lusts, passions, expedencies. To the extent that souls are human, their right and wrong will be limited by beliefs. The beliefs which, until comparatively modern times, have determined right and wrong, have been mainly religious, based on the assumed authenticity of specific supernatural commands, miraculously revealed, and on the teachings of divine exemplars. While such beliefs existed, they were adequate to determine right and wrong. At this day, as regards enlightened civilisation, these beliefs are non-existent, and the only effective determination of right and wrong is constituted by the expedencies of predominant sections applied to maintaining privileges and animal gratifications.

Perhaps an illustration will here help us. Suppose I am a Christian. To be this I have realised as my universe what, from our present standpoint, is the highest development of the possible brute-universe constituted by the emotion-continuum. For me, as a supposed Christian, the affective bodies, right and wrong, are excited by sensory bodies (motor activities) involving psychical bodies (ideas) which I may generalise by the terms self-preservation (wrong) and self-sacrifice (right). Now, as earlier indicated, if a soul

wills its lower wills (or more rudimentary realisations of the ante-cosmic organic soul) to prevail over its higher wills (as more developed realisations of the ante-cosmic organic soul), that soul is at war with itself—a spiritual monstrosity. To our apprehension the most rudimentary will is that involving motor activities least constituting self-sacrifice and most constituting self-preservation. From this standpoint, accordingly, there is no higher realisation of its possible universe by a brute soul than is involved in the sacrificial ideal of the Christian.

But, suppose another than a brute soul—is there any higher realisation of its possible universe by such a soul than as the ideal of the Christian? I contend that the human soul can attain such higher realisation through intellect, involving the ideal of justice which I set forth in this work. The proof of the validity of my contention is that the ideal of justice depends on intellect, and that the only type of soul that can manifest intellect is the human. I contend that, through the very fact that the human (as intellect), as distinct from the brute (as emotion) universe is now realised as the highest terrestrial differentiation of the ante-cosmic organic soul, the Christian ideal is rendered impossible, and the ideal of justice is imposed in its place. I maintain that no age and no society has been so far from exemplifying the Christian ideal as is the society of this day. From my standpoint the fact is attributable to the present almost universal application of reason instead of emotion to determining truth, and to the decreed supersession of the

brute by the human universe. The present prevalence of the brute universe, as reason, involving expediency, is soul-retrogression, as compared with the bygone prevalence of the brute universe, as emotion, involving self-sacrifice, and, from my standpoint, must lead to the prevalence of the human universe, as intellect, involving justice.

When a soul has realised intellect, if that soul wills emotion or reason (as expediency) to prevail over belief, that soul's supreme or motor will wills lower sub-will to prevail over higher sub-will. Do terrestrial circumstances affect that soul as a post-terrestrially evolving entity under such conditions of mal-volition? I believe, as indicated, that circumstances, as environment, will have no such effect. I can recognise no such effect in terrestrial evolution. So far as I can apprehend, evolution takes no "excuses" on earth; so I fail to see why evolution should take "excuses" post-terrestrially. Once a soul has realised a universe, that soul is evolutionally responsible for its exercise of the universe. It wills environment (as temptations, etc.) as fully as it wills intellect. What is called temptation can only exist for a soul that has willed affective bodies (as passions, lusts, etc.) responsive to the particular stimuli, which latter, again, only exist as that soul's willing of the matter-soul into sensory bodies (as objects of lust, passion, desire). Accordingly, we may be rationally assured that circumstances on earth will nowise atone for "unfit" omission or commission of the soul in willing its actualised universe.

Another question now confronts us which we may

try to answer speculatively. According to the human in the hybrid is, here, the maximal actual suffering. According to the brute in the hybrid is, here, the minimal suffering. Will this distribution of actual suffering continue post-terrestrially? I venture to think that, post-terrestrially, the condition will be reversed; that then the brute in the hybrid will involve the maximal actual suffering, and in a greater ratio than it involved the minimal actual suffering on earth. I think this reversal and intensification in regard to suffering, as between terrestrial and post-terrestrial states of the hybrid, may reasonably be inferred from the valid premise that the post-terrestrial state, as it involves a universally higher stage of individual soul-evolution, must also involve a higher environmental evolution. Accordingly, as the present environment favours the brute in the hybrid, so will the future environment favour the human. Moreover, this reversal will not be in equal ratio, inasmuch as what I may term the evolutionary fixed point will not simply be reversed, but will, at the same time, be moved away from its terrestrial position relatively to the antagonistic constituents of the hybrid soul. Thus the brute-human, post-terrestrially, will have suffering in greater ratio than he had pleasure on earth.

It will be seen that, according to my hypothesis of post-terrestrial evolution, transformation from the brute to the human must either be accomplished on earth or as some corresponding transformation after earth, and that the post-terrestrial human or brute

must be a relatively higher creature as compared with the terrestrial human, or brute. Applying this argument to the whole of cosmic organic evolution, and assuming that the things in our mind constituting the extinct types dealt with by paleontologists are prosecuting as souls evolutionary changes analogous to those we are forced to attribute to ourselves, we may picture what I may term a pan-cosmic evolutionary progression from the terrestrial to the post-terrestrial stage, and through indefinite stages beyond the immediately post-terrestrial stage, in which progression souls are ever accomplishing their evolutionary destiny. Each age, each individual life, constitutes what may be termed a stratum or fragment of a stratum in a pan-cosmic growth constituting the actualisation of the ante-cosmic organic soul and the realisation of the will of God.

Of course my present speculation involves that time and space will persist, for post-terrestrial humanity, as experience analogous to that on earth. As earlier indicated, I see no reason to suppose that these non-resistances will not condition our post-terrestrial, as they condition our terrestrial, sentiency. If relativity is to persist post-terrestrially it is conceptually impossible without the time-sensation and space-sensation. Though many correlations of effective units constituting earthly experiences must, post-terrestrially, become ineffective, and many units, ineffective terrestrially, become effective post-terrestrially, I believe that effective units, as sensory bodies (not necessarily like earthly bodies), will constitute post-

terrestrial experience, and that accordingly 'the time and space sensations, or some equivalents of those sensations, will be part of that experience.

It will be seen from the foregoing exposition that difference in souls does not consist in essential difference between the minds they will, each of which contains the same universe as effective or as ineffective units; but that the difference consists in different powers of such minds to excite fiats. Thus the soul's will is the same for each individual mind to the extent that each soul wills a mind in which is the same universe, whether as effective or ineffective units. On the other hand, each soul cannot will a mind that shall excite fiats involving the same universe, as effective units, as such units of another mind. Thus the soul is only a limited entity in the sense that it must will in relation to conditions. Obviously there must be some entity not limited that decides the will of individual souls. This entity is God.

Though the individual soul wills its mind, God wills the individual soul. Thus the universe is what I have often termed it—a mind-organism; and this mind-organism is, ultimately, a will-organism controlled by a will outside organic conditions, that is, outside relationship.

Do I *know* all this to be true? Yes, I know it all to be true. Why? Because I believe it. To the mind that cannot believe it, it is not true. God will decide how far it is to be true to other minds than mine. For no other reason than that I believe it, it is true to me. I believe it solely through one

faculty which I call intellect. Accordingly I believe that intellect is the highest faculty with which I am endowed, and I believe that the soul which wills a mind endowed with intellect is a higher evolutionary product (with more momentous possibilities) than a soul that does not will such a mind. I also believe that the soul that is a higher evolutionary product is not necessarily one that evolves normally. The test of normal soul-evolution is not belief but action. As I have persistently impressed on the reader throughout this work, action is the great thing. Soul-evolution visits "sins," not according to the grade of soul, but according to the quality of its evolution, as normal or abnormal. The mind that can believe must be able to excite its soul to fiats conforming to the belief, or its "roosters" will come home and cause twinges. A human soul of high degree accomplishing its evolution abnormally, that is, by action not according to belief, had better, so far as concerns its comfort, have been a mean soul accomplishing its evolution normally, that is, by action conforming to emotive promptings. According to realisation of the will-continuum, so is the fittest manifested in soul-evolution.

The brute-soul involves no suffering. Suffering comes by the hybrid soul involving a mind that can believe but cannot excite fiats for corresponding action. The brute, devoid of intellect, that acts what his idol tells him evolves normally. He will not suffer. The hybrid who believes and yet pretends to have an idol, thus, as it were, betraying his higher nature, evolves abnormally. He will suffer.

He is plentiful to-day, and seems to be getting along comfortably. I would rather have his idol without his comfort. I would rather, as a brute, intoxicate myself to emulate "Him crucified," with nails through my hands and feet, than have to accomplish the soul-evolution of those believing minds whose testimony is of an exemplar of the noble brute ; whose action is that of the vile hybrid.

Believers, who call themselves Christians, in these days must repudiate by action either their human or brute universe. To act the Christian they must repudiate belief. To act belief they must repudiate the Christian. Philosophy says : believe and act belief, or be Christian and act Christ—one *or* the other. Then soul-evolution will be normal. On the other hand, philosophy says : belief and acting it means repudiation of Christianity. You cannot believe Christianity, you can only feel it as brute automatism. So, if you profess and act Christianity, you must repudiate belief telling you it is false. That involves hybridism and abnormal soul-evolution. Normal soul-evolution demands either brute or human realisation of the will-continuum. Brute *and* human realisation involves repudiation of belief and hybridism.

Suffering came into the world by man, and by man it will have to be overcome. The brutes are, I may say, symmetrical with their destiny. Man, as hybrid, is asymmetrical with his destiny, which is to eliminate the brute. Until this is accomplished man will suffer. That it will ever be accomplished on

earth I do not believe, though I believe that the steps towards its accomplishment on earth by the individual soul will proportionately affect its accomplishment post-terrestrially. Again, I believe that the more, in the hybrid, the brute affronts the man—in other words, the more the intellect is rendered abortive by the reason, intelligence, emotion—involving stultification of what intellect constitutes moral right and, as consequence, what reason identifies as most of the evils confronting us in our common affairs, the more ill-adapted to post-terrestrial conditions will be the particular soul, and, corollarily, the greater will be its suffering as a post-terrestrial individuality, however it may fare terrestrially. Idols for the believer here, involve gyves and pricks elsewhere. The brute is an easy burden ; the man is an onerous burden. The man-brute is light to carry in this world ; but after—!

CHAPTER XXXV

CAUSALITY

MANY of us have heard of René Descartes, the famous French philosopher, and his valiant attempt to discover a bed-rock truth, and how this truth revealed itself as the formula: "I think, therefore I am." And many of us are now convinced that this bed-rock truth of Descartes is full of most questionable assumptions. I am now going to emulate, in a cursory, but, I trust, not ineffective way, the illustrious philosopher's quest. I am going to try to formulate a bed-rock truth. This I hope to do by adopting the rôle of a questioner and answering his questions. What exists? What we believe to exist. Does nothing else exist than what we believe to exist? No. Why? Because the very affirmation itself that something did exist that we did not believe to exist, would imply the affirmation that nothing does exist except what we believe to exist. Assuming our affirmation to be honest, nothing can be affirmed to exist except what we believe to exist, and what we cannot affirm to exist does not exist.

What do we believe to exist? That depends on the believer. A child, rustic, man-of-the-world, philosopher, believe very differently about things in existence. Is each one's belief equally valid? It is : to the particular believer. Then is there no absolute criterion of what exists? Yes. What is it? Still belief. Why is this a universal criterion? Because it is equally applicable to all believers and all existences.

I will assume that the supposititious questioner has no further cross-examination ready, and I will apply my bed-rock truth to the subject of this chapter. It will be obvious to the reader that what I believe to exist is not what many people believe to exist, and that I have pretty fully stated the grounds on which I hold my belief, and have examined and given reasons for rejecting the beliefs of many other people. It is for those who do not believe as I believe to examine my evidences as I have done theirs, and, if possible, to rebut those evidences ; or, on the other hand, these people may ignore me and my belief and retain their own. Whether they do the one or the other thing, from my standpoint, will not be determined by themselves.

Now, the first thing I believe to exist is feeling. The next thing I believe to exist is something that feels. Next, I believe that what feels is the instrument of what does not feel, but wills. Then I believe that what feels is multitudinous and, corollarily, that what wills is multitudinous. Next, I believe that multitude implies conditioned relationship, and that what is so related is limited. Next, I believe that what is limited

must be conditioned by what is unlimited. It may be urged that, if the unlimited conditions the limited, the fact constitutes the unlimited in relationship, and that I posit the related as limited. I reply : there is unconditioned as well as conditioned relationship. What conditions all must be unconditioned condition, inasmuch as it must be the source of what is conditioned and of its conditions, and, as such, must exclude condition not determined by itself as source. To say that it is conditioned by that to which it is related is merely to say that it is conditioned by its own conditions : itself. Its relationship to the multitude is not at all the relationship of the multitude among themselves or to it. To say it is related to the multitude is merely to say it is related to itself : self-existent. Such a self-existence is limited only if we consider self-limitation, limitation.

It may be asked : why not assume the multitude as constituting a whole limited only by itself? I reply : I reject such an assumption for the simple reason that I cannot believe multitude to exist except as manifestation of something that is not multitude. As I am forced to believe that multitude exists, I am equally forced to believe that the antithesis of multitude exists. The very fact that I believe multitude to exist involves that I believe unity to exist. The implication that the unity might be the multitude would involve the implication that neither existed. Either we must abandon terminology in the connection, or we must affirm that what constitutes the multitude cannot be what constitutes the unity. But,

it may be urged, I state that, in being related to the multitude, the unity is related only to itself—is not this, it may be asked, equivalent to stating that the multitude is the unity? No; the statement merely implies that the unity is related to itself as condition, constituting conditions, or the multitude. Condition related to itself as sub-conditions is not necessarily so related to its whole self. Condition implies being; but being implies much more than condition. For instance, being implies self-existence, without which there can be no condition to generate sub-conditions.

It may be asked: in what way is being unity, if it has constituent as condition? A constituent implies other constituents: heterogeneity, not unity. I reply: condition, as *constituent* only exists as relationship with *conditions*, or the multitude. Condition is not an element of unity implying unitary heterogeneity or the multitude, and consequently limitation. Condition is merely constituent as being related to conditions or the multitude. Condition constitutes conditions or the multitude. Contemplated solely in this aspect, condition is constituent of unity, but this does not involve that it is intrinsically discrete as what we ordinarily conceive as a concrete element of a whole. It is merely discrete conceived as relative to the multitude as itself. The implication is merely that Being, as condition, manifests itself as the multitude or conditions.

It may be asked: why assume conditions as proceeding from condition—why not assume conditions as self-existent? I reply: we know nothing of self-

existence within experience, therefore we must deny that it, experientially, exists. Conditions are in experience, therefore we must only attribute to them qualities within experience. This excludes self-existence as their quality. On the other hand, we know nothing that is not caused ; therefore we must affirm a cause for conditions, and we must infer that this cause is self-existent, inasmuch as were it not self-existent it would be caused. Again, it may be asked : why affirm cause at all—why not assume changes exclusively of causal relationship? If we assume this we deny the most cogent of our experiences. The denial of cause would imply denial of everything rational, inasmuch as everything we rationally apprehend is only apprehended through the implication of causality. As already shown, the inner and outer sensations, at the root of all experience, carry the implication of causality. Let us now proceed to a more concrete consideration of the principle of causality and its implications.

The question we have now to consider is, is there any real validity in the distinctions, as doer and not-doers, between the soul as the former, and sensory and psychical bodies as the latter? Both soul and the bodies are things realised by the mind. Why is one a doer, but the other not a doer? The question here resolves itself into one of belief. Can we believe that the bodies are doers? If we can believe this, the bodies are doers. If we cannot believe it, they are not doers. As practical folk, we certainly can believe that the bodies, as tactual and visual, are

doers. But we can only believe this because, as practical folk, we assume that what we can touch and see are things existing outside the mind as we realise them by the mind. As I have shown in this work, this assumption is contradicted by all the facts of experience philosophically scrutinised. Such scrutiny tells us that the bodies to which we attribute, as practical folk, active efficiency, are what may be termed fancy-pictures arising through the activity of things of which we have no concrete experience, but which all our concrete experience compels us to postulate as ultimate realities.

At this day, most of our important practical truths exist through inference rather than through naïve experience, on which latter, at one time, humanity solely depended for all its truth. Philosophy merely applies this process of inference to a wider body of experience than is dealt with in our ordinary affairs. By the application, philosophy shows that we must believe—if we would hold the fittest belief—that there is only active efficiency in something that is behind bodies of any sort, whether such bodies be tactual, visual, olfactory, gustatory, auditory (which, as I show, constitute all the bodies of which we have real experience, as sensors), or again, whether such bodies be affective or non-affective psychical (which, as I show, constitute all the bodies of which we have real experience, as thinkers and feelers). This philosophical truth is really more valid than is any of our ordinary truth, inasmuch as the philosophical is the necessary resultant

of our ordinary truth. Denial of the philosophical truth would be no more rational than would denial of any scientific truth by an ordinary sensualist who, while he apprehended the scientific evidences and could not disprove them, rejected them merely because they seemed to contradict the evidence of his senses. For instance, if somebody rejected the scientific demonstration of atoms merely because he could not touch or see an atom, we should consider such a person as an *ignoramus* or a fool. This all applies to the person who rejects the philosophical demonstration of soul as conditioning sensory bodies, and who contends, against that demonstration without disproving it, that sensory bodies are active efficient, as they seem to be to common observation.

In propounding my hypothesis of units, I indicated that the notion of necessary relationship, and of things acting on other things, and being acted on by other things, arose through the "inner" and "outer" sensations and the "necessity-sensation," the former sensations affording us the experience of active agency, and the latter sensation affording us the experience of connection between certain idealised sensory experiences (or what I call psychical bodies) and other such experiences. To such relationship, established by the necessity-sensation, we commonly apply the terms cause and effect. Now it will be obvious that, as all the things to which we apply the terms cause and effect are equally things in the mind, whenever we judge that one event is the cause of

another, or the effect of another, we necessarily create such events as psychical bodies.

Of course, it must be remembered that when I say we create psychical bodies, I really imply that our soul, subject to God, creates them by hypnotising the matter-soul into the medium which, by responding to the soul, constitutes what we call mind. This mind is what I above designate as "we." It has no contents except those very psychical and sensory bodies themselves and other elements constituting the continua, with which I have specifically dealt in earlier chapters. Thus these bodies and non-resistances themselves, are the only thinkers and feelers. The "I" behind them is the soul. This does not think or feel, but merely wills. Though I mention these points here, I trust they have already been rendered clear.

Let us now analyse a simple concrete case of cause and effect. When I strike a billiard-ball with the cue, I have hypnotised the matter-soul into the respective sensory bodies. To perceive that the cue causes the ball to move (for the sake of simplicity I deal only with the cue and ball) I transform, through the void-sensation, these sensory bodies into psychical bodies. This involves that I get cue-idea and ball-idea, as well as cue-sensory body and ball-sensory body. I have now two psychical bodies (cue and ball) simultaneously present in the mind, as well as two sensory bodies (cue and ball) so present. The sensory bodies are discrete things, not at all related. In other words, as a mere senser I cognise

them as bare impressions void of intelligible significance. The psychical bodies are not such discrete things. The cue-psychical body involves the necessity-sensation which binds it to the ball-psychical body.

Again, the ball-sensory body manifests transformations of effective into ineffective units, involving change in the space-sensation, as what we commonly call movement. These transformations in the sensory arena are correspondingly transformed by the void-sensation into a special ball-psychical body, which we call moving. Again, the moving cue-sensory body (as approaching and striking the ball) affords me experience of the transformation of ineffective into effective units involving annihilation (so far as the ball and cue-sensory bodies are concerned) of the space-sensation. These transformations are correspondingly transformed, by the void-sensation, into a special cue-psychical body which we call striking. Thus, on the one side, I have striking-cue-psychical body ; on the other side, moving-ball-psychical body. Between these psychical bodies is the necessity-sensation.

The above example is a type of all possible perception of causality, and, without this perception, the universe, for us, would be a bare succession of impressions, as meaningless to us as to a stone. On the other hand, looked at metaphysically, we can demonstrate nothing in this empirical causal relationship except various correlations of ideas. If, as empiricists, we say anything is really caused, or anything causes, the caused or cause can, meta-

physically considered, only be ideas. But if only ideas tell us that ideas cause and are caused, why shall we grant their authority? If reason will not accept, as final, the verdict of sense, why shall reason itself be accepted as final authority? Reason gives us causality, but shall causality exist merely because reason gives it? Reason tells me this cue causes that ball to move. Reason also tells me this idea causes that idea to move. Reason also tells me the cue and ball are not ideas. Reason also tells me they are ideas. What sort of an authority is reason? I say it is an authority too prone to sitting on the fence. Where then shall I find an authority that does not sit on the fence? I find such an authority in what I call intellect and its object, belief. Because intellect commands me I accept what reason offers. But reason offers a number of contradictory things. It does: still, intellect only offers one thing, belief. This cannot contradict itself or anything else. It is the same, whether it decides one or a hundred things, and whether these things contradict or confirm one another.

Intellect tells me, as a practical man, to believe that the cue causes the ball to move, and that they are both solid substantial things outside myself. On the other hand, intellect tells me, as a metaphysician, to believe that, in recognising causation, as between the ball and cue, I have to transform the ball and cue, as sensory complexes, into psychical bodies, and in doing so, to experience the necessity-sensation in such a guise that it involves another psychical body

which I term causality. Now the cue, ball, and "causality" are equally psychical bodies. But there is a vital difference between the two former psychical bodies and the last one. While the cue and ball-psychical bodies are immediately derived, through the void-sensation, from sensory bodies, the causality-psychical body is not immediately derived from a sensory body at all, but in the example is derived from the cue and ball-psychical bodies, through the necessity-sensation and the inner-sensation (affording the feeling of active agency). Through the necessity-sensation and the inner-sensation I imaginatively impute to the cue-psychical body the active agency which I feel in the sense of personal exertion. But this sense of personal exertion itself is no more real demonstration of causative efficiency in myself, as medium, than is its imaginative after-product as attribution to the cue. If there is any really causative agency involved, it can neither be the particular psychical bodies nor myself as mere medium. To get at a real causative agent, we must transcend bodies of all sorts. As indicated, the real doing is our soul's willing of our universe into effective or ineffective units. The cue and ball really do nothing at all except afford particular sensations of doing and being done to.

From the standpoint we have now reached, there is no such thing as cause or effect, in the empirical acceptance of each term, inasmuch as this common acceptance implies that sensory bodies are active agents outside the mind, while philosophy proves that these

bodies are things constituting mind itself, and, as such are not doers at all, but are merely the creations of will. This will *does* with the sensory bodies. The bodies themselves are merely products of the will's doing. Let us now deal with another illustration. When we say that lightning rends the tree, we make what, to philosophy, is an inaccurate statement. The lightning is a sensory and psychical complex composed of visual and affective units of consciousness arising as response of the medium to the soul's hypnotism of the matter-soul. The tree is a sensory complex of visual and tactual bodies arising through like activity of will as that, creating the lightning. When the tree is rent by the lightning (to adopt conventional terminology) there is merely sequence of sensory bodies involving that one sensory complex (tree) manifests effective units of consciousness (as its riven and charred trunk) with pseudo-effective units (space-sensation), different from those arising when the lightning was not willed under the particular contingency involving what we familiarly call the tree's being struck by the lightning.

We experience cause and effect in connection with the respective visual, tactual, and affective bodies which we call the lightning and tree, through the transformation, by the void-sensation, of the visual and tactual bodies constituting the tree and lightning, into psychical bodies, or ideas, between which latter the necessity-sensation generates our experience of causal relationship. This merely empirical causality, as between the respective ideas, is not philoso-

phical causality, any more than the bodies themselves are, philosophically, active agents independent of the mind. The idea of causality is perfectly valid, *qua* causality. In other words, there is such a thing as cause, because we must believe the inner and outer sensations telling us there is such a thing. However, this "cause" is not really the merely empirical experience of it, any more than the sensory and psychical bodies, between which "cause" is empirically realised, are really active agents. The empirical "cause" is no more philosophically valid than are the empirical bodies as things in themselves independent of the mind.

The lightning, as empirical cause, implies the fallacy that the lightning is something acting independently of the mind, whereas, it is really constituted by the mind, as medium responding to the soul's activity. Thus, there is no real cause at work in the contingency, other than the soul as interacting with the matter-soul so that sub-souls arise which, as realised by the medium, or mind, are parts of its universe (lightning and tree) which, in themselves, are sensory and psychical bodies quite devoid of causative efficiency. Again, considering the lightning and tree as sub-souls of the matter-soul, inasmuch as sub-souls only exist through the soul's activity, as hypnotist, and, inasmuch as "cause" only exists within our own immediate experience, and sub-souls are not in that experience, we cannot deal with cause as existing between sub-souls. We can only deal with sub-souls as things caused, just as are

sensory and psychical bodies emanating from sub-souls in interaction with the mind-universe. Of the tree itself, as a soul, we can say nothing as experiential fact. From my standpoint, we have no reason to deny that the tree has a soul, apart from its medium as a mere sub-soul of the matter-soul. But, of this soul of the tree as being active in the contingency of what we call its being struck by the lightning, we have no experience, and we can make no inference. We do not know if the tree-soul hypnotises the matter-soul as its own (tree) body mutilated by the lightning, as our soul hypnotises the matter-soul as the mutilated tree-body. So far as our experience goes, the tree is merely a sensory complex constituted by our hypnotism of the matter-soul. Accordingly, we know nothing of cause, in connection with the tree and lightning, except such cause as we empirically fabricate between sensory and psychical bodies, and such cause as we are enabled to identify through philosophical investigation. The former "cause" is, philosophically, spurious, though, of course, it is practically valid in our common sensual applications.

If I can only believe as a practical man, intellect condemns me to pass my credal existence in a very small parish. If I can believe as a metaphysician and a practical man, I may occupy the credal parish, or the credal universe, as occasion calls. For instance, if I am one of those practical people called physiological psychologists, I shall perhaps draw out a chart showing other practical folk what particular cerebral "centre" controls the movement of the toe or

finger ; what "centre" enables us to hear words, or see them and so on. I shall perhaps impress my practical non-physiological friends with many of the startling facts revealed by those beneficent experiments of vivisectors, the result of which is to prove, beyond any possible doubt—to practical folk—that there is no such thing as soul, and that life, thought—everything—is molecular vibration. On the other hand, if I occupy the credal universe, instead of the parish, I shall probably desire to know something about molecules and how they come to know they are molecules, before I yield to the gentleman with the chart.

Earlier ages were ignorant enough, in the parochial arena, to believe in higher concerns than those set before them in their common activities. Hence they had real religious ideals and their moralities were of a higher type—as being less expediential and emotional than are ours. We, of this age, are too well informed—within parochial limitations—to hold beliefs of any sort except such as are attendant on the grossest sensualism. Accordingly, our ideals are of the brute—and, of a lower stage of brute than afforded impulse to earlier ages. I venture to think that the present civilisation ranks lower in the scale of brute-evolution than did any of its predecessors. I surmise that the future ethnographer will place us in a far lower rank than that of the men of the great classic ages of Greece and Rome, of the civilisations of ancient Egypt and Assyria.

In assaying, as a metaphysician, the claims of the

physiological gentleman in the parish, I shall not, for a moment, dispute that, parochially considered, we get to know everything through nerve-fibres and cells, and that what we get to know is simply molecular vibration in these fibres and cells. On the other hand, I shall altogether deny that nerve-fibres, cells, and molecules have any existence outside the credal parish. I shall deny that the brain itself, *qua* brain, has more capacity to know anything than has a tin-kettle, and I shall affirm that the same knower that creates the tin-kettle creates the brain. I shall affirm that molecules are an invention of the imagination, on which the parochial knower has erected several more or less logical structures adapted to ensure belief to men in the credal parish and to turn them into godless, soulless gropers whose one end in life is to emulate the wolf, fox, and hog. I shall affirm that the gentleman in the parish is likely to have much painful soul-evolution before him, post-terrestrially, which he might have accomplished comparatively painlessly on earth, had the fates not willed him to occupy the credal parish. I affirm that science without preter-science spells human calamity and degradation. In my non-metaphysical character, as a practical man, I venture to express the opinion that science, so soon as it pretends to transcend empiricism and, until its speculative verification is confirmed by empiricism, should be taken with a considerable lump of salt, and treated, by the general public, as a possible enthusiast whose zeal is likely to turn him into a betrayer.

I will freely admit that the scientist, *qua* scientist, manifests one supremely admirable and socially important quality. He is honest. He affirms nothing he does not believe, and affirms everything he does believe: (so far as his specialism is concerned. I wish I could think he also correspondingly applied his specialistic method in his non-specialistic capacity.) In this respect the scientist is a splendid example for humanity. On the other hand, the things that he specially believes, in themselves, often will not bear the test of scrutiny other than that of what is arbitrarily called science, but which other scrutiny is scientific in the highest sense, inasmuch as it applies intellect and reason, untrammelled by emotion, to every problem before it. The philosopher as strongly believes that much believed by the scientist is essential falsity, as the scientist believes it to be absolute certainty. So, here comes the final clash between science and philosophy. In deciding between the rivals, we must remember the all-important fact that, while the philosopher, *qua* philosopher, assimilates and scrutinises the standpoint of science, the scientist, *qua* scientist, does not assimilate and scrutinise the standpoint of philosophy, but arrogates to his own specialism the office of being the criterion of all possible truth. As the theological bigot authenticates the Bible solely by its own contents, so, what I may be permitted to term the scientific bigot authenticates his particular "Bible" by its own contents.

The standpoints of the scientific and theological

bigots were inevitable so long as philosophy, as a mere system of logic-chopping, was itself nothing but another form of this specialistic bigotry. The conditions are now altered. In these days, philosophy has abandoned bigotry and become truly eclectic. From my standpoint, it would be a good thing for society were the scientist to assimilate the fundamental verifications of philosophy, and to qualify his often too dogmatic utterances by what he had attained, as belief, through applying philosophical reservations to his specialism.

In various earlier parts of this work I have dealt with the speculations of empirical evolutionism—Darwinism, Spencerism, Weismannism. In a later chapter I intend to traverse the Weismannian hypothesis of development from its own standpoint. To some extent I have already done this in various earlier chapters. Here I wish to apply my doctrine of causality to the evolutionism of the Spencerian school attributing organic metamorphoses to what is called environment as active cause. This school has really been extinguished on its own ground by the empiricism of German investigators dealing with the morphology and functions of the cell. However, as all Mr. Spencer's philosophy hangs on and implies the central truth (to that philosophy) that organic changes are the effects of material influences external to the organism, existing as things in themselves independent of the mind, I wish to indicate how totally at variance is such a philosophy with any conception of causality dealing with mind as constituting its own

universe and rejecting all hypotheses implying a universe outside the mind identical with that realised by the mind.

Obviously the assumption that environment exists as an active efficient determining organic changes, implies that the various sensory and psychical bodies constituting what are called natural phenomena are things independent of the mind, and that what empiricists recognise as the effects of these "phenomena" on organisms constitute interactions between really active agencies. Necessarily, this naïve realism involves all the essential error attaching to the crudest sensualism of ordinary observation, and is, from the genuine philosophical standpoint, worthless as solution of the questions with which it deals. The "phenomena" constituting the "environment" of this school of thought, being mere sensory and psychical bodies, can determine nothing as really causative agencies. Of course, in the familiar empirical sense the "phenomena" do cause changes, just as in that sense a knife causes a wound. But genuine philosophy must not be confounded with such superficialism as accepts this sort of interpretation as final.

Not only is the Spencerian school of thought flatly contradicted by genuine philosophical investigation, but, as remarked, empiricism itself, in another of its aspects, as the study of cellular morphology and development, has demolished the Spencerian school, so far as it pretends to account for organic development, as completely as has genuine philosophy. All applications of mere empirical specialism to determining

ultimate problems must be vitiated by the central fallacy implying a universe independent of the mind, through which fallacy only, empirical specialism exists as a system of truth valid within its limitations, spurious outside those limitations. Applied to ultimate problems, as it is by Mr. Spencer, this specialism is applied outside its necessary limitations. Mr. Spencer's philosophy seems to me to be at root merely a systematic integration of the philosophically untenable fancies of speculative empiricism. My view of philosophy compels me to assert that it is a misnomer to apply the term as definition of any thought-system accepting, as established premises on which to build an epistemological theory, not merely the facts but also the ultimate implications of scientific empiricism involving that a universe exists outside the mind, identical with the universe in the mind, as perception. I would call such a system a logic of science, but not a philosophy. For me philosophy must advance cognition beyond empiricism.

In earlier chapters criticising conventional biology I have occasionally compromised with materialism. Thus I have provisionally dealt with germ and somatic cells as having real existence independently of the mind. All such spurious realism is now swept away. Cells, as perceived, are nothing but sensory bodies. As such they determine nothing, but are themselves determined, as visual bodies, by the soul's hypnotism of the matter-soul and by the operation of the non-resistances constituting them objects of thought, and, corollarily, involving the biologist's hypotheses regard-

ing function and structure. Here nothing but soul multiplies or determines the character of multiplication. What the biologist discovers as cellular determinism is merely more of his own mind-universe, involving changes of ineffective into effective units of consciousness. He entirely ignores the really active agencies at the back of his mind-pictures, attributing instead the real activity to his own mental phantasmagoria, which he confounds with real things existing independently of his own mind.

What I have earlier called the "vital constant," as conditioning the supposititiously real activities called reflex, of muscles and nerves severed from a living organism, and as conditioning non-procreating sperms and germs (implying that muscles, nerves, sperms, germs are real entities apart from their characters as sensory bodies), must now be regarded in its philosophically true character. There is no movement, reflex or of any other sort, in anything, except in our own minds, as changes in space-sensation involving changing pseudo-effective units of consciousness, and there is no vitality, in the biologist's and physiologist's sense, in anything but a medium conditioned by an organic soul. The frog's limb, severed from the body, moves for the same reason that the frog itself jumps. This reason is that the jumping frog and the moving limb are sensory bodies of the visual and tactual orders and, to the extent that they are merely moving objects, are known as such because our mind "contains" them as changing effective units of consciousness involving corresponding pseudo-effective

units of consciousness, as space-sensation. The severed limb of the frog moves because our soul hypnotises the matter-soul into the limb as a moving sensory body. The living body of the frog moves for a like reason. However, this latter movement we are justified in assuming to be conditioned by the frog-soul, whereas the movement of the limb is only conditioned by our soul.

Again, the procreation or non-procreation of particular germs and sperms is, in the case of procreation, determined by soul-multiplication involving specific fiat, while, in the case of non-procreation, there is no such fiat, and the "life" of such germs and sperms is merely, as moving sensory bodies, conditioned by our own hypnotism of the matter-soul. Thus what I have earlier called the "vital constant" (as distinct from "dynamical suffusion" by the soul constituting procreative life) is merely a figurative presentment, so long as I provisionally tolerated materialism, for the philosophical truth of our own hypnotism of the matter-soul into moving sensory bodies. There is no life, in the real sense, except where there is organic soul. That the severed limb moves occurs because we continue to hypnotise the matter-soul into a moving sensory body, after the soul which once conditioned that limb as part of a living medium has ceased so to condition it. The so-called stimuli (electrical, etc.) which we apply to the severed limb are sensory and affective bodies, things of our own mind. They no more really cause the limb to move than a knife-cut really causes our hand to bleed. As

already indicated, empirical causation is not real causation.

I have just been reading about some experiments by M. Flammarion, the French astronomer, to determine the effects of variously coloured light on plant-growth. He found that the effects of white, green, red, blue light on Mimosa-seedlings of the same age and as nearly as possible identical development were extremely variable. The plant in blue light was virtually in a trance. Though, normally, one of the most sensitive of vegetal organisms, the particular Mimosa had become absolutely insensible to external stimulation, and had not changed in size since it was placed under the coloured glass. On the other hand, the plant in red light had its great normal sensitiveness vastly increased and had grown four times as tall as its fellow in white light and more than fifteen times as tall as its fellow in blue light. Let us investigate this case from our present standpoint.

Each plant we must consider the medium of an organic soul capable of willing, *sui generis*, as our body is another such medium. If the plant-soul reacts to the light we must assume that it does so in some way analogous to our own mode of reaction. Our mode is to hypnotise the matter-soul into particular sensory bodies which we call coloured, transparent, or translucent mediums. We have no means of deciding whether the plant-soul does so react. So far as luminous effects on the plant exist, they only exist within our own mind. As what we call colours, the varied light is, for us, visual bodies, as the particular mediums. As

simply "light" (as distinguished from darkness) it is an affective body. So far as regards the mimosa-soul we do not know what the light is. We can only infer from our sensory complexes, as the different plants, that the light affects the mimosa-soul in some way corresponding to the varied developments we perceive as sensory complexes constituting the different plants. We get the coloured light by willing sensory bodies (the variously coloured glass) into relationship with the affective body, light, as distinguished from the affective body, darkness. Did variously coloured light affect our bodily development, as we perceive it to affect the mimosa's, we should realise the effect as our body, as a sensory complex, altered from normal development through our willing one or another sensory body (luminous medium) constituting with the affective body (light) what we call coloured light.

By willing this coloured light into relation with sensory bodies which we call mimosa-plants, we determine that these plants shall constitute very dissimilar sensory bodies, but whether the plant-soul really reacts to the varied light by varied development, as our sensory impressions lead us to suppose it does, we do not know. All we know about the effect of light on the plant is what we know as the visual and tactual bodies (the plants) we fabricate by hypnotising the matter-soul under the different conditions of our own willing of visual and affective bodies as the variously coloured light. Accordingly, the causally efficient agent, as affecting the plant-growth, is, so far as our real knowledge goes, our own will. Let

us now, supplementing earlier consideration, glance at the bearing of the philosophical implication of causative efficiency on our common notions of disease.

I venture to assert (against the dicta of physiologists, morphologists, and pathologists) that the real cause of any aberration of function, called disease, is not the lesion of this or that part of any structure as a thing outside mind, but is, as I have tried to render clear in an earlier chapter, modifications of sensory and psychical bodies or mind-stuff by soul-fiat. The first organic soul which through its body manifested disease did so by what is termed auto-suggestion; that is, by hypnotising the sub-soul of the matter-soul as its own medium, so as to produce the abnormal sensory and psychical bodies which we call disease. The first organism that had disease discovered it as the physicist discovers a new gas. Every organism, after the first, that has had disease has had it either by auto-suggestion (discovery) or by ordinary hypnotic suggestion. Disease is simply the production, by the mind, of abnormal sensory and psychical bodies; in other words, the realisation of abnormal correlations of normal effective units, just as what we call good health is the realisation of normal correlations, involving normal sensory and psychical bodies.

When we see an abnormal growth of cells which we call cancer, and when we feel certain effects which we attribute to the cell-growth, we are doing essentially the same thing as when we place our hand in boiling water and feel certain effects which we attribute to the water. The water, our hand, the cancer

are all equally sensory bodies made by the soul, as hypnotising the matter-soul. Our hand and the cancer differ from the water as products of this hypnotism, inasmuch as they are constituents of a special sub-soul which our soul constitutes a medium for its own fiats. Empirical psychiatry now affords a great mass of incontrovertible evidence that disease is curable by hypnotic suggestion, and that structural and functional changes are producible by the same means (hypnotic suggestion). When I come to deal with hypnotism and allied phenomena, in a later chapter, I hope to place this evidence before the reader and show him how completely the facts of empirical psychiatry bear out the spiritual doctrines I advance in this work. I venture to assert that hypnotism is the only real agent that produces disease and the only real agent that can cure disease. Given suitable suggestion, that is, the excitation of suitable soul-fiats, all disease might be extirpated to-morrow. Disease is sensory and psychical bodies. The person who suffers from the disease and he who merely observes the disease both "catch" it. Only they "catch" it as different combinations of sensory and psychical bodies. The observer, if a medical man, "catches" it as visual and tactual bodies which he calls symptoms. The sufferer catches it as affective bodies, perhaps combined with visual and tactual bodies. Catching it in the latter way often involves the willing of the post-terrestrial in place of the terrestrial universe. Catching it in the former way involves certain gratifying sensory bodies, as cheques, bank-notes, or coins, as reward for hyp-

notising the sufferer, through sensory bodies called medicines, into willing into ineffective units the abnormal sensory and psychical bodies constituting his special experience of the disease. Sometimes, again, the sufferer gets hypnotised into willing away his abnormal bodies through having, say, his leg willed away into ineffective units of the tactual and visual orders (though not always completely willed away as affective units) into which member he had willed sensory bodies called gangrenous growths; or possibly this heroic remedy fails to ensure his willing away his abnormal bodies, but ensures instead his willing away his terrestrial universe.

How very preposterous is this! may perhaps be the thought of the practical reader. I affirm that it is more demonstrable as ultimate truth than is the proposition that drugs or amputation, as active efficient, ever saved a human life or lost one. I contend that it is as certain as human truth can be that every bodily affliction possible to humanity only exists as willings of parts of a universe latent or patent in every mind that exists, to which such affliction could possibly occur. It may be asked: suppose a man gets run over, does he will it? I reply, assuredly he wills it, or he could no more get run over than he could perceive the horse and cab that went over him, unless he willed them as part of his actualised universe. He wills as his Creator has decreed he shall will, not as he wants or chooses to will. "Accidents" do not occur on such conditions. He gets punished terrestrially by willing as he does.

Another gets punished, post-terrestrially, by willing himself terrestrially into a successful parasite. But it may be suggested, the man who gets run over has no choice, while the other has. This is only empirically true. Really the one has as much choice as has the other. So far as empirical choice is concerned, the parasite wills as he does because he does not know the result. If he knew the result he would no more "choose" as he does than the other person would get run over if he could help it.

Still, it may be urged, the one person is practically free to choose, while the other is not. I grant this; but the fact does not affect the ultimate truths that each person wills as his Creator has determined, and that to be run over as a living man is no more possible, unless it is willed by the soul, than are the sensory bodies realised by the successful parasite as his gratifications. The soul must will the cab and horse, in the particular contact with the medium, as part of its actualised universe; otherwise, for the body to be run over, it would need to be a corpse or mere sensory complex constituted by hypnotism of the matter-soul by those who witnessed its being run over. So it is of the driver. He must will the particular conjunction of sensory bodies, as his cab going over the man, or he could not sense them, any more than he could sense his cab as moving unless he willed varying units of consciousness and pseudo-effective units, as space-sensation.

In this connection we must grip the philosophical truth that the cab and horse *do* nothing, as things ex-

ternal to the mind. So far as the person run over is concerned, the cab and horse are sensory complexes, realised as effective units of his universe. Of course, empirically, the cab and horse are very much outside his mind, and do a great deal too much for his liking. Philosophically, the cab, as outside his mind, is a sub-soul of the matter-soul, existing for him only through his hypnotism of the matter-soul. In experience the cab, as part of his actualised mind-universe, is a sensory complex. The above applies to the horse and driver. They are also willed as part of his universe. The horse's movement, so far as regards the person run over, is his own willing of effective units of consciousness of the visual order, and of pseudo-effective units as space-sensation. His own body, so far as it is a sensory complex, is likewise a product of his soul's hypnotism of the matter-soul. Beyond being a mere sensory complex his body is a medium for the mind's realisation of its universe, of which universe itself (the medium) is an item. As medium his body enables the mind to realise the soul's willing of the various sensory and psychical bodies constituting the empirical experience of the results of being run over. What applies in this case applies in case of disease. Nobody ever had a disease that he did not will, and nobody ever got rid of a disease that he did not will away.

Suppose, it may be suggested, somebody pulls the person out of the way of the cab, surely the former does something! Certainly, he does a great deal. However, what he does empirically and what he does

philosophically are very different things. What he does empirically I need not discuss. What he does philosophically is so to will a sensory complex (as the person he pulls out of the way of the cab) in conjunction with the space-sensation as to involve a special place-relationship between it and another sensory complex (the cab). On the other hand, the person who is pulled out of the way of the cab wills the pulling away, just as does the person who pulls him out of the way. The only essential difference between the two willings is that one is accompanied by unsymbolisable emotion (effort), while the other is not. The way we get disease is to will it, without effort. The way we get rid of it is to will it away, without effort. Sometimes we can even will it away *with* effort. It may be asked, What does it matter how things are done—philosophically or empirically—so long as they are done? I reply it matters a good deal that humanity shall become human. That this may occur we must know how things are done philosophically, and we must have a social dispensation conformable with the knowledge.

Now let us consider drugs and poisons, modifying or destroying what we call physiological function. The opiate, for instance, is a sensory body. When it is "taken" it is quite a different sensory body as compared with its ostensible self when it is only "looked at." When it is only looked at it is a visual body. Then it is like the disease observed by the doctor. When it is taken it is an affective body. Then it is like the disease of the sufferer. Its

administration involves that it is willed into special interaction with other sensory bodies constituting what we call visceral and nervous systems (the medium). All these sensory bodies are the products of sub-wills determining the mind-universe. As mere sensory bodies they have no active efficiency, as causes. When the opiate takes effect it only takes effect as sub-will, not as sensory body. When the medium is affected it is only affected as sub-wills, not as sensory complex. The opiate, as sub-will, operates by neutralising other sub-wills, involving what we call consciousness, or the experience of sensory and psychical bodies. The result of the operation of the opiate as sub-will is that the mind-universe transiently becomes ineffective units of consciousness. Then there is what we call insensibility. The above applies to medicines. They do not cure. What cures is will, as what makes what is cured is also will.

Now let us turn to the poison. When arsenic is taken and kills a person, like the opiate, it is only "taken" as mind-stuff. Taking it and looking at it are merely two ways of willing it, as, respectively, visual and affective bodies. We call it arsenic whether it is "inside" or "outside" the body. Really, inside and outside, it is entirely different bodies. The particular sub-will constituting arsenic inside is quite different from the sub-will constituting arsenic outside. "Outside" and "inside" have no real application in the contingency; they are mere products of personal artifice involving empirical determinations. The arsenic is really always "in-

side," inasmuch as, in experience, it is nothing but soul, manifested as one or another sub-will, constituting particular sensory and psychical bodies. When the arsenic kills, the terrestrial mind-universe is for ever willed into ineffective units of consciousness, and nothing is left, terrestrially, but the medium, now a mere sensory complex preserved for a time by the hypnotism of the matter-soul by other souls still prosecuting their earthly stage.

As the will causes disease to appear and disappear, as it causes the arsenic to "cause" (empirically) what we call death to appear, so it causes everything else to appear and disappear that does appear and disappear. Physicists speculate how long the earth has existed and when it will cease to exist. Philosophy says that the earth only existed so soon as a soul existed that could hypnotise the matter-soul into a medium able to perceive and conceive the earth—in other words, so soon as an organic soul existed that could hypnotise the matter-soul into a sub-soul that could excite the organic soul to constitute sensory and psychical bodies, as what is called mind. If there were only a single organic soul left, able to manifest such fiat, the earth would exist. If that soul departed the earth would be annihilated. Philosophy says that science need not trouble itself about the question of the earth's existence.

I have now a chair before me. It is a sensory body or constituent of my mind. Does it exist when I go into the next room? Yes, because I am still hypnotising the matter-soul into the chair-sub-soul.

But, it may be urged, it is no longer for me a sensory body. No ; it is no longer a sensory body, but my soul is still hypnotising the matter-soul though I have no sensory body. The man who made the chair fixed it as a product of hypnotism constituting correlations of effective units or a sensory body (as indicated, all sensory bodies are really complexes). Before he hypnotised the matter-soul into the chair the man who made it had it in his mind as ineffective units, or hypnotism by God. When he hypnotised the matter-soul he rendered those units effective. I also had the chair in my mind as ineffective units before the man made it. By making it he "discovered" effective units in his own mind, and enabled me to "discover" like units in my mind. But these units for him and me are only effective under particular conditions of the medium (his or my body) involving what we call sensing the chair. Still, the chair is in his and my minds, as ineffective units, when we do not sense it. It was always in our minds, and in every mind, as ineffective units, before he made it. He made it because he was the first to turn ineffective units into effective units, as that chair. Once he did this every other soul would do it under his conditions of the medium, involving sensing the chair. Once the matter-soul is hypnotised into a sub-soul it is always so hypnotised until it is de-hypnotised or re-hypnotised—that is, until the sub-soul, as a sensory body, is turned into some other sensory body or bodies, or, in common parlance, until the particular object is destroyed or converted into another object.

When it is "destroyed," that particular sensory body is really annihilated so far as the mind is concerned. Though, for a time, it may remain as a psychical body (memory), it eventually returns to the matter-soul, and, so far as the mind is concerned, becomes ineffective units. So would the earth be annihilated if all organic souls could de-hypnotise and re-hypnotise the matter-soul into other concepts and percepts (sensory and psychical bodies) than those constituting it the earth. What we commonly call death involves such transformation of the earth by particular organic souls. But there are other souls left which do not transform the earth, but continue the hypnotism of the matter-soul as the earth. Accordingly, it is not annihilated. I believe there are souls that have transformed the equivalents of another, and many another, "earth" than this one. And if I may put the proposition in such a familiar form, I believe that these souls, as likely as not, are creating their equivalents of this earth on the very spot where we are all now creating our earth. Inasmuch as this "spot" where our earth is at present located is in our own minds, I believe that the "spots" where the equivalents of our earth will be located will be in the minds of those post-terrestrial souls.

It will be seen that, from this standpoint, God's hypnotism of organic souls is the prime efficient or real cause ensuring the possible universe of individual souls, and that universes shall be identical for all souls of the same type. God's hypnotism is also the real cause ensuring what particular parts of the possible

universe of each soul shall be actualised as effective units of consciousness.

In an earlier chapter I indicated that I in England must have the body of every combatant in Africa as part of my mind-universe, and that all sensory bodies existing while my mind exists must be so in that mind. This is a self-evident proposition if we grant, as we must, that nothing can get into the mind that does not already exist there either as a possible universe of ineffective units of consciousness or as an actualised universe of effective units. If every object which I could possibly realise as perception were not so in my mind, it would have to project itself as a self-existent entity into my mind were it to be perceptible by my mind. A mind depending for perception on such self-projection by objects, or an object capable of such self-projection, is not imaginable, quite apart from philosophical demonstration that it does not exist, and from the whole of advanced science showing that even empiricism is forced to accept objects as real which are utterly different from anything realised as sensory bodies by sensual apprehension.

Again, it is obvious that, if every possible object of perception is made by the mind, every mind must have the same potentiality for fabrication if it is to perceive, under the condition of sensing, what other minds perceive. On such conditions, if I had not the reader's body so in my mind, I could not perceive that body by sensing it were it face to face with me. I must hypnotise the matter-soul as does the reader

if we are to perceive one another under the condition of sensing, so as to render our perceptions mutually intelligible. If he hypnotised the matter-soul into a sensory complex as short, squat, fair, as representing my body and complexion, while I hypnotised the matter-soul into my body as tall, lithe, dark, our mutual recognitions would have no intelligible significance. Such "free and independent" hypnotism of the matter-soul, if generally operative, would obviously render all experience chaotic, just as, I may incidentally remark, the "free and independent" voter now renders social life chaotic. There can be no order without law.

I must hypnotise the matter-soul as does the man in Africa if I am to perceive, under the condition of sensing, what he perceives. His being in Africa and my being in England merely means that his soul is willing one part of his possible universe into effective units of consciousness while my soul is willing that identical part of my possible universe into ineffective units. Our empirical notions involving sensual space and movement are, in the connection, of no more moment than are our empirical notions involving sensual objects as things in themselves independent of the mind. Distance, space—all such notions as sensually entertained are utterly foreign to the real contingencies. Indeed, empiricism itself, in revealing the facts of telepathy, abolishing our conventional space and time, affords the amplest testimony to the truth for which I am contending. Our identical hypnotism of the matter-soul is merely an extension of the facts

of telepathy proving that people severed by space, so as to exclude all possibility of sensual intercourse, nevertheless fabricate identical psychical and sensory bodies.

It may be asked by the practical man, Is not all the foregoing very extravagant speculation involving contingencies utterly outside human experience? First, let me observe, this speculation is in my experience, therefore it is in human experience. Next, it is in my experience as a logical thinker who has assimilated the conclusions of a wide area of empiricism, and who constitutes empiricism the basis of his inferential processes. Now let me answer the practical objector in his own way. I will state an actual experience which has recently occurred in my own household. My wife and daughters are practical people, and apparently not at all promising subjects for successful hypnotic experiment. About such a thing as thought-transference I believe they had never heard until the events occurred I am about to relate. Of course it is possible the subject may have been referred to in some of the modern novels and journals, which, I am sorry to say, constitute the main literary pabulum of my family. However, if such had been the case, my wife and daughters had no conscious memory of the fact, and had not been enlightened by me, as I think the subject should be left alone, or carefully studied as a pivotal fact about which all our activities gravitate. That it is to the interest of the individual and society that the facts should be public property, I am convinced. But empty curiosity and desultory attention will only foster the emotionalism which is the bane of the age.

At present my family do not worry themselves about my philosophical work, and I tell them that when they want to know what it is, they must read it. Accordingly, our family circle is quite as practical and worldly as the average.

A few weeks ago, a friend made some desultory remarks in the presence of my wife and daughters about thoughts occurring at the same time to different people. This led to what I am about to relate. He asked my daughter to allow him to bandage her eyes. This done, he led her into the lobby and returned to the room. Then a number of playing cards were placed on the table and my wife touched one. Not a word was spoken. My friend and wife went into the lobby. My daughter placed her hand lightly on my friend's and led him into the room. Without much hesitation she led him to the table and placed her finger on the card touched by my wife. This my daughter had been requested to do. Next a number of small objects, at various spots on the floor and wall and in various not very accessible parts of the room, were touched and identified by my daughter. Then my friend remained with us in the room and another daughter went with the blindfolded one into the lobby. A card was touched by myself and noted by my friend and wife. My friend turned his face to the wall and my daughters came into the room, the blindfolded one leading the other. The card was identified. Then a particular figure on a particular card was touched and identified under the same conditions. Then my wife, who was a little sceptical notwithstanding what she had

seen, was blindfolded and went through similar experiences, identifying, though not as readily as did my daughter, different objects. The other daughter declined to be tested. Then I tried an experiment on my daughter—the first I had ever tried of the sort, though, of course, the phenomena were commonplace to me. I thought of a particular object and told my daughter to touch it. This experiment I repeated a few times, succeeding in almost every case. Again, I opened a book and thought of a word on the page. My daughter pointed it out.

After the experiments I tried to impress their significance as bearing on moral principle. I indicated that the person who thus wills another to do a certain thing is in the position, so far as moral principle and essential identity in activity are concerned, of a muscularly strong person who compels a weaker one to perform a specific action, and that if a person so wills another in defiance of intellectual principle, the former is equivalent to the muscular footpad who assaults and robs an unwary passer-by, and should be meted the same punishment as falls to the footpad. I indicated that society was now afflicted because a multitude of psychical bandits were allowed *carte blanche* to use their wills to impose psychical bodies as the law declines to allow the muscular footpad to use his will to impose sensory and affective bodies, involving what we call pain, fear, and deprivation of property.

I shall later deal specifically with thought-transference and other allied phenomena. I only instance the above dry facts within the recent experience of

matter-of-fact people, to show that there is nothing essentially extravagant, but only something unfamiliar in what I propound regarding the reality and unreality of what we call objective existence and conventionally assume to be independent of constitutive determinism by the mind. If we hold fast the prime fact that everything we perceive, as perceived, must be a thing in the mind, we shall not have much difficulty, even as practical folk, in believing the ultimate truths of philosophy of the transcendental sort I propound. No mind, no body ; no body, no mind—this is the cardinal formula of philosophy.

What occurred in the above experiments was simply the transformation of ineffective into effective units. All the objects were in all the minds as ineffective units, while they were not realised as sensory bodies. So soon as any object was particularised by my friend or me, there was for us a transformation of ineffective into effective units. Then our will hypnotised the will of my daughter, with the consequence that her ineffective units were transformed into effectives as were ours. Of course, in this case the willing occurred by what we call intention, involving what I term unsymbolisable emotion (effort) on our part. Still, even our willing, like all willing, *qua* willing, was an unconscious manifestation. The effort only excited this actual willing. On the other hand, reverting to the example of the chair, there was here willing without effort. The cabinetmaker who constructed the chair does not even know I exist, or do I know he exists. Still because he has willed the chair

to exist, I will it to exist. Because he has transformed specific ineffective units into effectives, I do the same thing, as does everybody else under the particular condition (sensing) which decides the chairmaker's transformation.

The reader's attention may now incidentally be drawn to the bearing of the above illustrations on the economic contentions advanced in this work and involving that the liberty to will to himself, as monopoly, what he can arrogate by exceptional strength of will, constitutes social iniquity, and that all willing to the individual's personal advantage, by the individual, so far as society can prevent it, should be stopped, society itself determining by the canons of intellectual justice to what extent the individual shall personally benefit by the exercise of his faculties. That human nature is largely selfish is a well-accepted axiom of practical folk. I contend that a really human society must control this individual selfishness to its (society's) advantage, and that society can only do this by determining the individual's reward according to the canons of intellectual right and punishing the individual for volitional malfeasance whether exercised in the capacities of muscular footpad, astute rogue, or conventionally honest man of exceptional parts. This control of individual will by society will be effected so soon as society declares itself the sole paymaster. Faculty-nationalisation is the only tolerable social dispensation which modern truth offers to the world. If that truth be ignored, the harvest will come as social dissolution.

What are called starvation and indigence exist because multitudes of minds cannot realise particular sensory bodies which are, nevertheless, in those minds as ineffective units. What are called plenty and affluence exist because a comparatively small number of minds can realise such sensory bodies as effective units. Were a sufficient number of souls, or a single soul, able to will the appearance of sensory bodies constituting what we call plenty, so that every mind would be in the position that mine is when I see or touch the chair, then there would be no starvation. What is wanted to abolish indigence and starvation is an economic reorganisation of society, on a basis of justice. Then there will be the will that can constitute for every mind the sensory bodies which we call food, raiment, housing, etc. Were society constituted on the basis I indicate, this willing would be accomplished. The more souls there are exerting their volitional power in this direction, the sooner the volition of other souls, not exerted to realising (except for themselves) the particular sensory bodies constituting plenty, will be overcome. The reason that there is now starvation is that there is no will effective to abolish it. Given the will it could be abolished to-morrow. Stated in familiar phraseology, starvation exists because people are too much brute to want it not to exist. The man must appear in place of the brute, before starvation can disappear. As I have earlier indicated, the man has not yet revealed his presence to any appreciable extent. There are plenty of two-legged animals in frock-coats and trousers, but we are sadly

in need of men. And to get men we must have intellect determining the character of unsymbolisable emotion ; in familiar language, we must have intellect instead of emotion determining the sort of effort we make. The four-legged brutes starve because they cannot will according to intellect. The two-legged brutes starve for the same reason. As the two-legged brutes have usually a modicum of man in their souls, they suffer more by the experience of starvation than do the four-legged brutes. The hybrid on the way to man suffers for his progressive potentiality. Get the brute out of him, he will be rid of suffering. The cult of the hybrid tells him he is born to suffer. The cult of the man tells him he is not born to suffer.

It will be obvious that the soul, if it be hybrid, cannot become pure, *proprio motu*. There must be a power outside itself to transform it. This power is God, the Cause of causes. From my standpoint, before God will transform any soul from hybridity to purity, that soul must constitute a mind endowed with intellect, and this intellect must ensure belief. If an intellect does not ensure belief, to the extent of its failure, it will be a constituent of the hybrid, man-brute. Even when an intellect ensures belief, unless that intellect can excite unsymbolisable emotion so as to ensure volitional fiat in conformity with the belief, such intellect is still constituent of the man-brute. I hardly need remark that the Christian—as are all emotive cults—is a religion of brutes and hybrids, not of men. Moreover, I believe that the hybrids holding such a cult who deliberately, by action,

repudiate the emotivity demanded by that cult, are essentially lower than the pure brutes. Their humanity, instead of raising them, degrades them. The pure brute is honest, or evolutionally healthy. The man-brute stultifying, by action, his emotive cult, is dishonest, or evolutionally morbid. To the extent of his dishonesty, he is a monstrosity. Honesty is the rule of normal (which is healthy, or sane) organism—brute, human-brute and human.

We must act as we know, whether we know by emotivity or by intellect. It may be asked, Does not a person know by emotivity when he accepts the Christian cult in defiance of his belief? Yes. Then why should he not act as he knows by emotivity? There is no metaphysical reason why he should not so act, except that he will thereby ensure abnormal soul-evolution, so far as the particular action is concerned. He cannot serve two masters. Intellect constitutes the man; emotion the brute. We may, normally, act as the brute, and believe as the man, but only on one condition—that the particular action is not opposed to belief. In a multitude of cases of action, involving what is called passion, or impulse, there is no conflict between emotion and intellect, because we are then pure brute; but in such a case as that involving retention of the Christian cult when we intellectually deny it, there is such conflict, because we are then morbidly hybrid. The result is what we term immorality: action against belief. Still, it may be asked, Shall we not be hybrid, on such conditions, if we follow intellect instead of emotion? No;

because intellect constitutes the man, and if action is according to intellect, there is only pure man in manifestation. But, it may still be urged, assuming emotion still to be prompting, the brute is manifesting itself. It is only manifesting itself as victim. By its sacrifice, the pure man has overcome his brute : the motor will realises its highest office. So far as that action is concerned, the will-continuum is normally active. The great sacrifice is not of a man-god, but of the brute by the human, in the individual man. The great victory is not over the death of a medium, but over the death of the human in the individual soul.

Somebody has said, scratch the Russian and you will find the Tartar. I do not know much about the Russian, but I am pretty familiar with the average Briton, and I say, scratch him and you will find the hog, fox, wolf, ape, and, occasionally, the dog. He is what may be termed a compendium of the brute. I believe that the only product in our civilisation absolutely differentiating us from the brute is our science. Our religion is of the brute. Our legislation is on behalf of the brute. Our commerce, politics, international dealings, are the struggle of the brute. Our art and literature are to ennoble, or debase, as the case may be, the brute. Our journalism expounds the ideal of the brute, and is slave to the brute. Our individual aims, through active life, are those of the brute. When we are about to die, our hopes and fears are of the brute. Accordingly, I deliberately affirm, we are, collectively, brute. If

anybody, from the scientific standpoint, can demonstrate fallacy in my conclusion, I shall own I had better have kept it as a secret for my private contemplation. However, as I also believe that I am a tool of evolution that has some carving to do, I commit myself, as a scientific investigator, to the affirmation: we are a nation of brutes veneered into hybridity by a thin shell of the human. I may add, the shell will be rendered thicker, so soon as its present thinness has become apparent to its constituents.

From the foregoing exposition, it will be seen that what we commonly consider to be the efficient agents in causation are merely what may be termed phantoms of those agents. Sensory bodies, *qua* bodies, neither cause nor respond to causation. Wills are what cause and respond. When I move my chair, a will involving my arm and hand interacts with a will involving the chair, so as to ensure a will involving what I call effort, which, again, involves another will ensuring various spatial changes which I call movement. The causation is specific interaction of constituents of the will-continuum. My arm and the chair, *qua* sensory bodies, are, from our present standpoints, inert puppets manipulated by wills. In relation to the wills, my arm and the chair may be compared with light cast on a wall by a mirror. As the mirror moves, so the reflection moves. As my wills "move" so the chair moves and my arm moves it. The movement is in the soul, as willings. Of course, it is difficult to reconcile these facts with our common

experience. But so are a number of other facts hard to reconcile with that experience. Thus the physicist's fact that an iron rail, on a frosty day, is not colder than a woollen rug hanging over the rail is also hard to reconcile with common experience. From the physicist's standpoint, for a thing to be colder than another thing, the one must be at a lower temperature than the other. From the standpoint of common experience, for one thing to be colder than another, it must simply feel colder. Similarly, from the standpoint of common experience, that one thing causes another to move, the one thing must be seen or felt to move when the other thing is seen or felt to approach and touch it. From the standpoint of philosophy, before we can grant that one thing causes another to do anything, we must identify what things cause at all. Then we discover that our seeing and feeling are, in the connection, very unreliable authorities.

CHAPTER XXXVI

POST-TERRESTRIAL RECOGNITION

IN the preceding and other earlier chapters I discussed some bearings of the demonstration that everything, as known, must be in the mind, as ineffective units of consciousness, before it can be known (effective units), and I illustrated the point by combatants in Africa, who must yet be in my mind, in England, assuming that I could perceive those combatants were I near them in Africa. I indicated that whatever exists, so long as my mind exists, must be in my mind, either as effective or ineffective units, and that everything that is to exist, so long as my mind exists, must be in my mind, as ineffective units. These propositions are self-evident truths, if we grant, as I show in this work we must, that everything, as perceived, is sensation, and, as such, must be a constituent of a possible universe common to every mind that can possibly experience the particular sensation, as sensory impression. Reverting to the illustration—every combatant in Africa, if I did actually perceive him, would be an actualised part of my possible universe ; in other

words, he would be a particular sensory complex constituting specific sensation. But he could not possibly be such complex unless he were in my possible universe, as a "latent" constituent. As such latent constituent he, of course, would not be the sensation I derived from actually seeing him. Still he must be in my mind, as the particular sensation *in posse*, as truly as, when I see him, he is the particular sensation *in esse*.

All existing minds have the same possible universe, but every existing soul is willing this universe into realisation in one or another way differently in comparison with another soul. One soul is hypnotising the matter-soul into sub-souls, constituting a realised part of this universe as African sensory bodies. Another soul is willing a European or American actualised section. One soul is so willing a Strand section. Another soul is willing a Regent Street section. One soul is willing a horse section ; another, a beetle section, or a book section. That each soul wills only some particular section of this possible universe common to all minds occurs because the Supreme Will so limits the realisation. Let us now see how these propositions bear on the question of post-terrestrial recognition of what we have recognised terrestrially.

The first thing to be impressed in the connection is that what we recognise terrestrially is, primarily, a universe inherent to the soul, but, until realised by the will, unknown, or "latent" as regards the medium, which medium is itself part of that universe, becoming

Post-Terrestrial Recognition 471

ineffective units so soon as the soul manifests itself post-terrestrially, through another medium, and so realises a further grade of its will-continuum, and, corollarily, universe-continuum. As the terrestrial universe is realised through the terrestrial medium, so the post-terrestrial universe will be realised through the post-terrestrial medium. Under such conditions, though the soul might hypnotise the matter-soul, post-terrestrially, as it did terrestrially, the resultant of the hypnotism realised by another medium might be entirely different from that realised by the terrestrial medium. The same matter-soul which afforded sub-souls, or bodies, through the soul's terrestrial hypnotism, would continue to afford sub-souls, only these sub-souls would involve different sensory and psychical bodies as compared with those realised during the earthly stage. Were this to occur—as I believe it will—our own bodies, or mediums, would, of course, be changed as were all other bodies. Would this involve an absolute rupture between terrestrial and post-terrestrial experiences such as would prevent our recognising the people with whom we had been closely or casually associated on earth?

In dealing with this question I may first draw the reader's attention to some points discussed in an earlier chapter dealing with biology from the metaphysical standpoint. In chapter iii. volume ii. I showed that procreation, involving the multiplication of souls, was determined by a special soul-fiat, and that the mechanical, physiological, and biological factors dealt with by empiricism, as indicating causa-

tive efficiency in regard to procreation, were merely incidental accompaniments totally devoid of causative significance. Thus, what the biologist deals with as germ-cells are, from our present standpoint, merely sensory bodies, no more efficient to determine soul-multiplication than are any other sensory bodies.

In every act of procreation a fresh soul comes to exist, and if its medium is within the experience of existing minds—in conventional terms, if it is born—it is part of the universe of all existing minds. Certain minds realise this part of their universe as the particular sensory complex or medium which we call, say, an infant or puppy. Each specific newborn medium, as infant or puppy, must be in the possible universe of each existing mind that can possibly realise such medium under the conditions of what we call sensing. What we call the perception of typical likeness or identity which would apparently ensure the recognition under the conditions of sensing, without necessitating that the specific medium should already be in the percipient, or mind, as ineffective units, is itself merely a product of the soul's willing of affective bodies involving the sensation of likeness, coincidently with its willing of sensory bodies affording material between which the likeness exists. The likeness, or affective body, is not the primary fact. Before the likeness can exist, the sensory bodies must exist between which there is likeness. As already shown, before sensory bodies can exist, as "patent," or effective units, they must exist, as "latent," or

Post-Terrestrial Recognition 473

ineffective units. Accordingly, if a new-born child or puppy is not "latent" in every mind, the particular sensory complex, as child or puppy, so far as regards minds not containing it as latent, can never exist at all. If any particular child or puppy is not latent in my universe, I cannot perceive such child or puppy even though I am with a person who has it in his arms, and though I can see and touch other objects as he can.

As already often indicated, the object, as perceived, can only be as it already exists in the mind, as ineffective units. The child or puppy is only perceived as an object, not in its essential character as a soul. As such object it is a sub-soul of the matter-soul, as is every other object, and as such is necessarily part of the possible universe of every existing mind. From our present standpoint, just as this child or puppy is part of the terrestrial universe of every terrestrial mind, so it will be part of the post-terrestrial universe of every post-terrestrial mind to which it was a terrestrial body. Whatever be its relation, as part of their possible universe, to terrestrial minds, will persist to post-terrestrial minds. Post-terrestrially, this child or puppy will be an object to specific minds to which it was a terrestrial object. If that child or puppy becomes adult to some terrestrial minds, as part of their actualised universe, it will be adult to some post-terrestrial minds, as part of their actualised universe. Correspondingly with their recognition of the child, puppy, or respective adults, post-terrestrial minds will recog-

nise those sensory complexes as some form of continuity with terrestrial experience. Once a soul has emanated from the ante-cosmic organic soul, that cosmic soul becomes an integrant of cosmic evolution in which there is no break. All is decreed at the beginning ; one stage of cosmic evolution decides another. So it is of post-cosmic evolution, which is continuous with cosmic evolution.

In regard to the above propositions it must be borne in mind that I am dealing with the child and puppy, as illustrations of a general principle, as sensory bodies, not as souls. Without affecting post-terrestrial recognition of sensory bodies, soul-evolution might materially affect the experiences incident to such recognition. Thus, terrestrial emotions regarding particular sensory bodies, as those we love or hate, might be reversed or modified in a multitude of ways, through respectively different accomplishments of soul-evolution on earth. The rogue, here, might realise blighted attachments in his next stage of soul-evolution. Those he loved, here, might excite his repugnance as having transcended his soul-evolution, and he might feel remorse and anguish through realising his revulsion. Those who loved him, here, might experience a like revulsion, post-terrestrially, with corresponding pain. Such possibilities which are susceptible of speculative elaboration to any extent would not necessarily affect post-terrestrial recognition, though, of course, they would materially affect the experiences incident to the recognition. So far as sensory recognition is concerned, I

Post-Terrestrial Recognition 475

believe we may safely speculate on its post-terrestrial continuity.

The question now arises, If we shall recognise mediums as sensory bodies post-terrestrially that we recognised as mediums terrestrially, shall we similarly recognise sub-souls of the matter-soul as ordinary objects? Shall we recognise our room and chair as we shall recognise our friend or child or a particular dog? The answer to this question is no. The room and chair are essentially different from the mediums constituting the friend, child, or dog, inasmuch as the latter are things, as souls, which evolve post-terrestrially, while the room and chair are terrestrial bodies not evolving post-terrestrially, constituted by the terrestrial soul's hypnotism of the matter-soul, which need involve no analogue post-terrestrially. Did post-terrestrial hypnotism of the matter-soul involve recognition of terrestrial hypnotism, such recognition would involve that the things to be recognised would need to be identical with those recognised terrestrially, the same sub-souls being constituted sensory bodies post-terrestrially as terrestrially. Were this so, our room and chair would be identical in the terrestrial and post-terrestrial stages. The case is different in regard to a medium evolving with its soul. In the post-terrestrial stage this medium would be willed according to the soul's altered conditions of realising the will-continuum, and the recognition would be as between organic souls, not in respect to mere willing of the matter-soul. In regard to mediums the recognition would be through

no memory of the medium as a terrestrial body, but through intuition of a past stage of soul-evolution common to the respective mediums. Of such intuition there are instances even in ordinary experience, when two people casually meet after long separation and, though all sensory guides to memory have been effaced, recognise one another as by a flash of inspiration. Though their bodies are entirely altered they are still recognised as the bodies they were before the time-lapse. No such effect as this could occur in regard to mere sub-souls of the matter-soul. Again, as will be evident when I come to treat of empirical hypnotism, what is called *rapport*, involving particular influence of one over another soul, is typical of what may be conceived as post-terrestrial recognition.

It may be asked, Does my speculation involve that we shall actually recognise every living thing we have recognised on earth? I reply, This contingency is not at all involved. The recognition, though involving post-terrestrial sensory bodies, will be, essentially, as between souls, and will be limited as it was on earth. I have seen a vast number of people whom I should not know again. Between me and them there was no soul-recognition. Their recognition merely involved hypnotism of the matter-soul into specific sensory bodies. On the other hand, a number of people are dead and otherwise out of my immediate experience who are, nevertheless, what I may term soul-intimates, or, to adopt psychiatric terminology, in *rapport*. These souls I believe I

Post-Terrestrial Recognition 477

shall recognise post-terrestrially. Similarly some brutes have been within this soul-intimacy. Them also I believe I shall recognise post-terrestrially. To put the matter concisely, I believe that my actualised universe, post-terrestrially, will be limited as is my present actualised universe, and that the latter will largely condition the former.

It may be asked, At what particular stage shall I recognise those with whom I have been in terrestrial soul-intimacy? Shall I recognise my friend as I knew him as a lad or man? Will the aged parent recognise his child as an infant or an adult? I reply that post-terrestrial recognition need not involve any specific terrestrial recognition. The aged terrestrial parent may have entirely forgotten his child as an infant. That does not affect his recognition of his child. I have no very vivid mind-picture of my mother's face, yet I feel assured I should immediately recognise her were she to rise from the grave as a terrestrial sensory body. An infant which I saw die about two years ago has left no very vivid sense-impression, yet it has left a vivid soul-impression, and I have no doubt I should recognise it were it to reappear as a sensory body among a hundred infants.

It may be asked, Will there be post-terrestrial sexual recognition and its consequences—procreation? No; inasmuch as all souls existing post-terrestrially must have existed terrestrially as products of the ante-cosmic organic soul. As earlier indicated, procreation, involving the first appearance of individual

souls, involves emanation from the ante-cosmic organic soul and must be consummated during the earthly stage of soul-evolution. The appearance of individual souls involves evolution of the ante-cosmic organic soul. Like all other evolution, this involves continuity of stages. Were post-terrestrial procreation to occur, souls would exist which had not manifested continuity of descent from the ante-cosmic organic soul. Such souls would negate evolution through involving omission of a stage of descent. To illustrate this point from the standpoint of empirical evolutionism—the human embryo passes through vermiform, reptilian, and lower mammalian stages, constituting what may be termed a dissolving view of organic creation, permanently culminating in the distinctly human structure. None of these stages could be omitted without destroying evolutionary continuity. So it is in regard to the products of the ante-cosmic organic soul. Were an individual soul to be procreated post-terrestrially, it would be equivalent to a human embryo in which some lower stage of progression had been omitted. According to the logic of evolutionism such an issue could not occur, inasmuch as a higher can only proceed from a predetermined lower stage, and so on, backwards, in rigid sequence, to the first stage.

Of course, empirical evolutionism—as I shall indicate more in detail in a later chapter—will not satisfy philosophy. From my standpoint, as I hope the reader will be well aware, the structures dealt with by empirical evolutionism are merely sensory

Post-Terrestrial Recognition 479

bodies, the evolution of which occurs in the mind which has them as part of its actualised universe. The human soul hypnotises the matter-soul into these evolving structures, constituting them mind-stuff. Conventional evolutionism deals with them as things outside mind. They may or may not be outside mind. Philosophy can only prove them to be inside mind. If there is any means of proving them to be outside mind, apprehensible to philosophy, then philosophy will grant they are outside mind. To the apprehension of philosophy there is no such means ; so philosophy denies that the structures, as they exist as sensory bodies in the mind, exist anywhere else than in the mind. To philosophy, the morphological sequences dealt with by empirical evolutionism are sequences of things in the mind. Assuming that the souls constituting these structures, as mediums, constitute them *as* they are fabricated by the human mind, then they are objectively real both inside and outside the mind. As the mind can only know its own universe, it cannot know if its own universe is identical with any other universe. Consequently, it cannot know if the structures dealt with empirical evolutionists are the same outside as inside the mind. So far as philosophy is concerned, what these structures are outside the mind are sub-souls of the matter-soul constituted as mediums by their respective souls. Philosophy believes that the sequences of sensory bodies dealt with by empirical evolutionism constitute real sequences outside the mind ; but philosophy does not believe that the real things,

outside the mind, constituting these sequences, are the structures dealt with by empirical evolutionism.

Let us now glance at this subject from a more sentimental standpoint than that we have hitherto adopted. When my blood was several years hotter, and when emotion applied the whip more effectively than now, I wrote the following lines :—

DEATH—A MYSTERY

Oh ! mystery unsolved by mortal man,
What secret doth thy gloomy curtain hide ?
Why darkly loom to blight our earthly span,
And what lies deepest in our hearts deride ?
Wilt thou annul for ever those fond ties
Whose mighty influence doth our hearts enslave ;
Or, when thy spell hath waned, shall we arise
To reap a double rapture past the grave ?

Oh, for an eye to pierce thy awful night ;
Oh, for a magic that would bring to sight
The vanished face, the erewhile love-lit eye,
One moment's glance, then naught were it to die—
Naught to those left their earthly race to run,
Naught to those passing from the light of sun.
Shall we again behold that precious form,
Grasp firm the hand whose last convulsive clasp
Responded feebly ere thy rav'ning storm
Compelled a being's last expiring gasp ?
Or shall we meet, to earthly likeness blind,
Forgetting all the thousand little acts
Which, tendril-like, our mortal hearts entwined,
And once were mem'ry's fondly-treasured facts ;
Forgetting parent, brother, sister, friend,
Forgetting self—for self doth surely end
When all its feelings, actions, are a blot,
The very essence of its being forgot !

Post-Terrestrial Recognition 481

Alas, fell conjurer, vain 'tis to implore,
Ne'er gaoler locked, as thou, a prison door,
Ne'er sphinx did hide, as thou, a secret deep,
Ne'er dream played antic as thy dreamless sleep !
Reap thou thy harvest, snatch the young, the fair,
Bid grey hairs journey to thy sombre lair ;
Laugh love to scorn, tell man 'tis love in vain,
The deeper cherished, deeper in its pain.
Wrench as thou wilt, cruel ogre, thou shalt yield—
See hope's bright star doth flood the battle-field !
Man 'gainst thy scythe a trusty blade shall wield,
Against thy blow oppose a potent shield ;
That blade, that shield, thou doleful king of night,
Is trusting faith in God, the King of Light,
Faith that the purpose of Almighty power,
In planting seed is not to curse the flower—
That bloom celestial, fair as human love,
Shall deck anew celestial glades above.

Arch-robber, Death, thy poison-fang is drawn,
Thou art but darkness ere the coming dawn ;
Thy reign shall end as thou dost end this world,
Down, lifeless, monarch, down shalt thou be hurled !
Thy own elixir compassing thy doom,
Oblivion reap, O warder of the tomb ;
Let thy own poison, for thyself distilled,
Bring thee corruption—be thy task fulfilled ;
Drain deep the measure thou so oft hast brewed,
Let life-sweat from thee, drop by drop, exude ;
Thy torture turned upon thyself now feel.
Unpitied monster, dead, unpitied, reel !

Now I ask myself, Suppose I did know what actual experiences I should have beyond the grave, and that they would be a sort of reproduction of the ordinary terrestrial ties and worries, what the better should I be for the knowledge, apart from

satiated curiosity? Even during an average earthly life children grow up and form new domestic ties; connubial happiness, or unhappiness, as the case may be, becomes largely a matter of habit; friends become like old slippers—too familiar to be treasured. Suppose we were assured that we should renew every terrestrially sundered tie just as we had last experienced it on earth, would not the knowledge tend to excite a feeling of monotony rather than one of hope? Would not the assurance be likely to deaden the intensity of earthly attachments? Is not the very uncertainty, permitting hope, a factor largely responsible for our depth of attachment to kindred and friends? Do we realise the fulness of love until they have passed into the domain of hope and beyond that of certainty? A few years, or often months, and the pang of the physical separation is past, and hope irradiates memory of the loved ones. After the poignant wrench is past, can we say we would recall the dead to life? If we have such desire, can we reasonably suppose that it is not more on account of ourselves than of the dead? Have we any ground for supposing that, once dead, we should be advantaged by re-opening our earth-experiences? Life for me has, I daresay, the full measure of charm, but I have a strong repugnance to the notion of a miraculous revivification after I have once “shuffled off the mortal coil.” I enjoy a good dinner while I am about it, but I do not want to start *da capo* after the wine and walnuts. So, when I have attained *hic jacet*, the surfeit has come. I want no more earth!

Post-Terrestrial Recognition 483

Now let us look at another side of the shield. How many people do we really desire to meet on the other side of the tomb, if what we experience of them during life be the measure of the after-meeting? Kindred apart, I think—speaking for myself—I could number such people on my digits, while I could muster a full regiment respecting whom the last thing I should desire would be such a reunion. Indeed I may own that the assurance of meeting some part of this regiment would inspire me with a vague hunger for annihilation after I had done with these people on earth.

As indicated in the earlier part of this and in other chapters, philosophy offers us assurance of continuity of post-terrestrial with terrestrial experience. What this continuity will be, as actual experience, in comparison with earthly attachments and repugnances is, of course, beyond our ken. Here we must appeal to faith for satisfaction. Faith leads me to trust that those I have loved here and who have loved me will be loved and love in a future state. On the other hand, I have no assurance that the future presentment of love will be like its earthly pre-condition. Rather it will constitute a synthesis transforming the earthly into another grade of experience.

Again, as faith leads me to trust in a future renewal, under other conditions, of earthly attachments, I am equally assured of a renewal of earthly antipathies. Love, as manifested on earth, is an animal emotion with potentiality of being transformed into a purely human emotion. I believe this trans-

formation may occur in the next state. On the other hand, hate is an animal emotion with no potentiality for transformation into a purely human emotion. So long as soul-evolution has not eliminated the brute, hate must persist. Of course post-terrestrial hate will no more be the human experience than will post-terrestrial love. Still it will, we may assume, bear the same relation to the latter as exists terrestrially. I cannot suppose that, in the next stage of soul-evolution of my generation, or of generations to follow, the brute will be eliminated from humanity. I surmise that I and my generation will pass through many stages of soul-evolution before the human has, for us, overcome the brute. I believe that multitudes of bygone terrestrial generations have passed through multitudes of post-terrestrial stages of soul-evolution, and that some of these generations have attained a stage of soul-evolution in which the brute is completely extirpated. We of this generation possibly start, post-terrestrially, from a higher level than they did, but we have not passed through their stages. Some future generation may completely realise the terrestrial extirpation of the brute. Then there would be what theologians call the kingdom of heaven on earth.

CHAPTER XXXVII

BIOLOGICAL HEREDITY AND EVOLUTION

IN the present chapter I am going to argue from the standpoint of materialistic empiricism, and, adopting the essence of its formulas, against the materialistic doctrine of evolution. What appears in this chapter must be considered as a polemic against current materialism, and, except to the extent that it conforms with my metaphysic, as already formulated, must be taken as assumed fiction, to meet the contentions of fictionists. I am here taking ordinary evolutionists on their own ground, not on my ground, except to the extent that I demonstrate against them the futility of pretensions to account for organic changes on what are called naturalistic lines. In a word, though I argue in this chapter from the premise of body outside mind, the reader will please remember that for me body is in mind and nowhere else. After having debased my metaphysic, to meet the empiricist on his own ground, I shall restate evolutionism from my own standpoint.

No inorganic matter-system manifests an activity

even remotely approaching procreation. Again, just as distinct as is the procreative activity from anything occurring in the inorganic world, is the evolution of organic from that of inorganic matter-systems. Organic evolution is not primarily an evolution of *bodies*, but of *souls*. Thus, when I say that man has been evolved from the amœba, I do not imply that man's *soul* was potentially present in the soul of the first amœba, but I imply that the potentiality for all souls of amœbæ and men existed as an ante-cosmic product of emanation from God, and that man's terrestrial appearance, as an evolutionary derivative from the amœba, involves that, in the supposed ancestor of man and the anthropoid ape, there occurred a terrestrial realisation of the extra-cosmic emanative soul of *homo sapiens*, and that this ancestor of man and the ape was itself similarly realised, terrestrially, as the procreative issue of some earlier product of creation, and so on backward until the amœba was reached as itself a similarly realised procreative product of some still more primitive organism. From my standpoint, evolution, in the ordinary acceptance of the term, could no more involve the appearance of man, as the issue of the amœba, than an apple could beget a tin kettle.

When, as an evolutionist, I assert that man was evolved from the same progenitor as was the anthropoid ape, I do not mean that certain bits of protoplasm, or what not, called germ-cells of that progenitor, *proprio motu*, transformed themselves at two procreative acts, respectively, into man and ape

germinal matter. I mean that, extra-cosmically, the souls of a man and of an ape, at some specific period, were caused to appear terrestrially, as the product of sexual relationship between certain terrestrially existent organisms of the same type: that the type of man and the type of ape, on their first terrestrial appearance, involved phenomena which had never previously occurred, and would never again occur, viz. the phenomenal realisation of the extra-phenomenal emanative souls of all mankind, and all ape-kind. These terrestrially realised type-souls would contain the potential universes of all future souls of men and apes, but *only* of such souls. If any new type of organism, involving the terrestrial realisation of fresh type-soul, is destined to issue from man or the ape, this product will involve such an interference with what we understand as natural processes, as that I have sketched above regarding man and the ape.

Accumulated experience tells us that however many duck-eggs may be hatched, nothing but ducks will ever issue from those eggs, and biology has never known an egg of any animal to produce an animal of a type other than that from which the egg issued. Again, collective experience tells us that certain types of animal and vegetal life which now exist on the earth, did not once so exist, and that others which once existed, do not now exist. These different types must either have been specially created, or they must have issued, by what we call "natural" sequence, from the first type which was

created. A desire to interpret what we cannot, by what we can, empirically investigate, impels some of us to reject the assumption of special creation and to adopt that of "natural" sequence. Accordingly, such theorists say that all existent and non-existent organisms have been "evolved" from one ancestral type. To make a proposition of this sort is sensible procedure so long as our empiricism supports our hypothesis. However, this is here far from being the case. No empiricism has yet shown that one species of animal can beget another species. Accordingly, it is speculation opposed to empiricism, or collective experience, which involves this evolutionary implication that species can, of their own impulse, transform themselves into other species. If we adopt this evolutionary hypothesis, as do biologists, we adopt it against collective experience which tells us that one species always begets the same species.

It may be urged that collective experience does not deny, but rather affirms, that one species can beget another, only the transition between one and another species is so gradual that we cannot observe it. Such a contention is plausible, as speculation advanced to support a preconceived hypothesis that the phenomenal universe is self-sufficing and self-existent, and that all that has occurred to that universe can be interpreted without importing the notion of Deity. Those who hold such a view, of course, urge that, as we have a vast induction available to show that what these people call natural causes, are all-sufficient to account for phenomenal

changes, we must assume that what we cannot empirically investigate comes within the category of "natural" causation, just as does what we can so investigate. Such a contention might be valid did not inference from this very induction, as I show in this work, inevitably involve a caused universe, and an uncaused Origin "outside" that universe. As I show that the assumption of a self-existent universe is rationally untenable, it follows that the particular "naturalistic" proposition regarding species, falls with the larger "naturalistic" proposition regarding the universe, as a whole. If, under the conditions, we maintain the naturalistic view regarding species, without having any warrant from empiricism that one species has ever begotten a different species, we are adopting an assumption which, on the one hand, is not warranted by empiricism, and, on the other hand, is dead against philosophical inference from collective experience regarding cosmical causation.

In the sense that it is the terrestrial issue of one extra-cosmic soul, appearing cosmically as what I term a type-soul, humanity may be considered as a single entity, as may every other type of organism, the evolution of which involved what I may term a cataclysmic departure from its terrestrially originating type. It may be well to devote a little attention to this point. What do I mean by a "cataclysmic departure from its terrestrially originating type?" I mean that the general resemblance between some of the embryonic stages of a so-called higher type of organism, and the adult stage of a so-called lower

type which is adduced by biologists to show evolutionary continuity between the one type and the other, only demonstrates such continuity *in respect to the body*; but that the demarcation is complete between the *souls* of the "higher" and "lower" types. For instance, though the embryonic stages of a reptile, a bird, and a mammal, as sensory bodies, undoubtedly include that of a worm, I maintain that when the first reptile, bird, mammal, appeared on earth, there was what I may term a special interference with, or cataclysmic soul-differentiation in, the sequence of organic life. I maintain that what caused the transition, in each case, was *no self-evolved change in the body*, but that the real cause was the terrestrial realisation of another type-soul as the germinal cell of the particular organism originating the new departure. Adopting biological terminology and standpoint, I maintain that, in such a case, there was a fresh invasion from the extra-phenomenal, of biophors constituting a new evolutionary feature in the metamorphosis of organic life. What zoologists call classes, orders, families, species, have all, from my present standpoint, arisen through such cataclysmic interference with pre-existing organic sequence. Whenever a distinctly new *hereditary* factor has first manifested itself, I maintain that there has been a terrestrial realisation of the extra-cosmic soul as a fresh type-soul involving evolution.

To take a case of obvious resemblance, when we compare the nervous system of a man with that of an ape, though we recognise many structural

identities, we also perceive some great divergences. If man and the ape have branched from a common ancestor, we may reasonably postulate equally great differences between the nervous systems of that ancestor and of man and the ape. We must, from my present standpoint, postulate a new soul-evolution, in the cases of man and the ape in relation to their common ancestor, and in the cases of man and the ape as between themselves. This involves cataclysmic interference with established order, as re-creation.

It may be urged that it is arbitrary to invoke the special interference at certain stages of change and not at others, and the question accordingly occurs : Why not posit such a terrestrial realisation of extra-cosmic soul in the case of each individual birth ? Empirically, we can answer such a question only by applying biological verification to the contingencies. Though we grant all that such an evolutionist as Haeckel advances regarding the evolution of the organic from the inorganic ; of man from the monad, we are really not touching the fundamental question : naturalism, or supernaturalism ? Though palæontology can show that the horse had once five toes and no hoof, unless we can prove the universe to be self-existent, we have no grounds for asserting that the first horse-soul was not something ontologically distinct from the reptile-soul, or germ-plasm, from which the first ancestor of the horse emerged. Either the new quality constituting the horse-factor must have existed "for ever" in a self-existent universe, and, corollarily, in that part of it

called a reptile, or the horse-quality must have come to exist in a universe created by an extra-cosmic Power.

Assuming we adopt the latter as the only rationally tenable contingency, then it does not matter to "science," as stickler for the "natural," whether we say the soul of the horse was in the reptile's soul, or that the soul of the horse was "superposed" on the soul of the reptile. There is then really no more "supernaturalism" involved in assuming the "superposition," *ab extra*, than in assuming the "projection" of the new quality, *ab intra*. Then, as collective experience tells us that species beget the same species, we have no reason, except our preconceived (as naturalistic philosophers) "naturalistic" fancy, for denying that specific difference is imposed *ab extra*. On the other hand, as collective experience tells us that *individuals* beget others differing, within specific limits, from themselves, we may argue, on the basis of this experience, that, though the new quality involving a new species, is imposed *ab extra*, the new quality involving a differentiated individual, within specific limits, is "projected" *ab intra*: in other words, that each species, as originally appearing, contains the evolutionary "material," or potentiality, for all individual difference within specific limits. Thus, in the case of the appearance of a new species, we argue from collective experience (that species beget the same species) that new species must have been imposed *ab extra*: in other words, must have involved a re-creative act of God. On the other hand, in regard to the individual, arguing from

collective experience that individuals beget different individuals, we conclude that individual, as distinct from specific difference, is "projected" *ab intra*: in other words, that individual difference was contained, as created potentiality, within specific difference, and, accordingly, that we have no need to import a new creative act to account for the differentiated individual, as we have to import such act to account for the differentiated species.

The conventional doctrine of evolution will need to be modified. The modified, or what I may term transcendently materialistic, doctrine of evolution necessitates the assumption of an ante-cosmic emanative soul, just as it necessitates the assumption of an ante-cosmic universe, in some such sense as that implied by Mr. Herbert Spencer's hypothesis of matter as in a state of "indefinite, incoherent homogeneity." My own view, compromising with materialism, of this ante-cosmic process of evolution, in regard to the inorganic, is thus stated, in *Rhythmic Heredity* (Williams and Norgate, 1894):—

"In my opinion, scientists will ultimately have to adapt their theories to some such evolutionary *schema* as the following:—

"First Cause.

"*Method*: Evolution.

"*Issue*. Energy: the ether of supermechanics, an immateriality containing in combination all potentialities manifest in matter as what are called physical and chemical energies. (Here I have slightly altered the formula as given in *Rhythmic Heredity*.)

"First stage of evolution. Matter : equivalent to the ether of physics. This is supermechanical energy existing as materialised and specialised analogues of its own potentialities, in the form of particles endowed with rhythmical periods as the analogues of the potentialities.

"Second stage of evolution. Integration of the former, constituting the equivalents of the atoms of chemistry. These are endowed with fixed rhythms corresponding to, but, corollarily, more complex than those of the former.

"Third stage of evolution. Reciprocal activity between two or more of the above, constituting the equivalents of the molecules of chemistry and physics. These molecules have fixed rhythms, equivalent to the 'mean free path' of molecular physics, and by reciprocal actions analogous to those of the preceding stage, cause mass-matter to issue.

"The above assumptions imply that all conditions are foreshadowed in the ether of supermechanics, as are all the conditions of organic development, in the germ-plasm : the universe being thus an organism developing under evolutionary conditions. This involves an embodiment of the incorporeal. If it involves metaphysics, it is metaphysics established by physics. Call it what we may, it is, at present, the inevitable inference from facts. When facts give a contrary verdict, will be the time for practical men to sniff at the metaphysics" (pp. 18-20).

The above quasi-materialistic statement refers to the ante-cosmic emanation of what we call the inor-

ganic. From our present "hybrid" standpoint, we may apply this conception of evolution to what we call the organic, involving a creative act distinct from that causing the inorganic. The ante-cosmic soul preceding physiological life may be assumed as an inchoate homogeneity containing all potentialities for the "coherent heterogeneity" which we apprehend as the evolutionary sequence of organic life. The process of evolutionary differentiation of the ante-cosmic soul involves, not the ante-cosmic differentiation into *individual souls*, but into integrations of the potentialities of individual souls, each integration representing an organic species equivalent to what in my metaphysic is a type-soul. To illustrate this: though the ante-cosmic soul contains the potentialities for the amœboid and human souls, the terrestrial realisation of the ante-cosmic soul, constituting the first amœba, does not involve that the first amœboid contains all the potentialities of the first human soul. Between the amœba and man there have been a vast number of terrestrial realisations of potentialities of the ante-cosmic soul. These terrestrial realisations constitute the new creative acts involving the terrestrial appearance of new species. Thus, one species does not contain the evolutionary potentialities of a succeeding species. The latter involves fresh terrestrial realisation of the ante-cosmic soul. On the other hand, the first *specific* soul contains potentialities for all succeeding individual souls of that species. Thus, if man and the anthropoid ape originated from one ancestral soul, whatever new

typical characters arose terrestrially through the appearance of the man-soul and ape-soul, would involve two fresh and distinct creative acts ; in other words, two fresh evolutionary differentiations of the ante-cosmic soul, involving the terrestrial appearance of fresh potentialities of the ante-cosmic soul, must then have been consummated, and the ante-cosmic soul must, thereby, have approached so much nearer the consummation of its predestined self-differentiation into complete, or final coherent heterogeneity. This assumption involves that the ante-cosmic soul was, at one time, a created inchoate, finite (limited) entity, just as Mr. Spencer's, or any other naturalistic evolutionary theory must involve that the physical universe was, at one time, an inchoate, finite entity. As the inchoate "physical" was created finite or limited, so was the inchoate "spiritual" so created. Mr. Spencer does not postulate a cosmic soul, but deals with soul as an evolutionary product identical with matter. Adopting this standpoint, he has resolutely opposed the Weismannian doctrine of evolution. Weismann's doctrine is fundamentally non-naturalistic. If life is what I propound it to be, and what Weismann's doctrine really implies (though Weismann has not squarely faced the fact), then Mr. Spencer's and all other naturalistic evolutionary hypotheses, even from the standpoint of naturalism, are radically unsound.

It will be seen from the foregoing extract from *Rhythmic Heredity*, that my standpoint seven or eight years ago involved what I may term an amalgam of

metaphysical and materialistic conception. I had not then so attained my ultimate metaphysical conclusions as to be able to formulate them entirely freed from materialistic impurity. The materialistic *virus* was not completely eliminated. Again, I was mainly concerned to meet conventional views from the conventional standpoint, as was the case in my dealing with scientific concepts in earlier parts of the present work. On such conditions, a compromise with materialism is necessary for the sake of exposition. It must be remembered that I only traverse materialism when applied outside its limitations to misleading regarding ultimate truths. Within its limitations, I accept its conclusions.

What applies to the physical, applies to the psychical. There has been no such automatic transition from one to another psychical "species" as is posited by materialistic evolutionism. If we consider as psychical types, analogous to organic species, the psychical forms of: (*a*) tendency to follow the line of least resistance; (*b*) common sensibility; (*c*) sight; (*d*) hearing; (*e*) touch; (*f*) taste; (*g*) smell; (*h*) discrimination by instinct; (*i*) discrimination by intelligence; (*j*) discrimination by reason; (*k*) discrimination by intellect—each has involved a new cosmic factor and, corollarily, an act of special creation.

The sense of the seeing reptile did not evolve (as posited on conventional lines) from the sense of the blind worm. The intelligence of the dog did not so evolve from his instinct, or from the instinct of any

other organism. The moral sense of the man and dog did not evolve from their instincts. The rational experience of cause and effect was not evolved from animal experience of change. The organism that first became aware of "consequence" could only attain the experience as representing a type-soul with a fresh universe. His intuition would be quite outside empiricism, involving the realisation in himself of a new product of creative fiat, imposing a new type-fiat conditioning his thinking apparatus. In a word, he would represent a type-soul endowed with a fresh universe. Of course, this new creative product might be simultaneously imposed on any number of creatures, or might be limited to one creature as prototype, and, given its creative origin, we may, if we like bowing to Darwinism, say that "selection" would involve the predominance of that part of creation in which the new quality was manifested. After all, our "selection" will merely involve creative determinism by God, and thus virtually negate its Darwinian implication of mechanical necessity.

The Weismannian application of Darwinism to hereditary elements really stultifies the demonstration of hereditary determinism through the germ, or else stultifies Darwinism. According to Darwinism, what proves its "fitness," by struggle, is the organism. According to Weismann, what prove their "fitness" are intracellular immortal constituents—"biophors." But how can immortal elements so prove their "fitness," when "unfitness" means extinction? The only test of fitness being survival, and of unfitness

death, to talk of "struggle" and "fitness" in connection with biophors, as defined by Weismann, is to talk meaninglessly. Biology stultifies its own demonstrations by applying Darwinism to hereditary elements. As they are life itself, how can they be killed? And if they cannot be killed, how can they succumb in the "struggle for life"?

Let us devote a little consideration to this question of immortality of biophors. Weismann has tried to escape the implication of life, in the metaphysical sense, by evading the logical issue of his own theory which is built on the implication that organic life is something essentially different, as procreative energy, from inorganic "life," and that what involves organic life is the metaphysical entity which he calls biophor, or life-element. Apparently adapting himself to fashionable materialistic notions, Weismann virtually postulates the life-elements as, at once, living and non-living. First, he says they are immortal, in the sense that they go on dividing "for ever." Then he says that they "struggle for life." Obviously, if they struggle for life, they are not life-elements, but merely "dead" matter transiently endowed with "life." Then, in postulating his biophors, he is as far from scientifically identifying life itself as is the crudest mysticism or materialism. His biophors are merely the atoms of conventional physics, endowed with some mystical attribute, by implication, outside Weismannian scrutiny. As such they are totally inadequate to support his elaborate theories regarding the facts of cellular division and perpetuation.

If Weismann's biophoric integration constituting the germ-nucleus is to be anything more than a verbal inspissation, it must be postulated as the equivalent of what I demonstrate as soul, and to define such a vital factor as a combination of a number of separate entities called biophors or anything else, materialistically conceived, is merely to incarnate a spiritual entity into fanciful forms conforming with our sensual notions of substance. To be consistent with logical necessity, biophors must be equivalent to the directive faculty which advanced physicists and chemists perceive as conditioning the activities of physical atoms, and which conception projects conventional matter into spirit. To postulate biophors as struggling for life is equivalent to postulating the directive faculty of atoms as struggling for directive faculty, or life itself as struggling for life.

Biophors in a germ-cell no more "struggle" than does the directive faculty in atoms. Biophors are to the physiological organism what the directive faculty posited by chemists is to the chemical atom. As this directive faculty is to the atom, so is the biophoric integration or soul to the germ-nucleus. The nucleus is the material world of the biophoric integration, as the chemical atom is the world of the directive faculty. The atom itself, as materialised by the chemist and physicist, or the nucleus, as materialised by Weismann, is no more outside sense illusion, and ultimately real than is the "solid substance" of the crude sensualist. Weismann's biophors no more struggle for life than the chemist's directive faculty of atoms struggles for

that faculty. Both, according to empirical implication, simply manifest facts according to supreme determinism.

Let us further consider Darwinism by the light of biology. As, according to biology, somatic effects (food, climate, "use and disuse") cannot touch biophoric determinism, Darwinian organic fitness, dependent on somatic influences, cannot touch hereditary determinism through the germ, and hence cannot affect to any appreciable extent the survival of one out of a number of like types under similar environment. I maintain that Darwinism is utterly inadequate to account for the origin of species by natural selection acting on minute sporadic differences (necessarily determined in the germ as fully as is normal type). No alimentary or climatal determinism could decide the predominance of one or another of such differences unless such somatic effects could modify the germ, which biology proves they cannot. Excluding such effect on the germ, how is it conceivable that a few "sports" out of millions of their type, under like environment, should fortuitously prevail over the rest? The proposition of such a result would seem to me about as worthy of credence as the tale of Old Mother Hubbard.

Of course it is obvious that conditions suiting one type may enable it to prevail over another type unsuited to the conditions; but this is quite another matter to granting that a few individuals of a type, under the same external conditions, and by the mere force of those conditions, can come to supplant the rest. In the first place, to render credible the hypo-

thesis, we must assume that the environment favouring the particular "sport" remains constant to practical infinity; next, we must assume that no other "sport" still better adapted to the particular environment appears during the process of fixation. But as, *ex hypothesi*, these sports are continuously appearing, why shall we not assert that no sport, on the conditions, could become a fixed type before another sport had nullified the efforts of the earlier one by manifesting superior adaptation? Is not this assumption as well grounded as the Darwinian's? What right have we to say of any fixed type: Here is the result of a struggle for survival, under persisting external conditions, of the posterity of one particular sport of some ancestral type? Remember there is no effect on the procreative capacity involved. This could only occur through alteration of the germ. The only factors to account for the result are, on the Darwinian assumption, a practically infinitely persistent environment and an arbitrarily imagined cessation of adaptable variability at one particular sport destined to fix the future type. Thus, while "chance" variability is invoked to start the process of typical fixation, the implication is that determinism rigidly decides how far this "chance" variability shall proceed so as to ensure a temporally infinite scope for one particular sport. To me this much of Darwinism is outside reason.

Unless there be somatic effects on the germ there can be, biologically speaking, no origin of species through sports and natural selection. That there is no somatic effect on the germ is the great demonstra-

tion of modern investigation of the cell, and, of course, constitutes one of the main empirical evidences for supernatural determinism and against mechanical evolutionism.

Let us now see how Weismannism bears on special creation. Every structural peculiarity of the organism is determined in the germ-cell. Then, obviously, we must either say the germ-cell itself selects out of its own potentialities which of them shall be manifested as the organism, or that the germ-cell, by external compulsion, manifests certain, and no other potentialities. As environment cannot affect the biophoric constituents of the germ-cell, it cannot affect the potentialities of the germ-cell to determine the organism. Then the first germ-cell that existed must either have contained the potentialities for all future germ-cells, or some fresh potentialities must have been added to later germ-cells. If the first germ-cell contained the potentialities of all other germ-cells, it must have suppressed some of these potentialities, or all types of organism would have come into existence together. How could a germ-cell be conceived to suppress any one of its potentialities were it not what we understand as a conscious, volitionally free agent? We will exclude this sort of primitive germ-cell. The mechanical evolutionist does not want it, nor do I. So we are driven to assume a primitive germ-cell lacking a number of potentialities within future germ-cells. As germ-cells cannot be conceived to manufacture that with which they are not endowed, any more than can potatoes, and as they manifest

whatever endowments they possess, if a later germ-cell manifests potentialities not manifested by an earlier one, the potentialities must have come from some source outside the germ-cell ; in other words, the new potentialities must have been specially created, just as must the original germ-cell itself. Result : the mechanical theory of evolution is demolished by biology. No organically new product can issue except through a germinally new product, and no germinally new product can issue except through special creation.

I will now offer a few remarks on Weismann's work, entitled *Germinal Selection* (Open Court Publishing Company, 1896), which embodies, so far as I know, his latest views on germinal determinism, and to which work I have referred in earlier parts of *Heresies*. To judge from Weismann's book, he is getting alarmed at the teleological monster he has raised in his theory of germ-plasm, and is now making, in my opinion, some laboured and futile attempts to escape that determinism which I have, in various works, emphasised as the inevitable issue of his doctrines. He seems to assume that, by applying to biophors the doctrine of "struggle for life," which Darwin applied to organisms, he (Weismann) has satisfactorily interpreted, without invoking the supernatural, the processes which afford the basis for Darwinian selection. In his own words (page 38): "The principal and fundamental objection that selection" (Darwinian) "is unable to create the variations with which it works, is removed by the apprehension

that a germinal selection exists. Natural selection is not compelled to wait until 'chance' presents the favourable variations, but supposing merely that the groundwork for favourable variations is present in the transforming species, that is, supposing merely that in the constitutional basis of the part to be changed are contained components which render favourable variations possible by a change of their" (the components') "numerical ratio, then those variations *must* occur, for the reason that quantitative fluctuations are always happening, and they must also be augmented as soon as personal" (Darwinian) "selection intervenes, and permanently holds over them her protecting hand."

This "germinal selection" is fundamentally what I have advanced in various works as atomic and biophoric selection. However, while I logically expand this idea to its inevitable issue—creative determinism, thus importing the teleological factor—Weismann assumes that he has escaped determinism by attributing to his biophors a "struggle for life." In this procedure, he emulates the physicist's method of "explaining," say, gases, by attributing to molecules the very gaseous qualities which are to be explained. Molecules are elastic; therefore, gases are elastic. Similarly organisms struggle for life; therefore, biophors struggle for life. This easy procedure is imposing to some people; still, it is merely circus-work, affording no real progression. Like the chemist who sees, in atoms, the directive power behind chemical phenomena, but ignores the

necessity of directive power behind atoms, Weismann sees, in the struggle between biophors, the origin of the Darwinian "struggle," but ignores what causes the assumed biophoric struggle. There is air conveying sound ; therefore there is, according to physicists, ether conveying light. The biologist chimes in : There are organisms struggling for life ; therefore, there are biophors struggling for life. This procedure I will call analogy run to hysterics. Why should biophors struggle ? Because organisms do ? But organisms, so far as we can apprehend them, are proximately independent of one another ; biophors, according to biology, are rigidly integrated as constituent potentialities of a determining cell. How could they become so integrated, if they were perpetually engaged in a mutual struggle for life ? To secure such integration would necessitate the nicest co-operation. Struggle is the very antithesis of such a state of integration as is assumed by biologists.

Again, we can form some coherent notion of what provokes struggle among organisms ; but what provokes it among biophors ? According to Weismann, nutriment is the main provocative. Biophors are as gluttonous as corporations, or religious associations. If these little fellows do not get plenty of "turtle" they languish like aldermen, or pietists of the London Missionary Society, who, according to a newspaper report, find such dainty trifles as *Bisque d'Homard*, Turtle, *Crème d'Anchois*, *Sorbet à la Chartreuse*, Mayonnaise of Lobster, Liebfraumilch, G. H. Mumm, Ex.

Qual., Ex. Dry, Liqueurs, etc., conducive to that fanatical enthusiasm characteristic of the modern Christian propagandist. Just as we may assume, the alderman or Christian propagandist would languish in default of the *chef's* stimulus, so these biophors lose all life-zest if their waistcoats feel slack. In fact, they then leave the biophoric community, and betake themselves to *ewigkeit*, so I assume, though Weismann does not tell us where they go to under the dire contingency. At any rate, they must die, in order to consummate that "change of their numerical ratio," through which, so Weismann tells us in the above quotation, "variations must occur." I am as utterly unable to reconcile the idea of dying biophors with Weismann's earlier definition of these factors as life-elements, as I am unable to reconcile the idea of struggling biophors with the Weismannian conception of germ-plasm as being unaffected by extraneous influences. If these biophors struggle for food, and die when they cannot get it, or when they get the wrong sort, then, I maintain, Weismann may save himself further trouble in combating "use-inheritance." Here is my reason for the contention: Biophors, on the assumption, depend on the soma for food. As the soma is modified by extraneous influences, the biophors' food will be modified. Corollarily, the germ-plasm will be modified, and extraneous influence, through the soma, is thus implied to have hereditary effect.

The following passage, first published in the *National Reformer*, May 28, 1893, and later incor-

porated in *Against Dogma and Freewill and For Weismannism* (2nd edition, Williams and Norgate, 1893), may interest readers of "Germinal Selection," and the above comments on Weismann's presentation of it. I think the passage shows that I had mentally anticipated the principle of germinal selection as propounded by Weismann, September 1895, and that it indicates the line of cleavage between my views and those to which I have above taken objection, as invalidating Weismann's hypothesis of germ-plasm. I will italicise those parts to which I particularly wish to direct the reader's attention:—"The great distinction between Darwinians and Weismannites is that the former assume that they are at the root of the question of selection when they are merely examining the trunk. From their point of view it is sufficient if they can show that certain processes, which they call selection, cessation of selection, reversal of selection, *acting on multicellular organisms*, afford a reasonable explanation of the cause of typical diversity. Now Weismannites maintain that *the basis of selection lies altogether deeper than influences affecting multicellular organism*. Such selective processes, operating at a comparatively late stage of evolution, *do not establish selection; this was established before complex organism existed*. . . . Selection has thus done its main work before these selective processes, as discussed by Darwinians, began to energise. Nevertheless, processes of selection . . . which are demonstrably able to determine what types of complex organism shall persist, are likewise prob-

ably competent to decide the predominance of certain true factors of heredity (character-determining components of one-cell organisms). So soon as these monads have coalesced into complex organism, primitive selection has done its work, and heredity in respect to this organism is established. Then begins the Darwinian process, the eliminative as distinguished from the constructive process of typification. *The prime factors of heredity (the determinants of the ids) are entirely unaffected by this later process. . . .* According to Weismannism, there is no need to assume any principle other than Natural Selection as adequate to explain all adaptation. But, *behind Natural Selection is the Inscrutable which constituted that law the all-sufficient factor*" (p. 187).

The primitive process of selection postulated in the above passage is radically different from that now postulated by Weismann. His "selection" is practically that which Darwinism attributes to physiological organisms. My "selection" implies aggregation arising from predetermined affinities. This seems to me the only selection reconcilable with Weismann's main hypotheses. The selection he posits, as I have shown, is irreconcilable with his main hypotheses. Weismann's biophors die. Mine, as soul, are immortal. And, that biophors are immortal is implied by "continuity of the germ-plasm." If the germ-plasm is unalterable, through the soma, as is involved in the denial of hereditary effect through extraneous influences, dying biophors are inadmissible, because dying biophors involve

feeding biophors, and feeding biophors involve food through the soma, and food through the soma involves biophors conditioned by the soma, hence involving hereditary effect through somatic, or extraneous, influence. I had no original reason for advocating Weismann's hypothesis of germ-plasm, beyond the fact that it appeared to me conformable with my own assurances from a wide field of inquiry, of determinism. That influences on the soma do not hereditarily affect the type was, to me, conviction before I had read a line of Weismann, and, in my opinion, the proposition stands irrefutable, whether we accept or reject the doctrine of biophors. This merely deals with symbols, just as does the physical doctrine of atoms. As the reader will perceive, my acceptance of any hypothesis, whether it be Darwinism, Spencerism, Weismannism, Newtonism, Maxwellism, Kelvinism, or any other "ism," is a very provisional affair. I am a good Agnostic with regard to all "isms," except this: that all hypotheses are futile and noxious which seek to exclude creative determinism as the prime efficient of phenomena. On this point I am as dogmatic as Cardinal Vaughan himself.

The modern conception of evolution as the process of initiation of fresh types from individuals deviating from pre-existing norms is a century older than the Darwinian epoch. Darwin, as it were, crystallised earlier fragmentary notions into a comprehensive theory, the pivotal axiom of which is natural mutation, as opposed to supernatural creation; in other words, mutation originated by a

self-existent, spontaneous cosmos, as against mutation originated by a self-existent, spontaneous factor, not the cosmos. Evolutionism, as conventionally interpreted, means, in its ultimate aspect, denial of God as determining the cosmos.

Empirically, this conventional evolutionism is impregnable—there has been no special creation, in the antique sense. Types, so far as we sensually apprehend them as matter-systems, have arisen from anterior types by natural transition, not by cataclysmic interference with existing order. On the other hand, when we look at the question from the standpoint of philosophy, we must assert, against this empiricism, that every new manifestation of potentiality involves a new creative fiat—that, behind what we sensually perceive as morphological change, is what we do not sensually perceive—the directive faculty, or soul-fiat, which constitutes the new potentiality itself. This potentiality, of which we only sensually recognise the outward manifestation, as, say, structural change, is the condition of what we call evolution, and involves new creative interference.

The antique doctrine of special creation failed, not because it propounded special creation, but because it was really as materialistic as is its modern conqueror. The bodies with which it dealt are the bodies of modern materialism. Accordingly it was inherently subjected to empirical scrutiny, and so soon as such scrutiny could demonstrate continuity, in place of special creation, the antique doctrine collapsed. The modern doctrine of continuity will collapse because

it is inherently subjected to metaphysical scrutiny, and this shows special creation in place of continuity.

As conventionally interpreted, evolutionism will never demonstrate more than the fact of sequence of phenomena. About essential causes and origins of phenomena it will ever be a blank equally with its non-empirical forerunner—the classical evolutionism of ante-scientific introspectionists. Though it has demolished current theological creeds, modern evolutionism strengthens the proof of God, and, when not applied outside its arena, it affords through the demonstration of determinism, a firmer ground for ethics than had previously existed. On the other hand, as merely part of the body of natural science, evolutionism has no claim to deal with questions inherently outside the arena of empiricism. In respect to ultimate questions, science is only the machinery to be manipulated by philosophy. Natural science affords the bases of inference; philosophy has to synthetise these bases, and must project the result beyond empiricism. On the warrant of empiricism itself we must now renounce the concept of matter as involving the qualities—visibility and tangibility, or density and weight—on the assumption of which, as constituting the essence of matter, rests the mechanical evolutionary theory. The physical concept of matter, as mass and motion, is now superseded, as ultimate science, by concepts of matter virtually postulating it as equivalent to spirit. Soon the whole scientific phantasmagoria will become

spiritualistic and "evolution" resolve itself into sequence of mind-phenomena emanating from a non-phenomenal mind-entity.

As evolutionism is unable to account for the origin of things by any hypothesis other than that the universe has created itself, or has been created by some Power outside itself, it tacitly implies that, at some time or other, there has been arbitrary interference with the *status quo* of nothingness. Some evolutionists try to evade the dilemma of creation by asserting that the universe is without beginning, or self-existent, but, as we know of nothing in the universe capable of affording us a notion of "without beginning," the terms have no rational significance. When we imply time, we imply beginning and ending, and as we only cognise the universe in time, we must attribute to it beginning and ending. Well, if the universe created itself, it caused what did not previously exist, and if God created the universe, God caused what did not previously exist. In either case arbitrary interference is implied as fully as in any doctrine of special creation of organic types. If we grant one arbitrary interference, we have no ground, unless we can rationally disprove them, to deny a score, a thousand interferences, or arbitrary interference every moment. All we can do in the connection is to apply our logical faculty to observed facts, affirming as many arbitrary interferences as seem to us necessitated by the facts. For instance, as every organism begets its like, and none begets its typically unlike, we may reasonably affirm that each

new species has involved the terrestrial appearance of a hitherto non-existent product. Whether this product was latent in a self-created universe or imposed from without by God, does not affect the fact that, as constituting a new species, it involved a fresh creation—something that was not hitherto in the universe. That a fresh species contains certain typical attributes of other existing species does not affect the fact that what constitutes it a fresh species constitutes it a fresh product of creation, and involves interference with the existing order. The universe may be assumed on non-metaphysical lines (*a*) as a self-contained, self-existent organism, without beginning or end (which no evolutionary or any other doctrine can render rationally intelligible, let alone rationally demonstrate); (*b*) as a product of creation set going at some point in time, with all its contents once for all supplied; (*c*) as such a product with fresh contents periodically added. The demonstration of causation compels us to deny (*a*); the breaks in sequence (between inorganic and organic, between sensation and ideation) compel us to deny (*b*). Philosophy, as I show in this work, drives us to affirm (*c*). The materialist may assume evolutionary continuity, without external interference, in respect to all inorganic manifestations, but must, according to the logic of his cult, affirm interference at the appearance of organic life; at the appearance of each new species, and at the appearance of various faculties, such as hearing, sight, touch, taste, smell, ideation.

Really, the concept of evolution implies crea-

tion in every *first* change. If we assume the cosmic *primordium*, as Mr. Spencer's "incoherent homogeneity," and that this *primordium* evolves to "coherent heterogeneity," the latter, whether as planets, infusorians, elephants, nerve-fibres, sewing-machines, are really at their first appearance as much products of creation as was the *primordium* which Spencerism assumes as the first existence. The *thing*, whatever and whenever it may be, that *first* exists, however many constituents of pre-existing things it may contain, is as much product of a creative act as was the thing without antecedents, or "first" thing. "Evolution" and "creation" involve distinction without real difference. Evolutionists talk as though they had got rid of "creation" by assuming that the inception of a first product without known antecedent is intrinsically different from the inception of a first product *with* known antecedent. For instance, in this sense, the primordial ether is assumed to be essentially different, as a "first" product, from, say, the horse, as another "first" product. Through this fanciful distinction, evolutionists imagine arbitrary difference between a process of sequential development and one of what they term special creation. Because the earth was "evolved," say, from nebulæ, the earth, according to these evolutionists, was not "created." Because the horse was "evolved" from *cohippus*, the horse was not "created," and so on. Such distinction is really fanciful. The earth and horse were as truly "created" in "evolving," respectively, from what was not the earth or horse, as

though earth and horse appeared, without antecedents, from nothingness.

What we apprehend as earth involves something absolutely distinct from what we apprehend as *nebulae*; so, also, the horse involves something absolutely distinct from what we apprehend as *eohippus*. The apprehended *difference* constitutes what is created afresh. Assuming that one, or a number of differences, as say, ether, preceded another set of differences which we call the earth, the later is not less created than the earlier set of differences. So far as concerns creation, the "when" of the difference is insignificant. That one difference, as what we apprehend as effect, seems to spring from other differences, as what we call cause, does not preclude that creation is involved in the effect. There is no real cause, except the Cause of the universe. What we apprehend as cause, in phenomena, is really effect. Therefore, every first difference, as phenomenon or effect, is equally a product of creative energy. No difference can emanate as the spontaneously mechanical transmutation imagined by evolutionists of the anti-supernatural school. Every such difference involves a product of creation. If the universe created itself as chaos, it re-created itself when it became order; if it created itself as ether, it re-created itself when it contained a *monoplastid*; again when it contained a worm; again when it contained a vertebrate, and so on, *ad infinitum*. To talk of a self-existent entity re-creating itself, is to talk nonsense. Accordingly, to talk of a self-

created universe evolving in the mechanical sense, is to talk nonsense. What can effect cosmical re-creation cannot be what is created. Conversely, what is self-existent involves what does not change, inasmuch as change involves substitution of one self for another self, implying self-annihilation instead of self-existence. Then, a Creator, not the cosmos, has created and, relatively to our apprehension, re-creates it. This process of re-creation we call evolution.

The modern doctrine of evolution is invoked by certain sanguine cognoscenti as destroying the warrant of intuition of God and morality, and the inference supporting that intuition derived from the demonstration of determinism as governing every individual phenomenon within the purview of science. And yet this doctrine of evolution, invoked against religious and moral intuition, is quite futile as affording a rationally credible interpretation of the origin of physiological life, to say nothing of mental experience. *Given* physiological life, the extremist votaries of evolution can certainly show a graduated process of sequence from what appears the simple to the complex; the inchoate to the ordered. On the other hand, about origins, these votaries can offer nothing better than a farrago of discordant speculation, *in nubibus*, adapted to bolster the evolution theory as obviating the necessity of metaphysical interpretation, but not adapted to satisfy, as unprejudiced investigation. Until chemists can synthesise protein, and show how such product of synthesis

could become a germ-nucleus involving a sentient organism, and, typically, perpetuating such organism, it is premature even to speculate, on the lines of conventional evolutionism, how the organic can have arisen from the inorganic; how moral intuitions, or even visual and auditory experience, can have arisen from primordial common sensibility, as mere development of matter conditioned by known physical forces.

As a thoroughgoing consistent system professing to account for the cosmos by "natural" sequence from "ether" to earth; earth to life; life to intellect; intellect to morality, empirical evolutionism is a dismal failure. Indeed, so far as it is not vague speculation, the empirical doctrine of evolution has nothing to show but a number of instances of morphological sequence collected by embryologists, paleontologists, and zoologists; of psychical sequence apparent to the imagination of psychologists; of physical sequence observed by physicists, geologists, and chemists, and of social sequence identified by anthropologists and ethnographers. Evolutionism can show us that the horse was once *eohippus*; the human embryo, once a worm; that types and individuals flourish and become extinct according to their capacity to survive in the struggle for food, and to adapt themselves to climatal conditions; that new organs and members "spontaneously" arise through "natural" variability, and are preserved and perfected by "natural selection"—such effects evolutionism can demonstrate in abundance; but about

the *whence* and *why*, the conventional philosophy of evolutionism can tell us no more than can a nursery rhyme.

Were it to follow natural impulse, the philosophy of such evolutionism would grant that all the effects it identifies are utterly unintelligible unless on the assumption of some power, not themselves, conditioning those effects. Then, the philosophy of evolutionism would project itself into metaphysic. However, this philosophy has a strong objection to indulging natural impulse, so it lays down as law that it will affirm nothing it cannot, by hook or crook, reconcile with the prejudice that what are perceived as physical phenomena are constituents of a self-existent something which it calls the universe, of which universe its experience is only that derived through the five senses, on the strength of which senses, it lays down dogma as pretendedly infallible as that of the most cocksure theology, or ignorant sensualist. Thus, while this philosophy tells us that suns and planets are "evolved" from "ether," it snubs ordinary folk who suggest that "ether," as much as planets and suns, needs "evolving" from something, and that it is reasonable to infer that something is at the back of "ether" that did not need "evolving." Again, while the conventional philosophy of evolution cannot show us even how to compound protein, it complacently tells us that morality is created by the "cosmic dust" which created suns and planets, but which the philosophy can only apprehend by the mental factor assumed to

be created by the "dust." Remarkable stuff, this dust! It first reveals itself as planets and suns; then reminds itself, in the shape of evolutionist cognoscenti, of its infantile state of ante-planetary and solar "dust," yet it cannot tell these folk how to turn itself into a grain of the stuff of which cognoscenti are made! Seriously, the intellectual bemuddlement which tries to account for the universe, without God, seems to me to cap the highest flights of theological romance.

CHAPTER XXXVIII

METAPHYSICAL HEREDITY AND EVOLUTION

It will be seen that, in the foregoing consideration of materialistic doctrines, I am debasing my own conclusions in order to apply them to current superstitions attributing causative efficiency to material bodies, as things existing independently of the mind. In my own doctrines, as the reader will be aware, I have utterly discarded such materialistic figments as suffice for the purposes of empiricism. Atoms, ethers, germs, sperms, as conceived by the physicist and biologist, are to me, as a metaphysician, of no more account than are philosophers' stones, and Old Moore's prophecies. Thus, what I metaphysically demonstrate, as units of consciousness, I have, in the earlier consideration, debased to the status of "potentialities" embodied as material particles called biophors, determinants *et hoc*, as things existing outside mind and acting like Bismarcks. These infinitesimal sensory bodies, arising, as I have shown in an earlier chapter, through what I term sensory imagination, are as totally devoid of causative efficiency

as are abstract ideas, and, as sensory bodies, are as much mind-stuff as are ideas.

I will now give a metaphysical version of evolution of the terrestrial, or cosmical order. From that standpoint, evolution, as a cosmical phenomenon—with its extra-cosmic, or post-terrestrial aspects I have already dealt, and am not now particularly concerned—is a decreed terrestrial order of organic souls endowed with specific universes, as specific will-continua involving specific hypnotisms of the matter-soul, and, in the case of one soul-type—the human—involving intellect. Every so-called faculty, at its first appearance, has constituted a fresh type-soul, as manifestation of God's willing the ante-cosmic organic soul to "exhaust" itself as terrestrial realisation. This point has been earlier dealt with, and I need not dilate on it here. The first mind that had visual bodies, as part of its universe, involved a fresh type-soul. The first mind that had common sensibility as its universe involved such a type-soul. Later minds, constituted of seeing or common sensibility, did not involve fresh type-souls, but were conditioned as what is called heredity by the conditions of the type-soul. Take an illustration: Two organisms of the same type may have different acuteness of vision. This involves that the sub-will constituting visual bodies is more or less active in one than another of the organisms. Possibly, the sexual fiat involving one of those organisms emanated from parent-souls endowed with stronger visualising sub-wills than existed in the case of the parent-souls involving the

other organism. These stronger or weaker sub-wills would be manifested as more or less power to transform ineffective into effective visual units of consciousness—in other words, to manifest themselves (the sub-wills) as actualised universe. None of these souls might be a type-soul. The different visualising powers would involve heredity, but not evolution. This latter only exists as between souls having different will-continua, involving different possible universes. Accordingly, as between individual souls of the same type, there can be no evolution in the present sense. Thus, the ability to will according to intellect, though constituting, as already shown, the only vital measure of development of the human soul, does not involve evolution as between human souls, inasmuch as the volitional manifestation is only a special feature within the same typical limits. I believe that the actual manifestation, by the individual soul, of its potentialities, is neither a matter of evolution nor of heredity, but of something transcending both, which I shall deal with as super-heredity.

Roughly, we may, of course, say that a soul evolves accordingly as it manifests its hereditary potentiality. From this standpoint, according to the units of consciousness a soul realises, as effective, from its possible universe, is its evolutionary status. Thus a keener seer, hearer, reasoner would achieve, according to the above assumption, more visual, auditory, psychical, as the case might be, soul-evolution than would an inferior seer, hearer, reasoner. I may add the *halluciné* and the lunatic as likewise, according to the

above view, manifesting superior soul-evolution (in regard to abnormality, but, conversely, inferior soul-evolution in regard to normality) as compared with the normal person. Their hallucinations and illusions as fully constitute superior realisation, in one direction, of the possible universe as effective units of consciousness, as, in another direction, do the exceptional visual, auditory, and ratiocinative manifestations in the normal cases. The abnormal class of manifestation is no less in the possible universe of the normal mind than the normal class of manifestations is in the possible universe of the abnormal mind. The lunatic and conventionally sane person simply manifest, more or less efficiently, as the case may be, particular parts of the same universe.

From my standpoint, the more or less effective realisation of a possible universe does not indicate soul-change, and unless there is soul-change there is no real evolution. There is no soul-change, failing change of possible universe, or emergence from the universe, involving intellect. So far as regards the possible universe, the brute and human souls are on the same evolutionary plane. They are on different planes so far as regards the will-continua, involving intellect in the one, but not the other case. The difference between them is hereditary, not evolutionary, so far as regards universe. It is evolutionary so far as regards will-continua, involving intellect in the one case, but not in the other. So long as both classes of souls merely manifest the universe, they equally manifest only brute or automatic soul-function. Specifically different souls may have the same possible universe.

This marks their status as being evolutionally, but not hereditarily, identity—the same thing. Thus many evolutionally identical types are hereditarily distinct types.

There would be evolutionary soul-difference between seeing and blind types, hearing and deaf types, reasoning and non-reasoning types, according as the particular functions were or were not parts of their possible universe. But there is no evolutionary difference between types endowed with all those capacities as their possible universe. There would be no soul-evolution as between man and brutes had the latter reason and intellect as constituents of their will-continua. It is demonstrable that many brutes so have reason, though none, to our apprehension, have intellect. On the other hand, I am not at all convinced that all ostensible men have intellect as constituent of their will-continua. Many men lead me to doubt whether they can believe at all. They can reason and accept the evidence of their senses, but if you try to discover on what grounds they accept sense-evidence, the acceptance reveals itself as a mere matter of their personal prepossessions, quite distinct from belief. So it is with their religion, morality, and, largely, their common affairs. "Reasons" are as common as buttercups in June. Belief is as hard to find as a pin in a haystack. I believe that the majority of people have belief as constituent of their will-continua, and that some brutes have the same possible universe, but not will-continuum, involving belief, as has man. On the other hand, I doubt

whether a man exists who has, for one week of his lifetime, consistently acted belief when it ran counter to selfish or to conventionally unselfish desire. (There is no really unselfish desire. The essential character of desire is selfish. Even the desire to die for a believed cause, the accomplishment of which would involve no personal advantage to ourselves, *qua* desire, is a manifestation of selfishness. There is only rightly and wrongly selfish desire. No real unselfishness exists except as action according to belief. Nobody can thus act unless he desires, that is, feels emotively inclined. This is selfish. Intellect and the corresponding volition are unselfish, and the test of human post-terrestrial soul-evolution.)

It may be urged that, according to the above test of post-terrestrial soul-evolution, the lunatic who acts as he believes is higher, in soul-grade, than the conventionally sane person who acts as he does not believe. I entirely affirm this. I believe that, on the above conditions, the lunatic is the higher in soul-grade; that he is really the saner of the two! I maintain that if the abnormal, in the above cases, is insane in one sense, the normal is insane in another; and that of the two forms of insanity the former has no post-terrestrial consequences vital to the soul, while the latter has. On such conditions the really sane is the conventionally insane. On the other hand, I am doubtful whether any lunatic ever acted as he believed. I surmise that all lunatics act by expediential or emotive promptings. They reason, but they reason from the brute standpoint, and the

resultant is never belief—always a mere manifestation of likes or dislikes.

Again, it may be urged that my distinction between evolution and heredity is, after all, a mere matter of words, and arbitrary. I grant that, in discriminating between symbolised concepts, not necessary resultants of metaphysical inference from the basal facts of experience (sensory bodies), the significance of the terms will necessarily be that attributed to them by him who applies them to expressing what he wishes to convey. Whether we call a change evolutionary or hereditary is only significant if we are concerned to define different sorts of changes. In earlier parts of this work, so far as regards evolution and heredity, I have often not been concerned to differentiate, and have probably termed changes evolutionary which I now term hereditary. In this chapter I am concerned to discriminate between two sorts of changes, and apply terms in conformity with the discrimination. I do not advance my discrimination, involving the terms heredity and evolution, as equally unassailable as is, say, my demonstration that sensory bodies are things of mind, and that there is no really causative efficiency in such bodies. When I demonstrate that intellect is the only purely human attribute, there is nothing arbitrary in the determination. On the other hand, that I call the manifestation of intellect an illustration of soul-evolution, as between human and brute souls, but of heredity and super-heredity, as between individual human souls, is essentially a matter of my personal preferences in selecting terms. To

that extent it is arbitrary. We have to make arbitrary and, in themselves, insignificant terminological distinctions in order to render intelligible things that are not arbitrary or insignificant. I believe I have rationally established the truths that the possible universe of man is common to some brutes ; that a new universe-constituent involves new soul-creation ; that if one soul involves the same possible universe as does another, the souls are of one type ; that type-souls originate lines of souls with the same possible universe. These things are not arbitrary or insignificant. To discriminate between changes involving souls with different possible universes, and those involving souls with the same possible universe, I call the changes respectively evolutionary and hereditary. These terms are arbitrary, but the differences they indicate are real.

In the conventional application of the terms, evolution implies typical change, while heredity implies typical likeness. But the conventional notions of typical change and likeness are entirely different from the metaphysical implication. The conventional notions of typical change and sameness merely involve morphological identities and differences. These have no metaphysical significance, unless they can be demonstrated to involve soul-changes and differences. This demonstration is impossible. Man's structure is no proof that he is typically soul-different from the dog. Sensory bodies prove nothing, metaphysically, regarding soul-difference, unless some are provable to be non-existent, others existent in a particular

possible universe. In such a case the different souls would have different possible universes, and would be typically or evolutionally different. But the sensory bodies recognised by metaphysics in such a connection would be sights, sounds, etc., indifferently or collectively, not particular sights, sounds, etc. These latter imply the realistic fallacy of objects independent of mind. Structure is a *particular* sensory body, and is no metaphysical criterion of anything except specific hypnotism of the matter-soul by particular souls. For metaphysics to accept sensory bodies as criteria of soul-difference, the bodies must be taken collectively, as what are conventionally called faculties or functions. For instance, it must be proved that one mind has innate sight, while another has not, before metaphysics will accept the criterion of the sensory bodies as deciding different soul-evolution involving the two minds.

Metaphysics is only concerned with the will-continuum, involving possible universes as deciding evolutionary or typical soul-difference. Metaphysics says: If the dog can see, hear, touch, taste, smell, reason, feel, and the man can do no more, they are typically alike as souls, no matter how much more or less efficiently the one can exercise a particular function than can the other. The difference in efficiency would merely constitute hereditary, not evolutionary difference. On the other hand, if the man can believe, while the dog cannot, they are different as soul-types—evolutionally.

The dog can smell better than can the man, and

the man can reason better than can the dog. This, metaphysically, is hereditary difference. The biologist would call it evolutionary difference as well as hereditary difference. As it involves no difference in possible universe, but merely the same possible universe differently actualised, the biological proposition is, metaphysically, peccable. It must be remembered that the above discussion refers to changes of soul-*types*, not to developments of individual souls. Thus one person, we will say, consummates belief by motor volition, while another does not. In such a case we may familiarly say that the motor consummation of intellect involves evolution. But the application of the term would be arbitrary, unless we involved the consideration of post-terrestrial with terrestrial evolution. As between terrestrial and post-terrestrial stages, I have tried to show in earlier chapters that such consummation of belief by volition involves the highest stage of terrestrial soul-development, and that it conditions post-terrestrial evolution. However, so far as regards terrestrial evolution, as earlier indicated, the consummation merely involves realisation of a will-continuum assumed to be common to humanity. Difference in such realisation no more constitutes terrestrial soul-evolution than does any difference in universe-realisation.

In earlier chapters I may have termed difference such as that above indicated soul-evolution. However, from our present standpoint we cannot admit the application. We are now discriminating between two sorts of soul-changes—hereditary and evolution-

ary. The former, strictly, are not soul-changes at all, but are merely changes of manifestation by what is, evolutionally, the same soul—whether, in the conventional sense, it be one or a million individual souls. All souls having intellect in their will-continuum are, evolutionally, one soul. In other words, they represent one type-soul. There can only be evolution as between such typically identical souls, and those representing other type-souls. (Regarding type-souls, see Chapter XXXIV.)

The above remarks apply to all terrestrial evolutionary changes. These are changes of soul, not of body. The changes of body dealt with, as constituting evolution, by empirical superficialists, are merely changes of realisation, by mind, of its universe. The mind makes this sort of evolution by fabricating sequential images, and the empirical evolutionist confounds the mental panorama with changes of the only factors constituting real evolution. These factors are mind-universes and intellectual volition, and souls constituting the universes and volition.

What is conventionally dealt with as heredity is merely the mental “panorama” of Darwinian evolutionism reduced, to infinitesimal proportions, as “biological units,” “biophors,” *et hoc*, through what I have termed sensory imagination and dealt with in an earlier chapter. These fanciful hereditary elements, like the gross bodies of conventional evolutionism, are mind-puppets with which the materialist deals as though they were real things existing independently of the mind and independently prosecuting successions

of changes. It is no longer tolerable that civilisation should belie its name by constituting the exponents of such bogus realism the arbiters of the supreme concern of humanity—the transformation of human souls from the brute to the human stage of terrestrial development. It is high time that civilisation ceased to take its ethics and sociology on trust from so-called philosophies built on the criteria of reality adopted by the child and the bumpkin.

Let us consider a simple case of heredity—the begetting of their like by two sexual souls. The only empirical evidence we have that sexual souls do beget their like is that we perceive likeness in sensory bodies, as between the media or parents' and offspring's bodies, and that we perceive likeness in affective and non-affective bodies (as what we call ideas, feelings, emotions, temperament) derived through our interaction, as percipients, on the one hand with the parental souls, and on the other hand with the procreated souls. As the parental souls condition their media, the procreated soul conditions its medium, and we may reasonably trust our personal artifice as percipient, as constituting the perceived likenesses, in their totality, evidence of real or soul-likeness. This soul-likeness constitutes real heredity. The soul-unlikeness, involving universe-unlikeness and constituting evolution is, as already indicated, on quite another plane as compared with the hereditary likeness.

This metaphysical heredity precludes what are called extraneous influences from affecting the line of development. For the so-called extraneous influences

Metaphysical Heredity 533

are nothing but sensory and psychical bodies constituted by the soul itself. To say that such bodies influenced the development of the soul as a procreative agent would merely be to say that the soul hereditarily conditioned its own development by fabricating sensory and psychical bodies. For an outside agent to affect the line of soul-development, the agent would need to modify the procreative fiat so as to ensure a procreated soul endowed with a will-continuum modified in conformity with the particular external influence. But really there is no such external influence in existence, inasmuch as the only external (as so-called environment) factors we know in the connection are sensory and psychical bodies, which are not really external but internal. Their empirical externality is no evidence of their externality as efficient causes in heredity. Moreover, it is empirically and metaphysically impossible to deal with a will-continuum so as to identify causal correspondence between its changes and influence of any sort. Metaphysically, there are no external influences existent in the connection, inasmuch as there are only sensory and psychical bodies. Empirically, these bodies are external, but they are not empirically causal as affecting the soul. Empiricism, as biology, says they do not affect the soul. Metaphysically, the only causality in connection with such bodies is their condition by the necessity-sensation involving the notions of cause and effect as between ideas and involving a specific realisation of its universe by the particular percipient. Such a realisation by the per-

ipient of its own universe can, obviously, have no effect on the will-continuum, as procreative agent, of another soul.

That a will-continuum may be affected in any such sense as that implied in the conception of hereditary change or evolution, it must be affected by the Cause that gave it existence, not through its own "initiative," as fabricating sensory and psychical bodies constituting what are called extraneous influences or environment. Truly causal influence is affirmed in the metaphysical statement of evolution which I afford. Let us consider a case of visualising difference in its hereditary aspect. On the assumption of hereditarily varying visual power, it would be derived through God's specific determinism of a line of individual souls, involving an initial deviation from the norm and its persistence. The visualising power of the ancestral type-soul—that is, power of the ancestral type-soul to transform ineffective into effective units constituting a possible visual universe common to itself and every soul descended from that type-soul—would then be passed, or not attained, as the case might be, by its hereditary posterity. Through such determinism the "sporadic" individual soul would "hereditarily" transmit its access or lack of visualising power, accomplishing the transmission by what we call procreation.

I believe that all great abnormality—as genius, mania, idiotcy—is strictly out of the line of heredity and caused by direct influence of God on the individual soul. Though I believe that particular will-

tendencies, involving what is called temperament, are conditioned by ancestral sexual souls, I do not believe that a genius, maniac, idiot ever existed solely through the will-types of the parental souls. I believe that all great deviations from what I may term will-norm within typical limits are attributable to specific determinism affecting the individual soul. Indeed, I believe that, though what are called hereditary preconditions exist, what will be the actual result of the predispositions, as specific manifestations, depends, as fully as on the hereditary determinism, on God's specific determinism of the individual soul, constituting specific willings. Thus I believe that the special hereditary predisposition to will epilepsy, mania, genius, talent, phthisis exists, but that whether any of these things *are* willed depends on the specific determinism. In a word, I believe that how the individual soul's will-continuum shall manifest itself is determined by God, as much directly acting on the individual soul as indirectly acting through ancestral souls as what is called heredity. This direct influence I call super-heredity.

The hereditary predisposition to abnormalities is the predisposition to will abnormal correlations of normal sensory and psychical bodies. The so-called abnormal things are not intrinsically abnormal ; but are only abnormal as relationships. Every typically identical soul has such abnormalities equally within its possible universe. The super-hereditary peculiarity consists in the willing of such possible into actualised universe. In this sense, abnormal and normal, as terms lose much of their biological sig-

nificance, inasmuch as both are equally hereditary. By way of illustration, what we call insanity is merely exceptional willing of normal sensory and psychical bodies. Hereditarily, everybody is, indifferently, "sane" or "insane." This he is constituted by the procreative fiats of his parents and their parents, and so on, backwards to the type-souls that initiated the particular hereditary potentiality, as possible universe and will-continuum. But that one or another manifests his hereditary potentiality for "sanity" or "insanity" is decided by super-heredity. This decides that the majority of people shall manifest the "sane" potentiality. Heredity, alone, merely decides the existence of the potentiality.

I believe that all normal universe-realisation, within typical limits (seeing, hearing, touching, smelling, tasting), is hereditary in the conventional sense. I also believe this of normal manifestations of reason and emotion. On the other hand, I believe that abnormal correlations of normal sensory and psychical bodies (as in cases of disease, physical or psychical ; perturbation—hallucination, illusion, hysteria, hypnosis, and so on ; deviation—genius, talent, marked psychical individuality of any sort) are products of super-heredity. I do not believe that heredity, in the conventional sense, can account for any of the above, as actual manifestation by the individual soul. The actual hypnotism of the matter-soul into mediumistic abnormality involving abnormal correlations of normal sensory bodies (as in cancer, for instance) is equiva-

lent, from the present standpoint, to the exceptional willing of abnormal correlations of normal psychical bodies involving genius, or mania. Heredity, in the conventional sense, I maintain, can no more involve cancer than genius or mania. Or, can it involve actual pathological deviation of any sort. It may involve the predisposition to the abnormal willing, but the realisation, as specific aberration, is attributable to super-heredity.

That I have the same number of limbs as have the majority of people involves that a particular type-soul existed that could will a sensory complex by hypnotising the matter-soul into a particular medium, and that my and other souls will mediums as did that type-soul. The essence of heredity is merely such typical willing. Heredity may be termed will-instinct, involving the persistence of a particular possible universe. All we can possibly do or suffer is really hereditary, inasmuch as all we can possibly do or suffer must be our possible universe, and this universe existed so soon as the type-soul existed from which we descended. On the other hand, looking at the question in another aspect, how we, individually, realise this possible universe as actual is largely not a matter of heredity but of specific determinism by God of our individual souls. This super-heredity may also be termed meta-will-instinct. Heredity is essentially a doctrine of negation of variability. Its essential revelation is that organisms beget their like. It tells us nothing to account for organisms that are unlike their parents. Of course, as conventionally

interpreted, it tells us that certain admixtures of material particles ensure such difference ; but it does not demonstrate that the "particles" exist until the mind has fabricated them, or does it tell us how things fabricated by the mind can ensure variability of will, by which only mind exists. This will-variability is the only sort that is philosophically significant. The continuity of morphological details by which biologists measure hereditary continuity is merely a realisation, by the human mind, of its particular universe, and proves nothing regarding causal continuity, which must be continuity of an entity that fabricates such things as "morphological details."

As earlier indicated, the personal artifice by which we construe willings into specific sensory and psychical bodies constituting what we term morphological and mental continuity, may be trusted as indicating soul-continuity as well as mere continuity of bodies. But this admission is not at all equivalent to admission of the causality attributed to bodies (as, say, "germ-plasm") by materialism. Motor manifestations, shapes, dimensions, ideas, emotions, may be taken as indicating true soul-continuity, but that shapes, dimensions, motor manifestations (as "germs," "sperms," and like products of sensory imagination) *cause* hereditary continuity, is quite another implication altogether disqualifying biology, from the standpoint of metaphysics, as a method of ultimate verification. What, in the above respect, vitiates biology, vitiates all materialistic investigation, in its

ultimate aspects, and it is obvious that, if we trust philosophies based on such metaphysically ridiculous premises as are accepted by materialistic science, as being revelations of true morality and sociology, we are, socially, "staking our money" on a desperately groggy "outsider."

Heredity is the pre-ordained realisation, by the organic soul, of its own universe, as necessary sequences of sensory and psychical bodies. When the evolutionist empirically traces the pedigree of the horse to *eohippus*, he hypnotises the matter-soul, through heredity, as did the souls of the media that realised, as parts of their universes, the various types between *eohippus* and the horse. Assuming the existence of brute-soul, each individual of these types, between *eohippus* and the horse, existed as a soul coeval with some human soul which thus discovered, or realised as part of its universe, a hypnotism of the matter-soul as the body of the particular ancestral horse-soul. As earlier indicated, once hypnotised, the matter-soul is always hypnotised, until it is de-hypnotised, or re-hypnotised; in familiar language, until the particular body is destroyed, or another body formed from it. Now, it so happens that certain sensory bodies produced as hypnotism of the matter-soul (as various intermediate horse-types) by various human, hereditarily-conditioned souls which are now prosecuting their post-terrestrial evolution, "infect," as what I call type-sensations, certain people at this day, whom we call paleontologists, hereditarily-conditioned as were their ancestors;

in other words, the products of hypnotism by prehistoric people, of the matter-soul, involving the bodies of the various prehistoric ancestors of the horse, have not been destroyed by de-hypnotism, but are hypnotised by modern investigators, through the condition of heredity, into continuity, as sensory bodies, for the modern observers as they were hypnotised into such continuity by any prehistoric observer who sensed them as bodies after their souls had left them ; in other words, who sensed them as does anybody who senses what we call a corpse. Pursuing this process of hypnotising the matter-soul, involving what are called the fossil remains of extinct types, the modern, hereditarily-conditioned investigator obtains a sequence of psychical and sensory bodies revealing what he calls the line of ancestry of the horse. From my metaphysical standpoint, the above typifies and incidentally involves all that is involved in the doctrine of heredity, as conventionally applied to bodies. The real heredity, with which the conventional investigator does not trouble himself, is typical continuity of hypnotism of the matter-soul, involving what I have termed will-instinct.

The realisation, by the human contemporary of *eohippus*, of that sensory body as what we call a corpse, would be different from the realisation, by a modern observer, of the sensory body as a fossil, often representing merely a fragment of the supposed original body. In the former case, the prehistoric soul, through its mind, might realise its *eohippus* as we realise a corpse just before it is buried ; or, again,

the prehistoric soul might realise its *cohippus* as what we call a skeleton. However it were realised, *cohippus*, to have existed at all, must first have been realised, as a sensory body, either by a brute-soul or by a human soul, and every stage of its existence between that of what we call its living state and that of what we call its state as a fossil must have been realised, as part of its universe, through hypnotism of the matter-soul, by some organic soul.

It will be obvious that when the paleontologist traces the pedigree of the family *Equidae* to the *cohippus* of a particular geological age which, by a like process of hypnotism of the matter-soul, the geologist calls the Lower Eocene period, all that the paleontologist achieves, from the metaphysical standpoint, is to revive, as effective, a multitude of units which, in default of his investigations, would constitute the dormant, or sub-conscious universe of ineffective units of the human mind. Again, when the geologist—taking as our type stratigraphical geology—localises in time the different geological strata in which the organic remains are found, he hypnotises a continuity of what I may call super-structures constituting sensory bodies, imagining them as extending backwards from certain sensory bodies called recent geological formations. While the paleontologist has no time-criteria for his bodies, from their own evidence alone, the geologist has such criteria for his bodies. So the paleontologist gets his chronological criteria from the geologist; while, on the other hand, the geologist largely

identifies his continuity of sensory bodies, or stratifications, by the sensory bodies of the paleontologist. The geologist's chronological criteria (considering him solely as investigating by the earth's solid substance) are constituted by applying the changing units, constituting movement of sensory bodies in his immediate experience (as empirically measurable changes in the earth's crust) so as to involve psychical complexes constituting what is commonly called temporal duration, and imaginatively attributing to other sensory bodies which yield him no changing units, as movement, temporal durations conforming with those he attributes to the sensory bodies in his immediate experience, consequent to the changing units they afford him. According as he trusts to one or another form of specialism, the investigator will tell us that the age of the earth may be anything ranging from one hundred down to twenty million years, and he is quite welcome to either estimate so far as I am concerned. As soon as he shows that the earth existed a second before, or could exist a second after, organic souls hypnotised the matter-soul into sub-souls, I will consider him seriously in the rôle of prophet.

The paleontologist's method of investigation—as likewise is the geologist's, so long as he is strictly empirical—is philosophically valid, though its conclusions are, metaphysically, untenable, inasmuch as they attribute to sensory bodies the quality, as real existence, which metaphysics will only attribute to souls. What the doctrine of evolution really implies

is an ordered progression of will-continua involving successions of possible universes. Evolution is one of the most certain things within our cognition, always provided we do not limit the conception to mere sensory bodies, but remember that its ultimate implication is—progressions of souls.

When certain evolutionists affirm that environment conditions heredity, they imply that sensory bodies so act on other sensory bodies as to cause the changes constituting what is called evolution. But these evolutionists—whose doctrines have been exploded by other evolutionists who demonstrate that environment does not condition heredity—do not demonstrate how sensory bodies can cause anything; or do they show that sensory bodies have any existence outside the human mind. If I were to tell such evolutionists that abstract ideas caused morphological changes, these evolutionists would perhaps tell me to go to an asylum. Well, their “environment” is merely sensory bodies, and sensory bodies, as being mind-stuff, are, essentially, equivalent to abstract ideas. The real things, independent of the mind, are no more sensory bodies than abstract ideas, but are the organic soul, matter-soul, and sub-souls resulting through the organic soul’s hypnotism of the matter-soul. There is no environment, in the conventional sense, to affect these real things.

As a practical sensualist, I say, a razor will cut, and good food, clothing, and housing, will tend to ensure a vigorous body. This is all right, so far as the practical sensualist is concerned. It is all wrong

when implied by philosophers who pretend to identify real causes and to afford reliable cosmological, ethical, and sociological theories. To attain such theories we must probe far below the strata investigated by the practical sensualist and the philosopher who confounds a logic of empiricism with identification of efficient causes. We can demonstrate sensory bodies to be really distinct from abstract ideas, but we can only accomplish this by identifying truly efficient causes. The demonstration of the distinction involves, also, demonstration of identity between sensory bodies and abstract ideas, so far as regards impotency as causative agents. The razor cuts, and the good food, housing, etc., ensure vigorous bodies, according to practical sensualism. According to philosophical scrutiny they do nothing at all. Scientific logicians should disprove the conclusions of philosophy, or accept them and cease pretending to reveal reliable cosmology, ethics, and sociology, on empirical lines. Philosophy undermines and pulverises empiricism, not only from its (philosophy's) own standpoint, but from the standpoint of empiricism itself. Now, let empiricism accept the inevitable! Within its limitations it is infallible. Outside those limitations it is puerile. Let it be oracle within its limitations!

It is a commonly accepted axiom that God is on the side of the biggest battalions, and the implication is, that being on that side, God will ever permit right to be crushed by might. It is overlooked that the biggest, equally with the least battalions, are

prone to imagine their own cause to be the right one, and that until some truly objective criterion of right exists, nothing is demonstrated regarding the prevalence of right over wrong, by the victory of big or little battalions. If the little are as far away from objective right as are the big battalions, as regards right, it does not matter which prevail. Human evolution, as distinct from human heredity, according to metaphysical demonstration, involves an objective criterion of right, inasmuch as human evolution involves the supremacy of intellect as determining right. When there are any "battalions" in existence struggling for this right, we shall know better than at present whether God favours mere size of battalions. So long as logics of empiricism successfully pose as true philosophies, it is probable that biggest battalions will continue to justify the confidence at present reposed in them. I trust that this work may tend to shorten the tether of logics of empiricism as successful masqueraders in the toga of philosophy.

INDEX

- Abnormal correlations of normal sensory and psychical bodies. See Abnormal Sensory and Psychical Bodies, Genius, Mania, Insane, Disease
 psychical bodies. See also Ideas, Imagination, 194-196, 355, 358, 361, 446, 448, 534-537
 sensory bodies. See also Sensory Imagination, Disease, Hallucination, 349, 350, 358, 359, 361, 446, 535-537
 soul-evolution, 419, 420
 willing, 366
 Accident, 448-450
 Act of sensory apprehension. See also Units, 195, 239, 242, 243, 245, 252, 254, 285
 Actualised universe. See also Universe, 267, 299, 379, 381, 401, 415, 449, 450, 455, 473, 477, 479, 523, 530, 535
 Aesthetic feelings. See also Emotion, 301, 323.
 Affective extension, 269, 285, 286. See also Extension
 movement, 268, 276, 284, 285. See also Movement
 necessity-sensation, 285. See also Necessity-sensation
 psychical bodies. See also Emotion, Feeling, 70, 214, 215, 240, 241, 264, 267, 268, 275, 276, 280, 281, 285, 286, 300, 339, 365, 373, 374, 413, 415, 433, 443, 445, 451, 452, 472, 532
 space - sensation. See also Auditory, Gustatory, Olfactory Space - sensation, 276, 285
 units, 239, 281, 427
 Africa and England, 297-299, 301, 302, 456-457, 469-470
 After-images, 198, 199
 Agnostic, 203, 510

- Amputation, 448
- Analysis, 1, 39, 40, 53, 56,
101, 102, 104, 163-166,
168, 169, 260, 317, 361
- Anatomist, 210, 309
- Ante-cosmic matter-soul, 330,
331, 380, 381
organic soul, 330, 331, 380-
385, 403, 414, 417, 477,
478, 489, 490, 495, 496,
522
- Aphasias, 309
- Arbitrary and causal succession.
See Causality
- Art, 216, 466
- Atavistic. See also Press, Lit-
erature, Art, 187, 205
- Atheist, 203, 335
- Atoms, 114, 122, 131, 157,
163, 192, 303, 304, 314,
332, 335, 352, 360, 362,
428, 436, 494, 499, 500,
505, 506, 510, 521. See
also Physics.
- Auditory body. See also Hear-
ing, 239, 240, 242, 251,
255, 261-263, 270, 272,
273, 281, 282, 427
extension, 269, 270, 284
movement, 264, 265, 268.
See also Movement, In-
tensity
space-sensation, 264, 265,
270, 280, 282
- Automatic. See also Sensation-
continuum, 4, 148, 221,
223-225, 323, 324, 337,
342, 344, 396, 407, 408
- Auto-suggestion. See also
Hypnotism, 162, 346-348,
360, 361, 367, 371, 375,
446
- Awaking, 342, 347
- Bacillus. See also Micro-
organisms, 360, 363
- Bacteria. See also Sensory Im-
agination, 362, 370-372,
374
- Being. See also God, Creator,
155, 425
- Belief, 3, 4, 8, 59, 66, 78, 86,
92, 103-105, 117, 131-
133, 137, 138, 148, 158,
161, 162, 171, 176, 183,
204, 205, 207, 216, 217,
220, 221, 223, 225, 226,
268, 282, 285, 289, 307,
324, 335, 355, 378, 384,
388, 389, 391, 392, 397,
404, 409, 411, 413, 418,
419, 420, 422, 423, 426,
427, 431, 435 *et seq.*, 464,
465, 525-527, 529, 530
that is morally abortive,
92
- Bible, 33, 438, 439
and free-will, 83
- Big battalions, 544, 545
- Billions, 43. See also Numbers
- Biology, 120, 200, 209, 253,
325, 360, 363, 364, 379,
380, 386-388, 393, 403,
439, 441 *et seq.*, 471, 472,
485-520, 530, 533, 535,
538

- Biophors. See also Biology,
Weismann, 362, 490, 499,
500, 501, 505 *et seq.*, 521,
531
- Brain and mirror, 118
- Brute, 66, 78, 85, 86, 175,
187, 189, 202, 205, 218,
219, 221 *et seq.*, 283, 313,
321, 333, 368, 384, 388,
391 *et seq.*, 405 *et seq.*,
416, 419, 421, 436, 437,
463-467, 484, 524, 526,
527, 532, 539
- evolution, 218, 283, 436
- faith, 202-204. See also
Faith
- human, 78, 312, 394 *et seq.*,
409, 464, 465. See also
Psychical Hybrid
- universe, 413, 415, 420, 524
- Cancer. See also Disease, 366,
397, 446, 447, 536
- Categories. See also Causality,
Knowledge, Judgment, 16,
146, 157, 161, 164
- Causality, 31-34, 55, 63, 64,
70, 71, 79, 83, 84, 94-97,
100, 112, 113, 116, 117,
118, 119, 139-148, 155,
165, 166, 168-170, 174,
175, 214, 220, 267, 273-
275, 286, 316, 319-322,
331, 339, 343, 359, 360,
362-364, 373, 374, 376,
380, 393, 410, 422-468,
489, 498, 514, 515, 521,
527, 533, 534, 538, 543,
544. See also God, Will,
Determinism
- Cerebral localisation, 117-119,
312, 435, 436
- Certainty, 1, 3, 7, 8, 9, 20,
22, 26, 33, 35, 38, 62, 105,
120, 121, 130-138, 157
- Chemistry, 365, 403, 494, 500,
505, 517, 518
- Choice, 82, 87, 88, 337, 449.
See also Will and Free-
dom
- Christian, 178, 203, 204, 217,
396, 405, 406, 413, 414,
420, 464, 465, 507. See
also Faith
- Concrete, 256, 257, 272-274
- Condition, 423, 424-426. See
also Determinism, Caus-
ality
- Conscious agent, 238
- Correspondence between tacti-
cal and visual bodies,
262, 263
- Creation, 331, 380-382, 385,
429, 486, 492, 495, 496,
498, 503, 504, 511 *et seq.*
of man, 221-225
- Creator. See also God, 79,
80, 82, 83, 93, 151, 153,
155, 174, 175, 178-181,
207, 305, 320, 385, 393,
410, 411, 448, 449, 489,
516, 517, 534
- Credal parish, 435-437. See
also Belief, Causality
- Credulity, 203-205
- Cross-movement, 250-251

- Darkness, 445
- Darwin, 383, 404, 405, 439, 498, 499, 501, 502, 504-506, 508-510, 531
- Death, 283, 366, 389, 390, 398, 399, 452, 453, 466, 480 *et seq.*, 499, 507, 509
- De-hypnotism, 231, 238, 252, 310, 381, 454, 455, 539, 540
- Descartes, 422
- Design, 356, 357, 385, 504, 505
- Determinism. See also Causality, Will, God, 175-178, 188, 283, 326, 379, 392, 418, 423, 424, 442, 448, 449, 470, 502, 504, 512, 517, 534, 535
- Dimension. See also Extension, 195, 196, 242, 247, 289, 538
- Discovery, 296, 331, 346, 360, 365, 370, 372, 401-403, 446, 454
- Disease, 362, 365-377, 397, 446-448, 450, 451, 536, 537
- Distant. See also Movement, Space, 243 *et seq.*, 283, 311, 331, 352, 457
- Distorting imagination. See also Void-sensation, 125, 194, 212, 287
- Doing. See also Causality, 266-268, 302, 337, 426, 432, 433, 449-451, 468
- Doubt, 161, 207, 335
- Drugs. See also Medicine, 369, 451, 452
- Duration, 269, 279, 280, 283, 286
- Dust, 231-233
- Dying sound. See also Auditory Movement, 264
- Earth, 453, 455
- Effective Units of Consciousness. See also Units of Consciousness, 108, 109, 111, 113, 195, 200, 215, 237, 238, 243 *et seq.*, 283, 294, 296 *et seq.*, 308, 337, 341, 355, 356, 365, 366, 378 *et seq.*, 386, 401, 403 *et seq.*, 417, 418, 430, 442, 450, 454, 457, 461 *et seq.*, 469, 472, 523, 534
- stimulus. See also Units of Stimulus, 238, 240
- Effort, 67, 71, 72, 77, 86-90, 92, 217-220, 267-269, 282, 288, 323, 334, 343, 378, 379, 399, 432, 451, 461, 464, 467
- Electricity, 254, 275, 276, 443
- Emanation, 380, 381, 478, 486, 487, 494
- Embryo, 478, 489, 490
- Emotion, 65, 66, 72, 76-79, 83, 85, 86, 88, 92, 93, 110, 179, 182, 183, 187, 202, 206, 209, 213, 214, 218-221, 226, 238, 268, 280, 281, 285, 289, 292, 299, 300, 323, 366, 378,

- 384, 389, 391, 394, 396,
407, 409, 412 *et seq.*, 421,
436, 438, 464, 465, 483,
484, 532, 536, 538. See
also Affective Psychical
Bodies
- Emotion-continuum, 58-75, 83,
140, 163, 213, 217, 221,
254, 282, 287, 323, 338,
343, 346, 347, 379, 382,
389, 391, 396, 413
- Empirical causality. See also
Sensory Imagination, Caus-
ality, 364, 376, 387, 393,
426, 427, 430 *et seq.*, 444,
450, 451, 453, 468, 471,
489, 533, 543, 544
- evolutionism. See also Bio-
logy, Causality, Environ-
ment, 479, 480, 485 *et seq.*,
497, 503, 511, 512, 517,
518, 531, 543
- England and Africa, 297-299,
301, 302, 456, 457, 469,
470
- Enteric fever. See also Disease,
375, 376
- Environment. See also Caus-
ality, Biology, Disease, 369,
385-387, 393, 400, 411,
412, 415, 416, 440, 501,
502, 533, 543, 544
- Eohippus*, 491, 515, 516, 518,
539, 540, 541
- Epidemic, 369
- Ether. See also Physics, 114,
157, 192, 303, 304, 493,
494, 518, 519, 521
- Ethics, introspective, 87, 88.
See also Morality, Justice
- Evolution. See also Soul-
Post-terrestrial-Evolution,
115, 116, 283, 330, 334,
382, 388, 392 *et seq.*, 415,
440, 478, 485-545. See
also Environment
- Expediency, 217, 226, 396,
413, 415, 436, 526
- Extension, 53, 244, 260, 265,
269-271, 279, 281, 283-
286
- Extensivity, 54-57
- Extraneous influences. See also
Environment, Biology,
Weismann, Spencer, 501,
502, 507, 509, 510, 532,
533
- Faith, 11, 66, 137, 179, 202-
207, 288, 335, 409, 410,
483
- Fallacy. See also Belief, In-
tellect, 225, 226
- Famine, 387
- Fatalism, 177, 178
- Feeling and knowing. See also
Knowledge, 169, 171
- First cause. See also Creator,
God, 174, 206
- Fit volition, 217
- Flow of ideas. See also Stream
of Consciousness, 269
- Force. See also Physics,
Thing-in-Itself, 277, 278
- Form, 1, 15, 19, 22, 23, 47,
53, 84, 100, 103, 105,

- 108, 133, 161, 164, 167,
193
Freethinker, 203
Freewill. See also Will and
Freedom, 180, 183
- Gases. See also Physics, 244,
260, 296, 332, 365-369,
403, 446, 505
Genius, 312, 403, 404, 534-537
Geology, 518, 541, 542
Germ. See also Biology, Weis-
mann, Disease, 363, 364,
372, 375, 376, 441-443,
486, 490, 491, 500 *et seq.*,
518, 521, 538
God. See also Creator, 60, 81,
83, 85, 87, 89, 92, 93, 118,
121, 126, 131-135, 152-
154, 159, 161, 171, 183,
184, 204, 206, 207, 211,
235, 275, 289, 305, 306,
312, 319, 320, 330, 335,
379, 380-383, 399, 404,
417, 418, 429, 454, 455,
464, 470, 486, 488, 492,
498, 511-514, 517, 520,
522, 534, 535, 537, 544,
545
of Justice, 204
Golden calf. See also Faith,
202-204
Gravity, 156, 277
Gustatory body. See also
Taste, 229, 239, 240,
242, 251, 255, 261, 262,
263, 272, 273, 281, 282,
427
- extension, 269, 270
movement. See also In-
tensity, 268
space-sensation, 270, 280,
282
- Haeckel, 491
Hallucination, 350, 354, 358,
524, 536
Handicraft, 216, 217
Hearing. See also Auditory
body, 109, 197, 251, 262,
272-274, 380, 497, 518,
523, 529, 536
Heat, 245, 254, 263, 264
Heredity. See also Biology,
485-545
Heterogeneity, 120, 129-131,
149-153, 214, 330, 380,
425, 496
Human, 85, 175, 187, 189,
191, 202, 213, 218, 219,
221 *et seq.*, 324, 333, 384,
388, 391 *et seq.*, 405, 406
et seq., 416, 420, 421,
463, 464, 466, 467, 524,
527, 532
Hume, 159
Hybrid. See also Soul-Evolu-
tion, Psychical Hybrid,
Man, Brute, 223, 224,
312, 394 *et seq.*, 416, 419,
420, 464, 465
Hypnotic will-power and con-
fidential beneficiaries, 91
Hypnotism, 66, 68, 90, 91,
132, 133, 162, 171, 200,
327, 341, 343, 344, 346-

- 348, 360, 367 *et seq.*,
446, 447, 459-461, 476,
536. See also Disease
- Hypnotism of matter-soul, 14,
25, 29, 48, 60, 69, 85, 89,
92, 108-110, 112, 113, 117-
119, 123, 126, 158, 170,
171, 198, 200, 209-211,
215, 228, 231, 232, 237,
240, 245, 246, 251, 252-
256, 267, 280, 295, 296,
298-301, 305, 309-312,
323, 324, 329, 330, 331,
336, 344, 349, 355, 357,
362, 365 *et seq.*, 378 *et*
seq., 386, 389, 412, 433,
434, 441, 443 *et seq.*, 449,
450, 453, 455 *et seq.*, 470,
471, 475, 522, 529, 536,
537, 539, 540, 541
- Hysteria, 347, 367, 536
- I and not I. See also Inner
and Outer Sensations, Self
and not-Self, 31, 32, 61,
70, 84, 117-123, 124-129,
248, 305
- Idealist, 317
- Ideas. See also Psychological
Bodies, Non - Affective
Psychical Bodies, 1, 4, 6,
13, 18, 20, 22, 53, 62, 64,
69, 70, 71, 73, 74-76, 83,
94, 97, 102, 104, 105, 111,
112, 114, 125, 135, 136,
141, 143, 144, 151-153,
159-161, 164, 165, 168,
170, 172, 200, 212, 214,
216, 238, 239, 241, 250,
257, 275, 279, 280, 300,
307, 323, 328, 336 *et seq.*,
350, 351, 366, 376, 413,
430, 433, 522, 532, 533,
538, 543, 544
- Imagination. See also Sensory
Imagination, 102, 113,
153, 157, 159, 160, 162,
163, 192-201, 220, 260,
268, 287, 288, 307, 336,
349, 350 *et seq.*, 367, 372,
432
- Imperialism, 405-406
- Individual and Nation, 184 *et*
seq., 189
- Ineffective units of conscious-
ness. See also Movement,
Ideas, 109, 111, 113, 143,
200, 237, 238, 242 *et seq.*,
294, 296 *et seq.*, 308, 336,
355, 356, 366, 378 *et seq.*,
386, 387, 401, 403 *et seq.*,
417, 418, 430, 442, 451,
457, 461 *et seq.*, 469, 471
et seq., 523, 534, 541
- stimulus, 238, 240, 242
- Infection, 295, 296, 360, 365
et seq., 447, 539
- Influenza. See also Disease,
372
- Inner Sensation, 31, 64, 66,
70, 112-114, 124-129,
144, 170, 234, 248, 277,
282, 287, 305, 428, 432,
434
- Inorganic Soul. See also
Matter-Soul, 326

- Insane, 524, 526, 534, 536
 Instinct, 68, 344, 347, 497
 Intellect, 59, 65, 71, 72, 76-78, 81, 85, 86, 91, 93, 104, 170, 187, 202, 205, 216, 217-227, 282, 285, 320, 323, 378, 379, 384, 387-389, 391, 395 *et seq.*, 409 *et seq.*, 419, 431, 438, 464, 466, 497, 518, 522 *et seq.*, 531, 545
 Intelligence, 68, 69, 127, 163, 164, 168, 221, 407-409, 421, 497
 Intensity. See also Auditory, Olfactory, Gustatory Movement, 264, 268, 276, 284, 285
 Interval. See also Time, Time-Sensation, 111, 279, 280
 Judgment, 99-106, 140, 141, 143, 153, 396
 Just, 183-185, 188
 Justice, 171, 177, 178, 179, 181-191, 335, 399, 402, 414, 415, 462, 463
 Kantian elements, 1 *et seq.*, 35
 Knowledge, 1, 4, 7, 145, 146, 148, 154, 157-160, 162-164, 166, 169-172, 179, 180, 207, 211, 254, 295, 296, 303, 306, 307, 308, 329, 361, 375, 376, 399, 400, 404, 418, 437, 451
 Lamarck. See also Biology, Spencer, 386, 387
 Language, 33, 62, 212, 287, 306, 369-371
 Laws, 34, 35, 150-154, 158, 181, 278, 411
 Life. See also Biology, Procreation, 363, 381, 385, 443, 448, 495, 499, 500, 517, 518
 Light. See also Physics, Affective Psychical Bodies, 242, 254, 255, 275, 276, 445, 467
 and plant-growth, 444-445
 Lightning, 433-435
 Literature, 205, 216, 217, 466
 Locomotive, 267-268
 Lunatic, 524, 526
 Man. See also Human, 221-225, 283
 -god. See also Faith, Christian, 202-203
 Mania, 534, 535, 537
 Materialism, 9, 206, 271, 299, 303, 304, 306, 332, 333, 364, 485, 489, 491, 493, 494, 496, 497, 499, 511, 514, 516, 521, 531, 538, 539
 Mathematics, 12, 33-46, 58, 72, 133, 145, 152, 153, 157, 161, 192, 231, 309, 354, 402
 Matter, 272-274, 315, 329, 352, 381, 494, 500, 512
 -soul, 5, 14, 25, 29, 60, 69, 79, 90, 92, 109, 110, 123,

- 155, 158, 170, 195, 198,
201, 228-235, 236, 237,
248, 263, 302, 305, 308,
319, 323-335, 338, 381,
388, 389, 435, 471, 473,
475
- Mechanics**, 192, 278
- Medicine**. See also **Disease**,
Poison, 365, 369, 372,
373, 375-377, 447-448
- Medium**, 3, 5, 14, 25, 60, 78,
89, 92, 109, 112, 119,
123, 171, 210, 215, 229,
230, 236, 237, 255, 267,
280, 294, 296, 309, 323-
326, 329, 331, 345, 363,
365, 367, 371, 374, 376,
378, 379, 391, 397, 432,
434 *et seq.*, 443, 449, 450,
452 *et seq.*, 470-472, 475
et seq., 532, 537, 539
- Memory**, 67, 68, 111, 137,
192, 196, 198, 211, 212,
220, 247, 254, 259, 264,
278, 286, 287, 336-345,
404, 455
- Mental passivity**. See also
Mirror-Mind, 158, 302-
303
- Meta-conscious**. See also **In-**
effective Units, **Necessity-**
Sensation, 128, 129, 336,
343
- Meta-Will-Instinct**, 537
- Micro - Organisms**. See also
Sensory Imagination, 347,
358-360
- Microscope**, 349-364
- Mind**, 1, 4-6, 8-10, 12 *et seq.*,
47, 50, 55, 70, 99, 112,
114, 121, 130-133, 145,
149-151, 153-155, 158-
161, 167, 171, 172, 183,
197, 210, 213, 214, 218,
229, 230 *et seq.*, 236-238,
252, 254, 257, 261, 265,
266, 271, 276, 278, 290,
291, 294, 301, 302 *et seq.*,
317, 319, 332, 336, 343,
350, 352, 353, 366, 391,
408, 418, 419, 426-428,
429, 432 *et seq.*, 443, 450,
453 *et seq.*, 461, 469, 470,
472, 473, 479, 485, 513,
521, 522, 524, 529, 531,
538, 543
-sections, 18
- Mirror-mind**. See also **Mental**
Passivity, 299, 302, 314-
318
- Molecules**. See also **Atoms**,
Physics, 73, 74
- Monism**, 84, 305
- Morality**. See also **Justice**,
Responsibility, 182 *et seq.*,
189, 205, 216, 333, 388,
397, 411, 421, 460, 462,
498, 512, 517-519, 525,
532, 539, 544, 545
- Morally abortive belief**, 92
- Morphological changes**. See
also **Disease**, **Hypnotism**,
367, 373, 374, 386
- Motion**. See **Movement**
- Motor will**. See also **Will**,
Will-Continuum, 68, 71,

- 72, 76-93, 174, 218, 220, 282, 289, 342, 345, 378, 379, 388, 391, 392
- Movement.** See also Pseudo-effective units, Ineffective units, Space-sensation, 51, 59, 97, 108-111, 113, 114, 144, 193, 209, 237, 238, 239, 242, 243, 245, 246 *et seq.*, 258, 263, 264, 266, 268, 269, 276, 277-279, 281, 282, 284-286, 288, 289, 292, 311, 339, 374, 429, 430, 431, 442, 443, 450, 457, 467, 468, 512, 538, 542
- Mystery.** See also Faith, 137, 205
- Nation and Individual,** 184-188
- Near.** See also Movement, 243-245 *et seq.*
- Necessity-sensation,** 23, 25, 29, 30, 31, 34, 64-68, 70, 75, 83, 86, 94-98, 112, 113, 135-137, 141-144, 158, 169, 170, 193, 197, 199, 237, 269, 275, 281, 282, 284-286, 300, 301, 310, 334, 336, 337, 339, 340, 346, 351, 359, 363, 407, 428, 430, 431, 433, 533
- Negative.** See Space, Time, Void, Necessity Sensations -belief, 163
- Non-affective movement,** 268, 269, 284
- psychical bodies. See also Ideas, 70, 215, 240, 241, 257, 269, 276, 280, 281, 284, 286, 300, 532
- time, 284
- units, 239, 241, 281, 427
- Non-resistances.** See Space, Time, Necessity, Void Sensations
- Normal psychical bodies.** See also Ideas, Imagination, 195, 197, 351, 361, 446, 535-537
- sensory bodies, 350-353, 358-359, 361, 446, 535-537
- soul-evolution, 419-420
- Not-I,** 84. See also Outer Sensation
- Nuclear premise,** 192-194
- Numbers.** See also Unity, Heterogeneity, 35, 39-45, 132, 133, 136
- Olfactory body.** See also Smell, 229, 239-240, 242, 251, 255, 261-263, 265, 281, 282, 427
- extension, 269-270
- movement. See also Intensity, 268
- space-sensation, 270-273, 280, 282
- Omnipotence,** 78-83, 92, 155
- Omniscience,** 155
- Ontology.** See also Realism, Thing-in-itself, Materialism, 153, 157, 163, 277-278, 314, 491

- Opacity, 256, 258
 Opinion, 328
 Organism of cognition. See also Sensation and Emotion continua, 71
 Oscillations. See Light
 Other-conscious, 6, 128, 154
 Outer sensation, 31, 64, 66, 70, 84, 112-114, 124-129, 144, 170, 208, 234, 248, 277, 282, 287, 305, 317, 428, 434
 Pain, 165, 179, 182, 254, 310, 323, 374, 474. See also Suffering, Soul-Evolution
 Paleontology, 417, 491, 518, 539-542
 Pan-cosmic evolution, 417
 Patriotism, 218, 405-406
 Personal artifice, 89, 208-215, 283, 287, 452, 532, 538
 Phthisis. See also Disease, 365, 372, 535
 Physics, 34-35, 46, 73-74, 114, 120, 131, 147, 192-193, 196, 199, 200, 231, 242, 244-245, 248, 253, 257, 263, 264, 268, 276-278, 296, 309, 314, 331, 332, 335, 353, 360, 365, 403, 446, 453, 455, 468, 494, 499, 500, 505, 510, 518
 Physiology, 117-118, 197, 199, 210, 241-242, 306, 340, 367, 403, 435, 437, 442-443, 446, 451, 471
 Poison, 451-452
 Position. See also Movement, Space-sensation, 258-260
 Positives. See Sensory and Physical Bodies
 Possible universe. See also Universe, 5, 236-237, 254, 297, 298-300, 303, 305, 366, 370, 379, 382-384, 401, 403, 455 *et seq.*, 469-470, 473, 524, 525, 528 *et seq.*, 534-537, 543
 Post-hypnotic suggestion. See also Hypnotism, 341, 343
 Post-terrestrial evolution. See also Soul-evolution, 175, 187, 218-220, 223, 283, 292-293, 321-322, 334, 381, 390-421, 455, 471, 473 *et seq.*, 522, 526, 530, 539
 penalties. See also Soul, 175, 187, 388, 411, 415-416, 419, 421, 449. See also Suffering
 recognition, 469-484
 Practical causality. See also Empirical Causality, 393
 Precondition. See also Causality, 272-274, 286, 289, 316, 380, 409
 Press, 206, 226-227, 405, 466
 Private property. See also Justice, Responsibility, 183-184, 188
 Procreation. See also Biology, 325, 363-364, 380, 442-443, 471-472, 477, 486 *et*

- seq.*, 499, 502, 522, 532-534, 536
- Productive imagination. See also Imagination, 196-197
- Proletarian and Justice, 190-191. See also Patriotism
- Prophecy, 346, 401-404
- Pseudo-discrimination, 77-78
- effective units of consciousness. See also Space-sensation, Time-sensation, 108, 110-111, 114, 239-240, 243, 246 *et seq.*, 265, 267, 270, 276-277, 286, 433, 442, 449-50
- Psychiatry. See also Hypnotism, 253, 370, 447
- Psychical bodies. See also Ideas, Emotion, 6, 17, 18, 22, 24, 26, 36, 62, 74, 76-77, 79, 83, 94, 96, 102, 194, 198-199, 215, 220, 229, 230 *et seq.*, 237, 241, 257, 275, 278, 281-282, 284-286, 288, 291-292, 300, 308, 327-328, 334, 346, 351, 359, 366 *et seq.*, 378, 402, 407, 413, 428-429, 432-433, 452 *et seq.*, 458, 533-535, 538-540
- and sensory universes—their different conditions, 299-301
- hybrid. See also Soul-evolution, Brute, Human, 202, 223, 394 *et seq.*
- Psychology, 54-59, 86, 95, 97, 117, 120, 135, 147, 163, 200, 212, 214-215, 253, 280, 281, 337, 408, 518
- Putrefaction, 310
- Rapport. See also Hypnotism, 476
- Rational universe, 356-357
- Reaction-time, 242-243, 245, 248
- Realism. See also Thing-in-itself, Materialism, 272-273, 317, 440, 442
- Reason, 38, 64, 72, 76, 85, 92, 97, 100, 103, 126-127, 132-133, 149, 156, 158-159, 161, 166, 168, 179, 203-205, 207, 216-221, 225-227, 286, 320, 353, 378, 384, 391, 397-398, 407-409, 414-415, 421, 431, 438, 497, 523, 525-526, 529-530, 536
- Redistribution, 333-334
- Reflector. See also Mirror-Mind, 299, 303, 314-316
- Reflex-action, 78, 241-242, 338, 340
- Re-hypnotism, 231, 238, 252, 310, 381, 454-455, 539
- Religion. See also Christian, 392, 396, 403, 436, 466, 525
- Resistance. See Sensory and Physical Bodies
- Responsibility. See also Justice, Soul-Evolution, 174-181, 415
- Right. See also Justice, Mor-

- ality, 176-177, 184, 389,
413, 421, 545
- Röntgen-rays. See also X-rays,
233
- Rudiments. See also Biology,
386
- Sane, 524, 526, 536
- Sceptic, 224
- Schemata, 1, 12, 15, 16, 19-
21, 23-24
- Science, 11, 158, 224, 303-
304, 315, 332-334, 346,
361, 368, 385, 387, 403,
428, 437, 438-439, 453,
456, 492, 497, 512
- Seeing. See also Sensory
Bodies, Units, Visual Body,
Microscope, Sensory Im-
agination, 62, 141, 199,
209, 251, 261-265, 272-
274, 294, 340, 349, 380,
427-428, 463, 497, 518,
522-523, 525, 529, 534,
536
- Self in pathological states
(multipersonality), 137
and not-self. See also I and
Not-I, Self-Consciousness,
Inner and Outer Sensa-
tions, 154, 172
empirical and real, 127-129,
287
-consciousness, 2, 6, 9, 120-
122, 127, 136-137, 149,
154, 171-172
-consistency of theory, 37
-existent. See also Thing-
- in-Itself, Creator, 305,
319-322, 424-426, 513-
519
- Self-sacrifice. See also Chris-
tian, 396, 413, 415, 526
- Sensation-continuum, 13, 14,
53, 58-75, 76, 79, 83, 85,
104, 123, 131, 133, 140,
163, 169, 171-172, 205,
213, 216-217, 219-221,
228, 237, 254, 257, 267,
282, 287-288, 291, 296,
323, 325, 331, 334, 338,
346-347, 356, 379, 382,
389, 391, 396, 408-409
- Sensing and thinking, 18, 24-
25, 29, 30, 49, 50, 59, 62,
68-69, 72, 75, 118-119,
141, 142, 250, 301, 427
conditions of, 310-311
- Sensory bodies, 6, 17, 18, 23,
25 *et seq.*, 56, 60-63, 68-
69, 72-74, 76-79, 83, 86,
89, 90, 94, 102-104, 107-
116, 119, 125, 134-135,
150-151, 155-156, 157,
160-161, 163-164, 166-
167, 169-170, 172, 182,
187, 192 *et seq.*, 198, 200,
205, 210-215, 220, 228
et seq., 237 *et seq.*, 266,
273, 275-277, 280-282,
284, 288, 290-291, 301,
308 *et seq.*, 324, 327, 334,
336 *et seq.*, 346-347, 349
et seq., 357, 362 *et seq.*,
378, 393, 402, 408, 412,
417, 426, 428 *et seq.*, 450-

- 451, 452 *et seq.*, 467, 470,
472, 475, 479, 521-522,
527-529, 532-535, 538-
544
- Sensory and psychical universes,
their different conditions,
299-301
- experience. See Sensory
Bodies
- imagination, 349-364, 521,
531, 538
- Sentiment. See also Emotion,
182-183, 221
- Shot-wound, 309-310
- Size. See also Dimension,
242-243, 249-250
- Sleep, 342, 347
- Small-pox. See also Disease,
366-367
- Smell. See also Olfactory
Body, 109, 230, 251, 254,
261-262, 265-266, 273-
274, 497, 529, 536
- Socialist, 189-191
- Soul, 5, 6, 10, 14, 18 *et seq.*,
24-25, 60-61, 73-74, 76,
83-84, 92-93, 95, 108-
109, 115, 117, 123, 126,
128, 154-155, 158, 170-
173, 200-201, 208, 210-
211, 214, 219, 221, 228,
235, 237, 263, 268, 272,
274-275, 288, 294 *et seq.*,
304-305, 309 *et seq.*, 324,
325-326, 328, 331, 337,
346, 362-363, 365 *et seq.*,
378-390, 426, 429, 435,
443 *et seq.*, 449, 453 *et*
seq., 463, 470, 472-473,
486 *et seq.*, 500, 522, 524
et seq., 527-529, 531-533,
535, 539-541, 543
- Soul-continuity, 538, 543
- continuum, 363, 382, 389
- evolution, 77, 92, 175, 202,
381, 387, 391-421, 455,
471, 478, 484, 486, 491,
523-524, 526, 529-530,
532
- Sound. See also Auditory
Body, Hearing, 197, 212,
230, 242, 254, 262, 264,
265, 271, 274, 280, 529
- Space. See also Movement,
Space-Sensation, 12, 16,
17, 47-57, 59, 67, 74, 96,
107-116, 157, 165, 167-
168, 193, 237-238, 249,
253 *et seq.*, 258, 261, 266-
267, 276-278, 280, 282,
292, 323, 352, 354, 417,
457, 467
- sensation. See also Pseudo-
Effective Units of Con-
sciousness, 61, 63-65, 70-
71, 83, 86, 96, 135, 141,
237-238, 240, 243-244,
254, 260, 268-270, 280-
282, 284-286, 288, 340-
341, 417-418, 430, 433,
442-443, 449 *et seq.*
- Species, 488-490, 492-493,
495, 501, 514
- Spencer, Herbert, 9-11, 148,
206-207, 439-441, 493,
496, 510, 515

- Spurious realism. See also
 Thing-in-Itself, 272-273,
 332, 440 *et seq.*, 532
- Starvation, 463-464
- Stream of Consciousness, 269,
 280-281, 284, 339
 sense-experience, 280
- Struggle. See also Biology,
 Soul-Evolution, 398-400,
 466, 498, 499, 500, 502,
 504 *et seq.* See also Dar-
 win, Weismann
- Sub-bodies, 142
- conscious. See Ineffective
 Units, Meta-Conscious,
 Unconscious
- soul, 5, 25, 92, 108-109,
 195, 198, 228-235, 236-
 237, 240, 249, 251-252,
 275, 276, 278, 298, 301
et seq., 311, 313, 327,
 330-331, 338, 357, 362,
 367, 381, 386, 389, 434-
 435, 447, 450, 453-454,
 470-471, 473, 475
- will, 76-78, 83, 88-89, 248,
 342-343, 351, 378 *et seq.*,
 388, 412, 415, 452, 453,
 522-523
- Subsumption of Concepts. See
 also Unity, Law, 7, 151-
 152
- Suffering. See also Pain, Soul-
 Evolution, 222-223, 400,
 410-412, 416, 419-420,
 437, 448, 464, 474
- Super-heredity, 523, 527, 535-
 537
- Synthesis, 1, 39, 40, 43, 70,
 73, 102-103, 128, 135-136,
 353, 361
- Tactual and visual bodies and
 their supposed correspond-
 ence, 262-263, 271
- body. See also Touch, 232,
 239, 242 *et seq.*, 251, 255,
 257, 261, 263-266, 270,
 272-273, 278-279, 281-
 282, 290, 310, 427, 433,
 445
 extension, 269-270, 284
 movement, 264-265, 268
 space, 259, 261, 265, 270,
 280, 282, 284-285
- Taste. See also Gustatory
 body, 109, 230, 251, 254,
 261-262, 273-274, 321,
 380, 529
- Telepathy, 90-91, 457-461
- Temptation. See also Environ-
 ment, Soul-evolution, 411-
 412, 415
- Theology. See also Christian-
 ity, 187, 438-439, 484, 520
- Thing-in-itself. See also Spuri-
 ous realism, Materialism,
 265-266, 271-272, 276,
 278, 289, 291, 314, 318,
 332, 439, 441, 450, 457
- Thinking and brain, 117-119
 sensing, 18, 24-25, 29-30,
 49-50, 59, 62, 68-69, 72,
 75, 117-119, 141-142,
 250, 301, 427
 away space and time, 51-52

- Time, 48-53, 59, 67, 107-116,
157, 165, 168, 193, 237,
240, 250, 253, 278-280,
282, 292, 323, 342, 347,
417, 513-514
-sensation, 63-65, 71, 83,
94-95, 239-240, 254, 275,
281-282, 284-286, 336 *et*
seq., 417-418, 539
- Touch. See also Tactual body,
62, 109, 141, 230, 251,
254, 261, 270, 272, 273-
274, 380, 427-428, 463,
497, 529, 536
- Transparency, 256, 444
- Trinity, 305
- Truth and fallacy. See also
Belief, 225-226
- Type-memory. See also In-
stinct, 344
-sensation, 295-296, 309,
340
-soul, 363, 381-385, 403,
487, 489, 495, 498, 522-
523, 528-531, 534, 537
- Unconscious agent, 238, 301,
308, 313
- Units of consciousness, 73, 74,
108-109, 113-114, 164,
236-293, 329, 521
stimulus, 73-74, 114, 236-
293, 305, 330
- Unity, 120-121, 127, 129 *et*
seq., 149-155, 424-425
- Universal ideas, 27-30, 145,
149, 151, 154
- Universe, 5, 9, 10, 14, 17, 18,
37, 85, 92, 120, 154, 158,
160-161, 180, 232, 237,
248, 252, 254, 257, 267,
277, 282-283, 294-313,
318-322, 336, 341, 347,
357, 367, 378, 380 *et seq.*,
387-390, 393, 398, 402
et seq., 413, 415, 418, 430,
435, 441, 448, 455 *et seq.*,
470, 473, 479, 488 *et seq.*,
513-514, 519, 520, 522,
530-531, 533-534, 538-
539. See also Sensation-
continuum, Possible uni-
verse
- Universe-continuum, 471-472
- Unsymbolisable emotion. See
Effort
sensation, 59, 61-62, 64, 69,
84, 122, 125, 134, 204,
208, 209, 211-213, 248,
254, 287-288
- Visual and tactual bodies and
their supposed correspond-
ence, 262-263, 271
body. See also Seeing, 232,
239, 242 *et seq.*, 251,
255, 257, 261-266, 270,
272-273, 278-279, 281-
282, 284, 289, 310, 427,
433, 441, 445, 451-452,
534
extension, 270-271, 284
movement, 264-265, 268-
269
space, 258, 259, 265, 270,
280, 282, 284-285

- Visual units of consciousness,
269, 450
- Vivisection, 312
- Void-sensation, 25, 62-65, 69,
70, 73, 83, 86, 95, 103,
112-113, 125, 135, 169,
193-195, 198-200, 212,
237, 282, 287-288, 327,
334, 336, 346, 359, 429-
430, 432-433
- Volition. See Will
- Weismann, 360, 364, 439, 496,
498-500, 503, 510
- Will, 7, 8, 14, 18, 24, 61, 66,
76, 84-85, 92-93, 95, 115,
140, 142, 148, 155, 170,
187, 189, 198, 215, 218,
235, 237, 257, 268, 272,
274, 282, 288, 289, 294,
295-296, 302, 309-311,
323, 327, 330, 336 *et seq.*,
363, 369, 378 *et seq.*, 388-
389, 392 *et seq.*, 412, 418,
423, 432, 445, 448 *et seq.*,
463-464, 467, 470, 472,
523, 535, 538. See also
Soul
- Will-continuum, 67, 79, 257,
272, 283, 289, 341, 343-
345, 378-379, 382, 392
et seq., 419, 467, 471, 475,
522 *et seq.*, 529-530, 533-
536, 543
- instinct, 537, 540
- norm, 535
- and freedom. See also
Free-will, 78-83, 86-
88
- of God. See God, Creator.
- of wills. See also Motor
will, 76-77
- Wrong. See also Justice,
Morality, Responsibility,
176-177, 389, 411, 413
- X-rays. See also Röntgen
rays, 255, 315-316

END OF VOL. III.

B

1645-

H53 H4

v.3

THE LIBRARY
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
Santa Barbara

STACK COLLECTION

THIS BOOK IS DUE ON THE LAST DATE
STAMPED BELOW.

UC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY



A 000 877 459 8

